KONSTANTIN PRESLAVSKY UNIVERSITY OF SHUMEN
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

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POLITICS, PROGRESS, AND THE WARS OF 19th – 20th CENTURIES

edited by
Biser Georgiev

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Introduction

This volume of Studia academica Šumenensia is dedicated to a global topic - Politics, Progress, and the Wars of the 19th-20th centuries. It contains collected works by ten leading historians in their fields of study from four countries. The topics are different, but they are bound together by a common idea – how do technological advances, politics, and the wars they provoke, influence each other, and how the latter affect the progress.

The articles are presented chronologically and thematically. With the exception of the first one by Georgi Markov, who explores generally the historical genesis and the right of the Bulgarians to be considered as an ancient civilized people, the rest of the works study the events of the 19th-20th centuries.

In the context of individual works, particular attention is given to the impact of wars and progress on universal human values. For instance, the third article dwells on the heroism of the life-guards in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878. At the same time, one of the following papers discusses the change in the morale of the military in connection with the involvement of the Entente soldiers and officers in the smuggling of essential foods and goods in Bulgaria shortly after the First World War.

In many cases, the articles focus on the national sentiment. The desire of many peoples, including the Bulgarians, to live united in a single state is the subject of several papers. In this regard, the article by Yagub Mahmudov studies the events in the so-called by the author 'Southern Azerbaijan' (present day Northwestern Iran) from April to September 1920, when the government formed there was fighting for independence of the region without achieving it. Similar, but in another context, is the article by Biser Georgiev, which analyzes the actions of the leaders of the Liberals after their fall from power in the last months of the First World War. One of the author's important conclusions is that the leading liberals do not plan to come to power in a coup putting at risk the national unification. In a slightly different perspective is the article by Lyubka Naydenova, who, among other things, explores the attitude of the political parties to the declaration of Bulgarian independence in 1908.

One of the problems with ambiguous interpretation is the issue of the 'culprit' for the outbreak of the 'European War' in 1914 and the politicians who put their nations on the 'wrong' side. This is discussed in the works of Todor Galunov and that of Gregory Shkundin. The topics are different, but the essence of their theses is the same. Similar to them, but with a different perspective is the article by Dmytro Mykolenko, which is more historiographic in nature.

The last article in the volume in chronology but not in its significance deals with the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. In this noteworthy work, the author studies in detail the struggle for control of strategic resources in the region and their role in the direction of international politics.

In general, we should conclude that the scientific articles presented in this volume make a major step forward in exploring the mechanisms linking progress, politics, and war, as well as their consequences for moving humanity forward. The topics are diverse, but the research outcomes are more than positive.

Biser Georgiev, trans. Svetlana Nedelcheva

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От фракийского до мадарского всадника (From the Thracian to the Madara Horseman)

Georgy Markov

Abstract: Orphism and Thracian arts coordinate with the state-making ability of the Proto-Bulgarians to serve as a basis for the genesis of the Bulgarian people. Continuity in civilizations creates favorable conditions for lasting upgrading, which is crucial for national fate. The Thracians did not disappear but left a significant cultural and historical heritage, and the ancient Bulgarians gave the name to the state, which was preserved for centuries. The Slavs underwent a series of beneficial effects, the language having a priority. Every group/tribe of the Bulgarian people has its undisputed merits, so that today Bulgaria is on the world map.

Key words: Thracians, Orphism, Proto-Bulgarians, south Slavs, Madara Horseman

Резюме: Орфизмът и изкуствата на траките се съчетават с държавнотворческата способност на прабългарите, за да залегнат в генезиса на българския народ. Приемствеността в цивилизациите създава благоприятни условия за трайно надграждане, което е определящо за националната съдба. Траките не изчезват, а оставят значимо културноисторическо наследство, а древните българи дават устойчивото през вековете име на държавата. Славяните претърпяват поредица от ползотворни въздействия, давайки предимство на езика. Така че всяка съставна част от българския народ е със своите безспорни заслуги, за да ни има и днес върху световната карта.

Еще в 5 тысячелетии до нашей эры между Дунаем на севере, на юге от Белого моря и Мраморного моря и на западе до Моравы и Вардара появился живой индоевропейский народ, населявший Фракию под своим именем до Великого переселения народов. Фракийцы многочисленны, но разделены на враждующие племена: ‘Фракийцы после индейцев самые многочисленные в мире. Если бы они были одно целое и управлялись только одним правителем, они были бы непобедимы и, на мой взгляд, наиболее могущественными из всех существующих. Однако, поскольку это невозможно и, безусловно, никогда не будет достигнуто ими, они слабы. В каждом отдельном племенном ареале у них есть

отдельное имя, но их нравы и обычаи одинаковы' (Геродот). Отец истории указывает 22 племена, но на самом деле их более 80! Он завидует варварам, что, в отличие от греков, они пьют неразбавленное вино на своих длинных пирах, и не экономит своей надменной желчи: 'Сидеть не работая, считается великим, считаться праздным считается великим, обрабатывать землю - унизительным, и жить от войны и грабежа – лучшим'. Фракийцы даже пиратствовали и в море, хотя в этом отношении они не выдерживают сравнения с морским народом древних греков.

Гомер называет фракийцев 'укротителями лошадей', а лошадь для них - священное животное. Как исключение, убийство лошади из-за мертвого вождя племени является частью похоронного обряда. Царь Резос ведет союзников Трои верхом на белых лошадях, а сам одет в потрясающие доспехи: 'Он пришел с золотым оружием, чудеса которого можно увидеть; их несут не смертные, а бессмертные боги' (Гомер). Когда они идут на битву, фракийцы поют песни в честь своих бессмертных героев. Ахейцы хотят покорить не только Проливы, но и берега Белого и Мраморного морей, и вторгнуться во фракийские земли. Царь Резос 'убил много эллинов за один день', но Афины послали Диомеда и Одиссея, чтобы вероломно убить его во сне. Она боялась предсказания, что 'если он попробует воду и если его лошади пьют из Скамандера, и если они пасутся с пастбищ на том же месте, он станет абсолютно непобедимым'. Резос и Ахилл имеют божественное происхождение по линии матери, и, поскольку дети были воспитаны нимфами, они предсказали их смерть под стенами Трои.

Фракийцы не участвовали в Греко-персидских войнах, но Терес I создал около 460 году до нашей эры царство Одриссов, которое охраняет выход на Мраморное и Белое морей. В течение 200 лет Афины должны были подчиняться могущественному государству, которое нависало с севера, чтобы сохранить свое присутствие в своих колониях, и оно также поддерживало их в Пелопоннесской войне против Спарты. Правда то, что фракийцы не построили такую централизованную и могущественную империю, как Македония, но им удалось создать свою собственную цивилизацию. Хотя они используют греческие и латинские буквы, они, вероятно, не являются народом без письменности и оставили все еще не разгаданные письменные символы. Несколько найденных надписей содержат фракийские слова, в то время как другие сохранились в названиях рек, гор, божеств и личных имен. Скудные сохраненные источники это преимущественно греческие и римские, поэтому фракийцы представлены в них в неблагоприятном свете. Золотые сокровища являются ярким свидетельством блестящей стороны многовековой истории, которая похоронена и хранится глубоко в земле,

и обычно в самых впечатляющих своих экземплярах случайно всплывает и напоминает о своем былом величии. Самое древнее обработанное золото из некрополя Варны удивляет своими 6000 годами и сочетанием символов силы и изысканных предметов.

Хотя разделенные, фракийцы говорят на одном языке, они следуют одним и тем же обычаям и молятся многим, но общим богам. Великая Богиня-Мать - это Богиня Природы и Плодородия, которая определяет многообразие мира и следит за всеми живыми существами со всевидящими глазами. Вечный цикл жизни и смерти, которому подвержены человеческие судьбы, зависит от ее силы. Солнце - сын Великой Богини по имени Сабазий, который является двигателем вечного обновления мира, умирая и рождаясь от света небесного до глубин земли. Он умирает на закате и воскресает на рассвете: 'Гелиос, ты - самое почитаемое божество у конелюбящих фракийцев' (Софокл). Сам царь-жрец, в свою очередь, является сыном Сабазия, как свидетельство божественного начала власти, и его подданные считают его Богом с высшим правом решать их судьбы.

Согласно Геродоту, фракийцы поклоняются Аресу, Дионису и Артемиде, а цари клянутся Гермесом, полагая, что 'они сами произошли из Гермеса', а династия их благословлена свыше. Гермес, однако, не похож на своего греческого тезки 'проводник душ', а воплощает бессмертие. Фракийцы изображают богов в своем собственном образе: 'Голубоглазые и рыжие - божества фракийцев' (Ксенофан). Царь является покровителем праздников поклонения богам, сопровождаемых праздниками, песнями и танцами смертных. Кукеры прогоняют злые силы, и игра огненных брендов в огне является священной. Единственный царь имеет право жертвовать лошадьми и людьми, а не обычными животными. После окончания земной жизни правитель становится защитником и посредником между людьми и богами, что заставляет благодарных подданных ежедневно молиться за усопшую высшую душу.

Если эллинам иногда можно доверять, то фракийцы имеют жестокий способ общения с богами. Каждые пять лет они выбирают жребием посланника, дают ему свои пожелания и бросают его поверх трех копья. Если 'посланник' умирает, пронзенный смертельно, то окружающие зрители радуются, что 'боги добры' к племени. Если он не умирает, они признают его виновным и выбирают другого. Вожди могли избежать жертвоприношений, потому что, будучи священниками, они могли напрямую общаться с богами. Разум напоминает нам, что знак свыше должен быть в обратном порядке, то есть, если 'посланник' чудом оживает, это следует считать предуведомлением о хорошей судьбе.

Фракийский рай возвышается в 'святых местах' гор, где поклонники будут заниматься своими любимыми делами. Каменное Небо - неиз-

бежное продолжение земного путешествия с вечной жизнью и встречи с предками. Святилища расположены в скалах, обращенных к Солнцу, или вдоль рек и озер, чтобы смыть грехи. Они также служат обсерваториями для измерения времени. Вера в загробную жизнь позволяет фракийцам подобрать необходимые и любимые предметы, которые можно положить в могилу. Вожди в доспехах и с оружием, в сопровождении любимой женщины и колесницы с запряженными лошадьми. Гробницы покрыты высокими насыпями, чтобы сохранить имя для будущих поколений и защитить их от грабежей. Сокровища спрятаны как 'королевские тайны', а за ними следят священные статуи. На современной болгарской территории возведено более 10000 курганов, открытие которых требует огромных усилий, ресурсов и времени с хрупкой надеждой археологов опередить кладоискателей, как минимум на одну ночь.

Несмотря на градации божеств, фракийцы поклоняются фракийскому всаднику (Геросу), который ездит верхом с поднятым копьем в правой руке. Герой является предком племени и династии, а также вечным символом веры в бессмертие. Он всегда побеждает на стороне добра против зла, а борьба природы и вселенной вечно решает судьбу человечества. Сами фракийцы известны как вражеские всадники, и отсутствие страха смерти связано с их верой что загробная жизнь лучше земной.

Будучи всемогущим покровителем жизни, фракийский всадник изображен в 3000 открытых мраморных вотивных плитах и украшает воинских доспехов. Он участник сцены охоты в сопровождении верного пса и преследующий хищника - обычно кабана, как символа зла. Единственный свидетель - змея, вьющаяся вокруг дерева. Плитки помещены рядом с щедрыми дарами в святилищах, и очень часто есть начальная надпись, в которой поклоняющийся просит Божество о защите и поддержке. Позже потомки фракийцев будут сравнивать его со св. Георгием Победоносцем, пронизывающий копьем змею, которая угрожает жизни королевской принцессы.

В некоторых из 100 найденных бронзовых статуэток Герос изображен с двумя или тремя лицами, потому что он видит все и находится везде. Он могучий воин добра и небесный вождь фракийцев, которые летали верхом на лошади, чтобы избавить человечество от злого воплощения хищника. Мифы, легенды и предания прославляют фракийского всадника как хранителя Дерева Жизни, которое злые силы стремятся уничтожить и достигнуть гибели человеческой расы. Культ Всадника, покровителя человека и племени, распространяется за пределы Древней Фракии. Вотивные плитки были найдены в Риме, Паннонии (Венгрия), Северном Причерноморье и даже Египте, вероятно, принадлежавшими фракийцам, служившим наемниками в легионах.

Наряду с Всадником фракийцы также обладают своим почитаемым героем в искусстве, который волшебным образом проник в их пострадавшие души. Легендарный певец, музыкант и поэт Орфей является сыном музы эпической поэзии Каллиопы и речного Бога и правителя Хемуса - Еагър, жившего в 13 веке до нашей эры в Родопах 'поколение до Троянской войны', современник Моисея. Посвященный священникам-жрецам из Мемфиса, он 20 лет учился в египетских таинствах и вернулся на родину. Знаменитый фракиец сопровождает аргонавтов в поисках золотого руна в Колхиде, когда он громким голосом заглушает морские сирены. Очаровательные звуки его чудесной 7-струнной лиры приручает зверей, птиц и ветров, приводят в движении деревьев и камней. Орфей поет гимны и лечит люди музыкой, подобной космическому языку: 'Тело не может быть исцелено, если душа не будет исцелена раньше' (Платон). У него был еще один ценный дар: 'Вокруг Понтийских берегов жили морисаны и ситоны из которых произошел пророк Орфей' (Плиний Старый). Уникальный музыкант обнаруживает как знак на небе, что 7 планет определяют судьбы человечества и людей.

В день свадьбы, ради женской зависти, его любимая Эвридика укушена ядовитой змеей, и счастье погружается во тьму. Орфей не может предотвратить ужасную потерю, он невыносимо страдает и решает спуститься в подземный мир через глубокую 'Горловую пещеру дьявола' возле Триграда. Там он пленяет своими печальными песнями Бога смерти. Хадес соглашается вернуть его возлюбленную, но при условии, что он не будет поворачиваться, чтобы увидеть ее, пока они не достигнут Верхнего мира. Страстно влюбленный певец не может этого вынести и хочет на мгновение увидеть, следует ли любимая женщина за ним. Эвридика возвращается в подземный мир, и лира даже бессильна снова успокоить раздраженного Хадеса.

Безутешный Орфей не может смириться с своим роковым поступком и, обремененный чувством вины, закрывается внутри себя: 'Эвридика, как живой, даровала мне любовь и блаженство, Эвридика, как мертвой, указала мне путь истины'. Он не обращает никакого внимания ухаживающим его вакханкам, которые злобно объявляют его 'женоненавистником', проповедующим только среди мужчин и жестоко разрывают его на берегу Хеброса (река Марица). Другая легенда рассказывает, что певец поражен молнией раздраженного Зевса. Части тела неправильно понятой жертвы выброшены в реку, которая ведет их к Белому морю вплоть до острова Лесбоса. Легенда гласит, что голова Орфея продолжала петь, а его лира играть в воде. Душа музыканта спускается в подземный мир, где находит душу Эвридики. Их судьба приказала им быть неразлучными не в 'Белом мире', а загробной жизни. На острове был воздвигнут храм оракула, посвященный Орфею, в котором оракул предсказывал судьбы людей.

Культ Солнца и высший мировой порядок получили дальнейшее развитие у фракийцев благодаря учению Орфея о значении человеческой жизни в освобождении души из темницы тела. Человек должен зажечь в себе Божественную искру и преодолеть изначальное начало: 'Интеллектуальная энергия бессмертна'. Освобождение души перемещает ее на Остров Блаженных. Солнце - это 'кружащий глаз вселенной', но поклонение не требует жертв: 'Не проливайте кровь!', Луна – 'мать времени, видящая все'. Орфей смотрит на звезды в поисках роковых знаков и обнаруживает, что Земля круглая: 'Космос, отец наш, как сфера ты окружаешь Землю!'.

Орфизм живчик для духовной жизни фракийцев, интерпретирует богов в конфликте с религиозными догмами, провозглашает против господства инстинктов и низких страстей, проповедует просветление, высшую мораль и дружбу между людьми и племенами: 'Знай себя, и ты познаешь Вселенную!'. Он стремится убедить священников принять Бога при рождении, смерти и переходе в Запредельное. Утонченность нравов направляет бессмертие души в загробную жизнь с девизом: 'Помогая слабым, утешая страдавших, надейся на всех!' (Аристотель). Орфические гимны часто повторяют клятву: 'Бог мой - любовь!'. Геродот и его последователи умышленно порочат еретика, описывая пьяные оргии в тайных пещерах, где сироты совершают ритуалы по замыслу Богини Матери, рождая массовые сношения между мужчинами и женщинами и вакханалиями в честь Бога вина и веселья Дионис.

Сравнение с моралью Олимпа явно не в пользу окружающей среды Зевса, которая не является примером для подражания в этом отношении: 'Орфей проповедовал идею братства между всеми людьми' (Аристотель). Гениальный фракиец чтит земные и солнечные божественные силы, однако осуждает кровавую славу правителей: 'Мир можно победить с помощью лиры, а не мечом!'. Вера в бессмертие души означает переход к Потустороннему или другому перерождению. Великая Богиня-Мать дает жизнь, а движение в Пространстве и общества происходит циклически, а не линейно.

Фракийская цивилизация была последовательно эллинизирована, романизирована и славянизирована, но оставила после себя часть своего ценного наследия в цивилизациях Греции, Рима и Болгарии. Переплавление сокровищ, подобных Панагюрского, может разрушить форму, но не содержание золота. Мы можем спорить о количестве цивилизационного наследия, но качество не вызывает сомнений. Нехватка из первых рук письменных источников не должна делать нас снисходительными к 'этим неписаным людям', потому что иногда вещественные доказательства более убедительны своей подлинностью.

Говоря о Великом переселении народов в 3-4 веков нашей эры, обычно указываются воинственные немцы, решающие судьбу Запад-

ной Римской империи. Вклад славян в сужение Восточной Римской империи, известная в наше время под именем Византия, был намеренно проигнорирован, потому что не рассматривали их как народ с 'даром государства'. Более того, хотя индоевропейцы не создали достойную цивилизацию: 'Славяне занимают большое место в географии, но мало места в истории' (Хердер). Умышленная политизация - старый и неправильный подход к пониманию Истории, и рано или поздно наказывает тех, кто прибегает к этому последнему средству.

Славяне производят впечатление своей множественностью и к середине 5 века нашей эры заселяют обширные земли между Карпатами, Одрой, Балтийским морем и Днепром. После смерти Атилы в 453 году нашей эры и распада Союза племен гуннов они разделились на три основные ветви: венеты (западные), анты (восточные) и славины (южные). Когда соберут урожай с полей, славяне точат свои мечи и пересекают Дунай в набегах. Император Анастасий воздвиг в 512 году нашей эры 'Стену страха' перед Константинополем для защиты от варварских нападений: 'Проклятые славянские люди овладели всей Элладой, окрестностями Салоников и всей Фракией ... Они научились вести войну лучше, чем римляне' (Иоанн Эфеский).

Юстиниан I Великий (527 - 565) построил укрепления вдоль Дуная и Хемуса с 300 крепостями, послал сильные войска через великую реку и заплатил золотом союзникам. В 574 году нашей эры каган Баян потребовал, чтобы славяне в Дакии повиновались ему безоговорочно, но ответ был смелым и завидным в себе: 'Кто этот человек между людьми и под лучами солнца, кто одолеет нашу власть? Потому что мы привыкли владеть чужой землей, а не нашей. И мы уверены в этом, пока есть воины и мечи'. Когда посланникам Баяна напомнили, что никому не позволено оспаривать волю их великого мастера, они были немедленно обезглавлены.

Несмотря на сопротивление, славяне осадили Салоники каменотесами в 586 году нашей эры и вторглись на Пелопоннес. В 626 году нашей эры славяне, протобулгары и авары были уже у ворот Константинополя. Помимо персов на Ближнем Востоке, ромеи сталкиваются с еще более опасным противником – с арабами, которые отвлекают значительную часть их сил в Азию. Первоначальными кампаниями по мародерству превратились в постоянные поселения Мизии, Фракии и Македонии из группы славян, которые будут названы в 7 веке болгарами и будут присоединены к новообразованной в 10 веке болгарской народности.

Уседшие земледелцы живут в племенных общинах, во главе со старостями, где все войны собираются на собрание, названное 'Вече' и выбирают племенного князя, в соответствии с законом военной демократии. 'Они давно живут демократическим путем, и поэтому все,

как правило, рассматривают полезные и трудные дела' (Прокопий Кесарийский). Совет старейшин помогает князю в самых важных делах. Рабство в племени неизвестно, а пленники выкуплены или освобождены. Календарь славян не имеет ни начала, ни конца, потому что он подвержен циклическому изменению четырех времен года в соответствии с весенним и осенним равноденствиями, а также летним и зимним солнцестоянием. Животворящее солнце воспринимается как многочисленное божество с четырьмя воплощениями. Конечно, славяне еще и скотоводы, и ремесленники, но их основной источник существования напрямую зависит от природных условий. Славянская материальная культура не так сверкающая, как фракийская. Они не знают гончарного круга: их керамика связана с повседневной жизнью: жилищами, грубой глиняной посудой, инструментами и оружием.

Сильные и выносливые войны, защитники своих домов, славяне знают, как сражаться в качестве засадников-пехотинцев с ядовитыми стрелами, или в открытом поле. 'Они свободолюбивы и ни в коем случае не оставлены для порабощения или управления, особенно в своей собственной стране'. (Псевдомаврикий). Врагов встречаю мечом, а друзей угощают медовиной: 'Государев не терпят и не живут друг с другом совместно'. Византийский летописец стремится унизить варваров, но не впадает в явное противоречие: 'Прежде всего, они любят свою независимость и ни за что не позволят превратиться в поданных и зависимость. На своей родине они проявляют большое мужество и терпение, слишком легко переносят жару и холод, нехватку одежды и еды' (Псевдомаврикий).

Хотя не сразу создали прочное государство в Юговосточной Европе, славянские племена между Дунаем и Балканскими горами объединились в 7 веке против Восточной Римской империи (северы), а в долине реки Струма стримоны основали княжество Стримон. Их фрагментация напоминает фракийцев, которые также объединяются только после подавляющей внешней угрозы: 'Они либо не приходят к соглашению, либо, если они соглашаются, другие немедленно нарушают решение, вражда со всеми противниками и никто не хочет уступить другому' (Псевдомаврикий).

Славяне поклоняются 30 божествам, не имеют религиозной организации и молятся в родовых святилищах каждого своему покровителю. Верховным Богом является Перун - Бог штормов и молний, а также владыка князя, воинов и всех живых существ: 'Они признают как создателя всех вещей одного носителя молнии, которому они приносят в жертву быков и других жертвенных животных' (Прокопий Кесарийский). Во время жертвоприношении делают предсказания о будущем рода и племени. Перун изображен с несколькими человеческими лицами, потому

что ничто не ускользает от него, и он вездесущ. Он защищает праведных людей и одаривает их добрыми делами и наказывает покваренных и обманщиков. Ему часто посылают молитвы о дожде, потому что без жизненной влаги растения погибнут и будут голодать. Дажбог - Бог Солнца и Плодородия, а Лада - Богиня Красоты, Брака и Мудрости.

Легенда гласит, что Бог взял песок со дна моря и рассеял его, создав землю, чтобы она плавала над водой. В представлении славян существуют три параллельных мира, перпендикулярных Дереву Мира - гигантский дуб, который держит Вселенную. В короне лежит Небесный мир Богов во главе с Богом Огня Сварогом. В стволе находится Мир живых, управляемый Перуном. В корнях скрыт Мир Душ и Духов, где обитает злой Чернобог. В трех мирах 'Всевидящий' Бог Троян, со своими тремя головами, следит за соблюдением мирового порядка и баланса между природными элементами. Вселенная подчиняется божественному закону 'Правда', которому должны подчиняться все: боги и люди, духи и природа. Этот всемогущий закон уникален для славянской цивилизации и стоит больше, чем скопление ослепительных золотых сокровищ.

Славяне поклялись и поблагодарили богов под открытым небом у рек и озер, среди скал и лесов, поднося подарки перед каменными или деревянными идолами. Они не фаталисты и оставляют возможность изменить свою жизнь: 'Они не имеют понятия о Судьбе и не приписывают ей никакой власти над людьми. Но когда они чувствуют приближение смерти в какой-то битве или болезни, они клянутся Богу, если он спасет их, что принесут ему благодарную жертву. Спасенные, они предлагают обреченную жертву, думая, что они просили спасения через эту жертву' (Прокопий Кесарийский).

В то же время славянам не странно полагать, что боги правили людьми с момента их рождения через пророчиц, а также в роковом вмешательстве сверхъестественных существ. Бесы - это сверхъестественные существа, духи и демоны. Самодивы бродят по горам и помогают добрым, а плохим не избежать мести. Нимфы плавают в воде и тоже не прощают грехов. Ведьмы - волшебники, сбывающие желания, а вампиров и оборотных нужно обходить издалека. Кикимора - женский дух, который предпочитает бродить по дому, помогать или наказывать, спать или просыпаться в ночных кошмарах, сторожит, чтобы люди ночью были дома и не встречали злых сил.

Вера в загробную жизнь вплетена в похоронный ритуал. Душа живет в груди человека и проявляется в дыхании, когда он умирает. Тело сжигают на костре, а урну с пеплом закапывают в землю вместе с необходимыми предметами для будущей жизни. Похороны вождя племени сопровождаются военными состязаниями и богатым угощением 'прощения Бога'. При сжигании трупа тело освобождает душу, и она стано-

вится духом, которого можно впустить в Нижнюю Землю. Иначе душа бродит, как вампир среди живых. Бог смерти Смаргл живет во всех, кто борется со злом и болезнями, и если человек совершает злые дела, он сам убивает его и человек умирает. В определенные дни могилы посещают с едой для мертвых, с чьими душами разговаривают родственники. Мертвым остаются свободное место, как будто они присутствуют на Упоминании. Культ предков проистекает из убеждения, что поколения связаны с наследием общей Судьбы.

На протяжении веков в европейской историографии накапливалось укоренившееся предубеждение, что славяне являются хорошим строительным материалом для национального строительства, но некий 'более способный строитель' должен правильно его обрабатывать и использовать. Таким образом, протобулгары создали государство под своим собственным именем, а варяги сделали то же самое с Киевской Русью. Поэтому другие решают судьбу славян, которые не оставили после себя дворцы, амфитеатры и философов. В нашем уникальном случае, однако, сразу возникает законный вопрос: почему 'государственные деятели' говорят на своем языке и имеют одни и те же обычаи? Ответ не прост и требует больше исторических примеров.

Протородина древних болгар протянулась где-то между реками Амударья и Сырдарья, вокруг гор Памир и Гиндукуш и в Балхаре. Евразийские степные народы не являются расово однородными, поэтому у них достигнуто генетическое смешение арийцев, турок, угров, гуннов и других племен. Болгарский ген является здоровым, потому что он очень разнообразен и, следовательно, с низкой частотой генетических заболеваний. Смешанная сплав выносливее и долговечнее, чем сталь. 'Именник болгарских ханов' ставит начало болгарской государственности в 165 году нашей эры с территориального расположения на севере от Кавказа между Черным и Каспийским морями до среднего течения Дона и Волги. Во втором веке гунны захватили болгар в своем вторжении на Запад до распада Союза гуннов, когда болгары вернулись домой: 'За Каспием находятся булгары со своим собственным языком, языческие и варварские люди, у них есть города' (Захарий Ритор).

Византийские летописцы часто путают наших предков с гуннами, но они не кочевники, а полуседщий народ, которые предпочитают скотоводство и хорошо разбираются в сельском хозяйстве, ремеслах и строительстве. Протобулгары живут в племенных общинах и племенах, верхом на лошадях и спят в юртах во время похода. Культ к огню жизни проводится каждый день и ищет смысл жизни: 'Человек, даже если живет хорошо, умирает, а другой рождается. Пусть рожденный позже, когда он посмотрит на это, вспомнит того, кто это сделал' (хан Омуртаг).

Похороны через сжигание или кладка тушов с любимыми вещами и оружиями, необходимы для Запредельного, выражают различные ре-

лигиозные влияния. Обычно, кроме покойного, лошадь похоронена как верный спутник в обоих мирах. Надгробия известны как 'Каменные бабушки', образуя прямоугольники из 5, 7 или 9 рядов, лежащие с востока на запад. Один из камней находится отдельно, к востоку от группы. По мнению некоторых ученых, разбитые камни являются памятниками 'знаменитых богатырей', которые доблестно защищали племя, и, по мнению других, они показывают количество врагов, убитых покойным.

В основе пробулгарского календаря лежит 12-летний лунный цикл, каждый год которого соответствует животному, которому поклоняются. В определенные дни древние болгары предпринимают роковые действия, которые, как они ожидают, будут полезны для их дела. Их кампании связаны с урожаем и природными условиями для ведения войны. Письменные символы рун имеют не только звуковое, но и семантическое значение, они используются в качестве магических, астрономических и календарных символов.

Под давлением критических обстоятельств император Зенон вступил в союз с протоболгарами против остготов в 479 году нашей эры, но через несколько лет уже сражался с ними из за их намерения окончательно поселиться в плодородных землях от Бдина (Видина) до Охрида. Они также добираются до 'Стены страха' и дерзко хотят 'землю навсегда' вместо того, чтобы охранять границы как платные федерации. В 582-602 годы нашей эры протобулгары уже были в Дакии и Нижней Мизии, стремясь преодолеть Балканские горы, 'как тяжелое бедствие, посланное Богом' (Феофилакт Охридский). После распада союза с аварами и тюрками, разразились межвоенные войны и в 632 году нашей эры хан Кубрат создал Старую Великую Болгарию на севере от Черного моря, между рекой Днепр на западе и рекой Кубань на востоке. Император Ираклий предпочел быть в хороших отношениях с могущественным соседом Крыма, поэтому дает Кубрату титул 'патриций'.

Завет великого кана к его пятерым сынам не делиться и быть объединенными как связку палок, чтобы 'не быть рабами чужого народа', однако не соблюдался и под напором хазаров они решают искать другие земли для поселения. Только Бат Баян подчиняется как правитель Черной Болгарии и отдает дань победителям. Котраг ставит начало Волжско-Камской Болгарии, Аспарух - Дунайской Болгарии, Алцек через Паннонию и Баварию достигает северной Италии, а Кубер останавливается в Македонию. Судьба разделенных болгар отличается, но это не исключение во времена Великого переселения народов, когда движение миллионов людей меняет ход истории. Кан Аспарух имеет преимущество выбора 'места под Солнцем' для обитания будущих поколений детей, которое находится на перекрестке между Европой, Азией и Африкой и столь же геополитически выгодно, сколь и опасно, но, как говорится 'нет полного счастья'.

