THE UNIVERSITY OF SHUMEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY

STUDIA ACADEMICA ŠUMENENSIA

CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

(CIVILIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE)

edited by
Biser Georgiev, Rumen Vatashki and Ivo Topalilov

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'CHRISTIANITY IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE (CIVILIZATIONAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE)'

The second volume of the series **Studia academica Šumenensia** is dedicated to a global historical theme – **'Christianity in Southeastern Europe (civilizational and historical perspective)'**. This book comprises the collected works of eleven leading historians in their fields of study from four European countries. The topics vary but they are thematically related to the common theme – civilizational development in Southeastern Europe. The context deals with the political motives and parliamentary life, international diplomacy, Christian culture and relationships, manifestation of moral values, social state policy, etc. Having in mind the main theme a special place is assigned to the Christian values' influence on the development of the European society in the region discussed.

The papers in the volume are ordered chronologically. In general, the authors' works can be put in two main groups: on the one hand, the studies are devoted to the international relations and the development of political models through the prism of Christianity, on the other hand, some of the studies consider the moral and social problems in the society's development, as well as the relationships between the different church centers.

Undoubtedly, in the first group Prof. Dr. Habil Pantev's work 'Rereading *Stroitelite*' deserves the most serious attention. He presents one of the most dramatic episodes in Southeastern Europe – 'The Bulgarian crisis' of 1886 – 1894. The main aspect of the study are the Bulgarian-Russian relations, interwoven in the complex prism of international diplomacy, the Bulgarians' gratitude for the Liberation, Orthodox traditions, etc. The author clearly demonstrates the reasons, both ethical and political, which led Sofia to independent foreign politics and the huge drama of Russian diplomacy, which lost its influence on the brotherly Balkan Christian country.

Another research related to Prof. Dr. Habil Pantev's work is Prof. Dr. Habil Sazdov's article '*Russia and the Coburgs between Catholicism and East Orthodox Christianity*'. It studies a private matter of the same period and the same region, regarding the change of Turnovo Constitution as a result of international complications, the necessity of building a Bulgarian dynasty and at the same time – the 'reconciliation' between Bulgaria and Russia. Here the author focuses more specifically on the religious anguish of Prince Ferdinand because his first-born son has to be converted to Orthodox Christianity.

Prof. Dr. Habil Mishev's article '*The religious factor in the Austrian-Hungarian policy towards Bulgaria throughout the wars of 1912-1918*' presents a less studied problem up to the present moment, related to the attempts of the Bulgarians under foreign domination to use Austrian and Hungarian confessional interests on the Balkans to achieve better conditions for education and religion in their native language. As the author himself points out, their efforts were not successful.

The article of Prof. Dr. Habil Georgiev is entitled '*An attempt to create a Christian Democratic Party in Bulgaria at the end of World War I*'. The author's main thesis is that the attempt to create a Bulgarian political party with Christian views is not successful because the conditions in the country at the end of World War I are not appropriate.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kolev's work '*The Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate and abolitionism*' provokes an extreme interest. The study covers both main themes of the present volume. For the first time on the basis of carefully selected materials from the second half of 20th century the author makes the statement that in the Ottoman Empire there are no separate social circles and institutions that oppose slavery. The only exception is the Bulgarian Exarchate based in Constantinople, which turns into a central factor for Bulgarian abolitionism. It plays a leading role in the prohibition of slavery by law in Bulgarian Principality, marked by a special article in Turnovo constitution and in the autonomous region of Eastern Rumelia (South Bulgaria today). Simultaneously, the author follows the activities of the ecclesiastical authorities for redeeming slaves of Bulgarian origin within the Ottoman Empire in Asia and Africa.

The work of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Temelsky entitled *'The birth of parliamentary democracy (1871 church and laity council)*' focuses on a memorable event in the Bulgarian Renaissance history, associated with one of the first attempts of the Bulgarian society to establish democratically their public institutions, what is more, to establish them under a despotic foreign state power.

As it was mentioned above the second group of articles are dedicated to the moral and social problems in the development of society and church. Due to their thematic diversity they are ordered chronologically.

The study of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kravchenko from Ukraine '*Church and care for orphan children in Ukrainian territories in the 19th – the beginning of 20th century*' is about Russian Orthodox church charity for organization and taking care of orphan children in the Ukrainian provinces. It studies the role of eparchial patronage, brotherhoods, Orthodox monasteries and clergy in providing welfare assistance for orphans, in creating orphanages, educational and disciplinary institutions. The author presents the forms of

church care in the war years at the beginning of the 20th century.

The short article written by Prof. Dr. Karner, Direktor des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Graz-Wien, is entitled *'I lost my sight for my country! ... Soldiers blinded in World War I in Austria (1914)'*. It is research presented in Russian at 4th International Conference 'Первая мировая война: взгляд спустя столетие', which took place in Moscow in November 2014 with participants from nine countries. As the materials of this forum had not been published up to now and there is little chance it will happen in the near future, the author decided to publish in the present volume as an article the presentation that caused serious scientific interest in the Russian capital.

The only co-authored work in the present volume *'Serbian Orthodox Church cooperation and frictions with Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Bulgarian Exarchate during interwar period'* is submitted by two Serbian historians from Belgrade – Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mira Radojević and Srđan Mićić, MA. It considers not only religious but also many controversial political issues on the Balkans related to the struggles for influence between the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Vatican in the period between the two World Wars.

'*Political Morality and the Recall of Members of Parliament in the Bulgarian Parliamentary Tradition*', the article by Prof. Dr. Habil Galunov is devoted to Bulgarian issues and problems. Its chronological range is the period of Bulgarian socialism (1944 - 1989 AD), when the "recall of Parliamentary members" is a propaganda tool of the totalitarian regime. It discusses in detail the procedures for recalling characteristic of a closed society, standing away from the principles of democracy, political and Christian morality.

Last but not least is the extremely interesting research by Prof. Dr. Habil Vatashky *'Attempts of the Holy See to invite local Eastern Orthodox Churches to participate in the work of the Second Vatican Council'*. It presents one of the most important events in the history of the Christian church in the second half of 20th century. As the author points out the contacts between senior clergy of the East and West churches allow them to approach each other from the standpoint of Christian ethics in the name of the common church unity. It is of great importance for Bulgaria that the main ideologist and organizer of the festival is Pope John XXIII (archbishop Angelo Roncalli), who is an Apostolic Delegate in Bulgaria in the period 1925-1934.

Shumen, October 2015 B. Georgiev, R. Vatashki, I. Topalilov

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Rereading 'Stroitelite ...'

Andrei Pantev

Abstract: This article presents one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of Europe in the late 19th c. Bulgaria, newly liberated by Russia, opposes Russian interference in its internal affairs. This is the first successful attempt of the legally dependent and regulated vassal state to resist a Great Power such as Russia, whose special interests are recognized by the European diplomacy. In this stands out the figure of Stefan Stambolov, who is an admirer of Russia and who rejects Bulgaria's dependence with all the consequences. In this respect Bulgaria sets up a precedent for independent policy, being dependent at the same time on other forces who supported Bulgaria in this diplomatic quarrel. This is the essence of the 'Bulgarian crisis' in 1886-1894 which is described in the books on the history of European nineteenth century written by Simeon Radev.

Key words: appreciation, independence, dependence crisis, the Russian-Bulgarian conflict, nationalism, political drama

Резюме: Статията представя един от най-драматичните епизоди от историята на Европа в края на 19 в. Освободената от Русия България се противопоставя на руската намеса в нейните вътрешни работи. Това е първия успешен опит на малка и юридически регламентирано васална държава да се опълчи на Велика сила,при това срещу Русия, чиито особени интереси се признават от европейската дипломация. В тази драма изпъква фигурата на Стефан Стамболов, който бидейки поклонник на Русия отхвърля зависимостта на България от нея с всичките рискове на това поведение. В това отношения България създава прецедент на независима политика, без да приема зависимост от страна на останалите сили, които подкрепят България в тази разпра, но само дипломатически. Това е същността на 'българската криза' от 1886-1894 г. включена в учебниците на историята на европейския 19 в. и описана от Симеон Радев.

'It is my inner conviction that Russia has never had and does not have such envious, slanderous and even overt enemies as all Slavic tribes that it has just liberated ... These liberated Slavs will immediately throw themselves in the arms of the European countries and will constantly convince themselves that they do not owe Russia the smallest gratitude. Perhaps a century, if not more, they will shudder with fear from Russia for their

freedom. They will stutter in front of European countries, will gossip and intrigue against Russia'. I quote part of F. Dostoevsky's text.[1] The writer has another prophecy - he ridicules the imaginary Bulgarian prime minister as an extremely negative representative of this phenomenon. A special prophecy, confirmed to a large extent. He passes away without seeing the most dramatic confirmation of his prophecy. With all the conflicts and inconsistencies with other Slavic nations on the Balkans, its collapse in Bulgaria is the biggest defeat of Russian diplomacy after the Crimean War, in George Kennan's words, 'from the point of view of prestige'. In 1991, *Saint Kliment Ohridski* University Press published a study of the prestigious historian, now deceased, Radoslav Popov 'Bulgaria na krăstopăt. Regentstvoto'.[2] This is the most serious study on this topic and of this time period so far. The author uses a considerable collection of documentary evidence of different origin and answers the question if Stambolov is against Russia or Russia against Stambolov - a dilemma, which he later elaborates on into a book with a similar title. Unfortunately, a new situation had already created then such conditions and environment in which few people evaluated this serious research. There R. Popov opposes the traditional arguments of Simeon Radev claiming that Bulgarian political circles are no less responsible for the Bulgarian-Russian political conflict during the period. A similar opinion expresses the Russian historian Victor Kosik. What does actually happen during these crucial times? The idea of the Bulgarian-Russian political conflict after the Liberation is an object of descriptions, analyses and often ad hoc interpretations from the times of the 'Bulgarian crisis' between 1886 and 1887, which actually started after the Union of Eastern Rumelia with the Bulgarian Principality in 1885 and finished only after the fall of Stefan Stambolov in 1894.