Политеизм протобулгар отражен в древних мифах и легендах, в которых выделяется их поклонение небесным телам, символизируемое в розетке из семи лучей Плиски: Солнце, Луна и пять планет, видимых невооруженным глазом, с божественным знаком в центре. Верховный Бог - Бог Небес, Тангра, от высшей воли которого зависит все на Земле и во Вселенной. В середине Тяньшань (Небесная гора) в Китае возвышается вершина Кан Тенгри (Царь Небесных Духов). На древнем персидском языке Тангра означает 'правитель мира' и распоряжается судьбами людей в соответствии с 'каждому - свое!'. Ничто не может быть скрыто от всевидящего Бога: 'Тот, кто ищет истину - Бог видит, и тот, кто лжет - Бог видит! Болгары проявили большую доброту к христианам (византийцам - б.а.), а христиане забыли, но Бог видит!' (Кан Пресиан). Тангризм внушает не только благоговение, но и гордость от силы и справедливости всемогущего Бога.

Умилостивление богов осуществляется посредством жертвоприношений животных перед идолами в капищах среди скал, у родников и вековых деревьях, а в случае войны или стихийного бедствия даже люди приносятся в жертву. Вера в магию делает жрецов необходимыми волшебниками. Бой идолов - это ежедневный ритуал, а кан является первосвященником и общается с Всевышним: 'Не унижай наших богов. Их сила велика, и доказательство в том, что мы, поклоняющиеся им, завоевали всю Ромейскую землю' (Кан Омуртаг). После создания Дунайской Болгарии были построены культовые здания наряду со строительством дворцов и крепостей.

Древние болгары верят в сверхъестественную силу 'Оренды', которая вселяется в людей и предметов, такие как меч и хвост лошади, и может передаваться от человека к человеку. Они поклоняются священным животным, таким как лошадь, волк, собака и т. д., выбирая их в качестве тотемов (покровителей) рода, включая их в свой календарь. Вера утверждает, что человек и животные произошли от общего предка, поэтому данное животное защищает род. Все они носят амулеты и талисманы для защиты от зла, и священники осуществляют соприкосновение с Тангрой. Клятва священна, и нарушение ее - моральный крах.

Согласно протоболгарам, Вселенная имеет вертикальную структуру и освещена 7 небесными огнями. Небо высотой в 17 этажей, а подземный мир - в 7 или 9, которые считаются волшебными. Среди графитов встречаются магические знаки, среди которых квадрат с двумя скрещенными крестами, вписанными в него, показывающие направления света, кресты, свастики, лабиринты и многое другое. Идолопоклонство очень широко распространено, и любой может сделать идола, которого он выбрал для себя. Внутреннее убеждение и достижение спасительного равновесия между верой и жизнью также ведут к вступлению в жизнь клана и племени.

Шаманы считаются посредниками между людьми и сверхъестественными силами. Они выполняют очень влиятельный ритуал через барабан и плащ, полный загадочных рисунок статуэток, когтей орла и медведя, перьев разных птиц. Помощниками в их путешествии к Потустороннему являются лошадь, олень (как жертвенное животное), змея и орел. Змея олицетворяет человеческую душу, а конь и орел отводят шамана в Запредельное. Движения шамана становятся все более лихорадочными, а заклинания - все более и более странными, пока он не впадает в транс - знак того, что он уже установил связь с таинственными силами загробного мира, под диктовкой которых он делает свои предсказания, лечит, заколдовывает и искажает заклинания. На плитке из деревни Мадара четко изображена женская фигура в шляпе шамана, а это значит, что шаманство предназначено не только для мужчин. Шаманы также участвовали в сакральной бойне, когда правитель потерял аренду и больше не мог выполнять свои тяжелые обязанности государственного мужа и полководца.

Богатая мифология характеризуется тем, что некоторые мифы имеют ценность традиций, которые также содержат некую степень определенности. Космогонические представления о первых болгарах начинаются с мифа о добром духе Ульгене, который сотворил вселенную за шесть дней и лег спать на седьмом уставшим. Для создания земной суши он использует утку, олицетворение злого духа Эрлика, которому приказано нырнуть и удалить со дна исконного океана горсть песка. Под так называемой твердой землей Ульген помещает трех огромных рыб, чтобы прикрепить его к поверхности. Любопытно, что дьявол использовался для выполнения ‘черной работы’, а он ‘из ниоткуда’ повиновался.

И у древних болгар есть Дерево Мира или Жизни, которое растет на вершине Святой Горы, которая является ‘Пупком Мира’. Дерево соединяет выход с Земли и вход на Небеса, и именно через него проходит шаман, находящийся в трансе от земного до запредельного. Венец священного дерева представляет Небеса, ствол - видимый мир, а корни - подземный мир, мир мертвых, царство злого духа. Животные реагируют на такое же деление - птицы на короне, копытные на туловище и рептилии - на корни. Таким образом, хаос избегается, и каждая вещь ставится на свое место.

Еще до появления людей Тангра создает Солнце - Ут, которое принимает образ лошади или петуха, следует за исконным вселенским океаном Ра и Луны, олицетворяющим шторм, проявляющийся в образе волка - духа охоты, успеха, силы, победы и славы, покровитель протоболгар. Его огненный взгляд может сжечь, окаменеть, испугать и убить воров и прелюбодеев. За этим первым поколением бессмертных духов

(альп или дики) следуют еще два, причем дети третьего поколения уже смертные. Более известные альпы: 'небесный кузнец' Хурса; Туран - любви; Кубар - молния, гроза и дождь; Борис - о героизме и возмездии; Мардукан - свет; Самар - плодородия и благодати; Чак Чак - женственная красота и семейный очаг со знаком свастики.

В дополнение к хорошим духам, есть злые, называемые йореги или джины. Самым мощным из них является Албастий, целью которого является уничтожение человеческой расы. Он строит стену настолько высоко, что затеняет солнце, и жизнь на земле начинает угасать. Тангра посылает своего верного алпа Каргу в виде ворона, который разрушает стену и передает Албастию его приказ появиться немедленно перед ним, чтобы быть наказан. Конечно, злой дух не подчиняется и продает свою душу дьяволу, который делает его повелителем подземного мира под именем Тама Тархан. Самым ужасным йорегой, однако, является Шурале - дух засухи, смерти и любых других бедствий, изображаемый как гигантское высушенное дерево с огромной впадиной. Блуд и разврат - дело Аджаха, а воров и грабителей поощряет Куяна.

Согласно другому мифу, человек вышел из куропатки, пренебрегая желанием своего отца жениться на могущественном алпе второго поколения. Несмотря на то, что она охраняется Солнцем и Луной, ей удается бежать к своему любимому алпу Борису и родить трех мальчиков и девочку. Тем не менее, проклятие ее отца настигает ее, и все ее дети уроды. На помощ, ей приходит смертельный враг Альп и соперник их Солнечного Короля - иорег Шурале. Он смешивает землю с медом, помазывает мальчиков и они становятся здоровыми и красивыми детьми. Однако мед заканчивается, и Шурале мажет девушку пальцем, смешанным со слюной. Уродство было устранено, но вера в то, что 'женщина нечиста', остается. Тангра не оставляет людей во власти злого духа и приказывает Хурсе дышать 'огненным дыханием'. Вот как у них появлется душа. В отличие от испорченного тела, она 'бессмертно и главное в человеке', а ее хозяин - Всевышний.

Злые духи решительно выступают против появления людей на планете Земля и решают их уничтожить. Однако от браков между Альпами и смертными женщинами появляются богатыры, называемые альбирами, которые берут на себя защиту подобных. Очевидно, Тангра не хочет уничтожения человеческой расы, потому что на помощь альбирам он посылает Хурсу и снабжает их ударным оружием. Миф об альбирах напрямую связан с легендами о происхождении древних болгар. Вождем всех альбиров и племени имен является бывший альп Баян, который отказывается от бессмертия и спускается на Землю. Именцы населяют долину реки Дулу-Су и являются храбрыми бойцами, которые живут охотой, рыбалкой и сбором фруктов.

После смерти Баяна женщины племени начинают рожать мертвых детей. Чтобы предотвратить исчезновение рода, наследник власти Иджик собирает богатырей, которые являются храбрыми воинами и 'отличными лучниками', доставляя их на гору Хон, где они побеждают 'китайских турок', 'которые ели сырого мяса и никогда не мылись'. Женщины и их девочки 'свободно совокупляются с каждым мужчиной, где им попадется'. Именцы выбрали несколько девушек, 'еще не способных присоединиться к грязи и блуду своих матерей'. Они воспитывали их 'сами по себе', а когда вырастали, 'принимали их как жен и называли себя и своих потомков хони'. Этот древний миф является косвенным свидетельством этнической близости между первыми болгарами и гуннами, а также подчеркивает их более высокий уровень цивилизационного развития. Было также высказано предположение, что смешивание с другими племенами началось даже в отдаленные и не отмеченные письменные времена.

Знаменитый герой шумеро-аккадского эпоса Гильгамеш также фигурирует в древней мифологии протобулгар. Злой Шурале уничтожает растительность вокруг основного родника и вызывает длительную и страшную засуху. В ответ на просьбу Турана восстановить силу источника, он смело хочет занять место Солнца – 'Царя Духов'. Разгневленный наглостью, Кубара стреляет молнией, но она выбивает только одну из медных чешуек, которые покрывают тело йореги. Падая на землю, шелуха превращается в огромного быка-единорога, который угрожающе врезается в близлежащий город альбийцев с намерением растоптать его копытами. Однако Баян противостоит ему и с помощью Альпа Бури срубает чудовища и вешает его кусочки на Священное Дерево.

Тем временем, узнав об этом инциденте, Гильгамеш немедленно прибывает на поле битвы и делает то же самое с самим Шурале. Бессмертный йорега вселяется в каждом из кусочков, но его разорванная сила уменьшает многократно способности совершать зло. Гильгамеш, разгоряченный битвой, пьет из источника, но Шурале предварительно отравляет воду, и Гильгамеш засыпает. То же самое происходит с Тураном. Баян призывает Каргу и его жену Чак Чак, которые относят героя в волшебную долину Басана, где растет 'живая трава проса'. Баян берет просо и готовит 'напиток жизни' - бозу. Он возрождает с ней родник и пробуждает Туран и Самар от вечного сна, однако сила проса достигает для Гильгамеша лишь до осени. И поэтому каждый год альпы Грач и Чак приносят ему 'живую траву' весной, чтобы разбудить его для новых подвигов. Присутствие Гильгамеша в мифологии древних болгар является еще одним свидетельством их тесной связи с ираноязычными племенами.

Во время осады Константинополя 17 июля 813 года нашей эры кан Крум Грозный принес человеческую жертву, вышел в море, умылся,

окропил солдат водой и вбил свое копье в 'Золотые ворота'. Зрители с высоких крепостных стен сбиты с толку захватывающим видом и, в свою очередь, молятся Богу 'ударить варваров'. К сожалению, кан умер вскоре после сердечного приступа 13 апреля 814 года, и ромеи одерживают победу в своим молитвенным превосходством: 'Бог нас слышит!'. Однако, по словам хана Пресиана, 'Бог видит!'.

Культ памяти героев и дедов сильно развит с верой в то, что их дух населяет пещеры. Некоторые из пещер около деревни Мадара использовались в качестве жертвоприношений в присутствии дворян. Ритуал сопровождается играми, весельем и соревнованиями - скачками, драками и стрельбой из лука. Поскольку здесь обнаружено внушительное святилище Тангры, археологи предполагают, что оно изображено с рельефом скалы знаменитого всадника. Надпись торжественно объявляет, что кан Омуртаг принес жертву Тангре. Разрешено прямое соединение с главной вершиной Мандара святой горы Меру, описанной в индийском эпосе Махабхарата.

Впечатляющий каменный рельеф Всадника на скале в Мадаре остается захватывающей загадкой. Долгое время считалось, что он изображает, как кан Крум Грозный разбивает благородного императора Никифора: 'Если ты не хочешь покоя, для тебя есть топор!'. Позже появляется имя кана Тервела, который 'отчитывается' перед своим отцом кан Аспарухом. что он сохранил и утвердил созданное им государство. Далее делаются предположения о Кормисоше и Омуртаге, которые дополняют список достойных болгарских правителей. Сторонники теории иранского происхождения протобулгар напоминают, что Мадарский всадник напоминает бехистонский рельеф царя Дария I в V веке до нашей эры, хотя и со значительными различиями. По их словам, Всадник символизирует Солнце, пронзенный лев - звезда Регул, а бегущая собака олицетворяет Луну.

Всадник одет в короткую мантию до колен и лук с бантом на спине. Он сел на седло с высокой спинкой и наступил на стремена, типичные для протобулгарских воинов. Наверху копья в льву замечен лошадиный хвост, которой на самом деле является боевым флагом древних болгар. Поэтому Всадник символизирует веру в непобедимость болгарского оружия, несмотря на превратности Судьбы. Лев часто появляется на боевых флагах ромеев с убеждением в их превосходстве над варварами. Однако серебряная чаша из черепа Никифора доказывает, что «времена меняются» вместе с людьми и их судьбой.

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The Country of Azadistan, the National Government of South Azerbaijan (From April to September of 1920)

Yagub Mahmudov

Abstract: The article reveals events that occurred in an area located south of Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran in the years immediately following the end of World War I. These events are mainly related to the struggle to gain autonomy in the area within Iran, culminating in the rebellion in Tabriz, led by the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, on 7 April 1920. For a short time, the power was entirely in the hands of the rebels who carried out reforms in the fields of economy, education, health care, the fight against poverty and military affairs. They established an independent republic, which ended on September 12, 1920.

Key words: Azerbaijan, revolution, Tabriz, post-First World war, Iran

Резюме: Статията разглежда събитията, които се случили в област, разположена южно от Азърбайджан, в Северозападен Иран, в годините непосредствено след края на Първата световна война. Те се изразяват основно в борбата за получаване на автономия на областта в рамките на Иран, които кулминират в избухналото на 7 април 1920 г. въстание в град Табриз, ръководено от Демократическата партия на Азърбайджан. За кратко време властта преминала изцяло в ръцете на въстаниците, които провели в областта реформи в областта на икономиката, образованието, здравеопазването, борбата срещу мизерията и военното дело. По този начин се създала независима република, чийто край настъпил на 12 семтември 1920 г.

The tumultuous historic milieu of the World War I set the background for the resurrection of national liberation movement in the Southern part of Azerbaijan bound for the revival of statehood traditions as it had led to the establishment of the People's Republic in North Azerbaijan.

During the war, including South Azerbaijan which occupied the northwestern regions of the country, the whole territory of Iran became the battleground of military operations for foreign powers. The ubiquitous dominance of the die-hard reactionary Iranian command doubled with the foreign invasion had further exacerbated the livelihood of the people along with aggra-

vating the internal contradictions. Despite the fact that the February revolution eventuated in the downfall of the Tsarist autocratic regime in Russia, South Azerbaijan still remained under the control of the Russian armed forces. The national insurgence in the whole country aimed at the elimination of the monarchial rule and foreign incursion, as well as at the implementation of democratic reforms to establish constitutional laws in the country. It soon assumed the form of a massive national liberation movement in South Azerbaijan. The processes going on in Russia, the successful victory of the liberation movement in North Azerbaijan, the revitalization of the national statehood traditions, as well as the restructuring carried out by the People's Republic of Azerbaijan gave impetus to the national liberation movement in South Azerbaijan.

The national liberation movement of South Azerbaijan was headed by Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani (1879-1920), who was one of the spirited activists of the Iranian Revolution which had taken place in the years of 1905-1911.

The main heroes of this revolution called 'Mashruta (Constitution) Revolution' were Sattar Khan and Baghir Khan who were the valiant sons of Azerbaijan.

Under the guidance of Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, along with struggling against the internal tyranny and foreign occupation, the freedom fighters of South Azerbaijan also demanded countrywide reforms and democratic improvements at a national level. To realize this aspiration, they primarily strove for the victory of the revolution all across Iran which would wind up in the liquidation of the monarchial regime and the establishment of the democratic republican state. The attainment of the self-autonomy of South Azerbaijan within the democratic state of Iran was one of the prior goals of the national liberation movement. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (DPA) played an essential role in the coalescence of the South Azerbaijani people into one united front. The Central Committee of DPA was chaired by Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani.

Under the instruction of Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani, the Democrats persistently urged the people of Tabriz, Ardabil, Khoy, Urmiya, Sarab, Zanjan, etc. to go on a strike and protest against the pro-British Iranian government. They vehemently exhorted the immediate abdication of the King and resignation of the government, as well as prompt implementation of democratic reforms in the country.

At the beginning of 1918, at a time when national liberation movement rapidly expanded, the Russian troops were abruptly withdrawn from South Azerbaijan. Taking advantage of this opportune situation, England started positioning its military forces in South Azerbaijan. In essence, the British avidly craved for getting access to Baku oil. That's why the British govern-

ment had purposefully dispatched supplementary military units to Iran under the lead of general Densterwill who was specifically assigned to capture the port cities of Anzali, Rasht and Baku.

The seizure of the bordering regions of South Azerbaijan and Turkey by the British forces for the sake of 'preemption of the Turkish danger', which actually meant the total takeover of control of Iran by England, further deepened the growing frustration and dissatisfaction of the masses and shored up the escalating national liberation movement in South Azerbaijan.

Availing of this favorable opportunity, armed by former Russian officers and strengthened by the new foreign support, the Armenian criminal gangsters started perpetrating mass murders and slaughters against the Azerbaijani-Turkish population of South Azerbaijan living in the regions adjacent to Turkey in the same way as they had committed atrocities against the Turkish-Muslim people of the Eastern Anatolia and North Azerbaijan. Provoked and instigated by the French officers and American missionaries, Aysors and Kurds also aggressively conspired against and carried out massacres of the Azerbaijani people. If it hadn't been for the military presence of Turkey, South Azerbaijan would have been drowned in blood. Starting from March of 1918, the Turkish military forces relentlessly killed Maku, Urmiya and Salmas' invaders and Armenian-Kurdish-Aysorian slayers and finally entered Tabriz which meant the liberation of South Azerbaijan.

But, faced with an extremely difficult international situation, Turkey was constrained to withdraw its military forces out of South Azerbaijan in November 1918. Using this chance, the British army swiftly seized Tabriz and took over the entire South Azerbaijan. Thus, by subjugating South Azerbaijan the British forces gained complete power all over the Iranian territory.

Subdued by constant pressures, in the end Iran was coerced to sign a contract with England on 9th August 1919. The terms stipulated in the agreement made Iran subordinate of the latter. Inflamed by this abject submission and unacceptably dismal capitulation, along with the entire Iranian nation, the national liberation movement of South Azerbaijan rose up to defend the county against this disgraceful and outrageous pact. With the active participation of impassioned crowds, tempestuous demonstrations and heated strikes were held throughout South Azerbaijan in opposition to this subservient acquiescence. The freedom fighters that had started a violent riot against government drove the governor of Tabriz out of the city in October 1919. Shortly, the British military forces were also expelled out of Tabriz at the urging demands of the people.

Having gathered a momentous speed, the national liberation movement of South Azerbaijan assumed an increasingly more decisive and critical role in launching a violent insurrection against government. Thus, on 7th of April, 1920, the armed uprising took place in Tabriz under the leadership of

Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani. The rebellious people of Tabriz didn't hesitate to join the revolt to support their common cause. Not daring to interfere, the police forces that were ordered to smother the upheaval were forced to flee the city. The rebellion of 7th April triumphed and prevailed without any bloodshed due to the unprecedented enthusiasm and exceptional fervor of the Azerbaijani people. Addressing the nation on the same day of victory, Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani made an announcement about substituting the name of Azerbaijan with Azadistan, which means 'the country of freedom'.

Following the thriving victory, the insurgents of Tabriz immediately started abrupt dismissal and eviction of the state functionaries and military officials appointed by the central government. In this way, the governance and administration of South Azerbaijan were handed over to the well-organized and competent members of DPA. The uprising which had started with the pressing demands for democratic reforms and reconstructions in society consequently turned into a national liberation movement. Thus, the self-determining statehood traditions were revived in South Azerbaijan. The people were genuinely longing for the quick establishment of their own independent, national state with a free, liberal society.

The cities of Khoy, Ardabil, Astara, Maragha, Ahar and Zanjan in South Azerbaijan saw numerous fiery revolts subsequent to the glorious armed uprising in Tabriz. It's worth mentioning that the national liberation movement of South Azerbaijan was received with very warm welcome among the other defiant groups all over Iran who were truly adverse to the presence of the exploitive British invaders and the dominance of the authoritarian, old-line domestic rule.

As the opposition and antagonism against the internal dictatorial rule and British supremacy escalated and spread in the whole country, the insurgents of Tabriz were compelled to take more drastic and far-reaching measures. On 23rd of June, 1920, with the leadership of Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani the National Government was founded in Tabriz. Principally composed of the proficient members of DPA, the Cabinet of the National Government represented all various strata of society equally. 24th of June, the day which was marked by the festive inauguration of the National Government in Tabriz was broadly celebrated on a national scale. All businesses and enterprises were suspended, educational institutions were temporarily called off and all the markets and stores were shut down. Acting on the order of the National Government, including the Governor of Tabriz, all state functionaries and officials designated by the central government were toppled and thrown out of Tabriz within a span of only a few days. This in fact meant the actual dethronement of the autocratic monarchy in South Azerbaijan and the ensuing deposition of the Iranian authority which in turn led to the

revival of the national statehood traditions. To achieve this end, the National Government set up by Sheik Mahammad Khiyabani really functioned as a democratic and self-ruling republic on account of the continual reforms and restructurings it carried out.

Although the people of South Azerbaijan were determined to struggle for absolute independence, the National Government strove for the democratization of entire Iran and confirm the constitutional laws in the whole country along with complete abolition of the internal tyrannical regime and repressive British dominance. The National Government also fought to stop the discrimination policy directed against South Azerbaijan.

Although the people of South Azerbaijan were capable of aspiring to full sovereignty after having created virtually an independent, self-governing, democratic republic, the National Government was pursuing a preset course of struggling to secure just a local autonomy within the future democratic Iranian state. The leaders of the National Government held a deep conviction that the victorious uprising which took place in Tabriz would shortly arouse upheavals in different parts of Iran and soon after spread in the whole country. They believed that the monarchy would be overthrown and eventually a republican rule would be established all over the country wherein the sole source of power would lie with the people. The founders of the National Government had cultivated a profound hope that the Azerbaijani people would play an important role in the formation of the soon-to-be Iranian government which would have its basis rested only on the people of Iran. Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani was fully confident that 'Tabriz would be the main redeeming power behind Iran's salvation'.

Since the National Government didn't have any premeditated political intentions about segregating South Azerbaijan from Iran and forming an independent, self-ruling state, as soon as it started functioning, numerous multifaceted reforms were introduced in the spheres of economy, education, health services, etc. As a priority issue, first of all a range of urgent measures were taken to alleviate the miserable life conditions of the impoverished people residing in various regions of South Azerbaijan, including Tabriz. Special projects were undertaken to overcome illiteracy. Nationalized schools and equipped hospitals were opened countrywide. An special school was set up in Tabriz for the girls from underprivileged families. Qualified teachers were invited from Baku, Turkey and Tbilisi for teaching in the newly-opened national schools. The preparations were underway for the formation of a national garrison. Separate gendarme and police forces of the National Government were created. Special police academies were instituted. New ministries, offices and enterprises were founded to organize the necessary groundwork for carrying out other important projects such as the creation of new job opportunities, the implementation of currency reform, the establishment of a

finance-bank system, the realization of municipal elections. Ground-breaking land reforms were launched as well in order to procure the equal distribution of land among the people.

All the vital steps and reforms undertaken by the National Government were oriented to an independent, democratic, republican state-building process. The nascent independent state of Azerbaijan was therefore renamed as the Country of Azadistan. Accordingly, the term 'Azerbaijan' was replaced with Azadistan in all official documents, forms, as well as panels of the ministries, offices and other enterprises and institutions.

Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani used to call on the people of his Motherland to make every sacrifice since it was his genuine belief that this approach was the only way whereby independence and freedom ideals could be fulfilled. He used to disseminate his progressive and reformist views at the gatherings arranged in the main garden of Tabriz. Sheikh Mahammad specified his principal ideas about the national struggle and freedom in his speech delivered on 15th June, 1920 as follows: "*It's a natural and universal phenomenon to love your own identity. Every human being loves themselves more than their fellow beings. That's why in order to improve the welfare and prosperity of the people, no society should expect help from the other. It's particularly useless and futile to wait for favor and service from the people who have no affiliation or connection with you. Self-respect, self-esteem and self-confidence should be put in the same order as self-love for one's identity. No society or nation should possess arrogance or low self-confidence. In the same way as one should by no means accept immorality, baseness and ignobleness since all these blight and cripple people's self-trust, similarly no society should approve of aggression and belligerence as these lead to inability and powerlessness. Humankind is in a desperate need of collaboration and mutual aid on the part of all of its members. It would be wrong to presume that small nations cannot contribute to the common cause of humanity and a huge mistake to disregard their existence because of this. It's extremely unfortunate and regrettable that we have always underestimated our self-worth and self-value to the extent of being unaware and oblivious of our own identity. This fact has been tested in individual lives time after time. It has been repeatedly deduced that the individuals who own high personal qualities and devote themselves to supreme ideals as well as valuing their capabilities and upholding their honor have proved to reach great heights in life. It's specifically because of this reality that throughout the history the outstanding literary figures and philosophers have achieved great accomplishments and acquired broad influence particularly on the account of their personalities. They have gained the respect and admiration of great kings and grand emperors owing to their hard work and considerable effort. This is the reason why they were endowed with the uppermost positions in the palaces. Likewise, the nations can only evolve and advance if they elicit their national*

awareness, educe their latent grandeur and concealed spiritual strength and bring forth their lost identity. The nation striving for its independence and freedom cannot remain indifferent and unresponsive to the social and political processes that influence its life. If we wish to be considered among the developed and progressive nations, then we have to elevate our mentality and outlook to their level by raising our mindset and attitude all the time. The first prerequisite for a nation's dignity is the independence and freedom of that nation. The nation deprived of its independence is doomed to disgrace and ignominy at the end. The independence of a nation can be deemed as its merit and moral distinction. The features which safeguard and preserve the independence of a nation are the heroism, bravery and valor of that nation".

The national liberation movement of South Azerbaijan developed rapidly. The Azerbaijani people were practically on the verge of creating their own independent, democratic, republican state. The resounding achievements of the National Government spurred on the discontented population of Iran and inspire the whole nation to act against the central government. Shuddering with fear, the rulers of the tyrannical monarchial regime were faced with real danger of abdication and banishment. The vested interests of the British who were trying to maintain supremacy over the Iranian government and get a hold of Baku oil were also thrown into jeopardy by the growing turmoil and uproar in the country. So, without more ado they started conniving with the Iranian government to organize a conspiracy against the National Government.

The malicious Iranian government was deliberately engaging the National Government in hectic negotiations by granting countless pledges and assurances, on the one hand, and underhandedly plotting an assault plan to Tabriz, on the other hand. After all the preparation of surreptitious work was over, the heavily armed military forces of the suppressive monarchial regime unexpectedly attacked Tabriz on 12th September, 1920. The insurgents of Tabriz confronted the assailants intrepidly and withstood the attack heroically for two days. Nevertheless, the over armed regular forces of the central government far outnumbered the rebels. That's why on 14th September Sheikh Mahammad Khiyabani was brutally assassinated and the revolt was overthrown in cold blood. Thus, the freedom struggle of the Azerbaijani nation was once again cruelly crushed. In the same way as the callous Bolshevik regime of the Soviet Russia had squelched the People's Republic of Azerbaijan in North Azerbaijan, similarly the reactionary monarchial regime of Iran viciously smothered the Country of Azadistan in South Azerbaijan. Russia and Iran couldn't have tolerated the independence of the country that they had once ferociously divided in Gulustan and Turkmenchay. So, once more North and South Azerbaijan were incorporated in Russia and Iran respectively.

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Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878

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The article is translated by Angelina Preskovskaya

Abstract: This article is devoted to the involvement of the Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment of the Imperial army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which took part in a number of crucial battles such as the battle of Gorni Dubnik, the capture of Zlatishki pass, the battle in Pleven. During the war grenadiers tried out new tactics of warfare, and the regiment itself contributed to the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman rule.

Key words: Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment, Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, Bulgaria, Ottoman Imperia, the battle of Gorni Dubnik

Резюме: Настоящата статия е посветена на участието на Лейбгвардейския гренадирски корпус на имперската армия в Руско-турската война през 1877-1878 г., който взема участие в редица важни битки като например тази при Горни Дъбник, при Златишкия проход и битката при Плевен. По време на войната гренадирите използвали нови тактики на военното изкуство, като корпусът спомага за освобождаването на България от османското управление.

The Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment was formed in 1756 in Riga as the first Grenadier regiment and was considered as one of the best military units of the Russian Empire. The Regiment participated almost in all wars held by Russia in 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Therefore, its military glory is inseparably connected with the Bulgarian history.

At first Grenadiers took part in combats on the territory of Bulgaria during the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774. Thus, they succeeded to demonstrate their forces in the siege of Silistra in June of 1773.[1] The first Grenadier Regiment without having any special weapons was excellent in its composition and was always sent to the battles to strengthen the others troops.

[1] Sudravskii 1906, 188-193.

In 1775, in the day of the celebration of the peace with Turkey, Empress Ekaterina II took the title of colonel, having become the chief of the regiment and ordered the regiment to be renamed as Life-Guard Regiment and: 'in honor and respect to infantry of the Russian army's 1st Grenadier Regiment, first according to its grade and particular in the military discipline and bravery'.[2]

In 1828 Life-grenadiers participated in the siege of Varna during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-1829.[3]

However, it was in the war of 1877-1878 that the Regiment greatly contributed to the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman rule.

19th century was characterized by the rise of the national-liberation movement of people living in the Ottoman Empire. In 1876 a great rebellion broke out in Bulgaria, but was ruthlessly suppressed by the Turkish authorities. These events were highly judged by the European countries. The aspiration to improve by peaceful means the situation of Christians was thwarted by the unwillingness of the Turkish side to concede. Thus, the Eastern crisis of the middle of 1870s posed the question on the elaboration of the appropriate strategy by the Russian Empire. The attempts of the Russian minister Dmitry Milyutin to prove to the Emperor Alexander II the inevitability of the war with Turkey were considered negatively. The exacerbation of the situation in the Balkans increased the pressure of the 'Party of action' on the Emperor, and on 24 April of 1877 he signed the Manifest which declared war to Turkey.[4]

Regardless to the fact that the war had already been declared and in June 1877 the Russian troops crossed the Danube river, the Life-Guard Regiment wasn't sent to the warship. However, the July events, related to the unsuccessful assaults of Pleven, caused the need to increase the quantity of the military staff. In this regard, Guard and Grenadier corps were mobilized.[5]

On 3 August, the Regiment received a notification for its intervention in the combats on the Balkans, and on 2 September, it took the road to the appointment in six echelons after a parting prayer.

Having crossed all Russia on 13 September the grenadiers arrived to the city of Iasi (Romania), from there they moved on foot to Bulgaria. On 15 October, the regiment passed by Danube and on 17 September arrived at Gorna Studena.[6] In a few days, the regiment took its first battle in the war in the siege of fortifications of Gorni Dubnik.

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[2] Semchenko 1990, 63.
[3] Rusanov 1960, 11.
[4] Zakharova 2003, 38-53.
[5] Puzyrevskii 1887,1-2.
[6] Sudravksii 1908, 37-38.

By that time the Russian troops faced the stubborn resistance of Turkey near the city of Plevna (modern Pleven), shielding the road to Sofia. Three assaults did not give any results, that is why after some unsuccessful attempts to conquer Plevna, the Russian command decided to cut it off from the main parts of Turkish army.

By that moment, the Turkish succeed to construct on the road near Sofia not large but well-fortified fortresses Gorni Dubnik, Dolni Dubnik and Telish. It is on these forts that the Plevna's providing system is based. To manage the operation the command sent from Saint Petersburg the hero of the defense of Sevastopol in the Crimean war General Eduard Totleben. He declared to Alexander II: 'There will be no Fourth Plevna', i.e. no fourth failure at Plevna.[7]

Totleben created a special unit under the command of General Iosif Gurko, who started the operation with an attack to the Turkish fortifications of Gorni Dubnik. The 24th October had come - the day of 'baptism by fire' of the Guard. Its main forces attacked the position near Gorni Dubnik.

The fortress garrison consisted only of five thousand persons with 4 weapons, when there were 22 thousand Russians with 64 weapons. But the fortress and its terrain represented a huge hill with a large flat slope around. On the top of the hill there were unseen from far strong fortifications: the unit had to move to the destination for about 2 miles open and unprotected.

The attack was held from three sides by the 2nd Guard division composed of the Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment and Guard rifle brigade.[8] Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Izmailovsky Guard regiments were dislocated between Gorni and Dolni Dubnik and functioned as a barrier from the possible sally from Plevna.[9]

The most difficult part of the battle was for the Grenadiers. They started the operation at night, they crossed the Vid river and departed to Gorni Dubnik. The Regiment was arranged in front of the enemies' fortifications, and had in avant-guard its 4th battalion, in the second line - the 2nd and the 3rd battalions; the first was left in reserve. In such order, the regiment started the attack (fig. 1). Because of the rugged terrain it was difficult enough to maintain the direction of the offensive, that is why the regiment had to make stops and to put everything in order. After having noticed the appearance of the life-grenadiers, Turks opened a withering fire. The Russian guards attacked according to ancient rules - in close formation, that is why they got many losses.[10]

[7] Fortunatov 1950, 124.
[8] Genov 1979, 159.
[9] Rediger 1999, 90.
[10] Shefov 2002.

The 4th spearhead battalion of the Guard Grenadier Regiment was the most effective in the attack. The chain of the battalion consisted of 1,5 company. From a distance of 1200-1500 steps, the soldiers did not run in a whole chain but in small parts. Running in groups, blind spots, permanent staying in chain of the half of the battalion - all that highly reduced the losses of the battalion taking into account the lack of fire trainings.[11]

A further advance of the attack to the main fortification seemed impossible because of the strong buckshot and rifle fire from the fortification. The entire terrain in front of this fortification lighted up by the lead rain. In a few minutes, many people were killed. Here, there was a need to improve the situation and the command of the regiment. Colonel Julian Lubovitsky ordered to the 2nd battalion to attack the small redoubt. Companies of the 2nd battalion moved ahead and with the support of the 3rd battalion overtook the redoubt. Being unsatisfied, battalions undertook the attempt to overtake the main fortification, but they faced deadly enemy fire, so they had to fix their occupied positions.

Officers of the regiment were a real example of bravery and courage: they personally controlled the battalions fire, and at the same time they sent people one by one to trenches. Some people crawled to the exterior ditch of the main redoubt. By the twilight, the ditch was entirely occupied by the Guard and at seven o'clock in the evening screaming 'Hooray' they broke into the main redoubt. The Turkish garrison capitulated (figs. 2, 3).

In the telegram sent on 25 October 1877 11:03 a.m. to the prince of Romain Carol from Tuchenitsa the general-adjutant Eduard Totleben reported: 'Gorni Dubnik is taken. The battle continued for 10 hours. 3000 persons are taken as prisoners. Telish is not conquered. Losses are not calculated. Many commands of divisions are put out of action'.[12]

The Russian army's losses were numerous in this battle, up to about 3600 persons. The Life-guard Grenadier Regiment lost most of his people (1017 persons),[13] thus for example the losses in the 10th company were: 42 - injured, 6 - killed, 5 - lost in the action.[14] The regiment now had only 10 officers, 6 companies were managed by sergeant-majors.[15] The regiment colonel Julian Lubovitsky was wounded in the action.[16]

A contemporary of these events, future Russian defense minister Aleksandr Roediger wrote in his memoirs: 'the battle was at its highest point at

[11] Belyaev 1956, 260.
[12] Sbornik 1905, 1.
[13] Belyaev 1956, 264.
[14] RSMHA, Fund. 2575, Inventory. 1, Affair. 83, l. 29-30.
[15] Sudravskii 1908, 40.
[16] Khronika 1878, 427.

our rear, and we started to receive anxious news: these people are killed, this regiment has heavy losses. «...» I have to honestly admit that it was very eerily only to think that our regiment would be next to be plunged into the thick of the battle. However, by the evening Gorni Dubnik was taken but with many victims'.[17] (figs. 4, 5).

In the result of the conquest of Gorni Dubnik, Telish and Dolni Dubnik, Plevna was totally surrounded and separated from the outside world. The fall of Plevna on 10 October 1877 became one of the most crucial events of the war, enabled to release more than 100 thousand people for the further progress of the intervention to the Balkans.

Besides that, the battle for Gorni Dubnik substantially influenced the war tactics of the Russian army. It is in this battle that an elaboration of the chain tactics was entirely realized. In place of the large close masses directly moving ahead, troops assailed in open order formations at a considerable distance of one line of advancing units from another with a good knowledge of the terrain.[18]

The fall of Plevna made an oppressing impression on Constantinople. But the Turkish government decided to continue the resistance, expecting that it would be impossible for the Russians to pass the Balkans in winter, with the aim to prolong the war till the intervention of the European countries.[19]

That is why Russia had to continue the intervention. One month after the battle at Gorni Dubnik the Life-guard Regiment occupied the city of Etropol. Moreover, in a few days it received a task to take the Zlatishki pass and to reinforce its positions there. On November 29, after the battle, which continued for 4 hours, the Guards push the Turks out of the pass and hold it for a month. In this period, the grenadiers faced all the surviving difficulties of winter mountains. Holding the pass the regiment lost 1050 people from whom 20 died of cold, 220 got frostbites, 810 got sick.[20]

In early January 1878, the regiment took part in the battle for Plovdiv (Philippopolis) - the final battle of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. The war was drawing to an end, the Turkish army had been defeated and soon the peace was declared.

After the end of active combat actions, the regiment organized an encampment in Kyuchuk-Tchekmendzi. Regardless the end of the war the regiment had to face all the difficulties of the marching life. In the region of the camp the epidemic of typhus had started, in consequence the regiment

[17] Rediger 1999, 90.
[18] Puzyrevskii 1881, 103-104.
[19] Kolenkovskii & Belolipetskii 1939, 30.
[20] Chtenie dlya soldat 1887, 5, 7, 8, 12, 21.

was moved to Ambarli village at the shore of the Marmara Sea.[21] Later it was relocated to the encampment at Buyuk-Kalkaly village.[22] On every stop life-grenadiers helped to local population: guarded villages, restored bridges.[23]

One year after the intervention in the war on 2 September 1878 the Life-guard Grenadier Regiment was sent back home to Russia.[24]

Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 indicated the strengths and the weaknesses of the military forces of the Russian Empire. In this war, Russians were the first in the war who faced extremely new combat conditions. According to the historical conditions, the Turkish troops developed the defense in fortifications in all types of combat. For this aim fortifications were constructed so that they could accommodate a great number of shooters. They had to hold the enemy as far as possible under the defense fire. Places of fortifications were situated so that they were surrounded by flat landscape on all sides.

During the war of 1877-1878 Russian army received an invaluable combat experience. The war produced commanders who meet modern requirements. The chain tactics was successfully developed and was for the first time widely implemented in the battle under Gorni Dubnik.

In addition, this battle became one of the key points in the war, it helped to siege the city of Plevna, having accelerated the fall of Turkey and the liberation of Bulgaria. And as in previous wars with the Ottoman Empire, the Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment was directly involved in all the important battles.

For the active military actions, courage and bravery, shown in the Russo-Turkish war, by the highest decree from 17 April 1878 the Life-Guard grenadier Regiment's headwear was decorated with distinctive signs with an inscription: 'For Gorni Dubnik on 12 October 1877'. Many officers received fighting decorations. For the battle under Gorni Dubnik the command of the regiment was promoted to Major General with an appointment to the suite of His Imperial Majesty and awarded with the Order of Saint George of the 3rd category and for the heroism in the siege of the Etropole - with the golden arm. For the Balkans crossing and the heroism in the battle for Philippopolis the regiment colonel was given the medal of Saint Vladimir of the 3rd and 2nd categories with swords.[25]

Chteniya dlya soldat – 'Leib-Grenadery na Zlatitskom perevale v russko-turetskuyu voinu 1877-1878 gg., Izdanie redaktsii zhurnala, 1887.

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[21] Sudravskii 1908, 41.
[22] RSMHA, Fund. 2575, Inventory. 1, Affair.83, l. 301.
[23] RSMHA, Fund. 409, Affair. 168433, l. 4.
[24] Sudravskii 1908, 41.
[25] Novitskii 1914, 64.

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
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1. The map of the attack the fortifications of Gorni Dubnik.



2. M.B. Grekov. The attack of Life-Guard Grenadier Regiment of Turkish fortifications near Gorni Dubnik.



3. N. Bunin. The attack of Grenadiers of small redoubt.



4. The monument
to Life-Guard Grenadier
Regiment in Bulgaria.



5. The monument
to Life-Guard Grenadier
Regiment in Bulgaria.

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The Liberal Radoslavists and the main problems of the internal political life in Bulgaria during the government of the Democrats (1908 – 1911)

Lyubka Naydenova

Summary: This article explores the attitude of the Liberal Radoslavists to the main problems of the internal politics of the democrats' government from 1908 to 1911. It focuses on the democratization of the social life, the restoration of the autonomy of Sofia University, the elaboration of a modern Education Act, the guarantee of the freedom of speech, the increase of the municipal autonomy, etc. Times of crisis during the government are also highlighted, referring to the parliamentary elections, the shooting at the demonstration in Ruse and the delay of passing the Law on the convocation of the Grand National Assembly.

Key words: Liberal Radoslavist, Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Democrats' government, internal politics

Резюме: Тази статия проследява отношението на либералите радослависти към основните проблеми на вътрешната политика на правителството на демократите в периода 1908-1911 г. Акцентите са поставени върху демократизирането на обществения живот, възстановяването на автономията на Софийския университет, изработването на модерен Закон за народната просвета, гарантирането на свободата на словото, увеличаването на общинската автономия и др. Проследени са и някои кризисни моменти от управлението, свързани с парламентарните избори, стрелбата по време на Русенската демонстрация и забавянето на приемането на Закона за свикване на Велико народно събрание.

The democratic changes in Bulgaria during the 90s increased the researchers' interest towards the main political parties which appeared during the 80s and 90s of the 19th century. Hence, why the Liberal Party became a subject of a serious research during the last two decades? Serious results are achieved till now thanks to the efforts of professor B. Georgiev, professor M. Palangur-

ski and partly to professor T. Galunov.[1] They amended dozens of out-of-date theses.[2] However, there are still unstudied moments from the development and the views of the designated party mostly during the period after 1908. This article focuses on the period from the beginning of 1908 to the fall of the Democrats' government in the spring of 1911.

At the beginning of 1908 doctor V. Radoslavov's Liberals created a big, for the scale of Bulgaria, political party with a serious public influence. They were very active in the public and political life and sometimes led the main attacks of the opposition against the cabinet.

Detailed information has been used from the central archives, the stenographic diaries of the Fourteenth National Assembly, the periodical seal memorial literature and some other sources in writing this article. The achievements of modern historical science are mentioned, and some more are added in accordance with the newly extracted source material.

* * *

The fight between the Democrats and the Liberals had begun long before the first came to power on 16th of January 1908. The Railway strike and the act of booing of Ferdinand by the students on 3rd of January 1907 marked the beginning of the crisis in the governance of the national Liberals. This crisis led to the closure of the University, a mobilization of the railway workers, an establishment of a secret police, some measures against the free print, and in general, an offence against the civil rights. All that led to an acute reaction of the society.[3] The Thirteenth National Assembly supported the government[4] actions but the power weakened.

In January 1907, the so called 'Patriotic block' was formed, in which the democrats took part.[5] Contrary to them the liberals remained outside the block because it wasn't approved by Ferdinand. They believed that the prince would not entrust the power to any of the coalition parties together or individually. However, in the fall of 1907 it became clear that the monarch was clearly ignoring the populists and the Liberals from power. In order to react to him they formed the so called 'Small block' together with Tsankovists. Due to the intrigues in the palace, it didn't start an active work.[6]

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[1] Georgiev 1992, 113-129; 1993, 129-146; 2001a; 2001b, 45-55; 2004, 223-244; 2007a; 2007b, 285-302; 2011, 13-34; Palangurski 1995; Galunov 1997, 58-78; 2013 etc.

[2] Cf. Iotsov 1947, 183-190; Hristov 1951/1952, 36; Topalov 1961, 27; Grancharov 1986, 28-31.

[3] Popov 1986, 112- 115.

[4] Popov & Damyanov 1999, 83-86. See also Georgiev 2014, 525-528.

[5] Popov 1982, 56-64.

[6] Georgiev 2001a, 177-178.

At the end of 1907 the Thirteenth National Assembly voted on the 1907 budget and completely used up its work due to the expiry of its term of office. The prime- minister P. Gudev resigned on 8th of January 1908. On 16th January, Ferdinand issued a decree for the establishment of a new cabinet led by Al. Malinov. He created a homogeneous government consisting only of representatives of the Democratic Party.[7]

The coming of the Democrats into power discouraged the supporters of the Liberal Party for a while who hoped to assume the power after the national liberals. The new cabinet not only ignored their leaders as potential allies, but it didn't also give ordinary liberals much of an opportunity to take up positions in the administration and to influence the municipal self-government. This somewhat frightened the Radoslavists activists. The ambitious plans stated in the regional ordinance of the Central Liberal Bureau from 28th December 1907 for an urgent transformation of the party bureaus and increasing the numbers of the troops[8] were not immediately implemented.

In March 1908 the Democratic party announced its intention to hold parliamentary elections for the Fourteenth National Assembly. This greatly increased the activity of all the parties. On 9th of April the Central Liberal Bureau summoned a meeting.[9] It decided the party to take part in the elections, but approved the nominations of its adherents in only 24 out of 89 constituencies. That was less than 27% of all parliamentary seats, which even with complete success, was not enough to participate in the government.

It became clear from what had been done that during this period V. Radoslavov and his closest supporters weren't aiming at taking power 'from below'.[10] The leader of the Liberals personally took part in the parliamentary elections but that also didn't bring him any success. He nominated himself for the elections in Chirpan where he entered a coalition with the National and the Progressive-Liberal Party and thus kept the existence of the 'Small Block'. Nevertheless, the representative of the Democratic Party K. Prodanov prevailed in the city.[11] The vice-president of the Central Bureau P. Peshev earned his traditional parliamentary seat in his native town Sevlievo, but in a coalition with the Democratic Party which didn't even have its own organization in this town.[12]

Despite the fact that there were a lot of issues with the elections, the Liberals did well and became the second largest opposition force after Bul-

[7] Metodiev & Stoyanov 1987, 317.
[8] Narodni prava N074/ 8. Apr. 1909, 2.
[9] CSA, f. 401k, op. 1, a. e. 37, l. 1.
[10] Georgiev 2016, 317 and cited bibliography.
[11] NBKM – BIA, f. 263, op. 1, a. e. 23, l. 18; SL 14, I IS, I, 46-47, 77-82.
[12] Palangurski 2011, 219-220.

garian Agrarian People's Union. They themselves accepted the Union as a part of the governing body and declared publicly to be the first among the opposition and the failure was explained by the pressure and the arbitrariness of the power.[13] This accusation was exaggerated. In his memoirs published decades later, Peshev evaluates the elections as being much freer than the previous ones.[14]

As in many similar cases so far, the parliamentary elections had been won by the government. In this case it happened by a large majority.[15] Nevertheless the election arena became a place for serious clashes between the Democrats and the Liberals and provided dozens of occasions for the latter to raise accusations against the central authority. It should be noted here that regardless of the manifested aggressiveness,[16] the Radoslavists lost their vote almost everywhere. That discouraged their activists to a certain degree. There were dissatisfactions with some activists who, during the elections, tried to put forward their candidacies in alliance with the power.[17]

At the beginning of March 1909, additional parliamentary elections for about 32 seats were scheduled for 12th of April.[18] They covered more than 30 districts and gave some chance to the Liberals to include their leader in the National Assembly and to improve their parliamentary presence. It was an unfavorable situation for the Democrats to be overthrown because after the official recognition of the Independence their positions were very stable. Moreover, even with one hundred percent winning the additional elections, which was a political illusion, the Liberals wouldn't have had the chance to get the parliamentary majority. That's why their leadership decided to boycott the vote. However, this position was unacceptable for the provincial Liberals who had been in opposition for more than 10 years and hoped their leaders to take over the government soon. For that reason, the central leadership tried to gradually convey that idea to their party members and the negatives of what had happened would have been entirely transferred to the government. The attack began on 14th of March with an analytical article published in 'Narodni prava' which answered the question 'Why had minister Takev sped up the additional elections?' The main thesis was that the elections were postponed several times until then because the Democrats didn't enjoy the voters' confidence. Then the Minister of Internal Affairs was rushing because

[13] Sanstefanska Balgariya No. 499/ 5. Jun. 1908.
[14] Peshev 1993, 360.
[15] Pryaporets No. 62/ 31. May. 1908.
[16] Narodni prava No. 48/ 4. Mar. 1909; No. 62/ 20. Mar. 1909; No. 73/ 9. Apr. 1909; No. 79/ 14. Apr. 1909; No. 86/ 24. Apr. 1909 etc.
[17] NBKM – BIA, f. 263, op. 1, a. e. 14, l. 281-282.
[18] Palangurski 2011, 233.

he suggested the Election law to be amended and the proportional election system to be widely included. It was said that M. Takev didn't want the elections to be held before 1st of August – the day when the amended law would come into force and thus the results from the elections would be different.[19] The Minister was soon accused of 'tapping the laws' and presenting 'fake reports' in the palace. [20]

On 4th of April the Radoslavist' official journal published another critical article about the upcoming elections,[21] and the next day the bureau of the Sofia Liberal Group posted a decision according to which the organization, which situated in the capital, shouldn't participate in the additional parliamentary elections on 12th of April. In pursuance of this decision the supporters of the Liberal Party in Sofia had to deposit their voting cards by the elective day in the editorial office or to any of the ten-member committees specially selected for this purpose.[22]

The decision of the Liberals from the capital was very soon followed by the Chirpan and Etropole groups and the Orhanian (now Botevgrad) district Liberal Bureau. The last threatened to exclude all its members who didn't adhere to the decision.[23] Very soon the Municipal Liberal Group in Plovdiv, the district Bureau in Ferdinand town (now Montana) and the Borisovgrad (today Parvomay) district Bureau decided to set up a boycott. They were not so firm and didn't oblige their members to return their voting cards but warned them that those cards could be requested for verification at any time.[24] In contrast to them the leaders of the Haskovo Liberal Group acted firmly. On 26th of April the members of its Bureau considered all citizens' declarations for joining the Liberal Party that had been already received. One of the conditions for becoming a member of the Party was the extent to which the signatories had complied with the decision that required refraining from participating in the Parliamentary elections on 12th of April and depositing the voting cards. The same condition was imposed to the regular members. Based on the results, the Bureau decided that valid members of the Haskovo Liberal Group would only be those 181 people (their names were published in the party official organ) who had deposited their voting cards.[25]

Regardless of the measures that had been taken, Radoslavov and his close supporters were not content because particular supporters of the

[19] Narodni prava No. 57/ 14. Mar. 1909, 3.
[20] Narodni prava No. 67/ 28. Mar. 1909, 1.
[21] Narodni prava No. 71/ 4. Apr. 1909, 1.
[22] Narodni prava No. 72/ 6. Apr. 1909, 3.
[23] CSA, f. 401, op. 1, a. e. 67, l. 5; Narodni prava No. 72/ 6. Apr. 1909, 2-3; No. 74/ 8. Apr. 1909, 3.
[24] Narodni prava No. 74/ 8. Apr. 1909, 3.
[25] Narodni prava No. 114/ 1. Jun. 1909, 4.

Liberal Party and whole groups committed to some candidates to support them and to vote for them regardless of the decision of their superiors. That made the center to address the party and remind them about the decision taken regarding 'an absolute refraining' from participation that was a part of the common policy and respecting it in accordance with 'the strict discipline of the party'. The governing body of the Party publicly explained to its supporters that 'they had good reasons' for making that decision. It also warned that it should not be influenced by local considerations and that if the party had not taken part in the elections, its supporters could not help other candidate-members. It was recommended for all to follow the example of the Sofia Liberal Group and each voter to deposit his card in the Bureau of the group.[26] For their part, the members of the Central Liberal Bureau toured the country and explained at meetings to their supporters why they should not vote.[27]

Despite the warning, some provincial Radoslavists took part in the elective race. The party eager to secure positions, saw in the deputy mandate a possibility for a quiet life for several years. In that case it was worth the risk not to prove yourself in your own party. Thus, in Peshtera, doctor V. Radoslavov's candidacy was handed in without him being aware of that. The case was peculiar and had been already analyzed,[28] but it had not been fully proven yet whether Vasil Radoslavov had known about his candidacy or he had relied on taking a deputy seat thanks to a political trick, the loss of which wouldn't have brought him serious negative consequences. On 14th of April he officially thanked everyone who had voted for him (less than 1150 people against more than 1700 for his opponent).[29]

Immediately after the elections, 'People's right' declared that the Democrats had lost the trust of the people as according to the quoted by the independent newspaper 'Bell' information, given to him by the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, there were a total of 46220 votes for government candidates, and 51566 – for the opposition. Nevertheless, according to the majority vote, the Democrats won 31 out of 32 mandates.[30] The Liberal calculated that if the proportional system would be applied, the opposition would get 17 mandates against 15 for the government.[31] The main reason for the victory were

[26] Narodni prava No 74/ 8. Apr. 1909, 3.
[27] E.g. On April 19, 1909, a district meeting was held in Belogradchik, at which R. Radev delivered a two-hour speech - Narodni prava No. 84/ 20. Apr. 1909, 3.
[28] Georgiev 2016, 319-320.
[29] Narodni prava No 79/ 14. Apr. 1909, 3. The newspaper published the exact number of voters who voted for V. Radoslavov: 285 in Peshtera, 83 in Bratsigovo, 118 in Aydin 118 and Chepino 651 - all 1141.
[30] Palangurski 2011, 233-234.
[31] Narodni prava No 81/ 16. Apr. 1909, 3.

the partisans and the remission of fines for hidden livestock from 'beglik'.[32] It was stated that the main reason for 'the victory' was the 'disagreement' and the remission of fines for a hidden tax on goats and sheep. It should be noted here that the Radoslavists leaders were aware that with few members of parliament more or less, the Democratic Party wouldn't lose its majority. That's why, after the final approval of the Independence on 6th of April 1909, they invoked to convene a Grand National Assembly,[33] that would put the Democrats to new trials.

The boycott of the additional parliamentary elections didn't have the expected influence on the political attitude. That's why the Liberal leaders seriously prepared themselves to participate in the partial municipal elections during the second part of 1909. Under Ferdinand's Decree №52 of January 31st the same year,[34] they were entirely held according to the proportional elective system. The first to test it were the towns of Chirpan, Stara Zagora, Razgrad and Radomir as well as a lot of settlements in Shumen and Burgas regions. The prognoses of the 'People's rights' that the Minister of the Internal Affairs would hurry to hold municipal elections before the proportional system entered into force didn't come true. That required the search for new ideological means.

On August 6th the Central Liberal Bureau came out with Memorandum №2 in which it explained to its supporters the new pre-elective situation. The local activists were instructed to strictly follow the instructions of the Center and to choose a voting-paper with a green color which has already been registered by the Sofia District court and which has been widely proclaimed in issue 138 of the official newspaper of the party.[35] At the same time it was reminded that under Article 16 and Article 55 of the new Election Law the voting cards have been issued for a period of three years and could be used at all the elections. For that reason, the party 'Office for saving the members' voting cards was set up. That office had to keep the cards and to distribute them when it was necessary.[36] The latter gave an opportunity for a complete control over the Liberal electors and their families.

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[32] Narodni prava No 79/ 14. Apr. 1909, 1; No. 84/ 27. Apr. 1909, 3.

[33] Narodni prava No 84/ 21. Apr. 1909; No. 96/ 8. May. 1909; No. 11. 16. Jan. 1910; No. 127/ 15. Jun. 1910 etc.

[34] DV No. 32/ 5. Mar. 1909.

[35] At the beginning of 1909 the Democrats made changes to the Election Law. One of those changes was the introduction of party colors under Section 21 of Article 65 from the Law of the amendment of the Election Law – DV No. 24/ 11. Feb. 1909. The green was among the most preferable colors and doctor V. Radoslavov did his best to take it. On May 30th 1909 Sofia District court registered a dark green color of the voting paper for the Liberal Party in the whole country. After that this color became a symbol of Liberals in the following years.

[36] CSA, f. 401k, op. 1, a.e. 41, l. 1-2.

Partial municipal elections were held shortly after the parliamentary ones. On August 20th 1908 the Central Bureau of the Liberal Party issued a Memorandum to serve as instructions for those elections.[37] There was a great activation on the part of the Liberals but the elections caused an incident in which Radoslavov almost died at the train station in Pleven. The broken leg and shoulder decreased his activity in the following months and, to a certain degree, affected the dynamics of the political life of the party. For example, the leader of the Liberals was the only great political leader who didn't attend personally the declaration of the Independence in Turnovo.[38]

Another partial municipal election was held in the spring and the summer of 1909. The offence of the authority against some traditional liberal centers, as Lovech and Sevlievo, during the election campaign provoked a widespread commentaries and sharp attacks against the actions of the governing party in the Radoslavists press.[39] Some of the accusations were tendentious but others were a reflection of what had been happening at that moment. On February 24th 'Narodni prava' published an article the topic of which was 'The Democrat municipal self-government'. That article was followed by a similar one on March 2nd. In them the government regional policy was under the lash.[40] There was a particularly acute dissatisfaction with the adjournment of the municipal council in Radoslavovo village (until 1899 its name was Kolanlare village, and from 1946- Chavdar village, L.N.), Zlatitsa - Pirdop district, which was named after the leader of the Liberal Party.[41] Here the local secretary tax-collector, who passed on to a higher post in the administration of the Democrats, managed to convince some of the municipal councilors to give their resignations in order the Council to be adjourned.[42] 'Narodni Prava' also published certain reports about the arbitrariness of the police during the municipal elections. Among them, P. Chorbadgiisky's report about the elections in Stoil Voivoda village, Nova Zagora district, deserved a particular attention. The police blockaded the village there in order to prevent the agitations of the opposition, and the ballot-box was placed in 'a closed room' that hadn't happened since the time of St. Stambolov's government.[43] At the end of March the newspaper came out with a caustic

[37] Narodni prava No 39/ 21. Feb. 1909, 3.
[38] Georgiev 2016, 318.
[39] Narodni prava No 10/ 15. Jan. 1909; No. 46/ 2. Mar. 1909; No. 67/ 28. Mar. 1909; No. 68/ 1. Apr. 1909; No. 73/ 7. Apr. 1909 No. 116/ 3. Jun. 1909 etc.
[40] Narodni prava No 41/ 24. Feb. 1909; No. 46/ 2. Mar. 1909. See also No. 48/ 4. Mar. 1909.
[41] About the history of the village – see Ivanov 2013.
[42] Narodni prava No 56/ 13. Mar. 1909, 3.
[43] Narodni prava No 58/ 16. Mar. 1909.

article in which it blamed the pressure of the authorities on the election process while giving some particular cases from the elections in the town of Shumen.[44] The governing was also accused for committing homicides at the precincts. The application of the 'Law for encouragement the local industry' was also criticized by hinting at corruption and a preference for 'their people' from the part of the Democrats.[45]

Among the reports that the Liberals made public there was inevitably a lot of true information. However, the way in which that information was presented inevitably pointed to an increasingly strained political relations between the governing and one of the leading opposition parties.