Readers of Simeon Traychev Radev's books do not need to be encouraged. His 'Stroitelite...'[3] has several editions and is pointed out as similar to 'Zapiskite'. However, it differs from the April Uprising, 'Stroitelite... is even more dramatic. This time is gone forever and it will be in us forever. As human history shows there is not only sunshine, there is also darkness. The convenient distance of history provides us with the opportunity for these corrections, but as for knowledge and reflections that period is left in immovable greatness. We read about passions and cruelties, about honor and betrayal, about follies and nobility. But mostly we

[1] Dostoefksi 1989, 349-354.
[2] Popov 1991. See also Popov 2000.
[3] Radev 1911.

feel the atmosphere of that period reflected in the title of book. Since then Bulgaria will never be the same. The diverse pulse of that time will have an inertia effect on Bulgarian political life until 1944, and in some respects after that as well. Each new historical play in our country and all new political characters in it will have the wounds and prejudices of that time.

Every nation builds a majestic epic into its common memory. It is often exaggerated and decorated with romance, it preserves national identity, especially in times of extreme trials. Then the consolation in the past gives support in contemporary troubles. However, the story becomes significant only when it is represented in literature. The interlacing between academicism and artistic imagination leaves a more lasting impression, even when we learn about patriotism sitting on our granny's knee. If the martyrs' April Uprising of 1876 acquired such an image for the future generations, the first years after 1879 bring a dramatic replay of the same epic in new circumstances. The former is immortalized by 'Zapiskite…', the latter restores our self-confidence through 'Stroitelite…'. There is a short chronology between them. The evolution of the idea about our own significance becomes revolutionary. Never before that time and never afterwards has our historical time moved with such speed. Being victims who call forth rather compassion than respect, for four years we have transformed into a bold nation that 'checks' sustainability ratio with European political forces. Who would have thought that after being 'gifted' freedom Bulgaria would win independence overwhelming for its status and size and the dramatic twists of its destiny will enter forever the history of the European 19th century. It is not the case that at this period there was no lawlessness and violence from all sides. But there was a sense that never before has our destiny been determined so determinately by ourselves.

Already being on the European map, we frantically and sometimes desperately looked for manifestations to confirm our right to exist as a state. We could not go on without recognition from outside, precisely because of our public opinion which we now call Civil Society. Because we knew that this right was denied to us in the past. It turned out that it was not only unfair, but also without any reason. How strange! It seemed that till 1908 when we were dependent by law, we exhibited more independence than afterwards! In our hectic and almost feverish search for miracles in our past we often overlooked the real achievements, because they were primarily anonymous and general; that we have the oldest gold, that we raised noise in the Bosphorus, that we captured Emperor Baldwin and conquered Edirne fortress. Recently it turned out that an 8000-years-old refrigerator was found near Vratsa, which can also be a Bulgarian artifact like the dinosaur remnants found near the village of Dorkovo. These exaggerated

facts hardly relieve our historical wounds. But this does not have the desired effect in our own eyes and the eyes of the world. At the same time, our ancestors acted audaciously and they had no counterpart in European history at least up till then. And in what hostile environment they lived! Let us remind you that the delicate diplomatically hidden motives and arguments against the restoration of the Bulgarian state after 1876, concerned our readiness and maturity to govern a state. They assumed that Bulgaria did not have enough human resources to be able to organize and govern themselves. There were concerns that the fourth Slavic state would be a puppet of foreign interests and a constant source of Balkan disorder because of its institutional weakness. There were even fears that it had no trained switchmen to build the unfinished Bulgarian section of the Orient Express, although the only railway passed the Bulgarian territory.

Were these the only false believes and prejudices? High barriers stood in front of our future development. As incomprehensible as it sounds, ethnic domination of Bulgarians in the Eastern Balkans created conditions for a natural alliance against the Bulgarian state because, in order to implement its program for a unified ethnic territory, Bulgaria had to control this area. But its fate of a late guest in the Balkan state distribution nipped this perspective in the bud. There is another paradox. Bulgaria had no strategic enemy among the Great Powers. So it was hard to find a permanent counter foothold against them to be a permanent strategic ally. If this does not justify at least it explains our 'vacillating'. However, it created a suspicion toward the Bulgarians, on the one hand, as an Orthodox pro-Russian force and, on the other hand, there were suspicions about us being weak in foreign political commitments to everyone. In St. Petersburg we were thought of as pro-Austrians, in Vienna as pro-Russian. The sudden decision of fierce conflict with Turkey and the fate of our refugees there in 1913 was followed by a military alliance with it only two years later. We are not the only responsible for such inconsistency, but it was one of the reasons for the 'loneliness', which I mentioned in the title of this preface.

'Stroitelite ...' was published precisely in 1911, when confidence was floating triumphantly above us. At the end of the 19th century Bulgaria is the most important country on the Balkans. Foreign correspondents accredited on the Balkans as a rule had a permanent residence in Sofia. James Boucher became a European celebrity with its Bulgarian theme not only in journalism. A column named 'the situation in Bulgaria' was constantly present in the European press. During the government of Stambolov, which was called 'a regime' even by its supporters, Bulgaria 'swept' rapidly ahead. Railways – a symbol of modernization, were

prolonged by 360 km. The unrecognized Bulgarian prince Ferdinand was accepted in June 1891 by Emperor Franz Joseph and in the summer of 1892 by the dignified Queen Victoria. The former exile, who participated in four anti-Ottoman uprisings and then became Bulgarian Prime Minister – Stambolov, was met with salutes with his wife in the Bosphorus and was awarded with a Turkish medal of significance. The sultan was afraid of a Turkish-Bulgarian state blend, because he feared that the Bulgarians with their qualities would dominate in the union. Since August 15 till November 1, 1892 an agricultural-industrial exhibition is held in Plovdiv. These are indicative results of the building process which had started back in 1879. Expatriate Bulgarians 'watched with hope and pride the great beginning of the small principality'. Social legislation, which had begun under P. Karavelov's rule did not allow Bulgarian peasants to have the fate of the peasants in Romania, Greece, Russia, Sicily, Ireland and Spain. A spiritual prerequisite for solving the Bulgarian unifying issue became the agreements for appointing three Bulgarian bishops in Macedonia. Even the brief constitutional crisis credentials regime was overcome smoothly and the Turnovo Constitution was peacefully restored. The entire documental memory of this period testifies how the new state was built. Therefore, we will often return to these facts because they prove the positive spirit of building our nation. Bulgaria was the Piedmont of the Balkans, despite all its strategic incompatibilities with the neighboring countries.

Until then the situation was different because we suffered from historical prerequisites. Being in extreme geopolitical isolation, our country had fallen into deep oblivion for the rest of the world. Only good experts of the East knew about its medieval splendor. The travel notes which mentioned the Bulgarians described them as ethnographically picturesque or as hardworking shepherds whose obedience was due to ignorance. There were some exceptions to these humble descriptions, but they were only exceptions. Where should statesmen, ministers, MPs, mayors, watchmen and politicians come from for this country? Who knew anything about our lives under the Turks? We had no window to see us! How many memoirs and petitions, how many missions with knocking at the gates of Europe, how many sacrificial revolts had gone in vain? Was it possible to defeat an empire situated on three continents with cherry-tree cannon? We were not in the periphery as Serbs, Greeks and Romanians, we were located in its European heart! They entered Europe and returned from it through our lands.

Only a few years later a miracle happened. The time had come for our historic rehabilitation. Flooded with indulgence Bulgaria managed to create an orderly state system, constitutional arrangements, we had all the institutions of a modern state, normal economic conditions, social

legislation, post offices, schools, diplomatic offices and an army that would become famous in 1885. We doubled our territory by ourselves, we won a war in which no one saw us as the winner, and we showed wise balance after the Union. In ten years Bulgaria outstripped its Balkan neighbors, who had advantage of about 60 years of state life. That is how we enter the European world, uninvited, almost undesired. Who then could still assume that a country with a definite legal dependence, surrounded by hostile neighborhoods, will achieve all this? It boldly laughs at a cruel European treaty, rejects foreign interference, but it accepts another in return! Since 1885 most journalists accredited on the Balkans did not live in Bucharest, Athens and Belgrade, but in Sofia. The American journalist-missionary, Dorothy Davis, called Bulgaria a 'newspaper celebrity'. The Greek Prime Minister criticized the British Ambassador in Athens, Edward Monson, that England had forgotten Byron and Greece because of Bulgaria. Has it happened before? What about our martyrs who were hanged and died in isolation and European indifference? This was an unprecedented event in history then, when each small country was put in the strangling embrace of a foreign patronage. Even colonial countries such as Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands did not avoid such a secondary fate. And in those times of crucial trial our Renaissance generation did it. The revolutionaries from Wallachia, self-taught scholars, graduates of European schools carried out the ideas of the historic plan reflected in the simple song 'to be again as we used to be'. Regardless of our subordinate status of a formally vassal principality Stambolov's government made trade agreements with Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary. In the difficult 1888 the Higher school was establishes and later it was called University. This was what the descendants of the subjugated population ('rayah') did.

Before we continue this short story we find it appropriate to make a short thematic divergence. What was Europe then and what the Bulgarians could and could not do in such a situation? Our fate then was not in an isolated vacuum. It depended on the European political and cultural dynamics. Let us mention the most characteristic features in the content of this definition. The most significant event during this period was the French Revolution of 1789, rightly defined as Great. It did not change only France and it even did not change only Europe. It constructed new ways and methods in the thinking and the structure of the world, affecting the entire European political philosophy. What is modern should be universal as a socio-political structure. And most of all a purpose should work as a function. Privileges by birth and class affiliation are eliminated forever. Legally defined corporate divisions drop out, medieval barriers and

business monopoles are overcome, foreign trade contacts are accelerated, the complete triumph of the so called unconditional ownership sets in. It becomes a source and condition of political influence and power. The subject of the state is the citizen and the sovereign are the people, though still with some restrictions. Civil rights become part of the legal system. There comes a kind of regrouping of the division of labor, property, and the ensuing public authority. The importance of public opinion grows – a factor unknown in any previous time periods. It is the novelty that legitimizes political power. The expression of the Middle Ages 'God is with us' is transformed into the statement 'Public opinion is with us'. This motto became both alternative and equivalent of state policy. The names of 'England', 'France', 'Spain', etc. do not only stand for the monarch, parliament or government. In a sense, such a drastic adjustment in the argument scope and nature of political power is stronger than the changes that result from bloody revolutions at that time. But there is something else.