With the liquidation of the excess credits the Democrats increased the funds for educational, cultural and social activities in the state budget. The Fourteenth National Assembly passed a Law for protection of the public health and under the pressure of the Minister of Education, the government increased the teachers' salaries. [46]

Unexpectedly that caused an acute reaction on the part of the Liberals who declared that the 1909 budget 'stimulated the misappropriations', and the Democrats didn't keep their pre-election promises at all.[47] That couldn't be interpreted otherwise except as a political criticism. The same referred to the attack against 'the decrease'[48] of the military budget at a time when the existence of the state was threatened.[49] The party supporters, who had been in opposition for a long time, definitely needed to ally, but the way in which that was done was indelicate and incorrect to the actions of the governing body. Sometimes in the public area even appeared some inadequate charges against the power such as the Democrats being Republicans,[50] that caused a sharp response from the part of the latter.[51]

From the autumn of 1909 the criticism of the Radoslavists was transferred to the National Assembly. First to be criticized was the inertness of the Government regarding the amendment of the Constitution in connection with the already officially recognized Independence.[52] It had some reason

[44] Narodni prava No 63/ 21. Mar. 1909, 1. For events in this city during the period, cf. Georgiev 2019, 338-342.
[45] Narodni prava No 68/ 1. Apr. 1909, 1.
[46] SL, 14 ONA, 693-726. See also Mushanov 1908, 68-77.
[47] Narodni prava No 2/ 3. Jan. 1909; No. 35/ 16. Feb. 1909; No. 41/ 24. Feb. 1909.
[48] In the light of the complications surrounding the protection of declared Independence, the government has voted to release additional weapons – CSA, f. 1303k, op. 1, a. e. 3, l. 34-37.
[49] Narodni prava No 44/ 27. Feb. 1909.
[50] Narodni prava No 110/ 27. May. 1909.
[51] Pryaporets No. 57/ 28. May. 1909.
[52] SL, 14 ONA, 2, 11, 3224-3225.

because, in order to hold power for longer, the Democrats delayed creating a draft of a new project for a Main Law and the announcement of elections for a Grand National Assembly.[53] At the same time there was a hint at corruption, a state interference in the affairs of the Church etc.[54]

Right after its coming to power the Government came up with a clear program for a democratization of the public life. The basis of that program was the position for the restoration of the autonomy of Sofia University, the restitution of the freedom of speech and press, the introduction of a proportional electoral system, and the removal or severe restriction of the excess credits.[55] N. Mushanov was a Minister of Education in the Democratic Government. When he took up his post, he reinstated in their former offices the professors who were fired about a year ago and launched a broad campaign for drafting a new 'Law on Public Education', passed ready in February 1909.[56] In its essence it was modern and democratic. That's why the Radoslavists, who were in opposition, didn't confront directly the reforms but they tried to criticize the Minister indirectly. On 20th of March, under the orders of the Minister of Education, the organization of the class teachers in Sofia elected members of the Disciplinary Council to the Ministry. For those elections N. Mushanov tried to boost into position his official candidates, who haven't received the approval of the union teachers and of a considerable part of the non-union class teachers, who the Democratic Minister relied on mostly for his success. Indignant at the ministerial procedures and impositions, the union teachers nominated themselves for election in contradiction to the ministerial candidacies. Both sides showed a great interest in this choice. As a result, the Minister's candidates only polled between 10 and 25 votes while those of the teachers – more than 100 (Staliiski 113, and Iv. Kepov – 125 votes). The Liberal Radoslavists estimated what had happened as 'a slap to the minister' and praised the teachers' honesty.[57]

Gradually it became clear that the Radoslavists opposed the Democrats on many issues. About a year after the National Education Act was passed, they criticized its local implementation by trying to make the teachers oppose the governing. The attack began with a charge against the Minister of Education trying to split the teachers' organization that had passed censure on him. According to the Liberals, Mushanov did that on the principle '*Divida et impera*!' (Divide and Rule! author's note). That was expressed specifically

[53] Markov 1983; see also Metodiev & Stoyanov 1990, 21-27.
[54] Peshev 1993, 362-363; Narodni prava No 8/ 13. Jan. 1909; No. 20/ 27. Jan. 1909; No. 30/ 9. Feb. 1909 etc.
[55] Pryaporets No. 46/ 22. Apr. 1908; No. 50/ 1. May. 1908.
[56] Mahafova 1979, 150-159.
[57] Narodni prava No 58/ 16. Mar. 1909, 3.

in the formation of the Teachers' Union of organizations consisting of only upper secondary teachers, led by people loyal to the Minister. Most of them were from Lom area, but there were also unqualified principles appointed. Specific names and posts were listed among which the principals of the two secondary schools for boys and the secondary school for girls in the capital. The newly formed organizations came out with a call for a split of the Teachers' Union due to the lack of valiance and for establishment of a trade union consisting of upper secondary teachers only.[58]

On 28 February 1910, a love story became a serious political problem for the Democrats. The elopement of the juvenile Turkish girl Saafet with her Bulgarian betrothed and the return of her parents by the police led to a shooting at a peaceful civil demonstration in Ruse when about 30 people died and twice as many were injured. The event caused mass protests across the country.[59] Immediately the Liberals tried to use it in order to provoke the fall of the Government from power. The front page of the party official newspaper looked like an obituary and contained appeals for the Cabinet to resign for months.[60] The Democrats held on to power and even M. Takev temporarily retained his post as a Minister of Internal Affairs, but their position became more unstable. For that reason, the Central leadership of the Liberals tried to unite and encourage its supporters with the personal presence of its members at impressive in numbers meetings in some towns. One of them was Pleven, which was visited by the leader of the party and the member of the Central Liberal Bureau Hr. Iv. Popov on 25th March. Due to a decision taken at the meeting, that brought together about 7000 people in the square, a sharp protest was made against the shooting in Ruse, the delay of the parliamentary elections for a Grand National Assembly and some other current political problems.[61]

Takev's replacement as a Minister of the Internal Affairs was postponed until September 1910.[62] That's why the Liberals' reproaches[63] had some reasons. In addition to that, in the autumn of the same year in the Ministry of

[58] Narodni prava No 9/ 14. Jan. 1910, 2. The attacks continued in the following months – see Narodni prava No. 62/ 19. Mar. 1910; No. 133/ 21. Jun. 1910; No. 134/ 22. Jun. 1910; No. 135/ 23. Jun. 1910.
[59] About this case, cf. Nenov 1998, 146-151.
[60] Narodni prava No 46/ 1. Mar. 1910; No. 67/ 26. Mar. 1910; No. 70/ 30. Mar. 1910; No. 81/ 12. Apr. 1910; No. 88/ 26. Apr. 1910; No. 113/ 31. May. 1910; No. 181/ 20. Aug. 1910 etc.
[61] Narodni prava No 69/ 29. Mar. 1910.
[62] Metodiev & Stoyanov 1987, 317.
[63] Narodni prava No 203/ 18. Sept. 1910; No. 229/ 18. Oct. 1910; No. 244/ 6. Nov. 1910 etc.

Internal Affairs and of Public Health, some corruption schemes, where high-ranked police officers were involved in, were revealed.[64]

In order to consolidate its positions, in autumn 1910, the Liberal Party held its VI congress, the resolution of which sharply criticized the whole policy of the Government.[65]

Since 1903 one of the Democrats' tasks has been to repeal the Paskal Taburnov' Interpretative Law. It was passed by the Thirteenth National Assembly which was dominated by the Stambolists. That law amnestied the ex-ministers doctor V. Radoslavov, D. Tonchev and T. Ivanchov, who were convicted by the First State Court. The idea of repealing the law was not to bring back the case against the Radoslavists but to bring to justice for corruption some of the National Liberal ex-ministers in the cabinets 1903-1908. Among them were eminent Stambolovists figures and Radoslavists' friends- general M. Savov – a former member of the Central Bureau of the Liberal Party[66] and doctor N. Genadiev – a lawyer of the defendant Radoslavists ministers.[67] The repeal was held at the First session of the Fourteenth Common National Assembly during extremely sharp protests of the Liberal deputies.[68]A decision to sue the ex-ministers was presented in the Assembly not until 10 December 1910. It was finally voted on February 1911 after a long debate.[69] The deputies in the Liberal Party were not only flatly against, but they also disobeyed and the leader of their parliamentary group, P. Peshev, refused to sign the Proceedings.[70]

At the end of 1910 the Democratic Party finally gave a concrete expression of its intensions to convene a Grand National Assembly to amend the Constitution. According to the monarch, by that, its political tasks for the moment ran low. The opposition parties sensed the change and began a struggle to win the favor of Ferdinand because, in that moment, it depended on him who would take over the power. Unexpectedly for the leaders of the Liberals, Iv. Ev. Geshov, who was neglected until that moment, was invited to an audience.[71] They followed the King's moves anxiously,[72] because, with some reasons, they were afraid of being neglected again in his choice. However, they had an off-chance to put pressure on the palace. On 9th of March

[64] Narodni prava No 38/ 18. Feb. 1910; No. 101/ 12. May. 1910; No. 126/ 14. Jun. 1910; No. 146/ 8. Jul. 1910. See also Pryaporets No. 240/ 15. Sept. 1910.
[65] Narodni prava No 237/ 29. Oct. 1910.
[66] Georgiev 2001a, 65.
[67] Georgiev 2007a, 150.
[68] SL, 14 ONA, 548 – 556.
[69] SL, 14 ONA, 3354 – 3367.
[70] Narodni prava No 45/ 27. Feb. 1910; Peshev 1993, 360.
[71] Nikolova 2004, 207.
[72] Narodni prava No 243/ 5. Nov. 1910.

1911, Malinov was forced to resign, that happened four days later. Only a week after that, on March 16, the power was entrusted to Geshov who assumed it in coalition by the National and the Progressive Liberal parties.[73]

* * *

The attitude of Liberals towards the main problems of the internal political life during the Democrats' government can be qualified, as a whole, as moderate critical. The main goal of the Liberal Party was to overthrow them and that's why it criticized most of the internal political activities regardless of their usefulness. A political demagogy was often used. Nevertheless, the Radoslavists' attacks can't be defined as used for personal benefits. The tone in the press was sharp, but not harsh. The supporters of doctor Radoslavov had the right view of the bourgeois democracy. They often caught well-concealed violations of the governing, interference of the power structures in the electoral process, corruption etc. Furthermore, Liberals used only legal methods of struggle. Sometimes they didn't even get involved in anti-government actions in order to avoid the clashes with the authorities. Their attempts to climb to power during that period were mainly expressed in attracting the monarch's attention. Despite the great tolerance to the latter, the relations between the leader of the party and the palace were complicated. At some points Coburg neglected Radoslavists and that compelled the leaders and the members to criticize Ferdinand' s actions but in most cases the king was 'protected' from the attacks of the other political forces, including Democrats. There the Radoslavists' efforts to present themselves as the only reliable defenders of the crown were greatly exaggerated, which was an expression of their eagerness to come into power.

CSA - Central State Archive (Sofia).

DV – Darzhaven vestnik (Sofia).

SL, 14 ONA – Stenographic logs of 14th Ordinary National Assembly.

NBKM – BIA – Natsionalna Biblioteka 'Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodii' – Balgarski istoricheski arhiv.

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[73] Vlahov 1999, 111.

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The Leaders of the Liberal party (Radoslavists) during the last months of World War I

Biser Georgiev

Summary: This article briefly examines the political activity and the fate of some of the leading liberals from the spring to the fall of 1918. The last months of the World War I had been marked by their own specifics, in which the liberals had an important role. Up to the present moment, this problem has not been thoroughly investigated.

Key words: Liberal Party, liberal leaders, World War I, Bulgaria during World War I

Резюме: Настоящата статия проследява накратко политическата дейност и съдбата на част от водещите либерали от пролетта до есента на 1918 г. Последните месеци на Първата световна война са белязани със своя специфика, в която либералите заемат важно място. До настоящия момент този проблем не е подробно изследван.

In popular political prose and to some extend in the specialized historical literature, Dr. Vasil Radoslavov's liberals are some of the most criticized Bulgarian politicians. Most of their prominent members and leaders are called 'power-men' and 'speculators' that were able in the name of power and money to involve Bulgaria into a war. Their bad reputation lasted long after 1918, and for the objective reader, it remains a mystery how the public allowed so many grim people to rule the country almost throughout the whole World War I. In the following study, we will try to answer those questions, because it is incorrect to judge those people's acts only negatively. The memory of them should not be demonized, but analyzed. It is time to leave the field of journalism and give an adequate historical assessment of the individuals, their views, surroundings, and role in the events, etc.

Unpublished material from the central archivs, the journals of the Seventeenth Ordinary National Assembly, the Bulgarian periodical press, published documentary material and memoirs were used to write this ar-

ticle.[1] V. Radoslavov's monograph on the First World War was also taken into consideration, as well as his 'Daily Notes', in which he presented the views of the liberals on the national issue and the ways to solve it, the reasons for many specific decisions by the rulers, etc.[2]

* * *

In May 1918, the power of the liberals during their rule became irresistible, and even the Germans agreed that the Radoslav cabinet had to be replaced.[3] At the beginning of the same month, an 'elderly representative' arrived in Bulgaria, presenting himself as an envoy to the Kaiser, with an order to gather information about the spirit of the nation and army. He talked to governing politicians. During the conversations he stated that the population was starving and the spirit of the soldiers had fallen and the only thing they wanted was the war to end. There was a big dissatisfaction with the government. Even the issue 'dirty businesses of the relatives of the ruling figures' had been raised, including Dr. Hr. Georgiev's. The excuses that everything was due to skillfully driven propaganda could no longer mislead the Allies. The only real arguments from the Bulgarian side were connected to the issue of Dobrudzha[4] and the fact that the German command did not send the promised divisions to the Thessaloniki Front. Thus, according to the liberals, the common Bulgarian soldier was left with the impression that he was already fighting to satisfy the 'German interests'. In order to justify the governing body, some politicians blame some of the senior Bulgarian officers (General S. Savov, Lukov, etc.) for campaigning in the army. The last thing, spoken to a foreign observer, was a pathetic explanation. Some even accused Radoslavov of failing to repress this propaganda,[5] which led to Berlin's belief that he should be replaced. The Prime Minister himself had not been informed of the situation because he was not in the country at the beginning of May. Arriving in Sofia on May 8, after signing the peace treaty in Bucharest, he was informed by his son-in-law, Christo. Georgiev, who also talked to the 'messenger'. It was obvious for the experienced politician that there was an attempt of his replacement behind his back, for which the consent of the Kai-

[1] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106 (d-r Hr. Georgiev, Iz blizkoto minalo. Borba za nezavisimost i obedinenie. Hora i sabitiya); Bozveliev 1943; Vasilyov 1934; Vlaikov 1930; Genadiev 1985; Geshov 2008; Danev 1992; Krachunov 1928; Madzharov 1968; Mah 2002; Petrova 1991; Peshev 1993; Stanchova 1991; Stanev 1925; Stoyanovich-Adzheleto 1992, 116; Tenev 1941 etc.

[2] Radoslavov 1993; Ilchev 1993.

[3] Petrova 1991, 121.

[4] Regarding the following problem see Minkov 2013, 124-126; Georgiev 2018a, 68-79; 2019, 107-117 and cit. bibliography.

[5] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 382-384.

ser was needed in order to avoid unnecessary situations. The Liberals' leader suspected that the monarch had something to do with the plan. His opinion was that King Ferdinand, who wanted to oust him in 1916 because he did not want to share the glory of national unity with anyone,[6] decided in May 1918 to offer him as a sacrifice, for the reason that Bulgaria joined the Central Powers' World War and failed to achieve national unity. Dr. Radoslavov was the main person who had to bear the consequences of failure and even during times when he did not have power to remain the 'one to blame', a fact with the help of which the ungrateful monarch ran away from responsibility. At the same time, a new government, led by Alexander Malinov, would be best suited to the palace because the war would continue.[7] Of course, these were just assumptions, some of which had been 'supplemented' years later, but in general they corresponded to the real situation. The events were further built up in a well-known scenario. V. Radoslavov went to an audience with Ferdinand. He informed him that he was aware of the German visit, but he advised the Prime Minister to 'pretend he didn't know' until the results in Berlin became evident. And the last but not least, according to those close to the prime minister, he predetermined the decision of the Liberals' leader to resign, despite Coburg's assurances that he was fully trusted.[8]

His deputy and government minister Petar Peshev might have been informed of the intention to resign. There is no information about who else was informed of what was intended, but the events happened before the realization of what was intended. On May 22, the national liberals, supporters of Dobri Petkov, decided to leave the cabinet. The stated reason was the unsuccessful resolution of the Dobrudzha issue in signing a peace treaty with Romania, but the real reason was poor internal governance, for which they did not want to be held responsible and kept away their supporters from the benefits of governing and ruling. On May 23, Petkov met the commander-in-chief of the army, Gen. N. Zhekov who was the kind of politician that proposed to 'bring order out of chaos' by taking the prime minister's place. The general refused, but the monarch, who was frightened by such a crisis, invited him on May 28 to come and meet in Sofia. What followed was another Coburg farce, for the period of three days in a row he did not meet the general, but sent the heir to the throne to speak with him instead. Meanwhile, the situation at the front was getting worse and that was the reason Gekov to return to the town of Kyustendil on May the 30th.[9] On the same day, D. Petkov and his colleague

[6] Regarding these relations see Georgiev 2018b, 65-86.
[7] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 384.
[8] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 385
[9] Kishkilova 1993, 51-52 and cit. lit.

from the same political party V. Koznichki resigned,[10] which marked the beginning of the end of Radoslav's 'reign'.

The motives connected with the real reasons for the resignation of D. Petkov and his followers diverge in the sources. It was a common belief that the leader of the People's Liberal Democrats had contradictions with the Prime Minister, but they were definitely coming from the palace. Reassured that there was no danger of a military dictatorship, the Coburg did his best to preserve his own interests. For a month, the German government was convinced that foreign policy was going to be preserved and Bulgaria was not going to leave the union, but the government had to leave for domestic political and economic reasons. According to one version, the head of Ferdinand's secret cabinet, Strashimir Dobrovich, had a conversation with the Stambolovist[11] Al. Stanchev, asking for the resignation of the leader of his party, D. Petkov and promising him to participate in a future cabinet.[12] This was typically in the style of the monarchy.

People's Liberal ministers' resignation had not been made public because Radoslavov hoped to persuade the stambolovist's leader to remain and work for the cabinet. However, there was an information leakage and the not-so-well-known Petkovists[13] in the capital began to talk and spread rumors that their leader was going to replace the liberals' leader in the prime minister's office, or will start working in the government headed by Alexander Malinov.

After Petkov and Koznichki left the cabinet, Ferdinand assigned Dr. V. Radoslavov the task of forming a government. Once again to some contemporaries, including leading radoslavists, this idea was 'not to be taken seriously' because it was known in advance that the leader of the Liberals would not succeed.[14] But, as in all previous cases, Radoslavov struggled to remain in the authority. First, he talked with D. Petkov, hoping that he would not resign. Then he tried to restructure the cabinet without the Liberals. It was expected that the entry of two or three new ministers would attract several others to them and secure a majority. This presumption also had a failure, after which the Prime Minister faced the opposition. With the help of Ch. Iv. Popov, he negotiated with Alexander Stamboliiski, but the latter refused to make any commitment from prison, and his associates in the National Assembly were unwilling to support the government until his amnesty.[15]

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[10] According to P. Peshev this takes place on the 1st of June (Peshev 1993, 544), but on V. Koznichky's resignation the date written is 30th of May – CSA, f. 313к, op. 1, a. e. 544, l. 1.

[11] Popular term for a member of the People's Liberal Party.

[12] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 385.

[13] Followers of Dobri Petkov.

[14] Mah 2002, 648.

[15] Peshev 1993, 544; Girginov 1936, 356-357, etc.

During the negotiations with V. Radoslavov, the Democrats initially had some concerns, but they were more likely to fear the establishment of military power, led by Gen. Zhekov, than from the restoration of the Radoslav's advisors. To insure against such a possibility, Hr. Slaveykov, who lived and worked in Kyustendil, attended the Headquarters. There, in conversation with the commander-in-chief, he was relieved to see that the general was not willing or thinking of forming a cabinet.[16] This information finally determined his party's negative position on making coalition with the Liberals.

On June 13th, Gen. N. Zhekov deposited in the palace a huge report describing the bad condition of the army and urging the change of government. This forced the tsar to pressure Radoslavov to resign on June 15, presenting his own actions as independent of him.[17]

Despite the desperate political situation in mid-June, the Liberal leader still lived with the illusion that he could remain in power. His close associates demonstrated greater realism, though for some time he did not allow them to declare openly their separation from government.[18] The end of it came on June 21st. Ferdinand accepted his resignation 'despite his sympathy'.

In his memoirs, Toma Vasilyov noted that Radoslavov's cabinet fell 'under the weight of his terrible sins',[19] but that was only part of the truth. With the removal of the Liberals from power, the king pointed to the 'most responsible' for the failure, hiding his own mistakes this way. In addition, Malinov formed a new cabinet of radicals and democrats, without the Germanophile D. Petkov, despite his promise. That way Ferdinand hoped to escape from his own responsibility for the failure.

Although during the First World War there were many scandals and controversies between Tsar Ferdinand and Dr. V. Radoslavov, according to the leaders of the Liberals, the two remained friends.[20] That offended the Liberal Party leader's prestige. In order not to be suspected of bad intentions by the Germans, the king drove him in his car, together with the princes Boris and Cyril, and Princess Evdokia, and made a demonstration tour in Sofia. With a special rescript, he awarded V. Radoslavov the highest medal 'St. St. Cyril and Methodius' on the 29th of July.[21] That ceremony reminded of an

[16] Maleev 1921, 28-29.
[17] Narodni prava No 140/ 22. Jun. 1918; Pryaporets No 135/ 17. Jun. 1918; NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 386. See Maleev 1921, 109-110.
[18] In his memoirs Geshev writes that after he says goodbye to his cabinet's personnel, he writes a short report in 'Narodni Prava', which is forbidden to be printed by Radoslavov – Peshev 1993, 544.
[19] Vasilyov 1938, 75.
[20] Peshev 1993, 618.
[21] CSA, f. 313к, op. 1, a. e. 13, l. 1.

older generation and the 'tour' of Ferdinand and Stambolov, who was also awarded a medal and a high rescript.[22]

There were hidden motives for the monarch's demonstrative act. The German political press acknowledged the great advantages of the Bulgarian minister for his country and for Germany, and hoped that the change would not cause conflict in the union.[23] Ironically, Dr. Radoslavov's resignation was submitted exactly the same day the German Kaiser celebrated 40 years since his ascension to the Prussian throne.[24] The Bulgarian 'gift', made with the active assistance of Coburg, was not welcomed in Berlin. During the period of the assignment of Malinov and the resignation of Radoslavov, the crowned Prince Boris arrived with a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm II to Tsar Ferdinand, at Radoslavov's house, with the following text:

'I am sorry to hear that you had parted ways with Prime Minister Dr. V. Radoslavov, a supporter of German-Bulgarian cooperation and union, a person among others who thought that German-Bulgarian collaboration contributed to a greater extend for the needs at that moment. So you remain the only comrade- in -arms for me. In your face, I see a guarantee that this collaboration of ours will continue in the future. I wish you good health, loyalty and stability!

Your Wilhelm IR /Emperor Rex/' [25]

The Prince left the telegram to V. Radoslavov and did not comment on it, because the meaning of the text was quite clear. Only a few Bulgarian politicians were rated so highly by foreign crowned heads. At the same time, the confidence which the Kaiser demonstrated Radoslavov clearly indicated his firm foreign policy orientation, which in 1918 was no longer beneficial to the country. The reasons for this were the following.

Following the peace contract treaties with Russia and Romania, Dr Radoslavov's government received some approval for his foreign policy course, but it was temporary. At that time, some Bulgarian politicians were optimistic and did not realize that the great war brought failure to their allies. As one contemporary said, 'German concerns were not the same as Bulgarian'. In addition, the Dobrudzha's incomplete annexation gave the opposition a dangerous weapon that was used to destroy the cabinet.[26] The best strategy

[22] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 386-387; Pryaporets No 140/ 23. Jun. 1918.
[23] Pryaporets No 136/ 18. Jun. 1918; No 139/ 21. Jun. 1918; No 140/ 23. Jun. 1918; Narodni prava No 140/ 22. Jun. 1918; No 141/ 25. Jun. 1918 etc.
[24] Pryaporets No 136/ 18. Jun. 1918.
[25] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 386.
[26] Mah 2002, 635, 646. According to this author the German Government, in its desire to stabilize Talaat Pasha's position, weakens Radoslavov's cabinet – Mah 2002, 647. See Peshev 1993, 540.

for Bulgarian foreign policy at that time was to open negotiations for a separatist peace, but this meant giving up Macedonia and Moravia, which for Radoslavov and the surrounding liberals was a political suicide.[27] As representatives of the older generation of politicians willing full national unity, they could not take such a step,[28] but they did not wish to give up the governing either. The strategy of the leaders of the liberals was loyalty to the allies and an attempt to reach common peace. The biggest obstacle the Bulgarians were facing was the restoration of Serbia after the conquest of Bitola. V. Radoslavov realized that quite clear,[29] but wasn't able to manage with the circumstances. The good journalist, writer and expert in Bulgarian psychology, Richard von Mach, explicitly stated that Bulgarian people were indifferent to Germany, hated Austro-Hungary and did not want to fight for their interests. However, their leaders, in the face of Ferdinand, Radoslavov, Tonchev, Zhekov, International Macedonian-Edirne Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) leaders and many others wanted with German help to accomplish the Bulgarian unification and were willing to contribute to the overall victory for all one is worth.[30] That stand and position explained some of the acts of Bulgarian diplomacy in the last months of the war.

In the historical literature, Dr. V. Radoslavov was most often presented as an absolute Germanophile and a steady Russophobe. This was not true. The politician was a nationalist with all the good and bad ideas about this concept. He was fighting for the prosperity of his own nation and wanted to 'make politics work' with all countries, including the Liberator and Germany. It was a shared conception by his close fellow liberals, which was mentioned in the sources.

Immediately after the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk was signed, the Bulgarian foreign minister began negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. His hopes were related to the idea of restoring trade and importing food. Dimitar Rizov, the Minister of Berlin in Berlin, was keen to leave for Petersburg, but he insisted to leave before the exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries.[31] For that reason, the former Minister

[27] IMRO's activists warn that Macedonia and Moravsko must stay within Bulgarian territory at all cost – see NBKM – BIA, f. 263, op. 1, a. e. 29, l. 51-58. Letter of Al. Protogerov to V. Radoslavov, 12 February 1918.

[28] In his testimony before the State Court the former plenipotentiary minister in Switzerland G. Pasarov claims that he has never given him any instructions on starting negotiations with American diplomats for signing a separatist Peace treaty, which, according to other sources have been in the process of negotiations by Sofia Archimandrite Stefan – see Peshev 1993, 583.

[29] Radoslavov 1993, 145.

[30] Mah 2002, 634.

[31] The opinion that he has been firmly 'determined' to go to Moscow (Radoeva 2014, 222) is unacceptable because Rizov dies unexpectedly on the 23rd of April – see Radoeva 2014, 223.

Plenipotentiary of Belgrade, St. Chaprasikov was chosen for this position. He was not a leading liberal, but his appointment to the post was because of the fact that he was very close to King Ferdinand.[32] However, the choice was successful because a person with good diplomatic skills, some experience and loyal to the liberals was chosen. Chaprashikov's assignment as a Minister in Russia was on May 21st, 1918. A week later, he leaded a five-person delegation. Among them were the lawyer, a member of the Central Liberal Bureau Metody Mavrodiev and the liberal M. Gerov. On June 2, the Bulgarian delegation was already in Russia, and on June 10 Chaprashikov delivered his credentials. Thus, Radoslavov established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Soviet Russia, disproving the myth that it happened in 1934.[33]

Following the establishment of Chaprasikov, the Bolshevik government was preparing in June for the arrival of its diplomatic representative in Sofia. Iv. Pinkel was assigned as such, he was married to a Bulgarian but after the fall of the Radoslavov's government, things were slowed down. Having in mind other reasons, Malinov restricted Bulgarian contacts with the Bolsheviks and Mavrodiev and Gerov were called back to Bulgaria in July.[34] After a little while, on August 9, Chaprashikov was summoned for a report in Sofia and did not return. On the orders of the new Prime Minister, the governor of the Bulgarian Legion Georgiev moved it to Pskov-occupied by German troops in mid-September. Thus, the Bulgarian-Russian official relations had been frozen for more than 15 years.[35]

In the spring of 1918, the personal attacks on Radoslavov and his circle of liberals increased. On May 13, a small article appeared in the press of the Democratic Party with 'gratitude' from the Turkish Red Crescent for delivering 10,000 kg of quinine for the needs of the Turkish army by the Sofia merchant and a member of the board of the Bulgarian Red Cross, H. Georgiev.[36] A major public scandal erupted because that was at the time of a malaria epidemic that had almost destroyed the Belomorian Bulgarian Army. Even the German Reichstag's attention was caught.

V. Radoslavov's son- in- law - Hr. Georgiev got panicked and blamed Grigor Vasilev, the editor-in-chief of the 'Pryaporetz', and the commander-in-chief N. Zhekov for the 'intrigue'. He also tried to prove his innocence with documents from the BRC and from customs. He wanted an explanation from

[32] From 1907 to 1914 r. he is his secretary – see Stoyanovich 2012, 436.
[33] Markov 2012, 325.
[34] It is possible that this has been done, because the Democrats start to purge Radoslavov's officials – see NBKM – BIA, f. 263, op. 1, a. e. 15, l. 85; NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 400.
[35] Spasov 2008, 29-30.
[36] Pryaporets No 107/ 13. May. 1918.

'Pryreporets' through 'Narodni prava': 'Which H. Georgiev was it about?', but the defense itself was naive and rose public doubts about the committed crime. The Democrats' representative kept silent on the issue, but the scandal had been announced by the 'Mir' newspaper. The Prime Minister had to deal with the problem himself. He ordered to make inquiries into the circumstances concerning the supply of quinine to Turkey on the request of Dr. Georgiev. Georgiev also appealed for the arrest of Gr. Vassilev, but at that time the situation of the government was troubled and the minister of Interior did not have the courage to do it.

On June 18, Radoslavov resigned and the investigation was delayed, but with the coming of Democrats to power, it began again. The financial inspector D. Stanchev left for Berlin in early August. There, he found that on December 14, 1917, Georgiev sent six crates weighing 727 kilograms from Berlin, but failed to specify exactly what they contained. On September 2, 'Pryaporetz' published the protocol, dated August 8, and again raised the issue of a judicial inquiry.[37] The same month Georgiev went to Vienna. Many people thought he was trying to escape, but he returned. Soon, an investigation against him began. The prominent member of the BRC was held responsible for an offence of art. 111 and 114 of the Criminal Code. He was accused of exporting directly from Germany to Turkey 10,000 kg of quinine, equivalent to 200,000,000 quinine jelly beans, in the total of three million BGN. Even before the inspections were completed, the police arrested Georgiev in early November 1918,[38] because at that time V. Radoslavov was already in Germany. According to the highly frightened and investigated Liberal, Gr. Vassilev wanted to see him 'hanged', and that the Minister of Interior Mikhail Takev hated the Radoslav family and imprisoned him in the Fifth Police Station in the capital, along with Radomir 'rebels' (said by Hr. Georgiev, B.A.), to punish him. The last did not happen. Taking advantage of the still powerful influence of the leading liberals in society, Georgiev appealed to the Speaker of the Seventeenth National Assembly, Dr. Dimitar Vachov. During the investigation, the government of Al. Malinov resigned and was replaced on November 28, 1918 by a new one, headed by Teodor Teodorov.[39] The National Assembly had not been dissolved and Vachov used his official position to request the judicial authorities to provide evidence of Dr. Georgiev's arrest. So far, no such documents have been found, which was why the Speaker of the National Assembly, who was also a famous lawyer, went through all the courts. At the end a committee had been convened at the Justice Ministry, which found no reason to waive the immunity of Hr. Georgiev to be put on

[37] Pryaporets No 197/ 2. Sept. 1918.
[38] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 403-407, 412.
[39] Metodiev & Stoyanov 1987, 319.

trial and he was released. The case remained unfinished and was resumed on November 4, 1919, when he was arrested again, along with all ministers and representatives of the Radoslavov coalition. Georgiev was accused of visiting Germany with his followers. His aim, according to the prosecution, was to liaise with ruling figures there. Later, together with their 'accomplices' liberals (ministers and people in authority), the indiscriminate export of foodstuffs from Bulgaria to Germany began, which weakened the people and the army and later led to failure.[40]

The political reason of such an 'accusation' was more than visible. It was quite possible that Dr. Hr. Georgiev had transgressed the law by carrying out illegal exports, but the newly appointed financial inspector Stanchev had failed to gather any evidence of such activity other than the publication in 'Pryaporets'. As a result, the prosecutor's office attempted to prosecute the arrested deputy in another case related to the export of 100,000 kg of wool from Bulgaria to Germany. The accusations were proved by a letter from the convicted of a connected with the authority abuse in the administration of V. Radoslavov, former secretary of the State Forestry and Water Administration Ivan Zlatev.[41] He visited Penka Radoslavova while her husband was in prison and insisted on telling her husband Christo that if he was not nominated as an inspector at 'his' bank,[42] 'he will not get out of prison'. Peter Peshev heard about the case while he was in a cell with Hr. Georgiev. Radoslavov's deputy told his son-in-law that Zlatev was a man with no morals. He was a former teacher in the Sevlievo region, whom Peshev first made district supervisor and then mayor of Sevlievo. Peshev brought Zlatev to the capital and found him a job in the editorial office of 'Narodni prava'. In return, he received a letter from Zlatev against him in the 'Mir' newspaper.[43] The above points clearly show the lack of moral of some liberals who back then had power; who, at the end of World War I and shortly after, tried to get rich through illegal means.[44]

Despite his many efforts, the prosecutor failed to gather serious evidence of import and export illegal deals against Radoslavov's son-in-law and his alleged associates. D. Tonchev, D. Petkov and Dr. Ivan Momchilov, Vice-

[40] NA - BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 468.