In the middle of the 17th century the first newspapers began to be published in Europe. This is a phenomenon with huge consequences and distribution. The chair of the chief editor of an influential newspaper is not a less important position in political endeavors than the throne of the monarch or the chair of a Minister. The idea is spread about the separation of the state, church and civil society. The idea of proportional representation in the parliament is realized with legislation in most countries. All governments, ideas and programs are presented as modern. Despite such overall evolution the world is shocked when in 1852 Napoleon III, the son of the brother of the real Louis Napoleon, is declared the Emperor of France. Apart from his name there is nothing great in him! He is the first statesman in monarchical Europe who takes part in elections and is elected! What is more, this emperor, unlike the American presidents, did not have a party. In 1848 he defeated his rival, the poet and the idol of the Revolution of the same year - Alphonse Lamartine. What a significant change for several centuries! Since then, even dictatorial regimes around the world will be presented as an expression of the common will and realization of the principles of popular sovereignty. A decisive political behavior can no longer be justified without this prop.

In 1580 began the lengthy sunset of crowned Europe. Subjects became citizens, even if the form of government of the state was a monarchy. The socio-political revolutions and wars between the 17th and 19th century, the administrative reform and church Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, which took place conditionally between 1750 and 1850, is compared as a historical consequence to humanity with the invention of the wheel. National liberation movements and the creation of

new states transform the political geography of the continent. Peripheral powers such as England and Russia imperiously interfere with world politics, while others such as Sweden and Spain lose their status as great powers. Europe is so different from the previous one, as the Roman legions differ from the armies of the Earl of Marlborough and Napoleon. The hereditary aristocracy and monarchy step back in order to preserve partly their influence. The development of the cities increases the mass political activity. The phrase 'City air sets you free' symbolizes the real threat of the old regimes, located in provincial estates.

In 1910 eight European cities have population over 1 million (Istanbul is one them). Significant improvements appear in the domestic life of the people, which increases the number of population and life span. At the end of the 19th century an average European lives more healthily than any crowned person two centuries ago. In 1851 the urban population in England becomes greater than village population which establishes the urbanization that has become one of the indicators of the modern world. As a counterpoint of this ratio we should remind that the village population in Bulgaria until 1944 is 79%. Industrial factories become as important and impressive as castles and cathedrals. Well, often castles are attacked more frequently. Counts are killed there, countesses are raped by invaders who are to settle there. Then about 300 years afterwards the history repeats itself in reverse.

The economic upturn and stability is a precondition for national prosperity and social stability, more efficient than the prestige of the monarchy. England prohibited slave trade in 1808. The era of constitutions starts. In the 1860s slavery in America and serfdom in Russia were eventually abolished. But intellectuals in Wien and Paris cafes who pretend to care about humankind simulate ignorance that it comes from the slave plantations in Brazil. In the middle of the same century the last public executions stop. Common suffrage is introduced for men - in 1871 in Germany and Switzerland, in 1882 in Italy, in 1896 in the Netherlands in 1898 in Norway, in 1906 in Russia, in 1907 in Austro-Hungary and the next year even in Turkey. The principle 'the majority governs', which was unthinkable in the previous eras, became a legal and moral postulate. It is often speculated on, but it cannot be denied anymore. By the beginning of World War I an absolute ruler in a European country is only the Prince of Monaco. In varying degrees, but everywhere in the Christian world the principle of division of powers is realized. This 'triangle' in government is considered to be one of the indicators of political modernism. The Swedish constitution of 1874 invented the referendum that duplicated the will of the majority by extra-parliamentary means. All the 'isms' of that time are still

alive, some victorious, others in decline, but not in oblivion, because all of them are an intellectual product of the ideological evolution of the European modernization. Marxism, which is so easily denied today, was invented not in Siberia or in the Chinese steppes, but in the reading room of the British Museum.

The human being becomes more human as anthropological perception and Europe is more integrated as a cultural unit. Contacts and communications are intense as never before. Passports are required only in Turkey and Russia. All countries maintain the gold parity of its currency. Still, the political supremacy in Europe determines the rulers of the world. This connection changes soon. In 1899 and in 1907 the first international peace conferences are held. This unanimity, however, does not prevent massacres in the trenches and gas attacks undertaken by the descendants of Baudelaire, Shakespeare, Goethe and Dostoyevsky in the Great War of 1914 – 1918. Neither of the processes, which have started in the chronological framework of 'Stroitelite...', is completed so far. The predictions and challenges of Marxism do not come true, irrespective of all experiments. But as a threatening extreme, it contributes to the development of the principle of social justice, which remains an immortal and noble instinct in human nature. Ideas and ideals, programs and experiments of modern times are not realized in their original form, with which started the conceptual and concrete construction of the modern world. But they lie in the institutional and ideological foundations of the times in which we live today.

Here is the situation in which our drama is played out, drama that will not be exceeded in passions and controversies even during the Balkan war. Two ships with 60 soldiers and 30 cannons approach Varna on the verge of a civil war with the threat of invasion from the outside and Serbian revenge. This is another version of our Liberation. The threats inflame the internal pressure, which turns into pathological hatred. It often happened that manners and actions were rude, language was coarse, but in such circumstances other societies showed more cruelty. But then we became part of Europe together with the negative characteristics. In 'Balgarskite burni vremena' ('Bulgarian turbulent times') - a name of a book by Richard von Mach, German-Russian political cooperation failed. Because of Bulgaria Bismarck 'chooses' Austria-Hungary and not Russia and so the Union of the Three Emperors fails. A French author claims that this union 'crashed in Bulgaria'. The future Entente is applied in its Bulgarian version with the Franco-Russian rapprochement, which began after 1871. France is the only country which does not support the resistance of the Bulgarians against Russia. Without a trace of megalomania we can claim that the

future allies, who started WWI, show indications of opposition or agreement during the discussions on the 'Bulgarian issue'. That's what we read in this insightful book that should stand on a bookcase shelf in every home. Its author does not need biographical data from the Internet as an explanation of his exceptional significance. He is an idea now, not just a name. From Caesar to Churchill it is a rare gift to write history, which is close to mystery.

A famous English economist-historian - John Stuart Mill had said somewhere that to be a great economist does not mean to be only that. This is absolutely valid for scholars and writers because history is neither a ledger, nor a reader for first graders, nor linear chronology. In a line with this precondition, Simeon Radev entered our historical life not only with history. He is a universal talent in science, art and culture in the universal times of the Second Bulgarian Revival. Delighted and suffering. Successful and failed. In his last book 'Ranni spomeni' ('Early Memories') in the hospital he confesses that he wrote those memories to release his spirit from oppression. Without being psychographs, we can only speculate about the reasons for this oppression. It is also universal. In 1952 S. Radev was accused personally by the famous anarchist Peter Mandzhukov that he inspired on February 21, 1898 the murder of Dimitar Macedonski – the editor of the Bulgarian newspaper 'News' published in the Turkish capital. They do not blame him, but they do not justify him either. Simeon Radev does not answer the accusatory letter - some say due to fine taste, others due to awkwardness. What was written remained.

People say that time is the most indicative measure of the true value of each book. If this is so then we have reasons to call 'Stroitelite ...' one of our enduring books. After years of deliberate ignorance or speculative disregard it was published again in 1973 to become almost immediately bibliophile and bibliographic rarity. The name of its author comes out of forgetfulness together with it. So many documentary publications, archival research findings and interpretations emerged from the time of its first publication and today we read it with the feeling of astonishment that all this has been seen, understood and written. What is so attractive in these times, marking the two most important Bulgarian events in the nineteenth century – the Union and the 'crisis' of 1886-1887? It is mostly the fact that the Bulgarians, for better or worse, comply with what the 'others' do and what the 'others' advise them to do less than at any other times in the past. A complex accumulated for centuries is partly overcome. From then on there was a lot of time and cases to prove themselves, not only through wars but with more lasting achievements.

I do not know if you can or whether you should make comparisons between the first and second volume of this famous book. But we can apparently see how the growing dynamism and drama in Bulgarian political life after the coup in August 1886 automatically imported more nerve and more stress, more expectations and more insight in the second part. In fact, with it begins the most acute phase of the 'Bulgarian crisis', its 'exit' from the European political proscenium. We see the growth of Bulgaria, which will be from then on an object of attention and forecasts. It seems we were more modest then than now, although we had more reasons for self-confidence, because we entered the textbooks not only as innocent victims.

Today we would look in vain for a serious study of this period of world historiography where the term 'Bulgarian crisis' is used and analyzed repeatedly with varying success. Before it our state life began with hopeful prospects. The Union in 1885 changed the view point of the world towards us. Konstantin Irechek wrote to Gregory Nachovich that Europe sees us 'in a different way' now. Then Bulgaria is swept by fierce internal passions and foreign trials. The dethronement and the abdication of Prince Alexander come afterwards and with them whatnot. What is dangerous, especially for the former Eastern Rumelia, which is without a monarch, are the frantic confrontation of the political forces in the country, the intervention of outside forces in solving its institutional organization, the increased chain dependence between Bulgarian foreign policy issues and pan-European political situation, the contradictory ways of addressing the Bulgarian prince issue and so on.