[41] Zlatev receives a 15-year prison sentence, but is pardoned by Ferdinand on the 15th of September 1918 at Radoslavov's personal request. After that Hr. Georgiev assigns him the position of a bank printing house's director – NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 420.

[42] This is about the Liberal party's bank, established several years ago. For its establishment see Georgiev 2007, 330-334.

[43] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 421.

[44] Near the end of the war, accusations of abuse regarding leading liberals come even from some of their supporters – Georgiev 2015, 57-72.

Chairman of the National Assembly, became witnesses. Zlatev's accusations of exporting wool with the help of Dr. V. Radoslavov were also dropped. The conclusion of the court against Hr. Georgiev was that he was released on May 26, 1921, and he spent almost 18 months in prison, but was finally justified in Investigation Case No. 4 of 1920 and Case No. 65 of 1921. Due to the lack of evidence, the case under Art. 20 of the Law of GGOP and Art. 111-114 of the Criminal Code was terminated. So Georgiev got out of prison.[45] He lived through the end of World War II and wrote memoirs to which we owe much of the personal information about Dr. V. Radoslavov and some of his closest friends.

Although Bulgaria's involvement in the First World War the German side had received relatively broad support, many had blamed for the failure of the Second National Disaster Radoslavov's government and his prominent Liberals and Young Liberals (among the last was the Minister of Finance Dimitar Tonchev). The main reason for that was the fact that for the accumulated social tension there had to be someone found guilty, and the identification of the 'one to be blamed' largely hides the 'minor' mistakes of other politicians. Even at the end of the war, the press reported abuse and stealing by the Radoslavov administration.[46] Some former officials had been sued and received effective sentences. However, serious attacks against the Radoslavists began only after the Thessaloniki truce was signed. During the Soldier's Rebellion, a socialist teacher offered the commandant of Sofia's fortified station Al. Protogerov to kill the Liberals leader, forcing the former prime minister to hide for some time.[47] On October 4, 1918, General Sava Savov told Radoslavov on the sidelines of the National Assembly that 'there will be beheading!'.[48] The threat was troubling the former prime minister because he could not rely on serious institutional support after Ferdinand's abdication. The decision to flee to Germany saved his life but destroyed his long-established political prestige. Leaving the country at the most difficult time of its existence as a free country did not correspond to the claims of being a top-class politician before.[49] After the death of the prominent statesman in Berlin in 1929, some politicians close to him tried to reduce the negative effect of leaving with an apology that he had been 'condemned by an unconstitutional court',[50] but they generally failed to erase the stain he himself had put on his political biography.

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[45] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 413-415, 420.
[46] Peshev 1993, 574; NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 452.
[47] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 466; Peshev 1993, 667.
[48] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 468.
[49] This is best understood by his peers, Petrova 1991, 97-98.
[50] Nardoni prava No. 267/ 3. Nov. 1929, 1-2.

The replacement of V. Radoslavov's cabinet with that of Al. Malinov on June 21, 1918 was not followed by a great change in Bulgarian foreign policy. Discussions on the formation of the new Council of Ministers were brief. Malinov received his term of office on June 17, before the official resignation of V. Radoslavov.[51] Understanding that because of the firm position of the palace, the foreign policy will not change, most parliamentary parties did not want to commit themselves to government. That was why the Cabinet of Ministers Malinov-Kosturkov set as its main task the improvement of the economic situation of the country and the pressure of the Allies for bigger discounts for Bulgaria after the 'victory'.[52] In practice, none of the wishes of the society was fulfilled.[53]

The two Prime Ministers maintained normal relations. On the day of the change, they had a meeting in the Council of Ministers,[54] where they talked for about an hour regarding the receipt and submission of documentation. At first, the public opinion was that the change of government was aimed at concluding a separatist peace and a gradual orientation towards the Entente.[55] Some authors even believed that the Bulgarian Masons' organization, encouraged by their American friends, seriously supported Malinov in his intentions.[56] More prudent and informed politicians, including the leaders of the Liberals, wisely thought that they could not expect a major change.[57] One of the reasons for this was the fact that Malinov's cabinet has only 35 MPs,[58] which were extremely inadequate to reverse the political course without the monarch's consent. At that time, Radoslavov was already in opposition, but liberals in the province still considered him as a factor in politics and inform him of occupation of work places as clerk men from democrats taking the place of his own supporters, who were previously asking him for help.[59] There were some people who supported their leader and resigned.[60] To reduce the prestige of the Liberals, 'Pryaporets' published telegrams of radoslavists to M. Takev in connection with different employments. The government's newspaper advisor commented in details and there was a positive attitude of the

[51] Pryaporets No. 136/ 18. Jun. 1918.
[52] Girginov 1937, 35-39; Pryaporets No. 138/ 20. Jun. 1918.
[53] Vlahov 1957, 268-278.
[54] Narodni prava No 140/ 22. Jun. 1918.
[55] According to contemporaries even the date for the peace treaty has been decided-15th of September – NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 452.
[56] Many protestants come to the Bulgarian one – May 2002, 650.
[57] Mir No 5438/ 21. Jun. 1918; No 5439/ 22. Jun. 1918 etc.
[58] Mah 2002, 648.
[59] See, for example NBKM – BIA, f. 263, op. 1, a. e. 15, l. 85.
[60] The county governor of Niš Dr. Enchev, Kyustendil's county chief, Tsarevo's mayor, etc. are among them – cf. NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 400.

German press to the new Bulgarian government and to the Prime Minister himself. There were debates related to the fact that Dr. V. Radoslavov had been 'lying for three years' to the Germans, that he was the only 'Germanophile' in Bulgaria and all the others were 'Russophiles', using it to stay in power.[61] At the same time, right after he took his new post, Malinov sent a telegram to German Chancellor Earl Hartling. With it, he formally informed him of the governmental change and stated that, as a foreign minister, he considered it 'his faithful duty' to ask for 'the same support and trust' that his predecessor had. The Democratic leader said he was determined to follow Radoslavov's foreign policy and accepted his 'rich heritage', and 'Pryaporets' gave publicity to the script by which Ferdinand awarded the former prime minister.[62] However, Democrats were afraid of the possible restoration of Radoslavov's authority and they accused the fallen prime minister of trying to get closer to the close socialists in order to return his power.[63] At the same time, the press described cases of illegal deals and stealing by Radoslavov's administration. The former Minister Dr. Peter Dinchev had been wrongly accused of exporting 50,000 lambs to Turkey.[64] Many former officials had been given to court, some with effective sentences like the district governor of St. Zagora Dakashev (convicted of ordering the requisition of pregnant sheep to feed the army), several district commanders and mayors that were liberals.[65]

Democrats' fears of V. Radoslavov's returning to power were not entirely groundless, because the German government and the monarch were unhappy with the unfavorable developments. As we indicated above, in September, 1918 Georgiev went to Vienna. There was no information as to whether this was ordered by the Tsar or the Germans, but the following events indicated that Dr. Radoslavov was not informed. In the Austrian capital Georgiev met Mikhail Savov. He expressed his 'sorrow' because of the poor relations between the government and the commanding general, believing that 'Ferdinand had something to do with it'. The parliamentarian informed the general that the Germans were dissatisfied with the situation in Bulgaria and were planning a combination Savov - Radoslavov. The former senior officer, who retired from active work, replied that this was 'madness' and that complications of the situation would follow in Bulgaria. He suggested that 'the old

[61] Pryaporets No 152/ 8. Jul. 1918.
[62] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 387. On the 11th of July Malinov makes an announcement in the National Assembly that an alliance with Germany is a 'country necessity'. The same thing has been said in the newspaper 'Fosische Zeitung' – Peshev 1993, 546.
[63] Pryaporets No 203/ 9. Sept. 1918.
[64] Peshev 1993, 574.
[65] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 452.

Radoslavov' thinks in a similar fashion. Savov informed his interlocutor that he already knew about the plan of the German representatives, who offered to support it with military force as well, but he disagreed.

After his return to Sofia, Dr. Georgiev immediately met his father-in-law and informed him of the situation. Radoslavov was quite clear: 'Having in mind the present situation, they cannot allow changes in the government. It was a pity Germans weren't predictable at that time'.[66]

That conversation was announced decades after it happened and cannot be confirmed by other sources, but it most likely corresponded to the historical truth. An indirect confirmation of it was the fact that during his long political career, the leader of the Liberals never intended the fall of the government to cause harm of the national interests. And because of the situation at that time it would inevitably lead to a civil war that he did not want.

The opinion of some contemporaries was that after the withdrawal of V. Radoslavov from his authority the 'goodwill' towards Germany was lost,[67] and could not be considered to be correct. There were no significant changes in the official position at least. The Democrats were constantly publishing data on the annexation of Germans on the Western Front and versions of the beginning of peace negotiations widespread from Vienna. The visit of the Bavarian King to Bulgaria in the beginning of September was marked with extraordinary solemnity, and the breakthrough at Dobro Polje was shortly mentioned on the second page, and the information was that the Bulgarian troops were forced to retreat a little bit to the north. The information blackout continued in the following days, and on September 23rd 'Pryaporets' published an interview with the deputy commander-in-chief, acknowledging some of the successes of the troops, but did not mention about the breakthrough at the front.[68]

Unlike ordinary people, politicians were aware of the events from the beginning. Leading liberals were one of the first to know about what happened. On the evening of September 15th, at a reception on the occasion of the visit of the high Bavarian guest to the palace, Ferdinand whispered in Radoslavov's ear to wait for him at his house, because that night he was planning to take him to the hunting palace in Sitnyakovo located in Rila. There, the Coburg was trying to persuade the former prime minister to accept the prime ministerial post again, promising to appoint M. Savov as commander-in-chief. The Tsar predicted that, in case the military resisted,

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[66] NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 449-450.

[67] Mah 2002, 649.

[68] Pryaporets No 209/ 16. Sept. 1918; No 215/ 23. Sept. 1918. See also Pryaporets No 204/ 10. Sept. 1918; No 206/ 12. Sept. 1918; No 207/ 13. Sept. 1918; No 208/ 14. Sept. 1918; No 210/ 17. Sept. 1918; No 211/ 18. Sept. 1918; No 212/ 19. Sept. 1918 etc.

he was going to receive assistance from a German's army from Crimea, that on their way home would pass through Bulgaria to strengthen the German troops in Sofia and at the front.[69]

V. Radoslavov thought of the monarch's proposal as a 'mischievous and betraying adventure'. He was concerned that such an act would lead to misunderstanding and harm national affairs. Because of his patriotic feeling the leader of the liberals rejected the possibility of coming to power this way. A few days later, shortly before the Bulgarian delegation left for Thessaloniki, two German envoys visited him to persuade him to return to power. They assured him that Savov already agreed to head the General Command and that German help was going to arrive in days. Dr. Radoslavov politely refused, asking them in no way to try to change the political situation in Sofia by using force. But that of course, did not manage to prevent rumors spread in the capital that the former prime minister was preparing a taking over with German help.[70] The refusal of that politician to assist in the realization of that inappropriate adventure with a fatal end showed a lot about his personality and morals when it comes to his country. And in the meantime, events were happening quickly. On September 20th, the breakthrough at the Dobro Pole front increased to 50 kilometers in width and 45 kilometers in depth, there was inability to stabilize. Despite the opinion of the General Command for the continuation of the war,[71] some contemporaries believed that some of the senior officers were inactive, facilitating the enemy that way. Unlike General Vladimir Vazov, who defeated the British troops at Doiran on 16th of September,[72] the commander of the Second Army General Lukov was indifferent and did nothing in order to intercept and detach French and Serbian troops from the main forces. There was also unconfirmed evidence of betrayal related to the release of information to conspirators.[73] Soon even the Germans were convinced that they would not be able to change the situation in the country and left Bulgaria without attempting to change the government. In a complex and unfavorable environment for the Bulgarians, the leaders of the Liberals maintain a neutral position, which was the right decision.

The breakthrough at Dobro Pole, the massive offensive of foreign troops, miserable living conditions and anti-war propaganda all that unleashed the discontent of ordinary Bulgarian soldiers. On September 24th, the Soldier's Rebellion broke out. The rebels arrested officers from the Main Headquarters in Kyustendil and then turned to Radomir. Rumours for a declaration of

[69] NA - BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 450.
[70] NA - BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 451.
[71] Hristov 1999, 318 and cit. lit.
[72] Topalov 1968, 75-76.
[73] Peshev 1993, 575; NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 452, 455.

Bulgaria as a republic were spread.[74] At that time, the General Zhekov was ill and was being treated in Baden-Baden, Germany. Chief of Staff, General Chr. Burmov was at a Council in Sofia. According to him, neither Ferdinand, who was in Skopje from 16 to 23 September, nor the 'welcomed' guest in the capital, Todorov (Zhekov's deputy) were doing something to strengthen the front. This was the reason that the uprising enlarged.[75]

The Council of Ministers welcomed the news of the riots with a feeling of fear and, on September 25th in the morning, ignoring the king's opinion about the continuing war,[76] voted for a decision to give a start to a peace process. A delegation of Andrey Lyapchev, General Ivan Lukov and Dr. Simeon Radev left for Thessaloniki to negotiate a peace treaty[77]. Radoslavov, who was in opposition, approved it. In an interview with Dr. P. Nichkov, he unambiguously stated that 'the love for the country was not for sale by liberals', hoping that Lyapchev would receive the conditions previously offered to his government, but he was unable to accept because he was the person who concluded the contract with Germany. 'It does not matter that I will not win the glory, said the old politician ... now it is important for Bulgaria to succeed'.[78] At that point, the leading liberals did not even suggest what kind of collapse the country would have.

Immediately after the start of the uprising, Dr. N. Genadiev and Al. Stamboliyski were released from prison., followed by Rayko Daskalov.[79] It is widely believed that the leaders of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union would help to calm down the soldiers in Radomir, where they arrived on September 26th. That same day, the political speaker came out with an announcement-first page announcement informing the public that the cabinet had made a formal proposal for a truce and peace on September 25th.[80] However, Daskalov soon seceded from the delegation and headed the uprising, and Stamboliyski returned to Sofia to persuade the government to hand in the power without the means of bloodshed.[81]

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[74] Hristov 1961, 55-56.
[75] NA - BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 454.
[76] General Zhekov has a similar point of view from Baden - see Maleev 1931, 102.
[77] Cholpanov 1999, 321.
[78] Narodni prava No 267/ 3. Nov. 1929, 9.
[79] The official announces only about Genadiev's release, because he has been officially pardoned – see Pryaporets No 218/ 26. Sept. 1918. The version that Minister of War S. Savov gives a letter to Malinov from the still imprisoned Genadiev, warning that a riot is in the making but the Prime minister doesn't concern himself with it 'because of the sender'. He ignores the news from a Switzerland's newspaper as well, in which the plan of Dobro Pole's attack has been explained in detail. Liberals are aware of this – cf. NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 458.
[80] Pryaporets No 218/ 26. Sept. 1918.
[81] Ognyanov 1978, 110-112.

The betrayal of agricultural leaders was condemned by all the parliamentary political parties, without some socialists. Even the parliamentary group of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union declared itself against the uprising.[82] Liberals, as well as other parties, welcomed the 'rebellion' as an attempt to overthrow the established constitutional order. V. Radoslavov had a personal reason to be afraid, because, as we stated above, his life was threatened.

On September 29th, the Bulgarian delegation, headed by A. Lyapchev, made a truce under extremely difficult conditions. It contained an explicit and secret part hidden from the common people.[83] In order to familiarize the deputies with the secret conditions, the National Assembly convened a closed session on the 4th October. That was the last day when Dr. V. Radoslavov actively participated in the political life of his country.

From its beginning, the closed session became a field of attacks against the government. When being asked about the reasons for the breakthrough at Dobro Pole, Malinov replied that it was a betrayal. MPs urged to know who did it. For a moment, because of the tension the Prime Minister lost consciousness. That turned aside the issue because other problems were also important and needed to be discussed. The Liberals accused the Democrat leader of deliberately weakening the front in order to use this as an excuse for the Allies to start negotiations. Their opinion was that the country was voluntarily subjecting itself to extremely difficult conditions which would come with the discussed peace treaty.[84] However, MPs were forced to approve the truce because in fact Bulgaria had no other options.[85]

As was mentioned above, after the end of the meeting, Gen. Savov threatened Radoslavov with punishment. Ferdinand, who was in fear of his life during the uprising,[86] abdicated on October 2th.[87] That was an extremely unpleasant moment for the former Prime Minister because the old monarch was his guarantee against future persecution. In connection with the truce, Bulgaria had to be abandoned by German troops as well, and was expected to be occupied by other troops. Due to the situation, he made the difficult

[82] Mir No 5519/ 28. Sept. 1918; Pryaporets No 220/ 28. Sept. 1918 etc.
[83] The news about the truce take about 14 lines of the Government's newspaper – Pryaporets No 221/ 30. Sept. 1918.
[84] This thesis is expanded in the following years – cf. Petkov 1927, 158; Peshev 1993, 578-579, 592; NA – BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 460.
[85] Certainly, the Government newspaper presents the event as a demonstration of the civil duty of the governors in order to sign a peace treaty cf. Pryaporets No 226/ 5. Oct. 1918.
[86] The monarch spends the 29th and the 30th of September in a special wagon at the train station in Nadezhda village (today a borough in Sofia, BG), guarded by five soldiers, ready to travel to Hungary at any moment, cf. Hristov 1999b, 324.
[87] Markov 2006, 335.

decision to leave his country. The preparation for this had been kept secret even from his closest political supporters. For example, Peshev found out about the departure three days later when Ev. Radoslavova invited him to his house to tell him the unpleasant news.[88] His son-in-law Hr. Georgiev was also very surprised. In his memoirs, he noted that in October the 6th or 7th (October 5, B.G.) he went to Radoslavov's house and was puzzled when he saw him wearing a long gray winter coat and a cap. On the question where he was going, his father-in-law answered by saying only 'I'm leaving'. According to Hr. Georgiev's memoirs, he did not take anything with him and he was not disguised. A German military car came and drove him to Rakovski Street near Dondukov Blvd. From there, another car drove him to the German military ramp in the village of Nadezhda. He got on a sanitary train and left for Berlin. He had travelled for six days, without heating or light and with a small amount of food.[89] That memory dispelled the myth that the Liberal leader was under house arrest, that he escaped illegally, and was dressed as a nurse, left the country with a shaved beard, as a German soldier with a helmet on his head, or even in a German general's uniform.

Dr. Radoslavov's escape to Germany was not only undermining his political prestige, but that of the party members too. Leaving the country at such a time did not meet the demands of a high-class politician. As Sultana R. Petrova precisely commented, if Radoslavov 'claims' that he was working 'falling out of love for the country', then, after taking up the difficult task of leading Bulgaria, 'he was obliged to remain in his position' and 'to die with dignity', bearing all the consequences along with the nation he loved. He 'chose to save himself and remain calm and quiet'. 'Bulgaria's misfortune was that at the most crucial moments, the country was left without conscious and clever executives!'.[90] To this we should add that just a year after its leader escaped, his decades-lasting party was in deep crisis and became part of a new formation called the National Liberal Party. Very soon, some of its leaders declined the old leaders, declaring they were national traitors.

In the relatively short Bulgarian history after the Liberation, the 'great politicians' who left their country for a while or forever were many. P. Karavelov and P. Slaveikov, Dr. Tsankov, Al. Ludskanov, M. Madzharov, D. Yurukov, S. S. Bobchev, dozens of officers and rebels, the leaders of the peasant revolts in 1900, who went to Romania, R. Daskalov, who in 1918 went to Thessaloniki, etc. The chain did not end with Dr. Radoslavov, it continued with Al. Obov, R. Daskalov, G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov, Al. Tsankov, Hr. Statev, Prof. L. Vladikin and many others. A syndrome, probably acquired during the

[88] Peshev 1993, 627.
[89] NA - BAN, sb. 4, op. 1, a. e. 106, ch. II, l. 478.
[90] Petrova 1991, 97-98.

Renaissance. Only the countries that accepted Bulgarian political emigrants were different. Of course, it should be noted here that in Europe, including the Balkans, political emigration was a common phenomenon, and Bulgaria itself in many cases hosted 'refugees', one of whom, for example. was N. Pašić, who thanked appropriately for his salvation. If we must speak truly, historical fact was that the President of the Central Liberal Bureau was followed by very few of his close supporters. Most of his prominent party members prefered to remain and bear the burden of political and social responsibility in their homeland.

The Liberals governing in the years of the First World War were associated with a series of ups and downs. The expectations that with German help there would be national unification were fulfilled for a short period of time in the late 1915 and early 1916, making their leaders the most popular figures in the country. Some of them gained the respect of part of their political opponents, which was a rare phenomenon in Bulgaria. Things were about to change in the years to come. In strategic terms, a significant mistake was made with the agreement with the German command that the Bulgarian army should not pursue forces on Greek territory. Some diplomatic mistakes had been made. The duration of the war severely exhausted the nation. In its desire to occupy a wider area, the Bulgarian state took unreasonable risksdue to the maximalism of King Ferdinand and some of his surrounding advisors, mostly among liberals. The weakness of this strategy was the exaggeration of Bulgaria's chances of success. Unjustified optimism that cost a lot. Maximalism and endless optimism stopped them from attempting to leave the Quadruple Alliance and conclude a separatist peace when, after the US intervention in the war, it became clear that the Central Powers would lose it. Macedonia's refusal was an overwhelming barrier to such a decision for liberals. Pursuing an unrealizable dream, they did not consider the option to give up the power to the opposition in order to realize a more limited but saving option for Bulgaria. Of course, in this connection the great ambitions of the monarch were strongly and infinitely an obstacle. Thus, in the critical year 1918, the country faced difficult economic, military and diplomatic problems. Despite those weaknesses, the Liberals in power were demonstrating high qualities. Many disputes with the Allies had ended in favor of Bulgaria, such as maintaining diplomatic relations with the US, restoring those with Russia and the Dobrudzha issue. The criticisms of the last ones were completely groundless, an expression of a political desire to overthrow the Radoslav cabinet from power. The comparison between his governing and the pitiful 'diplomacy' of Al. Malinov at the end of the war, which intensified the Second National Disaster, is enough. Since the time they were not in power, the leaders of the Liberals had been strongly accused of promoting corruption and even directly engaging in illegal transactions. It

was an indisputable fact that there were not many cases of illegal coming to wealth but none of the Liberals' ministers and the ones close to their leader was directly involved in anything like that, except for the investigation of Dr Hr. Georgiev and some planted saplings in the farmyard of Dr. P. Dinchev. Giving an assessment of the overall politics of the leading liberals in 1918, it must be noted that it was not completely unsuccessful. The mistake lay in the decision to include the Central Powers in the war. The all or nothing method took a huge risk. 'Success' lied in the brilliant realization of what had been started, especially with regard to foreign policy. At some point, Bulgarians almost 'touched' their national ideal, which gave the nation the power to push away defeat for years. Strategists of all this were Dr. Radoslavov and his closest companions, but they had no power to finish what was started and at the end of the war become helpless witnesses of the second national crash.

NA – BAN – Nauchen Archiv – Balgarska akademiya na naukite
CSA – Central State Archive
NBKM – BIA – Natsionalna Biblioteka 'Sv. Sv. Kiril i Metodii' – Balgarski istoricheski arhiv

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Представители Дома Романовых и российско-болгарские отношения в годы Первой мировой войны (Representatives of the Romanovs' Imperial family and Russian-Bulgarian relations during the First World War)

Gregory Shkundin

Abstract: The article examines the attitude of the Russian Emperor Nicholas II and his closest relatives to the Bulgarian monarch Ferdinand I during the First World War – from the very beginning, when Bulgaria still remained neutral, and then, after it entered the war on the side of Germany, and in fact against Russia. This personal attitude was not always adequate. It was transferred to the sphere of interstate relations and had a negative impact on the formation and implementation of the Russian military-strategic and foreign policy.

Key words: World War I, Russian-Bulgarian relations, Romanov dynasty, Ferdinand I of Bulgaria

Резюме: В статията се разглежда отношението на руския император Николай II и неговите най-близки родственици към българския монарх Фердинанд I в годините на Първата световна война, отначало, когато България все още е била неутрална и впоследствие, когато влезнала във войната на страната на Германия, и фактически срещу Русия. Това лично отношение не винаги е било адекватно. То се пренесло в сферата на междудържавните отношения и оказало негативно влияние върху формирането и осъществяването на руските военно-стратегическа и външна политика.

Еще до начала Первой мировой войны представители Дома Романовых искренне полагали, что Болгария, обязанная Российской империи своим освобождением от почти 500-летнего османского ига, в знак благодарности и признательности должна незамедлительно выступить на стороне своей освободительницы в 'решающей схватке между сла-

вянством и германизмом', и оказать помощь Сербии. Тот факт, что Болгария сразу же так не поступила, а вместо этого втянулась в длительный дипломатический торг с обеими воюющими коалициями – Антантой и Центральными державами, – об условиях своего возможного участия в войне, вызывал у Романовых дополнительное раздражение. Кульминация дипломатической битвы за Болгарию пришлась на лето 1915 г., которое так и вошло в историю под названием 'болгарского лета'.[1] В это время царь Болгарии Фердинанд Саксен-Кобург-Готский и глава правительства 'либеральной концентрации' д-р В. Радославов были введены в заблуждение 'Великим отступлением' российской армии и временными успехами германского оружия. Сочтя их предвестниками скорой и окончательной победы Центральных держав, болгарские руководители 6 сентября 1915 г. примкнули к Германии, Австро-Венгрии и Турции.[2]

22 сентября Радославов объявил всеобщую мобилизацию. Как отмечал через неделю в своем дневнике командующий лейб-гвардии конной артиллерией великий князь Андрей Владимирович, двоюродный брат Николая II, '*мобилизация в Болгарии вызвала взрыв негодования во всей России*'.[3] Ведь теперь нападение болгарской армии на Сербию, 'малого' союзника Антанты, становилось вопросом лишь нескольких недель. 5 октября страны Антанты разорвали дипломатические отношения с Болгарией. На следующий день Андрей Владимирович дал в дневнике выход своему возмущению: '*Трудно даже писать, какие чувства мы все переживаем при виде предательства Болгарии. Одно безусловно – это, что Болгария вычеркивается из славянской семьи, а Фердинанд Кобургский навеки покрыл себя несмываемым позором*'.[4] Спустя еще четыре дня, несмотря на то, что из всей династии Романовых наиболее близок с болгарским монархом был именно Андрей Владимирович, великий князь язвительно добавил: '*Мы не сомневались со дня начала войны, что он ищет удобный момент отомстить России за все неприятности, которые он лично испытал. Несомненно, что последние события ничего общего с интересами Болгарии не имеют; все это личная политика Фердинанда, политика мести мелкого авантюриста*'.[5]

Надо признать, что во многом великий князь был прав. Почти на всем протяжении своего к тому времени 28-летнего правления в Бол-

[1] См. подробно Notovich 1947, 72–81, 209–213, 224–230, 234–244; Ilchev 1990, 55–209.
[2] О переговорах главы болгарского правительства см. подробно Georgiev 2016, 396–426.
[3] Dnevnik 1925, 85.
[4] Dnevnik 1925, 88.
[5] Dnevnik 1925, 92.

гарии этот потомок Кобургов и Орлеанской династии испытывал на себе почти неприкрытую неприязнь большинства всех представителей Дома Романовых. Спустя месяц, 6 ноября, уже в условиях войны между Россией и Болгарией, Фердинанд перечислял российскому посланнику А. А. Савинскому все те обиды, которые он претерпел за 28 лет. Это и изначальное категорическое неприятие императором Александром III его кандидатуры на болгарский трон в 1887 г., и последовавшие попытки свержения Фердинанда, и длившееся потом долгих 8 лет его непризнание болгарским монархом, обрекшее Кобурга на дипломатическую изоляцию со стороны великих держав.[6] Даже после того, как молодой император Николай II в 1896 г. всё-таки удостоил Фердинанда официальным признанием, последний продолжал испытывать на себе недоброжелательное отношение со стороны Романовых. Это проявилось, в частности, в плохо прикрытом недовольстве Петербурга в связи с принятием болгарским князем в 1908 г. царского титула, что Николай расценил как 'поступок мегаломана'.[7]

Фердинанд не состоял в прямых родственных связях с Романовыми. Он был связан с ними свойством через великую княгиню Марию Павловну, урожденную принцессу Мекленбург-Шверинскую, супругу умершего в 1909 г. великого князя Владимира Александровича. Эта умная и властолюбивая женщина в 1908 г. активно содействовала второму браку Фердинанда. Он женился на двоюродной сестре Марии Павловны, принцессе Элеоноре Рёйсс цу Кёстриц. Последняя отличалась русофильством и во время русско-японской войны 1904–1905 гг. добровольно поступила в российскую армию, где, как опытная сестра милосердия, была назначена начальником 2-го санитарного поезда, содержавшегося на личные средства Марии Павловны. За бескорыстную работу по спасению больных и раненых российских воинов в 1907 г. Элеонора была награждена темно-бронзовой медалью 'В память русско-японской войны' с Александровско-Георгиевской лентой. Высокую награду ей вручил лично император в Петербурге. Во время брачной церемонии с Фердинандом Элеонора с гордостью украсила свое свадебное платье этим высоким знаком воинского отличия.[8]

Но женитьба на столь искренней приятельнице Дома Романовых не повысила в их глазах авторитет Фердинанда. Недостаточно уважительным, по мнению болгарского царя, было и отношение к его коронованной особе во время официального визита в Санкт-Петербург в 1910 г.