In the recurring political situation a number of timeless principles of country's life are put in dangerous ordeal such as the legality of the elections, the functional purpose of the authorities, the soldier's oath, the request for armed intervention from outside, party loyalty and political friendship. We observe a strange try to reconsider the ideals of the Bulgarian Revival, the objectives of the political emigration and sometimes even the results of Bulgarian Liberation. Yesterday's political allies, fellows in the national liberation struggle became mortal enemies and vice versa. The political and civic loyalty of the new government recently proclaimed is impaired. The accusations of treachery become normal in the fierce debates, blood is shed, political processes begin, and the situation threatens the European peace. There is no significant European event in which Bulgaria does not take direct or indirect part. How is that possible after the exultation following the recent liberation and especially after the recent triumph of the Union in 1885? We are in a hurry to remind the reader that the "Bulgarian crisis" of 1886-1887 was largely programmed by the special status, which was given to the new state by the Congress of

Berlin in the summer of 1878. This is the reason to put it in inverted commas but even without them it is particularly important. Here we come to the main question. Does the past influence today's thinking? The legalistic moods of our Renaissance heritage did not prevent Bulgarian dictatorships. The same way as the most democratic constitution gave us only 5-7 years of true democracy in the Third Bulgarian Kingdom. Our hopes that fluttered like a flag over our heads started since then. There were a lot of disappointments, but the beginning was so promising.

Simeon Radev’s book gives us the opportunity to reconsider to what extent this crisis was caused by internal forces and factors and to what extent it was a reflection or rather a reaction to external interference regulated by the international law back then. It is particularly specified in relation to Bulgaria by the restrictive clauses of the Berlin Treaty. Although it could choose its monarch, its choice was legitimate only if it was recognized by the Gate. But in turn the Great Powers, especially Russia, whose guns were heard in Constantinople during the Liberation War, exerted strong influence on Turkey about the Bulgarian prince issue, so it was actually decided first by St. Petersburg and the other capitals and finally by the Turks. This created the possibility of dangerous and legitimate initiatives that Constantinople could be allowed to intervene forcefully in Bulgarian affairs. What prevented Turkey to send troops to Eastern Rumelia when the Governor according to the agreement of April 1886 was the Bulgarian prince, but he was not there? Perhaps, the lessons of Slivnitsa. That is how we avoided the ‘gaping hole\ in front of which Bulgaria stood in Stambolov’s words. Because of these fears he is not that extreme in his government. Unbiased researchers found out that he was looking for support in the parliament, even among the frightened opposition and he was more critical to his party members than to the opposition. This is a phenomenon of monocracy of all times. Although we define his regime as ‘terror’ not only the bureaucratic sharp-language newspaper ‘Svoboda’ is published, but dozens of opposition newspapers in Sofia and the country. Despite all drastic cases of arrests, whipping and repulsive events during the elections for a III Grand National Assembly and V National Assembly between the terrible years of 1886 and 1887, Stambolov’s iron hand is responsible for the clashes, persecution and repression, as well as for the conflict with the bishops. But the opponents of the government are accomplices in those ugly riots. The abrupt statement of the Prime Minister about the ‘inner conviction’ has continuation, which is often passed over. He turns to MPs and says: ‘You will judge me later’. In this story there are not only knights or only villains. Was it possible to have them when everything was at stake?

The crisis is not only an abnormal status of the political life in the country, neither just a political power struggle, nor even a self-serving ambition of one or another political power to impose their own solutions or views for solving it. It is primarily a dramatic try of the inner political powers in the country as divided and weak as they are, to solve the artificial or accidental problems of the country in their own way and with their own methods. But the crisis can regenerate the old regime as it happens with the general crisis of feudalism in Europe in the 17th century. Not every crisis is destructive, but each one is an indication of weakness in which public state institutions cannot function as they did before. Each internal and external political move is looking for a change. The newspapers published threatening and humorous proposals to declare independence and even Republic. In relation to this occasion, a malicious Russian publicist noted that he expected the Bulgarians to declare an empire. This frivolous fantasy has nothing to do with reality, but it reflects the multiple-choice decisions that were discussed then, even the union with Turkey or the election of the defeated King Milan for a Bulgarian prince.

In this sense we can see close resemblance in the programs and the activities of almost all party events, regardless of the often repulsive courtesies of some of them to one or another Great Power. Further on this means that the 'Bulgarian crisis' does not follow and does not end according to the recipes of the representatives of the 'European concert'. That is why we can talk about growing autonomy, already shown and verified in September 1885. The Bulgarian crisis is largely predetermined by external factors and the foreign political environment, but it is not guided by them for sure. Otherwise we cannot explain the fact that despite the political passions unleashed in Bulgaria, despite the party struggle of life and death, which sometimes looks like taking revenge, few are those who are willing to sacrifice the state independence of the country to impose and implement their foreign political program or simply to take the power. Some of them as Bobchev we honour but not for this. The poor great democrat P. Karavelov did not understand that harsh times call for ferocious decisions. And Bulgaria was in critical trials. It had no friends and was alone in the world. Of course, a central problem in the crisis are Russian-Bulgarian relations. At that time everyone acknowledged the special interests of Russia to Bulgaria, even though they were not declared in an agreement, even its most serious opponents across the Channel, together with defeated Turkey.

Small nations have a tendency to exaggerate the interest of big countries towards them. The Bulgarians are not an exception. But in this particular case in the policy of imperial Russia there is a peculiar obsession

with the Bulgarian issue. Abandoned by other Orthodox Balkan country, which were created with its help, Russia focuses on Bulgaria. So it was here Russia met its greatest defeat, from the point of view of strategy and economics, but also as prestige. Very soon after the liberation Russian royal politics in Bulgaria experienced an important tactical change. From the idea of a special relationship to the Bulgarians the royal diplomacy goes to the practice of special interests, which leads to some distortion of the traditional matching of these two components in the Russian-Bulgarian relations in the period before the liberation. Moreover, when Emperor Alexander III was enthroned the Russian diplomacy started a kind of ‘politics of feelings’ regarding the Bulgarians. This partiality does not always allow Russia to utilize those natural and accumulated through the centuries advantages that it has always had among the Bulgarians. It turns out so that Bulgaria and Russia hate each other as lovers. And sometimes such kind of hatred is the strongest.

This negative change, equally disadvantageous to both countries, is very strong precisely during the period described in the second volume of ‘Stroitelite ...’. After the counter-coup and especially after prince Alexander, feeling embittered, leaves the country, but the Regency remains in power, the leaders of king's diplomacy are wrongly but firmly convinced that it is only possible to restore and preserve the Russian influence in Bulgaria by threats and rough oppression. The success of Russian diplomacy in the removal of Battenberg creates the impression in St. Petersburg that ‘the voice of Russia’ (in the words of Mikhail Katkov) is omnipotent in Bulgaria and that only through extreme methods, including the use of force inside and outside the country, they may reach a satisfactory for Russia solution of the Bulgarian problem.

Although throughout the crisis Alexander III bears personal responsibility for continuous aggravation and break off of the Russian-Bulgarian diplomatic relations, this idea is shared by a significant number of Russian Empire leaders. The denial of any reasonable compromise, the inability to take account of the balance of forces within Bulgaria, the perseverance in maintaining unsuccessful and even failed principles and methods in Bulgarian royal politics, the use of unpopular and discreditable methods - attempts of corruption, conspiracies and assassinations, make this line of politics during the crisis one of the most spectacular failures of Russian diplomacy throughout the nineteenth century. We can claim without exaggeration that it is on the background of the ‘Bulgarian crisis' where the political actions of Russophiles and Russophobes in Bulgaria stand out most vividly and show their deepest roots. Similar groups with pre-defined foreign policy orientation there are in Greece, Serbia and

partially in Romania. But in Bulgaria they reach staggering numbers. During the Liberation everything goes normally. It is known that one of the first real projects for the Liberation of Bulgaria made by Sofroniy of Vratsa in the early nineteenth century involves unconditionally Russian intervention. The idea about 'old Ivan', spontaneously implemented in our country in the 17th century, which turned almost into folklore, arose almost immediately after the Moscow concept of the Third Rome. Stambolov wrote in his diary that 'Russia was sacred to us at that time'. On April 17, 1879 at the Grand National Assembly one of the unreserved flagmen of the unconditional Russophile political ideas Bishop Kliment Branitski of Turnovo (Vasil Drumev) in a moving speech invited the MPs to elect prince Alexander Battenberg. The favorite child of Europe, a relative of Queen Victoria, the prince-candidate is loved and appointed by Alexander II. Although he is not always fairly designated as Russophobe, Turkophile and Anglophile Dr. Chomakov, who passed away in 1893, recognizes the crucial support of Count Ignatiev for the favorable outcome of the Bulgarian church issue. Then comes what we can define as logical insanity. The tense Russian diplomacy is scared of the phenomenon in Greece, Romania and Serbia, the collapse of their influence there, may be repeated. Its idea of a friendly Bulgaria is that a Russian senior official should to take the head position in the Military Academy, to be the Military minister or even the Prime minister. The arguments are simple – 'we shed blood for you'. And for some time it was so. But who could tolerate this for a long time. The Bulgarian bold resistance is so unexpected that it leads to a situation that no one has expected – luckily, for their common enemies, in the autumn of 1886 Russia and Bulgaria suspend their diplomatic relations. None of the Balkan countries has done this so far. Bulgarian wounded and aggressive nationalism reacts with uncontrolled sharpness, in spite of the desire for reconciliation after the Union. From then on, it is clear.

Throughout European history in the nineteenth century there is no similar case of so dramatic and unnatural mismatch between international relations and cultural and historical closeness, as is the Bulgarian - Russian dialogue during the 'Bulgarian crisis'. Attacks, accusations, fabrications, threats and extreme excesses overflow the pages of the relevant governmental authorities and political speeches, shocking the European audience although it is accustomed to any Balkan surprises. Such a sad and negative follow-up of the Russian-Bulgarian mutuality crossing the line of centuries-old closeness is a dramatic denial to national and religious kinship.

Our journalists, publicists and political scientists would probably be surprised if they knew that the words 'a hot spot on the planet' is used in the newspaper jargon for the first time in the European press to refer to

Bulgaria. And if Russia becomes 'the other' after the enthronement of Alexander III, the 'other' is also Bulgaria after Stambolov takes a strong commanding position in Bulgarian politics. The functional dependence we already know – institutions - traditions - goals - political figures is no longer the same as in the time of Russian politics. Both hopes and foreign politics of Bulgaria change. The 'honest' mistakes of Bulgarian politicians during the crisis reflect not only political bias, but the peculiarities of the political situation in Europe then. We should not forget that if for many of them the state and prospects especially in the dynamics of the European political situation were not quite clear, the same 'ignorance' was typical for the prestigious political leaders of the Great Powers. Old alliances still exist, but they have little practical effect and the future government coalitions are at an early stage of manifestation and application.