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[6] См. подробно Kosik 1993.

[7] Lepsius *et al*. 1925, N 9199.

[8] См. подробно: Zlateva 2010, 198–209; Bondary 2010, 137–149; Chukova 2012, 465–484.

Предметом насмешек служили нетрадиционная сексуальная ориентация Фердинанда, его женственность, изнеженность, суетность, склонность к театральным жестам и пристрастие к украшениям. Даже его длинный фамильный кобургский нос являлся непременным атрибутом политических карикатур. Они постоянно появлялись в российской прессе, особенно во время Балканских войн 1912–1913 гг. Тогда обуреваемый константинопольскими химерами Фердинанд готов был вступить во главе болгарской армии в Стамбул, дабы чуть ли не возродить Византийскую империю под своим скипетром. Конечно, указанная цель болгарского царя была нереалистичной, но она постоянно и реально присутствовала в его планах.[9] Это не могло не раздражать Николая II и других представителей Дома Романовых, весьма болезненно воспринимавших всё то, что касалось Константинополя и Черноморских проливов.[10]

В уже упомянутой беседе с Савинским 6 ноября 1915 г. Фердинанд жаловался: '*Россия меня оттолкнула и обидела. Сейчас в России ненавидят именно меня. Да, действительно меня ненавидят. Отняли мой полк* (болгарский монарх 12 лет был шефом 54-го Минского пехотного полка, в котором числились его сыновья, принцы Борис и Кирилл. – *Г. Ш.*), *мою почетную военную униформу, вычеркнули из списков кавалеров ордена Св. Андрея Первозванного*'.[11] Вряд ли этим царь хотел всего лишь дать удовлетворение своей злопамятности и мстительности. Он подчеркивал, что все случившееся – дело его рук, что он лично этого желал, так как не нашел, дескать, того отношения к себе, которого искал в России. И Фердинанд несколько раз повторил слова, которые и были самой существенной частью разговора: '*Si et quand je disparaîtrai de ce monde ou bien de l'horizon politique des Balkans, le pont entre les deux pays se refera*' (Если и когда я исчезну из этого мира или с политического горизонта Балкан, мост между двумя странами будет восстановлен). По мнению некоторых дипломатов, эта двусмысленная фраза была вызвана страхом Фердинанда перед лицом возможного возмездия со стороны России, его опасениями за будущее династии и стремлением, в самом крайнем случае, обеспечить болгарский престол хотя бы за престолонаследником Борисом, крестником Николая II.[12]

14 октября 1915 г. в 6 часов утра Болгария объявила войну Сербии, а ее армия вторглась на сербскую территорию. Для держав Антанты

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[9] Madol 1992, 74–79; Konstant 1992, 202–203, 244–245, 272, 295–302, 307, 309–310, 329.

[10] См. подробно: Bobroff 2000, 76–95.

[11] Savinsky 1927, 307.

[12] Анализ различных версий, связанных с этим разговором, который состоял целиком из недомолвок, см.: Shkundin 2007, 53–57.

это был казус белли. Император, еще с 5 сентября принявший на себя функции Главнокомандующего Русской армии, в это время находился в Ставке в Могилеве. Туда на подпись Николаю II и был направлен 18 октября подготовленный текст царского манифеста об объявлении войны Болгарии. Манифест был подписан 20 октября.[13] Швейцарец Пьер Жильяр, наставник детей императорской семьи, оказался случайным свидетелем того, как Николай II подписывал этот манифест. Император заявил Жильяру следующее: '*Если бы кто-нибудь мне сказал, что придет день, когда я подпишу объявление войны Болгарии, я счел бы такого человека безумцем, и вот, однако, день этот настал. Но я подписываю это, скрепя сердце, так как убежден, что болгарский народ обманут своим королем, и что бóльшая часть его сохраняет привязанность к России. Сознание племенного единства скоро пробудится в нем, и он поймет свое заблуждение, но будет поздно!*'.[14] В манифесте была заклеймена 'измена Болгарии славянскому делу' и не совсем правдиво, на наш взгляд, указывалось, что якобы союзные великие державы обеспечили Болгарии 'исполнение давних стремлений болгарского народа – присоединение Македонии'. Далее говорилось, что 'русский народ с тяжким сердцем обнажает против Болгарии меч, предоставляя судьбу изменников славянства справедливой каре Божией'.[15]

Возмущение в царствующем доме Романовых позицией Болгарии и её монарха было всеобщим. Если кто и был еще удивлен, что развитие событий дошло до русско-болгарской войны, так это уже упомянутый великий князь Андрей Владимирович, сын Марии Павловны. 20 октября он записал в дневнике полную горечи тираду: '*Россия, освободительница Болгарии, обнажила меч против Болгарии, которая восстала против своей освободительницы. Кошмарность этого явления не поддается описанию. Хотя и привыкли считать, что в политических вопросах сентиментальности нет места, но все же минимум некоторых принципов допускается. Принцип единокровия, единой веры, те принципы, которые руководят расами, соединяя их для противостояния иным расам, всегда были священны. Теперь и эти последние принципы попраны. Стыдно, глубоко стыдно должно быть ныне человечеству за все, чему свидетелем ему пришлось быть. Последние идеалы рухнули. Перед престолом Всевышнего да вопиют все те русские солдаты, на полях Болгарии за ее освобождение свою душу положившие. Вопием и мы, их потомки, в единой надежде, что те, кто виновны в этом, понесут свою кару и, ежели*

[13] Shkundin 2007, 29.
[14] Zhilyar 1990, 127.
[15] RV 1915, 7 (20) October.

народ болгарский был введен немцами в заблуждение, – да уразумит его Господь'.[16]

Императрица Александра Федоровна, никогда особенно не отличавшаяся взвешенностью оценок, в письме к своему августейшему супругу в те дни тоже изливала своей гнев в адрес «подлой», как она изволила выразиться, Болгарии: '*Черт побери эти балканские государства! Россия всегда была для них любящей матерью, а они изменили ей и сражаются с ней*'.[17]

Еще 10 октября французский посол М. Палеолог вырвал у Николая II обещание бомбардировать болгарские черноморские порты Варну и Бургас, а также Эвксиноград, что и было осуществлено 27 октября. Глава российской дипломатии С. Д. Сазонов позднее признавался: '*Мера эта, совершенно бесполезная, была мне чрезвычайно неприятна. Бомбардирование незащищенных городов, ставшее обычным явлением во время европейской войны, …казалось мне ничем не оправдываемым проявлением одичания*'.[18] Как сообщал Франо, германский консул в Варне, разрушения, причиненные бомбардировками, и количество жертв среди военных и гражданского населения, были незначительны.[19] Однако эти бомбардировки не были лишь символическим жестом. Помимо прочего, они имели целью минимизировать угрозу для черноморского побережья России со стороны германских подводных лодок, получивших теперь возможность базироваться в портах Болгарии.[20] К тому же, не только материальный урон тут был важен, но и нравственное впечатление от атаки. Ведь болгарский берег обстреливали суда под командой русского адмирала по приказу российского монарха, внука Царя-освободителя Болгарии!

После вступления Болгарии в войну на стороне Центральных держав среди государственных, политических и особенно военных деятелей стран Антанты время от времени всплывал вопрос о возможности заключения сепаратного мира с Болгарией. Однако Сазонов при обсуждении этого вопроса был вынужден считаться с неприязненным отношением Николая II к Болгарии, персонифицированным в давней неприязни к Фердинанду и производным от неё. Поэтому министр последовательно выступал против примирения с Болгарией, но лишь до тех пор, пока у власти в Софии оставался Фердинанд.[21]

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[16] Dnevnik 1925, 101.
[17] Цит. по: Pisarev 1993, 58. См. также: Nabokov 1922, № 119.
[18] Sazonov 1991, 288.
[19] Todorova 2002, 485, № 393.
[20] Kozlov 2001, 17–19.
[21] Telesheva *et al*. 1938, 350, 1; Shkundin 2007, 92, 103–107, 115–117.

29 апреля 1916 г. в Петроград прибыл глава сербского правительства Н. Пашич. 4 мая состоялась его аудиенция у императора в Царском Селе, длившаяся больше часа. Впоследствии, информируя принца-регента Сербии Александра о содержании этих переговоров, Пашич писал: '*В России нам было дано обещание как царем, так и министром иностранных дел, … что будет создана возможно более сильная Сербия, так как этого требуют не только сербские, но и русские интересы. Болгария же будет наказана, поскольку виноват не только Фердинанд, но и болгарский народ и все партии, которые с ним солидарны. Исправление нашей границы на востоке до Струмы и на западе в районе Видина не встретит возражений, так как Болгарию следует ослабить ради будущей безопасности Сербии и России*'.[22] В ходе этих переговоров сербов заверяли, что в Петрограде рассматривают Болгарию как врага русской политики, поскольку она мешает продвижению к Константинополю, что таково общее мнение Николая II, Сазонова и всего российского правительства.[23]

Эти данные, почерпнутые из сербской дипломатической документации, подтверждаются документами из российских архивов. Император подготовился к разговору с Пашичем. За день до аудиенции он принял князя Григория Николаевича Трубецкого, посланника в Сербии. Тот представил ему свою 'Записку о Сербии и Болгарии'. На архивной копии этого документа написано: '*Представлено на благовоззрение Государя Императора с краткой докладной запиской Министра* (т. е. Сазонова. – *Г. Ш.*) *о согласии с выраженным в этом письме*'. В записке говорится: '*По моему глубокому убеждению, основная причина выступления Болгарии на стороне наших врагов кроется в опасении ее увидеть Россию на Проливах. Прежде всего, Фердинанда не покидала мечта самому завладеть Константинополем. Но помимо того, как он, так и его сторонники отлично сознают, что, если Россия обоснуется на Проливах, то мечте о гегемонии Болгарии на Балканах будет положен естественный конец. Если Болгария не желает сильной России на Балканах,* – продолжал Трубецкой, – *есть ли у нас какой-нибудь интерес желать усиления Болгарии после ее преступного выступления на стороне наших врагов?*'. Затем в черновике записки содержится такая фраза, которой в окончательном варианте нет: '*Не будет ли попустительство с нашей стороны в этом отношении признанием нашей слабости?*'.[24] Очевидно, данный полёт мысли князь зачеркнул из верноподданнических побуждений, не желая травмировать чувства императора.

[22] Popovich 1977, 319.
[23] Popovich 1977, 314.
[24] AVPRI, F. 151, PA, Op. 482, D. 4024, l. 395–396.

В мемуарах об этой аудиенции Трубецкой написал: '*Я ... представлялся государю. Считая долгом сделать все, что мог, чтобы проводить мысль, в верности коей был убежден, что сдвиг на войне может быть достигнут только на Балканах одновременно с нашей стороны через Румынию и Союзниками от Салоник, я написал в этом смысле письмо Сазонову для представления государю на аудиенции... Те же мысли я доложил Государю, когда был принят*'.[25] В разговоре с императором Трубецкой солидаризировался с мнением сербского принца-регента Александра о том, что одержать верх над Болгарией представляется более осуществимым, чем ожидать скорого и полного успеха на европейских театрах войны. Он даже предлагал подумать над тем, '*можем ли мы ... предпринять какие-либо действия против Болгарии, если бы, например, было отсрочено наступление на нашем главном театре войны, где мы продолжали бы временно занимать оборонительное положение*'.[26] Когда разговор коснулся Болгарии, Николай сказал: '*Я выключил Болгарию из своего сердца*'. На это Трубецкой ответил: '*Да, но чтобы изменить это положение, нам нужно нанести удар болгарам, а это возвращает к тому, что я докладываю Вам*'.[27]

20 июля 1916 г. император заменил Сазонова на посту главы российской дипломатии Б. В. Штюрмером. Определяя российскую позицию в отношении Болгарии, престарелый бюрократ, искушенный в придворных интригах, но отнюдь не в дипломатии, также был вынужден считаться с неприязненным отношением императора к этой стране. В конце августа по инициативе российского военного командования в повестку дня встал вопрос о возможности династического переворота в Болгарии. Гиперосторожный Штюрмер, опасаясь сделать неверный шаг, решил запросить мнение Савинского по данному вопросу. По мнению последнего, Россия как монархическая держава не должна '*принимать в нём никакого активного и явного участия. Единственно, что нужно будет осторожно вселить в умы болгар, это что не только лично король* (царь Фердинанд. – *Г. Ш.*), *но и вся его династия не внушают нам доверия*'. Престолонаследника и будущего царя Бориса III Савинский характеризовал так: '*Политическая личность наследного королевича более чем сомнительна: во время событий, предшествовавших войне, масса признаков ... свидетельствовали о его открытой симпатии к немцам и австрийцам и к германофильской политике отца. Королевичу 24 года, но по своему развитию, характеру, незнакомству с делами, на которые он смотрит глазами отца, не позволявшего ему ни одной свобод-*

[25] Trubetskoi 1983, 272.
[26] AVPRI, F. 151, PA, Op. 482, D. 4024, l. 396–398.
[27] Trubetskoi 1983, 273.

ной мысли, не только действия, – он походит на 15-летнего мальчика'. Тем более безосновательными выглядели надежды на Кирилла, второго сына Фердинанда.[28]

Так Савинский обосновывал необходимость полного изгнания Саксен-Кобург-Готской династии из Болгарии. А вот вытекавшее из этих рассуждений дальнейшее предложение монархиста Савинского могло показаться Николаю II неожиданным. '*Восстановлять монархию было бы для нас крайне невыгодно: всякий иностранный принц не только из ныне дружественных нам домов, но даже из нашего царствующего дома, а тем более основатель национальной династии, сделавшись болгарским королём, будет неизбежно, силою вещей, стараться увеличить территорию и мощь своей новой страны; и чем ближе он будет к нам, тем нам будет труднее противиться его планам. Поэтому было бы практичнее всего способствовать будущему временному правительству превратиться в республиканское или федеральное*'. К череде аргументов в пользу республики Савинский добавил последний, 'приправленный' изрядной порцией цинизма и великоимперского снобизма: '*При страшной склонности болгар к политиканству, такое правительство на многие годы занялось бы своими внутренними делами, и таким образом одна из наших задач на Балканах, – воспрепятствование созданию слишком сильных государств была бы достигнута*'.[29]

Все это, вместе взятое, предопределило позицию императора – его категорический отказ договариваться с Болгарией. 3 сентября 1916 г., уже после начала военных действий между Болгарией и Румынией, Николай II заявил Штюрмеру после его доклада, что никакие переговоры с болгарами невозможны, пока Фердинанд остается на престоле. Инициатива переговоров ни в коем случае не должна принадлежать России. Однако Николай допустил возможность переговоров в случае отречения Фердинанда в пользу Бориса, своего крестника. Обратиться же к переговорам император полагал возможным только после нанесения Болгарии сокрушительного удара.[30]

С каждым днем неприязнь Николая II к Болгарии продолжала нарастать. Особенно явной и недвусмысленной она стала после того, как 5 сентября началось непосредственное российско-болгарское вооруженное противостояние в Добрудже. Вечером 19 сентября император в качестве Верховного Главнокомандующего беседовал в Ставке в Могилеве с генералом К. Коандой, представителем теперь уже союзной румынской армии. Коанда обратил его внимание на то, что 40 лет назад

[28] AVPRI, F. 138, SA, Op. 467, D. 578, l. 43.
[29] AVPRI, F. 138, SA, Op. 467, D. 578, l. 44.
[30] Semennikov 1927, 52, 149.

румыны сражались вместе с русской армией за освобождение Болгарии от османского ига. А ныне болгары вместе с турками сражаются против тех армий, которые им принесли свободу. На что Николай II ответил Коанде: '*Будьте уверены, мы накажем их так, как они даже не могут себе представить*'.[31]

В те дни родственники императора, великие князья из дома Романовых 'обрабатывали' его в антиболгарском духе, настаивая на занятии им твердой позиции, которой следует держаться во взаимоотношениях с союзниками. Например, один из деятелей так называемой 'великокняжеской фронды', дядя императора Николай Михайлович писал своему августейшему племяннику 9 сентября 1916 г.: '*Уже раньше меня поражало благожелательное отношение англичан... к Болгарии, а теперь это стало выражаться в более определенной форме. Если вообще англичане только считаются со странами, имеющими выходы к морям, что и есть преимущество Болгарии, то теперь явилась другая еще нота – привлечь болгар на сторону Союзников. Это уже не скрытое желание, а явное стремление выгородить именно болгар во вред прочим балканским народностям, и особенно несчастной Сербии, у которой нет нигде выходов к морю. Надо, значит, учесть заблаговременно эти английские тенденции, чтобы не дать им развиться и чтобы ко времени мирных переговоров не вышло бы неожиданного конфликта. Если советник посольства Линдлей осторожно только намекает на желательность щадить Болгарию, то добродушный Бьюкенен только и говорит об этом за последние недели. Ни французы, ни итальянцы не поддаются на эту удочку, но было бы желательно теперь же отрезать и поплавок*'.[32]

В эти месяцы в российских придворных кругах шли упорные слухи о том, что после свержения Фердинанда на болгарский престол готовится взойти двоюродный дядя императора великий князь Николай Николаевич-младший. Поскольку он бездетен, ему в наследники прочили Романа Петровича, сына его брата Петра Николаевича.[33] Но здесь все было непросто. Николай Николаевич и Петр Николаевич были женаты на сестрах – черногорских княжнах Анастасии (Стане) и Милице ('черногорских паучихах', как их называли за глаза). Их можно отнести к просербскому лобби в императорской фамилии, правда, с некоторой оговоркой, учитывая сложные отношения их отца, черногорского коро-

[31] BNR, D. Iliescu, F. 13; Popa 2010, 146-147, № 21.

[32] Semennikov 1925, 86.

[33] Semennikov 1925, 15. Еще весной 1916 г. эти слухи стали достоянием французской разведки. См.: NA-III-BAN, Collection 'Les Archives de Ministère des affaires étrangères. Paris', Europe 1914–1918, Sér. A, Car. 381, Dos. 3, P. 180; Guerre 1914–1918. Bulgarie, 6 NS/241, 223–225.

ля Николы, с сербской династией Карагеоргиевичей. Черногорки и особенно Николай Николаевич находились во враждебных отношениях с Г. Е. Распутиным, который пользовался репутацией 'царского друга' и через императрицу Александру Фёдоровну влиял на Николая II. Распутин же, как известно, с самого начала, еще летом 1914 г., был против того, чтобы Россия, защищая сербские интересы, ввязывалась в роковую и губительную для себя войну. По некоторым, правда, неподтвержденным данным, Распутин несколько раз в присущей ему загадочной, нечленораздельно-мистической манере проговаривал какие-то туманные проболгарские и антисербские фразы. Не потому, конечно, что он сочувствовал болгарскому национальному идеалу и негативно относился к сербскому, а потому что всеми силами стремился воспрепятствовать усилению группировки своего самого непримиримого врага Николая Николаевича.[34] Однако эти действия Распутина не повлекли за собой какие-то позитивные изменения в отношении императора к Болгарии.

В середине ноября 1916 г. российское военное командование предложило союзникам нанести удар на Салоникском фронте с целью разгрома болгар при содействии русско-румынских армий.[35] Это были последние, касавшиеся Болгарии, 'телодвижения' правящей элиты Российской империи перед революцией, свергнувшей царизм. Вместе с монархией канули в Лету и гипотетические планы представителей Дома Романовых о нанесении удара по Болгарии. Подводя итог, можно отметить, что их далеко не всегда адекватное личное отношение к этой стране и её монарху, перенесенное в сферу межгосударственных отношений, зачастую оказывало в годы Великой войны негативное воздействие на формирование и осуществление российского военно-стратегического и внешнеполитического курса.

AVPRI, PA – Archiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii, Political archive.

AVPRI, SA – Archiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii, Secret archive.

BNR, D. Iliescu - Biblioteca Nationala a Romaniei. Colectii Speciale. Arhiva Istorica. F. Saint Georges. Pachet XVI. Dos. 2. Arhiva generalului D. Iliescu.

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RV – Russkie vedomosti (Moskva)

[34] Berovski 1994, 217, 249.

[35] Rostunov 1975, 287–288.

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The political elites in the search for the culprits responsible for the First National Catastrophe

Todor Galunov

Abstract: The period of 1912-1913 is one of the most tragic periods in the Modern history of Bulgaria. As a result of The First Balkan War, in a short period of time, it looks as if our nation would finally be united within the Kingdom of Bulgaria. What follows shortly after is a National tragedy, instead of a triumph. After the Second Balkan War begins the search for the former ministers who are being held responsible. In 1914 a committee is established to investigate the facts around the rout. The committee works in the course of 5 years, but the found documents weren't brought up when it came to determining the guilt in the National Assembly.

Key words: ministers, war, investigation, parties, responsibility, catastrophe.

Резюме: Периодът 1912-1913 г. е един от най-трагичните периоди в новата история на България. В резултат на Първата балканска война за кратък период от време изглежда, че нацията ни най-накрая ще бъде обединена в рамките на Царство България. Малко след това следва национална трагедия, а не триумф. След Втората балканска война започва издирването на бившите министри, които носят отговорност. През 1914 г. се създава анкетна комисия, която трябва да проучи фактите около пътя и причините към националната катастрофа. Комисията работи в продължение на 5 години, но докладът и не е обсъден в Народното събрание.

The period of 1912-1913 is one of the most tragic periods in the Modern history of Bulgaria. As a result of The First Balkan War, in a short period of time, it looks as if our nation would finally be united within the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The treaty of London is signed on May 17, 1913 between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire with which the Empire is forced to cede its European territories. The treaty's clauses give a new hope to creating a bigger and stronger Bulgaria. Very soon this illusion is shattered. On June 16, 1913 the Second Balkan (Inter-allied) War breaks out, which brings the country to its knees.

On July 28, 1913 the Treaty of Bucharest is signed. According to article 2, Bulgaria cedes to Romania South Dobrudzha. Serbia is given a large portion of Macedonia, starting from the summit Pataritsa and ending at the crest of Mt. Belasitsa, where the Greek-Bulgarian boundary is situated (Art. 3). Greece gains territories with predominantly Bulgarian population. The border between Greece and Bulgaria starts at the end of the Bulgarian-Serbian border at the crest of Mt. Belasitsa and ends at the mouth of the Mesta river where it reaches the Aegean Sea (Art. 5).[1]

The remaining territories were split between Bulgaria and Turkey according to the Constantinople treaty signed on September 16, 1913. A significant part of Eastern Thrace was ceded to Turkey, while Western Thrace remained a Bulgarian territory.[2]

The mentioned treaties commemorate the end of the Inter-allied war, which brought the first national crisis in the modern history of Bulgaria. Against the backdrop of the national grief is raised the question about the responsibility for this rout which is carried by the governors.

On September 23, 1913[3], Tsar Ferdinand issues a decree with which the XV Ordinary National Assembly is dissolved, while the new election date is set for November 24, 1913. Immediately after this act, the Radoslavov government, consisting of the Liberal (Radoslavist) party representatives, Young liberals' party (Tonchevists) and the National Liberal party's two wings (Genadievists and Petkovists) makes a decision to set up a committee of adequate persons which will investigate the military supplies, requisitions, the state of the armed forces and sanitary work before and during the war. The aim of this action is to correct "the twisted ways of the political and public life".[4]

In the course of the pre-election campaign the factor that unifies the political parties, is that they all want the government investigation to happen. However, the investigation can take place, only if it is initiated by the National Assembly, which is dissolved for the time being, while the country is in a pre-election state. From this point of view, the pleads for a parliamentary investigation, coming from the political parties can be realised only after the establishment of a political chamber.

The elections for the XVI Ordinary National Assembly take place on November 24, 1913. During the wars in the new chamber of governors, the People's party (PP) has 5 MPs, while the Progressive Liberal party has only one.[5] This has never been perceived as something illegal, considering the fact

[1] Genov 1940, 401-417.
[2] Genov 1940, 419-425.
[3] CSA, f. 284, inv. 1, a.u. 3071; Narodni prava, No. 163/ 25. Nov. 1913.
[4] Kishkilova 1998, 67.
[5] SL, 16 ONA, I e.s., 5; Kishkilova 2016, 348 onwards.

that they were the people, who governed during the two wars, which brought Bulgaria its first National catastrophe in the country's Modern history. Something interesting is that during December the two parties act calmly towards each other, because of an article written by the former People's minister, who claims that Bulgaria is on the losing side, because it tries to cooperate with the Great Powers when it comes to politics, instead of acting alone. PP reacts strongly and argues that Romania is so successful because for a long time the country has been on the Great Powers' 'coattails'. The article is also seen as an attempt to question the Balkan union's expediency, created under Russia's guidance.[6]

The current state of the Parliament favours further discussions on the topic, regarding the responsibilities carried by Iv. Geshev's and St. Danev's Governments.

On December 30, 1913 the Prime Minister V. Radoslavov reads a government declaration at the National Assembly, in which one of the purposes of the Cabinet is, again, to begin a parliamentary investigation. Every party must participate in it and the committee will try its hardest to be unbiased in their search for the perpetrators who caused 'people's unnecessary grief throughout the war' and the problems with the deliveries.[7]

Meanwhile the MPs from the majority present a proposal to the NA, based on art. 106 subpara. (2) of the TC, that requires conducting a parliamentary investigation. The proposal is supposed to cover the actions of the former ministers who were part of Iv. Geshev's and St. Danev's cabinets during the wars. Some of the main points are the battles of Tchataldzha; the delay in London's negotiations; the lack of care that the military experiences; the way in which the Inter-allied War breaks out is called 'treason' and 'betrayal'.[8]

However, the XVI ONA doesn't want to start the movement that will seek ministerial responsibility from the cabinets of the Progressive Liberals and Narodnitsi. On December 31, 1913 it is dissolved by the monarch, because V. Radoslavov's cabinet doesn't receive any support for its politics from the chamber.[9] By doing this Tsar Ferdinand clearly shows that the political map on which he stakes is called 'Liberal concentration' with the current Prime Minister as the head. The elections for the new seventeenth ONA are set on February 23, 1914.[10]

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[6] Balgariya, No 73/ 14. Dec. 1913.
[7] SL, 16 ONA, I e.s., 28-32; Volya, No. 279/ 1. Jan. 1914.
[8] Volya, No. 279/ 1. Jan. 1914.
[9] DV, No. 1/ 2. Jan. 1914.
[10] DV, ed. 15 from 20. Jan. 1914. Georgiev 2018a, 65-86.

Bulgaria is again in a pre-election state. Apart from slowing down the eventual parliamentary investigation regarding the actions of the former ministers, it gives room for many pre-election clashes between the progressive liberals and the representatives of the People's party.

The sharp polemics between the parties regarding the responsible for the First National catastrophe clearly shows that this subject will be discussed by the new Chamber.

On February 23, 1914 the new elections for the XVII ONA are conducted. The new Parliament is convened on March 20, 1914.There V. Radoslavov's cabinet has slight majority compared to the opposition. The ratio of the MPs seats is 129 to 116.[11]

Sharp contradictions exist between these groups when it comes to the questions regarding Bulgaria's internal and foreign policy. But when it comes to searching for the people behind Iv. Geshov's and St. Danev's cabinets, there is little to no difference between the governors and the opposition (with the exception of People's party representatives and the Progressive Liberals).

In the first meetings, the MPs from the Government majority suggest that 'the NA should appoint people from the National representation for a test committee which should investigate in generals and more specifically the governing of the former cabinets of Iv. Geshov and St. Danev for the period from the preparation of the war to its end'.[12] Of course, the importers speak on behalf of the Bulgarians. Their claim is based on the Constitution. According to the TC art. 106 para. 2 and art. 109 the National representation has the rights to make suggestions and to appoint a committee of inquiry regarding the affairs of the executive.[13]

The parliamentary debates, at the Liberals' request, begin on April 21, 1914 and are concentrated on the critical moments, outlined by importers and covering the period from the preparation for the Balkan War to Bulgaria's downfall in the Inter-allied War.

NR is for a poll. At the NA Burov explains its aims like this: 1). To define whether or not the governors have committed crimes which would allow to start the procedure of giving them up to the state court, 2). To satisfy the Bulgarian nation, 3). To investigate whether 'our political and public life contains any limited disabilities', which appear during wartime 'more acutely'. The poll's the most important and the final point is that if any major faults are found in our political system we would need to 'reflect as a people, as a nation on the necessary measures in order to get rid of these faults once and for all'.

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[11] Statistics regarding the elections for National representatives for the XVII, XVIII and XIX ONA. S., 1928, 18-20; Georgiev 2011, 47-52; 2016, 220-241.

[12] SL, 17 ONA, I e.s.,397-398.

[13] Almanah 1911, 915.

The more 'detailed, comprehensive and objective' the investigation is, the better, since Burov is certain that 'the truth speaks' in favor of the PP. The investigation should result in the punishment of the person, who is 'the true culprit behind the catastrophe, because otherwise, Bulgaria will be left unprotected from this person's new schemes'.

If the country becomes partisan 'after the process is over we will become more vicious, more separated and weaker', the way it has been over the past 30 years. He demands an answer to the question how Danev's cabinet managed to get Bulgaria involved in the devastating Inter-allied War, when a strong opposition to warfare as a way of resolving conflicts had always been held by his cabinet. The nostrum is found in the existence of 'omnipotent will, stronger than the government'. It needs clarify whether the monarch is committing a 'perjury' or 'an attack against Bulgaria's most sacred interests'. If this is confirmed, measures will be immediately taken in order for the monarch to become 'harmless', then Bulgaria will be 'secured'. The 'perpetrator of June, 16 1913' needs to be sentenced as well.[14]

By stating their opinion, the People's Party representatives bash the monarchical institution, carrying partial if not complete fault for the rout. Tsar Ferdinand's involvement in the events, according to Burov, needs to be cleared out. However, he doesn't go to extremes, like demanding for change in the political system, his only wish is to objectively define the Tsar's fault.

Former minister of finances T. Theodorov demands that the investigation should be 'unbiased'; 'comprehensive'; 'unsparing'. In order for the investigation to be like this, it shouldn't focus on the 'unimportant issues', e.g., 'distant factors' regarding the catastrophe; it should search for 'shortcuts'. In no way should it devote itself to retrospective analysis of events that took place 25 years ago. Firstly, the felonious responsibility should be determined, regarding the main culprits. Secondly, the accomplices, supporters, sponsors, etc. should be exposed as well. The former ministers can't be accused of not possessing enough brain power, because 'no one has ever been put on trial due to ignorance'. It should be defined, whether the acts that took place on June 16, 1913 are a result of frivolity, malicious patriotic enthusiasm; a result of 'a stupid belief that by doing this, the country is being supported'; or a result of a plan which is well-cut and well-judged, the beginning of a new policy which aimed at not only starting the war, but bringing ruin upon the union and driving Bulgaria in a new political direction, establishing a new political orientation as well. This is necessary, because 'today we stand on the threshold of a serious threat for Bulgaria and nowadays, unfortunately, we demonstrate that we weren't able to detect where the disaster came from-a special type of evil, which still lurks up to this day'.

[14] SL, 17 ONA, I o.s., 599-612; Cvetkov 1992, 45.

Bulgaria is left alone 'without a single ally' and serious threats endanger it, because the country sticks to a policy, which differs from the one set by the London treaty, a policy which has only been given by the Bucharest and Constantinople treaty; and if we don't perceive future events 'there will be Hell to pay'. The investigation needs to clearly define and consider the danger, which began on June 16 and continues up to this day. In order to achieve this Bulgaria's policy in the following 10 to 20 years should be peaceful and be set in the 'right direction'. However, if the investigation is partisan, the initiators will be met with disgrace, bigger than the one that befell Bulgaria. 'As of now' Theodorov salutes them for taking the initiative and 'takes a deep bow' before them.[15]

The PLP thinks that it will be beneficial for the investigation to throw light on the cons of our policy, which have been reoccurring for years. Defining the cons will provide the opportunity to 'unite ourselves in getting rid of them'. In order to accomplish the wanted result, the committee should consist of representatives of each parliamentary group.[16]

1. The first point that has been debated at the NA is connected to the responsibility of Geshov's cabinet regarding the treaty preparation for the Balkan War.

2. The second point which demanded debating at the NA is whether the government enters the war without arms, ammunition, clothes, shoes and medicine sufficient for the army.

3. The third point addresses the war itself: to what degree it was inevitable and whether the declaration had been justified and happened at the right moment. The Governors and the Opposition are of the opinion that the war had been declared at a highly unfavorable international environment, since the Great Powers and especially Russia were against it. The continuous interest of Russia to the Straits is not accounted for, as well. These factors give little to no room for success. None of the parties, however, discuss the question of how legal, the war, declared on October 5, 1912 was; and this is something of great importance for the parliamentary investigation.

4. The fourth major issue is whether Bulgaria should have ended the war with Turkey with a fast and efficient treaty in October 1912. All the parties, with the exception of PP and PLP, agree that Geshov's cabinet makes a grave mistake by not utilizing the possibility of peaceful solution after the Great Vizier Kamil Pasha writes a plead to the Government of Bulgaria, which was received on October 31, 1912. Geshov's cabinet doesn't acknowledge that the Great Powers need to have a say in the process of signing the treaty.

[15] SL, 17 ONA, I o.s., 657-722.
[16] SL, 17 ONA, I o.s., 638-657.

5. The fifth point which is being discussed at the Plenary hall is Tchataldzha's battle. Most of the parliamentary parties conclude that the Tchataldzha attack was completely pointless from military and political point of view. The eventual conquering of the Turkish capital wouldn't have brought any serious political dividends, in fact by doing this Bulgaria's problems would have grown in the face of the Great Powers and Russia. If the Bulgarian army had entered Constantinople, the claims of our allies, regarding new Macedonia territories would have increased, i.e. we would have faced growing claims while our military forces were weakened.

6. The sixth issue, discussed at the Chamber is what responsibility is being carried out by Geshev's cabinet, when he should have signed a treaty with Turkey on November 20 1912, which would have meant ending the conflict only a month and a half after starting it. Unfortunately, it doesn't happen.

7. The seventh point which needs to be addressed is whether Iv. Geshev's cabinet has missed another opportunity for ending the conflict, which surfaces with K. Hadzhikalchov's mission in the Turkish capital, requested by the headquarters and carried out behind the cabinet's back.

8. The eight point, debated at the NA, is whether Geshov's cabinet misses an opportunity for peace because it did not take under consideration the results from the negotiations of Gen. M. Savov with the commander of the Turkish army Nazim Pasha and the minister of external affairs-Norandungyan Effendi, which took place on December 25, 1912.

9. The ninth issue envisions the negotiations in London between the allies that took place between December 1912 and January 1913, whose failure leads to renewing the military actions.

10. The tenth issue, covered in the Plenary hall, analyzes the period from the termination of the London negotiation to the moment of signing the treaty on May 17, 1913.

11. The eleventh problem, which the seventeenth ONA discusses regarding the former minister's policy in the period from signing the London peace treaty to the breakout of the Inter-allied War and their responsibility concerning this topic.

Every political party with the exception of PP and PLP announce their beliefs that the beginning of the Inter-Allied War is a result of the Government's policy. Parliamentary debates related to this problem reveal many aspects of the Bulgarian policy in-between the termination of the London negotiations and signing the London treaty. Again, there are two main opinions at the NA. One belonging to the Governmental majority, supported in many ways by the parties, uninvolved in governing the country during the two Balkan wars. The political elite's main thesis is that Iv. Geshov's cabinet isn't able to find its way in the situation, which paves the way for the upcoming Inter-Allied War.

The second opinion belongs to the People's Party representatives and the people from the PLP. From their point of view Bulgaria is steadily walking towards beneficial arbitration owing to their excellent diplomacy. Their claim, however doesn't overlap with the facts, undoubtedly proving that the coalitional Government can't find its way in the complicated political game and leaves Bulgaria with no reliable allies. The lack of any feelings of guilt in the former governors doesn't go unnoticed as well.

12. The particular support of the government of the order for attacking Serbia's positions, whose execution actually marks the beginning of the Inter-Allied War.

The question at hand shows that on the whole the XVII ONA stays active, taking the blame for the catastrophe, caused by Iv. Geshov's and St. Danev's cabinets. Despite this the PP and PLP continue to defend the perfection of their policy with no feelings of guilt whatsoever.

During the parliamentary debates the speech of T. Theodorov, who has taken the floor twice up to this point, steals the spotlight. In the course of 12 hours, he masterfully rearranges the facts, while pleading for the innocence of the former ministers. After the debates have ended, the voting procedure regarding the suggestions about an investigation commences. The liberals' procedure says: 'NA should organize a test committee to investigate the former cabinets of Iv. Geshov and Dr. St. Danev, not only for the time being, but especially for the period between the preparation of the war and its end'.[17]

The liberals' suggestion is voted, but with one major change, the line 'especially for the period between the preparations for the war and its end' is deleted. By doing this the question about any peace treaties is avoided, which also means that Radoslavov's cabinet, which also signed the polls would be investigated. The premier himself claims that he won't allow 'an investigation, regarding the ruling Government to be carried out'.[18] The minister of Justice supports him, since investigating an 'active cabinet' is simply unacceptable.[19]

The PP defines the avoidance of the principle of proportionality as an absurdity, which doesn't live up to the chamber's prestige. The majority is accused of not obeying the laws which gives the minister the right to call on people for disobeying these laws. B. Vazov pleads the chairmanship not to make mistakes, even at the expense of their positions. The Liberal's project committee won't be effective and will keep working endlessly, due to the absence of 'the key element which is the opposition'. If we assume that there are parties which are against the investigation, then that is going to be an

[17] SL, 19 ONA, I o.s., 854.
[18] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 856.
[19] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 858-860.

'investigation in the dark' which won't bring peace. According to B. Vazov, without the PP the investigation will be one-sided, it will be deprived of 'the necessary ally needed for uncovering the truth', while the investigation will be 'walking with its eyes closed'.[20]

In the end the opposition unites, having a ratio of 13:17 in favor of the majority.[21]

On May 10, 1914 the voting process type 'ad bloc' commences when it comes to the committee's members, chosen by the chairmanship. According to the vice chairperson of the NA S. Ivanchov some of the members' names have been coordinated with their parties' leaders. The voting process determines that the members of the committee will consist of 30 MPs. 21 of them are from the government majority. There are no PLP or PP representatives in the committee.[22]

On May 10, 1914 on behalf of the parliamentary opposition, excluding the narrow socialists, Naycho Tsanov registers a protest addressed to the NA's chairman in which he disagrees with the fact that PP's representatives and progressives are deprived of representation at the committee, as well as with the 21:9 ratio in favor of the majority. There are also protests against including N. Genadiev in the committee, who is currently defendant regarding the second state court trial. The parliamentary majority is accused of: violation of the law; trampling the NR's rights and damaging NA's reputation. The letter of protest regarding the PLP is signed by Al. Stamboliiski, M. Takev, N. Tsanov, B. Vazov, Ya. Sazakov and Dr. Andrei Hodzhov.[23]

The opposition's letter of protest, however, fails and the remaining members of the committee do not meet the requirements of the Parliament's ratio of political forces.[24]

From the given facts, it can be concluded that the main political forces, including the PP and the PLP are certain that conducting the investigation regarding the First National Catastrophe is imperative. The difference lies in the fact that the PP and the PLP want the parliamentary investigation in order to prove that their policy is correct and that their ministers are innocent; while the others are certain that Iv. Geshov and St. Danev are the main culprits behind the rout and that the investigation will only prove this further on. It is worth mentioning that during and after the debates, the former ministers don's feel guilty, regarding their wrongdoings and even express certainty in their infallibility. The parliamentary majority are also acting haughty

[20] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 864-866.
[21] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 866.
[22] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 867.
[23] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 902.
[24] SL, 19 ONA, I e.s., 867.

when they impose their dominance to the membership of the test committee, despite the different ratio in the NA.

On May 17, 1914 the process of assembling of the parliamentary test committee begins. Then under Dimitar Vachov's guidance, chairman of the NA, Hristo G. Popov is chosen as committee's chairman, K. Panaiodov as vice-chairperson and T. Yankov as secretary. All three of them belong to the liberal majority. Hr. Popov and T. Yankov are from the Liberal (Radoslavist's) party, while K. Panayodov is from the PLP.

On May 22 the committee decides that four subcommittees need to be established for better efficiency. The first one investigates the war and its diplomatic preparations, the second is for the Ministry of Defense, combat readiness, sanitary materials and non-combatant management, the third one is for the sales and supplies, the fourth one is for requisitions.[25]

The work of the separate subcommittees isn't that supported by the Executive. The Executive doesn't conform that much to the NA's decision and doesn't attach much importance to the parliamentary investigation. The committee itself looks powerless compared to the Ministry of Defense.

There are serious difficulties when using the Ministry of External Affairs' and denomination's secret archives as well. Again, the committee sends a lot of letters. At the end the issue is solved when the premier V. Radoslavov intervened personally. At first, the documents are used at the Ministry itself, but the committee requests that they should be stored at a special room, which would make using them easier. After long negotiations this is 'graciously' permitted by the Ministry in the spring of 1918. Additional problems during the parliamentary investigations occur after October 1, 1915 when Bulgaria gets in World War I. Many of the suspects, which need to be interrogated, are called-up in the army. A large portion of the stationery staff that serves the committee and many office clerks face the same faith; and they are the people, who need to give necessary references. This leads to less common committee meetings.[26]

The results of the committee's activity and its structure aren't subjected to discussion at the NA. This fact defiles the importance of the act and serves as a hit against one of the parliamentarianism's elements –exercising the controlling functions against the Executive, by creating a committee, whose aim is investigating ministers' actions. The hardships mentioned above, sabotaging the parliamentary investigation aren't a legitimate reason for the XVII ONA not to discuss the things done by the committee. From its formation on May 14, 1914 to the dissolution of the meeting on April 15, 1919 nearly 5 years have passed, which turn out to be insufficient for the Chamber to debate

[25] SL, 17 ONA, IV o.s., 1508.
[26] SL, 17 ONA, IV o.s., 1509. Georgiev 2018b, 42-59; Gesheva 2003.

over this issue, concerning the Bulgarian society; and this is how it all comes to the First National Catastrophe and the responsibility of the cabinets of Iv. Geshov and St. Danev, regarding this rout.

Almanah 1911 – Almanah na balgarskata konstitutsiya (Plovdiv).

CSA - Central State Archive (Sofia).

DV – Darzhaven vestnik (Sofia).

SL, 14 ONA – Stenographic logs of 14th Ordinary National Assembly (Sofia)

SL, 17 ONA – Stenographic logs of 17th Ordinary National Assembly (Sofia)

SL, 19 ONA – Stenographic logs of 19th Ordinary National Assembly (Sofia)

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Participation of Entente soldiers and officers in the smuggling trade in Bulgaria after the end of the First World War

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Abstract: This article presents the participation of Entente soldiers and officers in the smuggling trade in Bulgaria after the end of the First World War. During the War, various regulations and restrictions were introduced in the Bulgarian economy and trade necessary to guarantee supplies to the army and the population. After the end of the war, the situation was temporarily maintained, with the DECPP being the main institution responsible for monitoring and regulating the country's economic structures and processes. The Entente soldiers are actively involved in the smuggling trade, which is helped by the fact that they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian court and their control bodies do not always respond to the signals of the Bulgarian authorities. Smuggling is also assisted by some organizational problems in the Border Guard service – the insufficient number of people and the poor living conditions in which they have to fulfill their duties. Soldiers are reported to be leaving the border posts, which are destroyed during the war, and spending the night in the surrounding villages. Individual Entente soldiers and officers are involved in the smuggling trade, and their role is rather peripheral. They were used to provide channels for smuggling because their military units were situated at key locations in the transport network and had control of the border areas.

Key words: First World War, Entente soldiers, Entente troops, smuggling trade, import-export trade, regulation, Bulgaria, occupation

Резюме: Тази статия представя участието на съглашенски войници и офицери в контрабандната търговия в България след Първата световна война. През войната са въведени различни регулации и рестрикции, които са необходими българската икономика и търговия да гарантират снабдяването с продукти и суровини на армията и населението. След края на войната тази ситуация се запазва, като ДСГОП е институцията, която наблюдава и регулира държавните икономически структури и процеси. Войниците на Съглашението активно се включват в контрабандната търговия, за което спомага обстоятелството, че не попадат в юрисдикцията на българското законодателство и контролът върху тях не е ефективен. Освен това, организационните проблеми на пограничните служби, нерегламентираното преминаване на границите и др. също спомагат за развитието на контрабандната търговия. В общи линии, отделни войници

и офицери се включват в контрабандната търговия, като използват каналите и транспортните връзки, които са контролирани от войските на Антантата, както и контрола върху пограничните региони.

The Thessaloniki truce of September 29, 1918, with which Bulgaria in fact ceased its participation in World War I, declares that Entente troops should occupy strategic places of the Bulgarian territory. According to Article 2 of the truce, *this occupation will be temporary and will serve only as a guarantee. It will give rise to neither coercion nor occasional requisitions. The commander-in-chief of the Union Army assures that without special circumstances Sofia will not be occupied*.[1]

In the first days of October 1918 the first Entente troops entered the Bulgarian territory - French, British and Italian troops. Depending on the goals and specific tasks they perform, in the next nearly two years their number varies greatly, but there are between 10 thousand and 40 thousand soldiers and officers (for example, as of March 15, 1919, there were 21 415 people[2] and as of June 1, 15 266[3]). They are concentrated mainly in the Danube and Black Sea ports, around Sofia, along the railways, in the territories which Bulgarian neighbors are claiming and in some of the larger cities.

Several stages can be distinguished during the stay of the Entente troops in Bulgaria:

1) The first stage covers the time when parts of the Eastern Army entered the Bulgarian territory until the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans (beginning of October - November 11, 1918). Then significant parts of the Entente armies pass through the country, and contingents are established in the periphery of the country and along the railways;

2) The second stage (11 November - late December 1918) is characterized by the occupation of the especially appointed places. Due to the continuous relocation of Entente contingents in Central Europe, southern Russia and the Ottoman Empire, significant military forces continued to move through the country;

3) The third stage covers the period from the beginning of 1919 to June the same year. This is a period of relative 'calmness', during which there is no significant deployment of Entente forces;

4) In the fourth stage (June - December 1919) there were significant deployments of occupation contingents and large troops entered from the north. The reasons for this are political (foreign and internal) and military. At the end of the period, the main forces of the Entente occupation troops withdrew from the country;

[1] Hristov 1986, 243–244.
[2] SMHA, f. 24, l. 3, a.u. 63, l. 146–148.
[3] SMHA, f. 24, l. 3, a.u. 63, l. 164–167.

5) The last, fifth stage, starts at the beginning of 1920 and ends on 9 August the same year with the ratification of the Treaty of Neuilly on the part of Bulgaria. The presence of occupation troops in Bulgaria is formal – these are small military units that have occupation status only from an international legal point of view, but their real task is to prepare for the work of the alliance committees mentioned in the Treaty of Neuilly.

During the First World War, various regulations and restrictions were introduced in the Bulgarian economy and trade necessary to guarantee supplies to the army and the population. After the end of the war, the situation was temporarily maintained, with the DECPP (Directorate for Economic Care and Public Predictability) being the main institution responsible for monitoring and regulating the country's economic structures and processes. The continuing regulation of import-export trade is one of the main reasons for the flourishing of smuggling during the period when the country was occupied by the Entente troops. This fact, combined with the lack of goods in Bulgaria and the scarcity of goods in the neighboring countries, with the still closed markets and trade routes, as well as the post-war economic disruption throughout Europe, creates significant difficulties for the Bulgarian state in providing food for the population. It was only in the second half of 1919 and in 1920, when the new, excellent harvest came on the market, and after the trade routes and markets were restored, that the restrictive measures of the state were lifted. For example, it was not until February 1920 that the free trade in salt resumed.[4]

The Entente soldiers are actively involved in the smuggling trade, which is helped by the fact that they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian court and their control bodies do not always respond to the signals of the Bulgarian authorities.

According to K. Todorov, who is a contemporary of the events, the main reasons for smuggling are the strict customs restrictions. Due to shortage of vehicles in Bulgaria, this trade is carried out mainly by Entente military trucks. The Entente officers trade with many Bulgarians, who thus protect themselves from arrest. K. Todorov emphasizes the extreme size this practice takes.[5] When smuggling the requisitioned Bulgarian steamers are also used, with the permission of the French authorities, smugglers and speculators travel there.[6] The Entente troops are accused even by the National Assembly tribunal of assisting smugglers and speculators.[7]

[4] IDECPP 1920, IV, No 25/ 4. Jun. 1920, 2.
[5] Todorov 1994, 156.
[6] Prudkin 1997, 313, 341.
[7] SL, 17 ONS, IV e. s., 921.

Smuggling is also assisted by some organizational problems in the Border Guard service – the insufficient number of people and the poor living conditions in which they have to fulfill their duties. Soldiers are reported to be leaving the border posts, which are destroyed during the war, and spending the night in the surrounding villages.[8]

On January 16, 1919, the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Varna sent a letter to the director of DECPP, outlining some of the reasons for the flourishing of smuggling. The cause for the letter is the mooring at Varna port of the Greek steamer *Esperia* carrying soap, oil, honey, coffee, lemons and other scarce goods: *As a result of the monopolization of imports, the importing traders cannot buy anything and are forced to watch their smugglers export everything from a steamboat in a smuggling way* (underlined in the original text – author's note) *and sell it at unbelievable prices.*[9] The letter goes on to state that the conditions of the Varna port have changed since it was occupied by Entente troops and the establishment of an Entente military administration. The customs is failing to exercise effective control, which creates the conditions for the smuggling to flourish. The President of the Varna Chamber of Commerce and Industry recommends that actions be taken before the main command of the occupation troops in Sofia to enable the customs to perform their duties effectively.[10]

Here is another case that is indicative of the assistance provided by the Entente troops to smugglers and speculators. This case is again related to the Bulgarian 'maritime capital', which, because of its position, has established itself as one of the centers of smuggling. French military authorities issue open travel sheets for the Bulgarian railways to Greeks - butchers from Varna, who open a 'French butcher shop' in the city and buy all the livestock from the population in the county. This creates conditions for speculation because the cattle are insufficient to satisfy the needs of the population and the troops, and the control of the regional committee of DECPP is avoided. The Greek butchers put French flags in front of the butcher shop to emphasize their links with the French troops. In a letter dated January 11, 1919, Mirski, the District Governor of Varna, asked for clarification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion about the extent to which the powers of the French commandant extend.[11] On February 11, 1919, the Bulgarian government sent a verbal note to the Entente Command, reporting the case and informing about the violation of the country laws, by creating prerequisites for meat speculation.[12]

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[8] SMHA, f. 25, l. 2, a.u. 118, l. 171, 174.
[9] BHA – CMNL, f. 273, 3, a.u. 2752, l. 4 a, b.
[10] BHA – CMNL, f. 273, 3, a.u. 2752, l. 4 a, b.
[11] CSA, f. 176 K, l. 4, a.u. 157, l. 1, 6.
[12] CSA, f. 176 K, l. 4, a.u. 157, l. 5.

In Varna, French soldiers, probably bribed or sharing some of the profits, are helping A. Velev and his Greek assistants to escape control in the trade in smuggled salted fish.[13] The protests of the Bulgarian authorities are forcing the commander of the Entente troops in Bulgaria, general Cretien, to give the Entente authorities in the city detailed instructions on the prohibited trade in foods.[14]

The smuggling to Dobrudzha is mainly carried out along the Dobrich - Varna highway, but also to Balchik and Kavarna.[15] In addition to the soldiers and officers from the Entente, refugees also take part in it. The ministry wrote to gen. Chretien, who replied on 17 August that the necessary measures were taken to prevent the smuggling trade, namely: a military post was placed near the village of Dervent, on the road from Varna to Dobrich, which had to stop all persons wearing the French uniform and to search their luggage and their vehicles; a post is also positioned at the Varna station, where a Bulgarian customs official is appointed: '*By a county order*, writes gen. Chretien, *I have called on all French military authorities not to succumb to the dangerous proposals that the various unscrupulous speculators and smugglers could make to them*'.[16] Later, on September 3, 1919, the Border Guards wanted a post on the Ruse - Tutrakan highway, where the movement of Entente trucks increased.[17] Such a post was made in October 1919.[18]

In January 1919, Hadzhiev, the Deputy Governor of Strumica, asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion (MFAR) for instructions on whether Greek troops arriving in the area were allowed to buy meat and livestock and bring it to Greece.[19] The letter of the local military chief stating that the Greek unit is from the 36th Regiment, based in Kalkovo, Drama,[20] regards the same problems. The MFAR informed twice gen. Chretien for the violation of the border by the Greek soldiers, and on February 28, 1919 sent a verbal note to the Entente Command in Bulgaria.[21]

In a letter dated January 20, 1919, the chief of the Border Guards stated that the posts were poorly prepared and some of them *morally corrupt*. He points out that the number of soldiers is insufficient and that the available ones do not only their duties but also all the housework. He recommends

[13] CSA, f. 176 K, l. 4, a.u. 157, l. 6.
[14] CSA, f. 176 K, l. 4, a.u. 157, l. 8.
[15] SMHA, f. 23, l. 2, a.u. 362, l. 234.
[16] SMHA, f. 24, l. 3, a.u. 80, l. 39.
[17] SMHA, f. 24, l. 3, a.u. 80, l. 43.
[18] SMHA, f. 24, l. 3, a.u. 80, l. 46.
[19] CSA, f. 176 K, 4, a.u.122, l. 1.
[20] CSA, f. 176 K, 4, a.u.122, l. 4.
[21] CSA, f. 176 K, 4, a.u.122, l. 2, 6–7, 10.

measures that would prevent smuggling: first, he believes, the more important posts need at least to be strengthened; he calls for the frequent replacement of border guards as well as an increase in the number of soldiers by at least 760. On January 25th, Army Headquarters gives orders to the divisional area commanders that correspond to the above recommendations.[22]

Smuggling cases in the area of Strumica reach the parliament. At the meeting on February 21, 1919, at the 18th Ordinary National Assembly, the Member of Parliament G. Zankov asked about the organized smuggling of cattle from Strumica area to Greece. The MP Georgi Potskov and activists of the Democratic Party in the district are directly accused of being organizers of this smuggling. In just two months, according to G. Zankov, about 200,000 head of cattle and a large amount of rice were exported through Strumica, Petrich and Nevrokop. The question was answered by N. Mushanov, at that time a Minister of the Interior Affairs and Public Health. He stresses on the inability of the administrative authorities to curb smuggling, which is well organized and generously funded. According to Mushanov, an obstacle to effective control is that the Bulgarian administrative and customs authorities are not located in Strumica area because of the restrictions imposed by the Entente, but are around Novo Selo. In his reply, G. Zankov claimed that smuggling was not carried out solely through Strumica, but throughout the border line - in the Belasitsa region, where the main point was Demir-Kapia, through Singelovo and through Nevrokop.[23] It is proposed that in this area, on the Bistritsa River Bridge, an Entente post be set up to control the agreement trucks crossing the Bulgarian-Greek border.[24]

The Entente Command in Bulgaria gives orders to strengthen the control over the Xanthi station, through which, according to the Bulgarian authorities, part of the smuggling trade passes.[25] Another center of smuggling, also carried out by Entente soldiers and officers, is the Edirne highway, where the Entente post almost never checked the carts and cars of passing passengers.[26] In a report by the Border Guards on August 20, 1919, we read that the smuggling along the Edirne - Karaagach highway was the most active in the area of the Turkish-Bulgarian border.[27]

On August 21, 1919, the Council of Ministers adopted an 'Ordinance on the Prosecution of Smuggling Exports, Speculation and Purchasing'. In an area of 30 km. from the border line the storage of commercially prohibited

[22] SMHA, f. 25, 2, a.u. 118, l. 171-173.
[23] SL, 17 ONS, IV e. s., 678–682.
[24] SMHA, f. 24, 3, a.u. 80, l. 42.
[25] SMHA, f. 23, 2, a.u. 383, l. 520, 521.
[26] SMHA, f. 24, 3, a.u. 80, l. 41.
[27] SMHA, f. 24, 3, a.u. 80, l. 42.

food is forbidden, as well as the movement of large and small cattle, with the exception of those belonging to the local population. DECPP is entrusted with the establishment of a special service for the search and prosecution of smugglers and speculators. A prize fund has been established for the fight against smuggling, which is estimated to be in the amount of BGN 100 to 1 000, as well as the receiver has the right to take a quarter from the value of the goods seized. For the purpose of the Directorate, a budget of BGN 100,000 per half a year is provided.[28] As early as January 1919, the DECPP prohibited the purchase of livestock from the interior of the country and its transfer to the border districts,[29] but apparently this measure was not effective enough and did not lead to the cessation of smuggled exports.

One of the main goals set in Alexander Stamboliiski's coalition government program is to curb the growing smuggling trade.[30]

The smuggling trade did not stop after the withdrawal of the Entente troops from Bulgaria. The prerequisites for it are the deficit and the regulation of prices. The state's involvement in business life, in addition to all the positive consequences that it has, also leads to some negative effects. The alliance control and military bodies left in the country after 9 August 1920 are also involved in smuggling. For example, the British military mission in the capital managed to thwart the export of large quantities of silver to Constantinople.[31] However, during the Entente occupation, the size of the smuggling trade is extremely large. Both Bulgarian authorities and Entente military authorities take steps to cut it off, but they have limited effect.

Any large-scale war leads to the emergence of smuggling, speculation and the development of 'black market', inevitably accompanying the State's attempts to organize and regulate economy and trade in order to guarantee the nourishment of the army and the population. The First World War is no exception; by Erich von Ludendorff's definition, it is the first total war in the history and as such requires the mobilization of economic resources and the fullest possible and detailed regulation of economic policy and relations. The troops of the French, British and Italian contingents stationed on the Bulgarian territory after the Thessaloniki truce take advantage of the fact that they are on the territory of a defeated state, that there is despondency, disorganization and chaos in the country caused by the results of the war. Naturally, individual Entente soldiers and officers are involved in the smuggling trade, and their role is rather peripheral. They were used to provide channels for smuggling because their military units were situated at key locations in the

[28] CSA, f. 260 K, 2, a.u. 27, l. 161–165.
[29] CSA, f. 260 K, 2, a.u. 22, l. 44.
[30] Radulov 1981, 80–81.
[31] Varnenska poshta No 383/25. Dec. 1920.

transport network and had control of the border areas. Probably Bulgarian politicians are involved in organizing and patronizing the smuggling channels, which should not be considered as surprising information. Data about the Entente military involvement in smuggling are fragmentary, but even they make it possible to conclude that unregulated exports are seriously damaging the budget and affecting the country's economy, additionally it is a prerequisite for the deepening food crisis.

BHA – CMNL – Bulgarian Historical Archives at St. Cyril and St. Methodius National Library (Sofia).

CSA – Central State Archives (Sofia).

IDECPP - Izvestiya na Directorate for Economic Care and Public Predictability (Sofia).

SL, 17 ONS – Stenographic logs of 17th Ordinary National Assembly (Sofia).

SMHA – State Military and History Archives (Sofia).

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The image of the Bulgarian Prince / Tsar Ferdinand in the historiography of the Russian Empire

Dmytro Mykolenko

Abstract: The article reveals the image of the Bulgarian Prince / Tsar Ferdinand, created by Russian historians of the late 19th – early 20th century. The author analyses different international cases, which predetermined the researchers' assessments of Ferdinand's internal and external initiatives. In addition, other factors that influence the interpretation of scientists are outlined. Among them are political views and affiliation to a particular institution.

Key words: image, prince, tsar, Ferdinand, historiography, Russia

Резюме: Статията разкрива представата за българския принц/цар Фердинанд, създадена от руските историци в края на 19-началото на 20 век. Авторът анализира различни международни случаи които предопределят оценките на изследователите за неговите вътрешнополитически и външнополитически инициативи. Освен това са очертани и други фактори, които влияят върху оценката на учените, сред които са политическите им възгледи и принадлежността им към определена институция.

Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha is one of the key figures in the Bulgarian history of the late 19th – early 20th century, who was the ruling prince from 1886 to 1908 and the Tsar of the Balkan state from 1908 till 1918. According to the constitutional structure of Bulgaria, the monarch was empowered to sustain the system of state power and implement the country's foreign policy. Ferdinand, due to his legal rights, influenced international politics, and determined the development of Bulgaria. Therefore, since the end of the 19th century his activities have attracted the attention of publicists, journalists and historians from various countries of the world.

Russia associated its foreign policy plans with Bulgaria. The development of good neighborly relations with the Balkan state fitted into the concept of panslavism – an ideological basis which St. Petersburg considered to use in order to strengthen its position in the Balkans and the European

continent as a whole. The Russian public followed the situation in Bulgaria and around it with a significant interest, and professional historians in the late 19th – early 20th century published a number of works devoted to the Balkan people.

Researchers from various countries of the world have previously attempted to shed light on various aspects of Bulgaria and its reflection in Russian imperial historiography.[1] The purpose of this study is to reveal the image of the Prince / Tsar Ferdinand in Russian historiography and outline the factors that influenced the interpretation of the Bulgarian monarch's activities by such researchers as S. S. Tatischev, D. I. Ilovayskiy, N. R. Ovsyany, A. L. Pogodin, V. I. Picheta, N. V. Yastrebov, P. A. Lavrov, and P. N. Milyukov.