In 1930s in the former USSR there are a number of publications researching Russian-Bulgarian relations, which are very critical to the Russian royalty. In 1935 the documentary collection *'Avantyury ruskogo tsarisma v Bolgarii'*[4] was published. It is a very authoritative publication where papers denouncing the objectives and methods of the royalty in Bulgaria and some of its followers are listed with their respective archival signatures according to all the requirements for publication of archives. In 1992 they were issued in Bulgarian with a short introduction by me. These publications are delicately avoided later in the study of Russian-Bulgarian relations during the crisis and in the study of the crisis itself. The time comes for extreme opinions and interpretations of both opposing explanations. Reasonable, balanced and scientifically justified theses are rare or often do not exist. It is necessary to point out that in the historiographical research on this issue in the US and Western Europe there are still publications today that willfully and unscrupulously look for artificial parallels between that time in the past and the present in the historical Russian-Bulgarian relations. A typical case in this sense is an unknown book by Karel Dourmana issued by the University Publishing House in the town of Uppsala, Sweden.[5]

The tests of the period without a Prince in Bulgaria should be understood by the enlightened reader without addiction to one or the other extreme. For many years researchers unencumbered by scientific or political commitments will fret over the question to what extent the disruption in the Russian-Bulgarian relations is a response to what they cautiously call 'some mistakes of Russian diplomacy', and to what extent it

[4] Kolarov 1935.
[5] See Durman 1988, 44-175.

is a natural although dramatized process in the Balkan political history. That is why the book by Simeon Radev will have readers and admirers in the future, although it presents a variant of this response.

The talented pen of the author recreates these episodes from the political history of Bulgaria, which can be reduced to the definition 'crisis after crisis'. The forced abdication of prince Alexander Battenberg, the government of the regency, the rupture of diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and Russia, the riots of Russophile officers in Burgas, Ruse and Silistra, the Bulgarian delegation travelling in Europe, the convening of the Third Grand National Assembly, the election of Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg as a Bulgarian prince in August 1887 – these are the cornerstones of the small individual crises that marked the general Bulgarian multifaceted crisis. The foreign political significance of the results of these events turns Bulgaria into one of the epicenters of European politics. Never before and never after that is Bulgaria mentioned so frequently and in detail in the European press and are diplomatic reports from Sofia read and analyzed with such attention.

It should be noted that the engrossing narrative of the author is not free from exaggerations and the contemporary's bias. His constant effort to justify almost all actions of the standard-bearers of anti-Russian politics in Bulgaria is obvious, as well as his attempts to present from an unattractive point of view, even comically those political figures who in some degree patiently and persistently seek ways of compromise and mutual understanding with Russia. Royal Russia's politics and the behavior of its representatives in Bulgaria are almost always interpreted by Simeon Radev in a negative sense and unfavorable light. But in his foreword he calls the authors without a personal position 'impersonal'.

The understandable exaltations of the author in regards to the advance of the events in Bulgaria and the extremely anti-Russian course of the Bulgarian foreign politics cannot be shared by us today as we are aware of the complexity of Bulgaria's position in the European politics. Eventually, the Atlantic powers that urged us to stand up against Russia made an alliance with it in both world wars. As a result of such short-sightedness three times in the last century – in 1913, 1919 and 1947, Bulgaria was unfairly but unconditionally defined as an aggressor with all the negative consequences that ensue from that.

From historical perspective the turning point in the Russian-Bulgarian relations prepared and contributed to a considerable degree the subsequent trials and tragic consequences in the historical fate of the Bulgarian state. Without noticing the complex dynamics in the international relations and not conscious enough of the invisible, but real

reconciliating processes of the Anglo-Russian conflicts, Stambolov and his closest associates rely too much on the anti-Russian forces and above all on Austro-Hungary and England. Naively hoping for the support of these forces, they push Bulgaria to an extreme anti-Russian course, which leads to unnecessary for the Bulgarian national interests' conflict with Russia. Consequently, the leaders of Russian foreign politics start looking for other allies on the Balkans, which affects negatively the future of the Bulgarian state. At Berlin Congress foreign minister Ristic said bitterly and threateningly – 'You'll come back to us' and his prediction came true not only for Russia but mostly for France and even England. After the crisis the Russian-Bulgarian relations never get that close as we observe them in the early years after the liberation and they never reach the closeness that seemed natural and predestined to many people, even in 1911, when the Russian-Bulgarian relations are the closest. Therefore, 'Negostolyubivo selo' ('Inhospitable village') by Ivan Vazov is at the same time emotionally true but politically untrue because closeness in politics, at least at this stage was over, but the emotion remained. This means that responsibility for the Russian-Bulgarian disagreement after 1886 does not only belong only to Russia. And if until recently we wrote about it, it was due to the political situation, in which our fault was ignored and concealed. But restoring the truth does not mean a mechanical turn of 180 degrees as the reformer Martin Luther says darkness cannot be illuminated with more darkness.

The period recreated by Simeon Radev with talent is a dividing line in the whole Bulgarian history not only in the Russian-Bulgarian relations. The building of the country starts roughly, but positively. How sad that it did not go on positively. We hold in our hands a book describing not beautiful, but glorious times. Not everything recreated in it is sublime. In life and history these concepts rarely coincide, valid for people and ages. But then at least we did not have this janitorial role on the Balkans which we adopted after 1919 up to 1999. Will we ever again hold the key of your own home in our own pocket? In historical writings it is often recommended to respect the principle 'without anger and bias'. But how can you reconstruct a historical reality brimming with anger and bias? Especially when it relates to your homeland? And if you keep neutrality you are attacked by both. Without anger and bias you can only write foreign history. If a person does not recognize the greatness in history he/she does not deserve to study it. But together with the grateful bow to the significant in our history we should self-critically look into the reasons for our defeats. Otherwise it turns out that we learned none of the lessons of our history, especially in the contemporary context.

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Russia and the Coburgs between Catholicism and East Orthodox Christianity

Dimitar Sazdov

Abstract: In 1887 Ferdinand Coburg Gotha was elected as a Bulgarian prince. He is a Catholic by faith. His wife, chosen with the help of his mother Maria Luisa Parma, is also Catholic. The Bulgarian constitution, however, requires the crown prince to accept the Orthodox faith. This questions his marriage and the creation of dynasty. The Bulgarian Government and Parliament are forced to comply with the wishes of the future wife and her relatives, and change art. 38 of the Turnovo Constitution. After the change it states that the first heir may be a Catholic. Subsequently, it is a problem for Orthodox Russia to recognize Ferdinand as a Prince of Bulgaria. Coburg and the Bulgarian government are forced to accept the conversion of crown prince Boris III into the Orthodox Faith in February 1896. That was the end of the controversial policy of Bulgarian institutions regarding Catholicism and Orthodoxy in creating conditions for a future Bulgarian dynasty.

Key words: Bulgarian dynasty, Catholicism, Orthodoxy

Резюме: През 1887 г. Фердинанд Кобурготски е избран за български княз. Духовно той принадлежи към католицизма. Избраната за съпруга с помощта на майка му Мария Луиза Пармска също принадлежи към католическата вяра. Българската конституция обаче повелява престолонаследникът да приеме православната вяра. Това поставя под въпрос женитбата му и създаването на династия. Българското правителство и парламент са принудени да се съобразят с желанието на бъдещата съпруга и нейните роднини, и променят чл. 38 от Търновската конституция. С промяната се пледира първият престолонаследник да може да принадлежи към католицизма. Впоследствие това се оказва преграда срещу признаването на Фердинанд за български княз от православна Русия. Кобургът и българското правителство са принудени да приемат покръстването на престолонаследника Борис III в православната вяра през февруари 1896 г. Така завършва противоречивата политика на българските институции в избора между католицизма и православието, при създаване на условия за бъдещата българска династия.

Russia's strategic policy towards Bulgaria was already laid down in the Manifesto of Emperor Alexander II concerning the declaration of the

Russo-Turkish war of 1877 – 1878. The Manifesto declared that Russia came 'to build rather than to invade'. In other words, Russia's aim was to create a new state on the Balkans, which would be friendly towards it. Alexander II relied on this friendship in his efforts to cement the Russian presence in the Balkan politics as well as its future control over south-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

During the Bulgarian Constitutional Assembly the czar's government stood in agreement with the democratic trends of the new Bulgarian constitution. This was corroborated by Alexander II's proclamation towards the Bulgarian people made on 11th of April 1879.[1] This stance of the Russian government should not be attributed to its sympathy for the democratic and liberal elements of the constitution; rather, it was due to the Russians' conviction that the wider prerogatives of the Bulgarian parliament could hopefully set off an eventual anti-Russian tendency of the future Bulgarian prince.[2]

Guided by this strategic objective, Alexander II defined the future tactics of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the new state. Therefore, the Russian assistance to rebuild the Bulgarian state continued until the constitution was adopted and Alexander Battenberg was elected as the new Bulgarian prince. From there on, Alexander II believed the future development of Bulgaria should be directed by the primary law as well as by the burgeoning political forces of the country.[3] In other words, the strength of the Russian foothold in Bulgaria should be based on non-interference in the country's domestic affairs, on a consistent good will towards the nation as a whole, and on the search for ways to address the Bulgarian national problem.