The concept of 'image' used in the study is considered as a form of representation of various aspects of work-life strategy of the Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand in the scientific works of Russian historians of the late 19th – early 20th century. Accordingly, we can discuss both images created by various researchers, and the generalized image created by all the mentioned scientists. At the same time, the representations offered by the authors are subjective and do not correspond or only partially correspond to the realities of the domestic and foreign policy of the Bulgarian monarch.

One of the early works published in the Russian Empire, which provides the information about Ferdinand, is the book of the diplomat, historian and journalist Sergei Spiridonovich Tatishchev,[2] known for his conservative views. The nomination of Coburg's candidacy and his election as a prince in 1887 opened a series of negative events in St. Petersburg. At the same time, the researcher is not inclined to explore the reasons for these failures in the sentiments of Bulgarian political elites, or investigate machinations of Austrian and German diplomacy. He focuses readers' attention on the miscalculations and mistakes of the mission of Baron Kaulbars and Russian international politics in general. The authors of the mission could not even assume that the citizens of the Balkan principality would give power to the Catholic. According to Tatishchev, the situation with Ferdinand revealed the hindsight of the imperial diplomatic corps.[3]

Thus, at the end of the 19th century, in the conditions of a severance of diplomatic relations between Russia and Bulgaria, Tatishchev actively formed the negative image of Prince Ferdinand as a non-believer in the minds of Russian citizens.

Even more irreconcilable position regarding the election of Ferdinand as the prince of Bulgaria was taken by the well-known historian, a represen-

[1] Lapteva 2005; Mykolenko 2011; Gokov 2014.
[2] Tatishchev 1890.
[3] Tatishchev 1890, 487.

tative of the moderately conservative ideology in Russia, Dmitry Ivanovich Ilovaiskiy. In his work he suggested the overthrow of the Bulgarian monarch, sending a military corps to the Balkans and thus achieve the election of a Russian candidate.[4] According to the scholars, Ferdinand came to the throne due to the assistance of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Afterwards, he defended the interests of those empires, as well as fought against the Russian influence in the Balkans.[5] Ilovaiskiy argued that Berlin intentionally provided the support for the Austrian prince, who was a Catholic and a relative of the French Orleans. It sought to hide from the world community its interest in subsequent strengthening of its own positions in South-Eastern Europe.[6]

However, in the early 20th century and on the eve of the Balkan Wars, the assessments of Bulgaria's policy changed significantly. During this period many publications devoted to Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha appeared in Russia. And St. Petersburg embarked on a plan to develop the union of Orthodox peoples in the region, directed against the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Bulgaria, as one of the most powerful in terms of its military potential, was assigned a significant role in the Russian strategy of block construction. The ideas of St. Petersburg were based, among other things, on conviction in benevolent attitudes of the Bulgarian political elites towards Russia. There were enough grounds for such an opinion, since the Anti-Russian government of S. Stambolov resigned in 1894. And afterwards, Ferdinand consistently sought to convince the imperial government in his favorable attitudes.

One of the earliest works in Russia that generalizes the history of Bulgaria is the book of the famous journalist Nikolai Ovsyany (1847-1913).[7] A significant part of his life is associated with the Balkans. He took part in the war of 1877-1878 against the Ottoman Empire, served as a governor of the Kyustendil province in 1878-1880, as well as a document manager of the Balkan Peninsula Affairs Department at the General Staff Building of the Military Ministry of the Russian Empire. From 1886 to 1893 he lived in Montenegro, where he was a tutor to Prince Daniel. During the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Ovsyany performed the duties of a member of the board of the Slavic charitable society in Old Serbia, where he was engaged in charity, helping local residents who suffered during the hostilities.

Ovsyany gave a rather detailed description of the personality of the Bulgarian monarch in his essay. The author emphasizes that Regency Council, which headed the executive power in the Balkan state during 1886–1887, in

[4] Ilovayskiy 1888a, 391.
[5] Ilovayskiy 1888b, 406–407.
[6] Ilovayskiy 1888b, 411.
[7] Ovsyany 1910.

the choice of a new prince advocated candidacy of Ferdinand under the influence of Austria-Hungary, a competitor of Russia for domination in Southeast Europe. However, the publicist is obviously trying to smooth out the unpleasant fact for the Russian public with the following arguments. Firstly, he draws the attention of readers to the fact that the prince was elected as a result of a national will as well as a result of voting of the Grand National Assembly deputies. Secondly, it emphasizes the material security and independence of the monarch. Thirdly, it focuses attention on the family relationship between Ferdinand and the French Bourbons (he was the grandson of King Louis-Philippe). Such a relation between the Bulgarian ruler and France, Russia's ally, influenced the public perception of the newly elected monarch.[8]

One of the main aspects of Ovsyany's work is the relationship between Ferdinand and a member of the Regency Council Stefan Stambolov (1886-1887), the country's prime minister (1887-1894), who advocated for a restriction of Russian influence on Bulgaria. The author emphasizes that in the early years of his reign, the Bulgarian prince depended significantly on the influential politician who controlled the monarch's correspondence, and, taking into account Ferdinand's precarious position, threatened with the expulsion from the country or resignation, which left the inexperienced aristocrat alone with the numerous state issues and irreconcilable Russophiles who did not recognize Coburg as lawfully elected.[9]

Ovsyany characterized the resignation of S. Stambolov as the result of Ferdinand's desire to realize the aspirations of the people, who mostly hated the first minister. However, according to the author, the prince prepared the plan to remove the prime minister from power. After he had managed to appoint Racho Petrov as the Minister of War and enlisted the support of the army, Stambolov's resignation was accepted on May 18, 1894.

Soon after the change of government in Bulgaria the former prime minister was assassinated. Rumors about the involvement of Prince Ferdinand in the murder began to spread among journalists from around the world. Ovsyany does not even raise this version in his work, considering that Stambolov's death was a revenge on him for his repression and abuse.

The publicist positively assesses the appointment of K. Stoilov as a prime minister with his loyal attitudes to Russia, emphasizing the calm and order that was established in the country after the change of power in Bulgaria. According to Ovsyany, the significant achievements of the new cabinet were the following: the baptism of the Bulgarian heir Boris according to Orthodox rite on February 12, 1896, the subsequent recognition of Prince Ferdinand as a legal ruler of Bulgaria by the Ottoman Empire and other great

[8] Ovsyany 1910.
[9] Ovsyany 1910, 69.

states, and the restoration of diplomatic relations between St. Petersburg and Sofia.[10]

Idealizing the image of the Bulgarian prince / Tsar Ferdinand in the eyes of the Russian reader, Ovsyany sought to show the perspectives on building up better relations between St. Petersburg and Sofia. At the same time, arguments of the publicist appeared to have a weak evidence basis and a populist character.

A significant contribution to the study of the activities of Ferdinand was made by the Russian historian, social and political activist, professor of Warsaw (1902-1908), Kharkov (1910-1919) and Belgrade (1939-1941) universities, Alexander L. Pogodin (1872-1947). On the pages of the 'History of Bulgaria'[11] he went further than Ovsyany in his striving to create a positive image of the prince in the eyes of the Russian public. Thus, the author, pointing to the origin of the Bulgarian monarch, argued that Ferdinand was more French than German by his origin. This undoubtedly influenced his benevolent perception, because France, unlike Germany, at the beginning of the last century remained the ally of St. Petersburg. In addition, the scientist compared the head of the Bulgarian state and his predecessor, Alexander Battenberg, who undermined his image with a desire to pursue pro-Austrian and pro-German policies. According to Pogodin, Ferdinand was different from Battenberg due to his excellent education and upbringing.[12]

Another plot, which enabled the historian to present the Bulgarian monarch in a favorable way, is connected with the relationship of the prince with the Prime Minister Stephan Stambolov. Pogodin indicates that already in 1888 there was a rift between them, and the head of government seriously considered the possibility of eliminating the monarch, who was invited to occupy the throne a year earlier. The author even retells unreliable and unsupported information from one of the Bulgarian political newspapers about Stambolov's attempts to expel Ferdinand involving Russian special services. The scientist claimed that the Prime Minister allegedly offered 200-300 thousand rubles for this service.[13]

The scientist divides the Ferdinand's reign into two periods. The first one is related to S. Stambolov's being in power and controlled the monarch. But the country suffered from under-development and unjustified increase in public spending and debts.[14]

The second period of the prince's reign started after Coburg had dismissed the prime minister (May 18, 1894). The peculiarity of this period was

[10] Ovsyany 1910, 69.
[11] Pogodin 1910.
[12] Pogodin 2002, 277.
[13] Pogodin 2002, 278.
[14] Pogodin 2002, 279.

the gradual power concentration in the hands of the monarch that was the result of the growing popularity of Ferdinand among ordinary people who did not sympathize with S. Stambolov and welcomed the change of power in the state. Due to the prince's first wife, Louise, who was a favorite of the Bulgarians, the citizens of the country perceived the monarch even more positively. At the same time, the author emphasizes the fact that the wife of the Bulgarian ruler hated S. Stambolov, and these negative feelings of the princess strengthened the already cold perception of the prime minister by the ordinary citizens of the country.[15]

Pogodin outlined the following positive changes that occurred after 1894: the release of political prisoners from prisons, the return of emigrants, the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia (1896), and the recognition of legitimate power of the Bulgarian prince by the powers-guarantors of the Berlin status quo. From the researcher point of view, the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century was marked by progress in all spheres of the country's life, vivid evidence of which was the transformation of Bulgaria in the most powerful country in the Balkans in terms of military and economic capacity.[16] According to the author, Ferdinand contributed significantly to the prosperity of the country. The historian emphasizes the personal qualities of the ruler, which helped him achieve significant results. These are the ability to lead the political life of the country, not tangling public affairs that were essential to his predecessor, Prince Battenberg, to participate actively in the national life with openness to his subordinates and prudence inherent to all the Bourbons.[17] Pogodin highly appreciates Ferdinand's ability to make concessions for the sake of state interests. Re-baptism of the heir to the Bulgarian throne, Boris, according to the Orthodox rite aimed at thawing relations between St. Petersburg and Sofia was called by the historians the sacrifice of the true Catholic Ferdinand for the welfare of the people.[18] At the same time, he underlines that this action of the monarch was positively perceived by Russia, and the Bulgarian people met the subsequent restoration of bilateral relations with real delight.[19]

Negative image construction of the former head of the government and the exaltation of Ferdinand by Pogodin could be explained by the political situation at the beginning of the 20th century. During this period, it was extremely important for the Russian Empire to draw Sofia into the sphere of its influence through its inclusion in the Balkan Union – the military bloc

[15] Pogodin 2002, 280.
[16] Pogodin 2002, 278.
[17] Pogodin 2002, 279.
[18] Pogodin 2002, 281.
[19] Pogodin 2002, 281.

of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, directed against the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary. Ferdinand was naively identified with the pro-Russian course, while S. Stambolov traditionally personified the cooperation of Bulgaria with the empire of the Habsburgs and Porto. Pogodin brought discredit on the former prime minister and it was an attempt to denigrate his international policy, which, by the way, found significant support, both in the context of the Bulgarian establishment and of the common people. However, Ferdinand's economic and political achievements were clearly exaggerated, while Stambolov was understated. The author attributes the success of the former head of government in stimulating industrial development, reforming the political system, stabilizing the situation in the country to the monarch and the pro-Russian cabinet K. Stoilov. Pogodin personally took part in the creation of the myth about negative perception of S. Stambolov by the Bulgarians and the popular love for Ferdinand.

Another important aspect of Pogodin's work was the proclamation of Bulgaria's independence in 1908. Like Ovsyany the historian consistently emphasizes Russia's benevolent attitude to Ferdinand's desire to obtain the Tsar's crown through the declaration of independence. According to the author, the vassal status of the principality vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire was nominal, but he insulted the national dignity of the Balkan people. However, Pogodin doesn't mention the widely known information that Sofia coordinated its actions with the opponent of Russia, Austria-Hungary.[20]

Thus, the historian is trying to present bilateral Russian-Bulgarian relations as benevolent and trouble-free. For this, he misses some important facts and tries to emphasize the pro-Russian sentiments of the Bulgarian government. He does not focus on the German origin of Ferdinand and his sympathies for Germany and Austria-Hungary, but emphasizes the prince's kinship with the Bourbons.

Some positive features are given to Ferdinand by the famous historian, publicist, public and political activist, leader of the Constitutional-Democratic Party of Russia Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov. In one of his articles, published in 1910 in a special collection of papers,[21] the researcher characterizes the Bulgarian prince as a clever politician and diplomat who had the courage and intuition.[22]

After the Balkan wars, which resulted in a national catastrophe for Bulgaria, Sofia began to build up better relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, even the obvious changes in the course of the Balkan

[20] Pogodin 2002, 282.
[21] Milyukov 1910.
[22] Milyukov 1910, 329.

kingdom, as well as the spread of the negative rhetoric of Russian press[23] in terms of Bulgaria, did not significantly change the attitudes of the majority of Russian historians to Ferdinand. Some of them, such as Ilovaysky, continued to characterize its activities negatively, noting that after his election to the throne in 1887, Kobour intended to weaken the influence of Russia in the Balkans.[24] Others, as before, endowed the Bulgarian monarch with positive features. So, in his works[25] the former student of Moscow University, a teacher of higher female courses and the member of Practical Academy of Commercial Sciences, a scientist from the Serbian-Ukrainian origin Volodymyr Ivanovich Picheta saw Ferdinand as a clever and cunning politician, but he also points out his indecisiveness in choosing methods of political struggle.[26] The author is the one among Russian researchers who supported a fully justified version of the involvement of the prince in the assassination of Stambolov.[27]

The researcher outlines Ferdinand's desire to resume diplomatic relations with Russia in 1896, as well as his aspiration to implement Macedonia's accession to Bulgaria with the assistance of St. Petersburg, to proclaim the independence of the country and get the royal crown, abolishing the vassal dependence from Porta.[28] He also notes that after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the Bulgarian monarch, disappointed with the military capabilities of St. Petersburg, began to develop relations with Austria-Hungary.[29] Along with this, the scientist suggests that the Russian Empire continued to fulfill different requirements and ambitious of the Bulgarian monarch. Russians helped to implement the declaration of independence of Bulgaria in 1908 and to solve the complex issue related to the East Rumelian railroad, create the Balkan Union under the aegis Russian Empire directed against Porta.[30]

Indentifying the reasons for the Bulgarian national catastrophe of 1913, Picheta points out that Ferdinand under the influence of the Dualist Empire government, issued a decree launching hostilities against the Serbian army. Along with this, the author objectively assesses the mood of the citizens of the Balkan countries and outlines the Bucharest peace treaty, which deprived Bulgaria of big part of Macedonia and South Dobrudza, harassed the government and threw it in the arms of Austria-Hungary and Germany, which turned the society against Russia, that was perceived as the main culprit for

[23] Mykolenko 2003.
[24] Ilovayskiy 1914.
[25] Picheta 1914; Picheta 1914/1915.
[26] Picheta 1914/1915, 20.
[27] Picheta 1914/1915, 21.
[28] Picheta 1914, 31.
[29] Picheta 1914/1915, 23.
[30] Picheta 1914, 31.

humiliating Sofia on the international scene.[31] However, the author notes: Ferdinand didn't understand that Austria-Hungary, unlike Russia, would not contribute to the Bulgarian aspirations to annex Macedonia.[32] According to Picheta, in 1914 the country did not determine its foreign policy course, while wily and thin Ferdinand seemed to begun to revise his Anti-Russian position. So, the scientist suggests that the upcoming events would demonstrate the intentions of Bulgaria[33] and the attitude of this Balkan country to the Russian people.[34]

After the start of the First World War and the ultimate accession of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, the work of the famous St. Petersburg Slavists, historian Nikolai Vladimirovich Yastrebov, and philologist and linguist Petr Alekseevich Lavrov,[35] was published. Despite the fact that the Balkan country became an enemy of Russia in an armed conflict, the authors positively characterize the Bulgarian prince, and regard him as a wily and clever person who, due to the instructions of Stambolov, quickly explored weaknesses and strengths of the Bulgarian people's character and managed to establish a regime of the personal rule based on skillful use of inter-party struggle in his interests.[36]

Researchers also state the fact that Ferdinand received the royal crown in 1908 and was empowered by Great People's Assembly to sign international treaties without the consent of the Parliament in 1911, avoiding any assessment of those events.[37] Instead, the researchers underline the support given by Russia to Bulgaria's aspiration to abolish the vassal dependence on the Ports and join Macedonia.

Yastrebov and Lavrov didn't show their inclination to accuse Ferdinand of a national catastrophe that the country experienced in 1913. Similarly, scientists do not associate the unification of Sofia with the Triple Alliance, which was hostile to Russia in 1915, with the aspirations of Coburg to take revenge for the defeat in the Second Balkan War. Scientists give rather abstract conclusions about the lack of a clear understanding of Bulgarian interests, goals and tasks, and also prefer not to give a clear assessment of the cooperation of the kingdom with Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, referring to the inability to characterize this event objectively, impartially and scientifically.[38]

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[31] Picheta 1914, 32.
[32] Picheta 1914/1915, 24.
[33] Picheta 1914, 32.
[34] Picheta 1914/1915, 27.
[35] Yastrebov 1916.
[36] Yastrebov 1916, 414–415.
[37] Yastrebov 1916, 419.
[38] Yastrebov 1916, 420–421.

Thus, our study showed that the main factor that influenced the Russian historians' interpretation of the activities of the Bulgarian Prince / Tsar Ferdinand was the international and the political situation. Thus, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Sofia and St. Petersburg, as well as the participation of Bulgaria in the formation of the Balkan Union under the auspices of Russia, predetermined the prevalence of positive assessments of the internal and external politics of the Bulgarian monarch. The period of the break in bilateral relations (1887–1896) was characterized by the fact that negative traits dominated the image of Ferdinand. However, it should be noted that Russian historians, unlike journalists and publicists, more often refrained from extremes in the assessments of the monarch, noting the variety of different components of the prince / tsar's image. This is well illustrated during the period from 1913 to 1917, when the Russian press attacked Bulgarian power with the criticism for their unhidden plans to strengthen relations with Berlin and Vienna. The majority of historians gave moderate assessments of Coburg's actions, with an emphasis on his deceit, hypocrisy.

Exploring the influence of scientists' political views on their interpretations of the activities of Bulgarian monarch, it should be noted that researchers with more conservative views tended toward a negative characteristic of Ferdinand, and liberal ones showed neutral or even positive attitudes. In this context we consider the works of different representatives of the right trend of the Russian scientific thought – D. I. Ilovaisky and S. S. Tatishchev, as well as the famous liberal P. N. Milyukov. There is an obvious aspiration of the university professorate to create more neutral image of the Bulgarian prince, in contrast to the scientists involved in political battles related to certain parties. This trend is well illustrated by the works of N. V. Yastrebov, P. A. Lavrov, V. I. Picheta and A. L. Pogodin.

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The control over the strategic resources – the cause of the Persian Gulf crisis 1990-1991

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Abstract: The strategic resources of each country, naturally, specify the economic and political orientation of the country and determine the major national and international security challenges. This paper focuses on the current security challenges related to the changing resource management and respectively to the changing security environment as a result of resource depletion. The resource security becomes a leading objective of the security policy and a major factor in the international relations.

Key words: resources, national security, Persian Gulf, international relations, challenges

Резюме: По своята същност стратегическите ресурси на всяка една държава определят нейната икономическа и политическа насоченост и предопределят основните предизвикателства във връзка с националната и международна сигурност. В доклада се акцентира върху предизвикателства пред сигурността във връзка с променящото се ресурсно управление и респективно променящата се среда за сигурност в следствие на ресурсното изчерпване. Ресурсната обезпеченост се превръща във водеща цел на политиката за сигурност и в основен фактор на международните отношения.

Countries, though using different means, pursue similar goals since ancient times. The main and radical objective of their geopolitics is the fight for and control over resources. The rest are just methods and means applied by the global players in the endless competition. And if Brzezinski's legendary axiom for 'the grand chessboard' could be used as a matrix in the international relations, the world is 'playing a geopolitical, resource chess game with no end'.[1] It has its own history, divided into periods, stages, it evolves, but the main players on the international stage are generally the same - possessing and controlling the strategic resources.

[1] Starikov 2014.

Assuming that countries pursue a policy of their own interest then tensions are always emerging, leading to conflicts and the pursuit of resource domination is clearly visible. Resources need markets and markets need resources. In view of the complex and intertwined interests and dependencies of the producer-consumer chain, it would be beneficial the international relations to be in the spirit of consensus and stability. Unfortunately, this is not the case even today.

There is a consensus in science that resources are always limited and have the potential for a conflict. There are no resources without an owner. By origin they are always under someone's control. The aspirations of every global player is to control their own resources and use them for their own benefit. Each of the above mentioned axioms is purely geographical and concentrates at several particular locations throughout the world. The Persian Gulf is one of them, not only because 65% of the world's oil reserves are concentrated there in five countries.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War changed the system of international relations. Whether the world became more secure with the end of the USSR is a dubious question, but it seems that security issues have given way to the interest in the economy and the first active steps of today's globalization.

Renowned scholars give different accounts for the formation of the countries' security policy – 'civilization identity' according to S. Huntington, 'economic globalization' according to Freidman, 'demographic problems and chaos', according to Kaplan, and according to Michael Claire 'the importance of resource competition should be accounted'.[2] The new geography of conflicts is the war for resources.

The Persian Gulf crisis, although planned a long time ago (Kuwait has a specific status ever since the Ottoman Empire, in the thirties of the twentieth century Iraq had its own claims for the first time and later in the sixties of the same century), began with the invasion of the Iraqi Army on 02 August 1990 without encountering organized resistance, using the available road network. Namely, the fight to control the strategic oil resource was the main geopolitical objective of Iraq, regardless of the allegations of some circles for territorial claims or other anthropogenic factors. 'We should not disregard the 'oil motive'. He (Hussein) linked his destiny to Iraq's treasure of oil. He believed that taking up his stand on that he could … become a general Arab leader'.[3]

It is a paradox that the country subject to aggression has so far been a supporter of the neighbor's foreign policy, and continues to supports it, even invariably credited it during its conflict with Iran.

[2] Kler 2003.

[3] Primakov 2007.

From a geopolitical point of view, Iraq needs a quick, successful and victorious intervention, strategic in nature. After the relatively unsuccessful war with Iran, the country spent or borrowed nearly 100 billion dollars (Bulgaria did not receive its payments due amounting to 1 billion dollars). Its direct debt to non-Arab creditors is about 35 billion dollars, mainly to commercial companies but with governmental commitment. With the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq pursues several strategic goals: attaining a leading role in the Arab world, a dominant position in the region, i.e. a regional resource-economic and subsequently military leadership.

The accumulation of Kuwait's resources gives Iraq the opportunity to control 20% from the production OPEC and to possess 20% of world's oil reserves, which automatically makes it an influential leader of world prices. With an eventual prelude to annexation of the military weak at the time Saudi Arabia, there was a genuine risk of control over all Arab oil. The events that took place in the Persian Gulf turn the first crisis after the Cold War into an international geopolitical oil crisis'.[4]

The geostrategy of Iraq generated powerful resistance and an unprecedented response from the international community. The local status quo was affected; there was a threat to the global players' interests. Iraqi leadership's anticipations that Kuwait's quick annexation will present the global leaders with a fait accompli and the country will be subjected to censure or temporary embargo as a punitive measure were not justified.

The massive negative reaction of the Arab world to the aggression was unanticipated as well. The analysis of the events at the time indicate that the deferment of a prompt (forceful) solution to the situation increased Iraq's chances of political success in its initially aggressive campaign. The compact diversity of many allies, thirty-three in number, different in origin, interests, significance, and civilization identity, implied effective and quick action.

The geopolitical situation in the world was also new. Iraq relied on the mediation of the Soviet Union; yet, the attempts of influence of the Soviet Union, according to its geopolitical power in the world at the time, were unsuccessful. According to the future prime minister of Russia, 'the USA as an active participant in the events had already made their choice ... they wanted to punish Baghdad. The latest types of weapons were tested in laboratories, while on the martial field ... a unique fact ... a broad anti Iraqi coalition rose up, which included not only the traditional partners but also other countries, including Arabic. Baghdad had siezed with fear everyone... The situation among the Soviet leadership was contraversary where a part of them were trying to prevent a war, while the other part stood on the opposite position...'.[5]

[4] Yergin 2011.

[5] Primakov 1999.

Iraq was, therefore, fighting for additional 10% of the world's oil reserves and extraction that would provide their economic security for further geostrategic goals and ambitions. By means of blitz operation Iraq would guarantee itself another segment of the geopolitical map of the world, another burden in the global economy. As a dominant oil producer country in the world and by means of active militarization, hypothetically with the purpose of providing security, the path to nuclear potential was open and, in some logical sense, standard. Iraq, holding nuclear and chemical arsenal and possessing a large share of strategic natural-mineral resources, would automatically be transformed into a regional leader with global aspirations and ambitions.

Under these circumstances, the influence of the global players in the region would be at stake or would be too expensive or risky. In this respect, the war for control and possession of the strategic oil resources becomes the center of events. The implementation of such projects in the past and today is a proof of far-sighted geopolitics conducted by countries with a strategic goal – 'a permanent presence not only on the political but also on the geopolitical map of the world'.[6]

Such a demand for membership in the global world leaders club worried not only the superpower country USA but also the regional players. On the basis of the common threat, an unprecedented consensus was reached among the international community (unattained by that time, and even later).

The aggressive behavior of Iraq is a violation of the tacit principle that an Arab state has no right to attack another Arab state and the controversial issues should be resolved between them. The reaction of most Arab leaders showed that shifting the tectonic regional layers did not suit them. As it could be seen, the leading motive of the coalition was not to disrupt the existing balance in the region. The pursued strategic objectives were different. They varied from continuous settlement and influence over the region as well as a full victory over the aggressor, to withdrawing only the Iraqi army from Kuwait and restoring its independence.

The coalition, however, succeeded in giving legitimacy to its purely 'doctrinaire' actions. While diplomatic efforts to regulate the conflict were taking place, the United States were gathering powerful military forces in the region, followed by their Allies. The attempts of Iraq to contravene by stirring up religious discords inside the Coalition, using hostages as a shield, violation of the Geneva Convention, as well as attempts to improve its relations with Iran, proved unsuccessful. The threats of attack on Israel and the oil wells in Saudi Arabia had only a consolidation character. The so-called 'Israeli card' for the Arab countries to leave the Coalition was played in vain.

[6] Mitchev 2005.

The attempts to bring pressure on Iraq by demonstrating force failed as well. The long-term impact of the USA and their Allies on the processes in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf was undertaken by quick hits leading to strategic superiority and neutralization of the defense infrastructure of the enemy.

On 29 November 1990 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the use of force by all necessary means after 15 January 1991 to compel Iraq to withdraw its forces and restore the independence of Kuwait and its regime. The routes for the 'First War in the Persian Gulf'[7] were open.

By launching air strikes and short-term ground operations, the Iraqi army retreated from the territory of Kuwait. These events remain in the history as Operation Desert Storm. More than a thousand take-offs took place on the first day. The military infrastructure was the main target and, sometimes, civilians targets were aimed at - primarily in the capital Baghdad. The Persian Gulf War is known in the history as 'a television event'; a large part of the battle zone was broadcast live on television for the first time. Despite some allegations of bias toward government propaganda, the media let the public be quite informed and engaged in a debate on various details, form an idea for setting out such a campaign, as well as its results.

The Gulf War turned out to be a major tactical and technical foundation for conducting modern military operations mainly in the technological field - specifically in the use of Air Force, missiles and missile defense systems, space data exchange systems, radio intelligence, etc. The key of the tactics was the attempt to minimize human casualties. Thus, ground operations were secondary from military point of view.

Western societies are neuralgic to the loss of living power. The memory in the USA for Vietnam is not remote. This war, however, sets the matrix for all subsequent NATO military missions and operations with minimal human risk in regard to the human factor. All subsequent campaigns –again Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, are based on the experience from the Gulf War. The concept of using limited military force is the key foundation in the military strategy of the coalition during the crisis. In other words, a framed military campaign that does not lead to utter defeat of the opposing side, but limits its possibilities of becoming a military threat. Rocket systems and types of weapons were displayed for the first time in real combat during the conflict, which later would be implemented as a serious segment in the international arms business.

The surrender of Iraq, failing its resistance, was announced on 27 February 1991. Part of the conflict research, entirely from military and political point of view, qualify it as 'incomplete' considering the fact that the regime

[7] Maier 2009.

remained in power for many years after it, and demonstrated hostility and negative attitude towards its energy resource consumers - the democratic countries.

Assuming that the dynamics of each military-political operation is determined by regional features and national characteristcs, and the cost by the resources and technological potential of the enemy, it can be concluded that the political and purely financial side of the Persian Gulf crisis is serious. The responsible state factors from the USA and UK have managed to collect 'about 4/5 from the expenses'.[8]

The political outcome does not guarantee lasting peace. The Middle East has not become more stable since the crisis. The events give impetus of Iran to a leading position in the region. Directly or indirectly, Turkey, Israel and to a certain extent Egypt and Syria gain profit based on their behavior. The USA permanently and legally set presence in the region. The crisis brought up another strategic issue to the agenda – the resource supply security outside the national borders of the consumer countries, and how to implement legitimate international community actions to discredit and respond to the aggressive geopolitical ambitions, as well as to guarantee the consumer needs of strategic resources.

The USA, as the world's largest consumer, has established a permanent military infrastructure to carry out direct control over the Persian Gulf to ensure security of supply.

An important consequence from the crisis is that a future conflict potential was set. Saddam Hussein remained in power. Despite its weakened positions and the US supported domestic conflicts with the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south, the regime demonstrated sustainability in the newly created geopolitical environment. Apparently, the Coalition leaders had achieved only some of their strategic objectives from political point of view. This in turn imposed a second operation years later to change the political geography in the Persian Gulf with the purpose of ensuring the required by the Western and the US economy and foreign policy resources needs.

It can be concluded that the Persian Gulf crisis within 1990-1991 outlined the foundation structure of the modern international relations. It proved that modern conflicts have multi-dimensional characteristics, but the genesis lies namely in the attempt to control and dominate over the traditional resources by which objectives are fulfilled and resolutions of strategic issues are resolved. This in turn, automatically, classifies them as strategic.

Each global force strives for control and management of strategic resources. And each such force collapses when the maintenance cost of

[8] Calvocoressi 2013.

its expansionary claims exceeds the revenue. The effect of control over the territory, population, and resources of a given country does not generate sufficient mobile goods and benefits. Such was the fate of the empires - the Roman, the Byzantine, the Ottoman, the Russian, the British Empires, the USSR in different historical periods.

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