Indeed, the presence of Russian officers in the Bulgarian military and gendarmerie as well as the post of defence minister being occupied by a Russian until September 1885 were factors that both the Bulgarian prince and the new political formations could not but take into account. Any radical changes or attempts to resolve primary issues could only be done if greenlighted by Russia. Besides, Russia was one of the countries which warranted the compliance with the Berlin Treaty.[4]

As soon as he got the news that he was chosen as a Bulgarian

[1] CSA, f. 139, op. 1, a.e.25, fol. 149; Dimitrov 1991, 102.
[2] Dimitrov 1991, 102.
[3] According Goran D. Todorov the 'repressive apparatus' (army, gendarmerie, Prosecution) from 27th April, 1881 till 7th September 1883 was mostly in Russian hand. No matter how true this assumption may sound, it is overstated. It deprives Bulgaria of participating in the 'repressive apparatus'.
[4] CSA, f. 139, op. 1, a. e. 25, fol. 61; Kosev 1964, 44, 149.

prince, Alexander Battenberg requested the Russian Emperor Alexander II for permission to amend the principality's semi-republican constitution. His disaffection mostly targeted the provisions banning titles and giving medals to citizens, and especially the method for amending the constitution itself.[5]

All attempts by Alexander I (Battenberg) to get the Russian Emperor's nod and suspend the constitution ended in failure. Doubtful of the young prince's future political leanings, Alexander II took some sort of a middle ground: the constitution might be amended but only through legal means.

After the assassination of Alexander II on 1 March 1881, the relations between the Bulgarian Prince and the new Russian Tsar, Alexander III, on the issue of the Bulgarian constitution changed. Alexander I was now able to convince the Russian monarch that the Bulgarian liberals were nihilists, just like his father's assassins. Thus, Alexander Battenberg, taking advantage of the rise of reactionary forces in Russia after the assassination of Alexander II, with the assistance of General Ernrot and the support of the conservatives and the blessing of Austro-Hungary, Germany, France and Italy, and despite the opposition of Great Britain, removed from office the government of Petko Karavelov on 27 April 1881. Shortly thereafter, on July 1, 1881, in the town of Svishtov, the second Grand National Assembly suspended the Tarnovo Constitution and introduced the regime of extraordinary powers (for the prince). The latter gradually weakened in the subsequent years, while Russia's interference in the principality's domestic affairs intensified. This was the result of Alexander Battenberg's line of politics and the foreign policy stance embraced by Alexander III who once said: 'Our misfortune in 1877-1878 was that we were walking together with the peoples instead of walking with the governments; the Russian Emperor should always walk only with the governments'.[6]

Alexander I's ambition to 'punch deadly' Tarnovo Constitution and enhance his position in the country's governance finally led to deterioration of the Bulgarian-Russian relations and his own abdication in August 1886.[7] His tenure as prince had proven difficult and controversial regarding these relations. But the momentum of building up a Bulgarian statehood was sustained.

Battenberg's dogged ambition to weaken the constitution resulted in rough-handed interferences by the great powers (Russia most of all) in

[5] CSA, f. 139, op. 1, a. e. 25, fol. 61; Kozmenko 1982, 14.
[6] Tsimbaev 2005, 197.
[7] Sazdov *et al.* 2003, 81-91; 112-121; 128-132.

the political life of the young country. After a string of political developments, the Saxe-Coburg and Gotha family finally settled in (1887).[8]

This was a Pyrrhic victory for the emerging Russophobic camp. Bulgaria became associated with forces which nurtured fundamental opposition to its strategy of addressing its national question. At the same time, the country's relations with Russia became distant and hostile. And Russia was the force with which Bulgaria had common interest in its historical development.

Bulgarian political circles were split over Ferdinand's choice as the new prince of the country. The nation had stayed without a prince for a while, and various stances over this choice had time to stir up.[9] The interests of Russia, the Western powers and the Bulgarian politicians in the government clashed over the issue. At the end of the day, the problem was resolved in a hurried way – and not by the Bulgarians, but for them, by someone else. At Ferdinand's welcoming ceremony in late July 1887, at the Vidin Danube port, Stefan Stambolov, one of the three regents and soon-to-be prime minister, while having his first meeting with the already appointed Prince, expressed in a subtle way his doubts about the choice. A little later (on 18/30 August), he would say to the French diplomatic agent, M. Flesch: 'We chose Prince Coburg, because we liked him, but if necessary we can choose another one'.[10] Thus Stambolov showed that the way he would treat Ferdinand in the future would only depend on what he thought was good for the country.

The pro-Russian parties of Dragan Tsankov and Petko Karavelov were adamant opponents of this choice. The political group around Dr. Vasil Radoslavov stood for the return of Alexander I, and after the arrival of Ferdinand in Bulgaria found itself in an awkward position.

But the choice was made and the ruling Stambolovists could do nothing else but strengthen the position of the new Prince – who had come with his Catholic faith – on the throne and sought ways for his universal recognition.

The matter of electing a new Bulgarian prince led to a breakup in Russo-Bulgarian relations and severing diplomatic ties as early as November 1886.[11] On 25 June 1887, in the old Bulgarian capital Veliko Tarnovo, the Grand National Assembly elected Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg and Gotha for Bulgarian prince. Ferdinand was informed of the decision the

[8] Sazdov *et al.* 2003, 128-151.
[9] Grancharov 1984, 80-89.
[10] Popov 2000, 65, 107.
[11] Popov 1991, 13-374; Statelova *et al.* 1994, 91-124.

same day by the Assembly chairman, D. Tonchev. On the next day, the latter received Ferdinand's reply. In it, the Coburg thanked the assembly and voiced his readiness to take over the country. However, he maintained that this might only happen 'as soon as my election is approved by the Sublime Porte and recognised by the Powers'.[12]

Despite his pledge to stick to the clauses of the Berlin Treaty as regards the rules for occupying the Bulgarian throne, on 28 July 1887, before the necessary permission was received, Ferdinand set out for Bulgaria. Without any shadow of doubt, his boldness was based on the secret support of powerful political forces, which were interested in his coming to Bulgaria.

In early August 1887 (he was at the Vidin port on 30 July), Prince Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, despite the absence of the official approval by the great powers and the Sublime Porte, came into the country, took his prince's vows and assumed the responsibilities of a Bulgarian monarch. Subsequently, it became known that Austria-Hungary had secretly endorsed his candidacy. In retrospection, the way Ferdinand behaved over the subsequent decades helps us comfortably conclude that his coming to Bulgaria was a shrewdly and diplomatically prepared mission designed to uphold the strategic Austro-Hungarian interests in the East.[13] Although in a milder way, or somewhat hesitantly, this view was held by Stoycho Grancharov as well.[14] Given the international situation, the state of the Bulgarian principality and its domestic issues, Ferdinand's 'courage', which prompted him to land in Sofia, was undoubtedly underpinned by some higher political circles. Emboldened by this state of affairs, even before he assumed the throne, Ferdinand made it clear that he would take an active part in setting the direction of Bulgarian politics.[15]

After he took his vows on 2 August 1887, Ferdinand made a proclamation to the Grand National Assembly, which ended pointedly with: 'Long live free and independent Bulgaria!'.[16]

This was received with rapturous applause by the assembly but met tempestuous responses by the European diplomatic circles. Russia reacted with consternation; it was meanwhile putting pressure on Sultan Abdul Hamid II to invade Bulgaria with his troops.[17] However, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy warned the Sublime Porte against the

[12] Dermendzhiev 1998, 9-10.
[13] Grancharov 1984, 98, 99, 100
[14] Grancharov 1984, 99, 100.
[15] Grancharov 1984, 100-103.
[16] DV, No 86/ 2 August 1887.
[17] Dermendzhiev 1998, 10 - 11.

'undertaking of ill-conceived steps'. Faced with an embarrassing situation, Turkey sent a note to Ferdinand whereby it defined his actions as contradicting the existing international agreements and advised him to leave the country. But the note bore no signature. According to the diplomatic etiquette, this implied that no reply was demanded. Subsequently, the Turkish foreign minister verbally advised Ferdinand that the note would have no consequences.[18] With these shenanigans, the Turkish diplomacy was deftly wriggling its way out of a tight political corner.

Ferdinand's ambitions to sit on the Bulgarian throne had become known as early as 1883. Familiar with the bad blood between Alexander Battenberg and the Russian emperor, Alexander III, Ferdinand visited Moscow on the same year to pay his respects at the coronation of the eastern ruler. It was here that Ferdinand manifested his interest towards the Bulgarian crown.[19]

Ferdinand had come to Moscow as a representative of the Coburg family. But his ambitions over the Bulgarian throne, which were voiced before Russian diplomats during the subsequent years more than once, must have been agreed with all Austrian powerful circles. Russia must have been aware of that. Perhaps, he was already seen as the agent of Austrian policy in those early years, which subsequently guided Saint Petersburg's hard line in demanding his ousting soon after he was elected as prince. Ferdinand's coming to power was an undoubted defeat for the Russian political line.

Bulgaria's new prime minister was the former first regent, Stefan Stambolov. One of the reasons for his coming on top of the new political wave was the controversial, or sometimes even negative, attitude towards Bulgaria by the Russian diplomacy after the unification.[20] Both the monarch and the prime minister were well aware that the political crisis, which had engulfed Bulgaria, wouldn't finish until the Bulgarian prince was recognised both by Turkey, as the overlord, and the great powers. The Russian-Bulgarian relations stood in the core of this matter. Neither the Sublime Porte, nor the powers would shoulder this responsibility before Russia recognised the Bulgarian prince. But for Russia, Ferdinand's settling in Bulgaria was a flagrant violation of the Berlin Treaty. This is why the Russian diplomacy kept pleading with the Sublime Porte to demand Ferdinand's removal from office from the Bulgarian government.[21] If Istanbul failed to intercede for this effect, Russia threatened to disregard

[18] Dermendzhiev 1998, 11 – 13.
[19] See Grancharov 1984 , 92, 93 and bibliography cited there.
[20] See Kosik 2008, 47.
[21] Genov 1942, 96-98, № 158; 100 ff., №162, 100 ff.

the Berlin Treaty as far as the Turkish benefits from it were concerned. At the end of the day, a formula was thrashed out whereby Ferdinand's election was lawful, but the way he took over contravened the Berlin Treaty's provisions.[22]

Alexander III and his diplomacy did their best to harmonise the great powers' position on the issue of the Bulgarian prince. Meanwhile, Russia was funding the Bulgarian diaspora to remove Ferdinand forcefully from the throne. At the centre of these efforts stood Dragan Tsankov, a political émigré to Istanbul and prominent Bulgarian politician. But all the attempts – the legal ones of the Russian diplomacy,[23] and the potentially violent ones of the Bulgarian expatriates – to get rid of Ferdinand ended in failure.[24]

Alexander III's diplomats analysed the international situation and steered the official Russian line accordingly. Their key objective – the removal of Ferdinand from Bulgaria – remained unchanged. The abortive attempts to achieve this through the Bulgarian political and military diaspora or through a collective demarche by the great powers compelled Saint Petersburg's diplomacy to change its tack and try different means.[25]

This change was caused, inter-alia, by the Austro-German treaty of alliance published in 1888.[26] The treaty implied the Germany would not be impartial in case of an armed Austrian-Russian conflict. This made the Russian diplomacy to align its stance on Bulgaria and the Middle East with the common European policy. This is what the Russian foreign minister, N. K. Girs, told representatives of the diplomatic corps in St. Petersburg: 'Rest assured that our conduct vis-a-vis Bulgaria will in no way surpass the line traced out by the Empire, which is limited to full self-restraint'. But this did not imply that Russia went along with Ferdinand's staying on the Bulgarian throne. Rather, it was a subtle diplomatic move aimed at warding off an eventual war.

At the same time, the Russian diplomacy was trying another tactic: to convince the Sublime Porte to denounce Ferdinand's stay in Bulgaria as illegal and undertake steps to remove him from the throne. Russia was

[22] Statelova *et al*. 1995, 9, 12,13, 17; Popov 2000, 16.
[23] Panaiotov 1934, 54-57, 69-80; Pantev 1972, 153, 166, 167; Konigslow 1970, 57, 69, 70, 71.
[24] Ioneva 1995, 10, 29-35; Popov 1991, 32-42; 67-70; 76-79.
[25] Popov 1991, 34-35.
[26] The alliance created in 1873 by the three emperors Otto Von Bismarck, Alexander II and Franz Joseph I – Wilhelm I was in place until 1887. As a result of Russia's withdrawal, Germany and Austro-Hungary concluded a new alliance treaty on the following year, while in 1892 the treaty for the creation of the Franco-Russian Alliance.

probing around to gain the support of the great powers. But the policy of those Western powers, which had a stake in this issue, was to drag their feet; slowly but irreversibly, this led to the cementing of the existing situation.

On 11th of February 1888, the Russian Government Gazette published an announcement of the Saint Petersburg cabinet regarding its policy vis-a-vis Bulgaria. Alexander III's diplomacy chose a softer language for this proclamation. All the attempts of the Russian emperor to thrash out a common position with the great powers and the Sublime Porte on the Bulgarian prince issue had already failed: now the rallying cry was that the Bulgarians' had to grope their own way out of the crisis. The single thing Russia demanded was that the usurper be removed from office. Otherwise, Russia was unwilling to meddle in the principality's domestic affairs. The attempts to truncate the rights of the Bulgarian people, guaranteed by international treaties, were categorically denounced. Russia was also against any use of violence to restore the rule of law. Practically, this amounted to a return to the softer line of Alexander II. After February 1888, Russia relied on the Bulgarian polity to kick out Ferdinand. Attempts were made to co-opt to the task all existing political forces in the country, including Stefan Stambolov's government and its supporters. Getting rid of Ferdinand was a matter of honour for the Russian Empire.

But the great powers seemed underimpressed. Rome, London and Vienna accepted Russia's pledges to abstain from forceful interferences in the Bulgarian crisis. France and Germany were more favourable as they saw the Russian declaration as a pledge to stick to international agreements. Encouraged by the friendliness of Paris and Berlin, the Russian diplomacy – through its ambassador in Istanbul, A. Nelidov – stepped up its efforts to get Ferdinand's sojourn in Bulgaria declared illicit. Yielding to this pressure, on 5 May 1888, the Sublime Porte sent a telegram to the prime minister Stambolov, which said that Ferdinand was illegally occupying the Bulgarian throne, and this constituted a violation of the Berlin Treaty.

Meanwhile, ever since Ferdinand sat on the Bulgarian throne, a low-key but persistent fight for political supremacy between him and the prime minister was afoot. One of their disagreements was the country's foreign policy. After the unsuccessful 1887 attempts of the Bulgarian diaspora to change Bulgaria's political trajectory, other ways were sought under the instigation of the Russian diplomacy. Dragan Tsankov, who was still living in Istanbul (he moved over to Russia in the summer of 1888), was working towards uniting the efforts of his own acolytes in the principality and the liberal Karavelists. Firmly convinced that Ferdinand was pernicious for the country, Petko Karavelov responded warmly towards this appeal for cooperation. This encouraged Dr Tsankov to put together a

proposal for the unification of all opposition cells in the principality, including the group around Dr Vasil Radoslavov.

But these political probings of the extreme Russophile Tsankov and the positive response of the more moderate liberal P. Karavelov were attempts to gain Saint Petersburg's sympathies rather than expressions of confidence in the mission's success. Another political émigré to Istanbul, S. S. Bobchev, qualified them as a game, as a way of 'spending days and months in .... idle occupations'.

Several attempts were made to normalise Bulgarian-Russian relations until 1891. Having outlived all attempts of the domestic and expatriate opposition to organise a coup d'état, Stefan Stambolov and his government moved to establish direct contacts with the government of Alexander III. In the summer of 1888, the Bulgarian side made its first attempt at a rapprochement, mediated by N. Toshkov and A. Teoharov. Stambolov was trying to overcome 'the freeze' between Bulgaria and Russia over the 'prince problem'. At one point, the Bulgarian prime minister seemed even ready to sacrifice Ferdinand: 'This Prince', wrote Stambolov, 'whom I brought here and installed on the Bulgarian throne, who is in my hands and whom I now hate more than ever – I pledge that within a single night I will send him back to wherever he came from. I will do this without any outside interference since I am the only one who can muster the military and administrative power of the country, and the love of the people'.

This was followed by specific proposals for the establishment of a contact between the Russian and the Bulgarian government. But the mistrust on both sides blocked the way to achieving any practical results. Alexander III stuck to the position he had taken back in February 1888: the Bulgarians should remove Ferdinand on their own accord, and only thereupon the candidacy of a new prince might be discussed.

In early 1889, Dragan Tsankov, who had already settled in Saint Petersburg, made another attempt to warm Bulgaria's relations with Russia. At a meeting with the Russian foreign minister, N. Girs, and Alexander III himself, Tsankov suggested that the Bulgarian issue might be resolved through Ferdinand's ousting and the formation of a mixed government, in which the opposition – headed by himself – would also take part. Tsankov pledged he would succumb to a secondary role in such a government. It would propose a new prince, whom Russia would approve. But the multitude of Tsankov's pursuits at this audience with the Emperor, as well as some awkward remarks about it he shared with his people in the principality, led to yet another failure to find a way out of the Russian-Bulgarian fracas. A few more followed. In 1891, a movement was launched to achieve an understanding with Stambolov over the princely issue. After

the unsuccessful attempt on his life of 15 March 1891, Stambolov decided to start negotiations with Saint Petersburg on his own with the design to get rid of the Prince and secure his own political survival.

But the negotiations reached a cul-de-sac. Stambolov insisted on receiving a written guarantee from Russia concerning the election of the future prince. Weary of tarnishing his own reputation, Alexander III was only willing to give him verbal assurances.

Meanwhile, probes were made periodically in Istanbul aiming at convincing the Sublime Porte to co-opt the great powers and have Ferdinand recognised. Stambolov assigned Dimitar Tonchev to carry out this mission around the Christmas holidays of 1890. But the Grand Vizier replied that Russia wouldn't approve of this. The Turkish diplomat also pointed out that officially recognising the Prince was 'a mere formality, which you can do without for the time being', since 'you elected the Prince, he is presiding over the country, and you yourself have been ruling for a third year already: therefore, you have already achieved what is in the essence'. Obviously, the Sublime Porte had chosen a delaying tactic designed to give everybody a chance to get accustomed to Ferdinand's sitting on the Bulgarian throne. Britain took a similar stance upheld by its ambassador, Sir William White. At a meeting with D. Tonchev, the latter said that the official endorsement of Prince Ferdinand had become a mere formality, but nonetheless rushing it was ill-advised as Russia was still adamantly against it, and would never succumb. The same advice was given to Ferdinand himself on the following year (1891) by no lesser figure than the former German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck: 'Your greatest ally is time – and the strength of habit. Unless you challenge them, they can do no harm to you, and in the course of time the world will get accustomed to seeing you on the Bulgarian throne'.

By 1892, Stefan Stambolov was already aware that Bulgaria could not be ally to Vienna and Berlin in an eventual war among the great powers. The Austro-Hungarian drive for a foothold on the Aegean through Macedonia and Thessaloniki ran counter to Bulgarian national interest. Stambolov gave a few arguments to this effect in his talks with Dr. Stoyan Danev and Metodi Kusevich. To the former, he once said in the street: 'You believe you are the only Russophiles? I will prove you wrong'. Evidently, Stambolov had already got ripe understanding where Bulgaria's place was in subsequent military alliances.[27] In the opposition between Germany, on the one hand, and Great Britain and France on the other, Bulgaria's natural allies were the latter. In parallel with that, the arguments between Russia

[27] In 1888 the alliance between Germany and Austro-Hungary was set up, and in 1892 the Franco-Russian Alliance was set up.

and Austria-Hungary[28] on the Balkans put Saint Petersburg closer to Paris and London. Stambolov understood clearly all this and was consistently looking for ways to mend Bulgaria's diplomatic relations with Russia.[29]

But with Ferdinand on top of it, the country was drifting towards Vienna and Berlin. The Bulgarian Prince used to spend his holidays in his family's Austrian estates; he kept constant and warm relations with a number of Viennese politicians. Therefore, the Bulgarian prime minister was not only seeking rapprochement with Russia, but was ready to part with Ferdinand for the sake of the national interests. The account of metropolitan Metodi Kusevich given to Dr Stoyan Danev shortly before the former's mission to the Russian capital is quite telling. This happened at a time when the relations between the Prince and his first adviser (Stambolov) were already charged with mistrust. Kusevich had met with both men, and was extremely surprised 'while the former was commissioning me to plead before the Russian political circles in favour of his cause, i.e. his recognition as Bulgarian Prince, and assure the Russians that he was ready to immediately and finally part with Stambolov, the latter was insisting that I should convince the Russians to mend their relations with Bulgaria, and he was ready to boot the Prince in return for that'. Obviously, Ferdinand already saw Stambolov as a roadblock to his mission in Bulgaria whereas the latter was becoming aware that a Bulgaria ruled by Ferdinand headed towards an alliance with Austria-Hungary, which in its turn flew in the face of Bulgarian interest in the Balkan south-east, namely in Macedonia.

Kusevich's mission in Saint Petersburg sent the ball in Alexander III's court. And his reply came soon enough. As a staunch enemy of Ferdinand's coming to Bulgaria, and a supporter of the Russian line during the 1886 crisis, D. Tsankov had to emigrate in Istanbul, and then, in 1888, to Russia

[28] In a diplomatic manner Germany stands behind Austro-Hungary. Back during the crisis of 1875-1878 the German diplomacy toward Russia was marked by insincerity. While Bismarck proclaimed that 'the interests of Russia and Germany run parallel', his diplomats ever more often support their Austrian colleagues in the development of the specific measures in the Balkans – Kaneva 2008, 54.

[29] At the same time in 1892 – 1893 King Ferdinand has given up all hopes that Stambolov's government will resolve the problem of his recognition. Since then the king started ever more actively seeking ways to legalize his post on the Bulgarian throne. He managed to strengthen the ties between the monarchic institution and the army and carried out the first polls among the Russian diplomatic circles. Having well realized that the preservation of his post depends mostly on Russia's position, Ferdinand started seeking ways to establish personal contacts with the Russian Tzar Alexander III.

where he kept acting against Ferdinand's remaining in Bulgaria. Yet after Kusevich's mission he suddenly claimed to have recognised Ferdinand as the legitimate Prince on the Bulgarian throne. Undoubtedly, this was the fallout from the Russian emperor's choice. The latter became evident in the way the Russian diplomats responded to the forthcoming (in August 1892) visit of Stambolov to the Ottoman capital. A. Zhadovski, sitting for ambassador A. I. Nelidov at the time, warned the Sublime Porte that 'if Stambolov was entertained in Istanbul, the Russian emperor would lose his patience'. The same political line was echoed by D. Tsankov upon his return to Bulgaria in 1894: 'Russia wants nothing else from us but to avoid aligning ourselves with the enemies of the Slavic nations and East orthodoxy'. As far as Ferdinand was concerned, he added: 'Russia is against his illegal election process rather than his personality'. Ferdinand was chosen at the expense of Stambolov – unwisely, given Russia's foreign policy orientation. Given his implacable animosity towards Stambolov and his acolytes (their relations got particularly strained after his multiple attempts to topple Stambolov's government with plots organised from overseas), Dragan Tsankov, the Bulgarian protégé of the Russians, is pretty likely to have influenced Alexander III's choice. Tsankov's fears must have been exacerbated by Stambolov merciless clampdown on the participants in similar plots in 1890 and 1892.

Alexander III's change of tack is practically a retreat vis-a-vis the deft manoeuvring on behalf of Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany and Great Britain – somewhat unwisely for the latter. From here on, the Russian-Bulgarian rapprochement was only a matter of time.[30]

The new Russian stance made Stambolov look for other ways to strengthen the foothold of the Bulgarian dynasty. An appropriate marriage for Ferdinand was in order, to stabilise his position 'both in the country and internationally'. But Ferdinand's attempts to clinch a dynastic marriage with some European courts had so far only met with failure. Ferdinand's mother, Princess Clementine, found a way out of this difficult situation. Her good relations with the Duke of Parma, Robert Bourbon, gave her a chance to ask for the hand of Marie-Louise, his elder daughter. The choice proved successful, but the faith of the heir to the throne was a problem. Article 38 of the Tarnovo Constitution, demanding the adoption of East orthodoxy by the heir, had to be amended. The Duke had only agreed on the condition

[30] The death of Alexander III on 20 October/1 November 1894 was interpreted by some authors as an event that brought to an end the Russian-Bulgarian conflict as well – Kosik 2008, 48. This is an unacceptable assumption, considering that Alexander III and Ferdinand had synchronized their positions on ousting Stambolov from power. Alexander III's death was more an occasion for triggering the process of reconciliation.

that his daughter's children would be Catholic.[31] Thus, the Coburgs were facing their dilemma whether to profess East orthodoxy or Catholicism.

The problem was resolved by Stambolov. Despite the clergy's and some MPs' resistance, on 19 December 1892, after a two-week debate, the national assembly approved the amendment of the constitution's article 38 providing for a compromise: 'the first heir to the throne is exempted from the obligation to profess the East Orthodox religion'.

With this constitutional solution, the Bulgarian ruling dynasty was put again in the schizophrenic split between Catholicism and East orthodoxy. As and when convenient or necessary, the heir to the throne could embrace East orthodoxy.

With the Russian-Bulgarian relations evolving in favour of Ferdinand, Stambolov would say in 1894: 'The choice of Ferdinand as the Prince of Bulgaria was the greatest mistake I ever made in my life'. On his deathbed, he would reiterate this: 'The Bulgarian people will excuse all my sins, but will never forgive me for having put the Coburg on the Bulgarian throne'.

This is one of the great statesman's insights: he seems to have half foreseen Bulgaria's tragic future, if a Catholic like Ferdinand would be still on the throne when the alliances leading to the Great War were formed.

Another prominent statesman, Petko Karavelov, shared this attitude: ever since the summer of 1887 he declined to recognise Ferdinand as the Bulgarian Prince. Karavelov regarded the prevailing of the Russophobic political line as a dramatic turn in the national history, with possible fatal consequences. He was convinced that the vital interests of the nation demanded Russian cooperation as Russia was our liberator and stalwart of East Orthodoxy and the Slavic cause. Having said that, he nurtured no illusions about the policy of Russian Czarism in Bulgaria or about the ways to reach an agreement with it. But he was ready to accommodate even the mistakes of the Saint Petersburg government because a breakup with Russia would drive the vital Bulgarian foreign policy objectives into a cul-de-sac. P. Karavelov believed that opting for a prince beholden to Austria and Germany would spell the doom for Bulgarian national interest. 'With Ferdinand on top, Bulgaria today is in a much more perilous situation than before… All those who signed the Berlin Treaty have declared the Coburg an illegal prince and have severed diplomatic ties with him and his government', argued the Karavelist organ, *Tarnovo Constitution*, in its last issue on 30th of August 1887.

[31] Kosik 2008, 18. The original text of article 38 of the Constitution stipulates the following: 'The Bulgarian King and his inheritors cannot profess any religion other than the orthodox one. Only in case the first elected Bulgarian King belongs to a different faith, he can remain committed to it.'

Karavelov openly voiced his opinion of the new Bulgarian Prince before the correspondent of the French newspaper *Matin*: the Prince stood in the way of Bulgaria's appeasement with Russia; he must leave the country since 'whatever he does, he has been tarnished by his Austrian origin, and any Austrian influence in this country is impossible because of Macedonia'. Then he made his case for the political proximity between Bulgaria and Russia: 'If Russia loses its interest in Bulgaria, we will be invaded – economically, financially and politically – by Austria, which will come to us through Serbia. We believe that the Russian influence will not imply a similar absorption. We will be able to follow our own line of development. Russia only wants the Bulgarian army to be its vanguard and ally. This is possible, without putting our autonomy on the line, and without sacrificing our national life'.

Karavelov's and his followers' consternation of Stambolov's regime was mainly motivated by the latter's support for Ferdinand. And it wasn't just a matter of short-lived political opportunism, but a long-standing vision of Bulgaria's future – the Karavelovists were aware that the political regime had already cemented itself.[32]

Ferdinand's recognition by Dragan Tsankov in 1893 encouraged the Prince to intensify his moves towards an agreement with the Russian diplomacy. During his frequent visits to Vienna, and without Stambolov's knowledge, he established contacts with Russian diplomats. A united opposition to Stambolov's government was set up inside the country under his aegis. Thus, Ferdinand worked out the tools to remove Stambolov from his office when it was expedient. Stambolov himself gave him the pretext for that. Annoyed with Ferdinand's attempts to strike contacts with the Russian diplomacy on his own, he handed in his 15th successive resignation. To his surprise, this one was accepted and that spelled the end of his relatively long rule.

A new government was formed headed by Dr. Konstantin Stoilov. On the very day the government was sworn in (on 19 May 1894), the prime minister and his foreign minister Grigor Nachovich, in an attempt to soothe the diplomats from the great powers and the other Balkan states, pledged that the new government should stick to the old political course and maintain fair relations with everyone.

[32] *Svoboda* No 86/ 23 September 1886; Izvestiya 1903, No 6, 7. The Gabrovo group makes an exception in this respect (which preserved its existence throughout Stambolov's regime), which was established by the industrial and commercial families in Gabrovo that had gained wealth. More details see in Todorova 1982, 124.

The advent of Stoilov's government marked a revisiting of Bulgaria's foreign policy orientation and offered a chance to ultimately resolve the 'Bulgarian crisis'. Normalising its relations with Russia as well as Ferdinand's recognition were important preconditions for any foreign policy endeavour of the new cabinet. Therefore, both the Prince and the new government embarked on an attempt to rally the support of the whole Russophile opposition in Bulgaria. Co-opting one of the most influential – and respected abroad – Bulgarian politician, Petko Karavelov, was a primary task. Karavelov was well-known in Russia as a consistent slavophile and a staunch supporter of East orthodoxy. But all the attempts of the government were in vain. Karavelov turned down the August 1894 declaration recognising Ferdinand as the Bulgarian Prince and chose to stay in jail until the big amnesty in December 1894. Karavelov's dislike of Ferdinand was not based on the formalities around his stay in Bulgaria; it was induced by the Prince's pro-Austrian inclinations. Ferdinand's retraction from this line was seen as 'preposterous and transient', as political opportunism designed to cement him on the throne. This was the reason behind Karavelov's and his followers' activism against the Coburg dynasty's presence in Bulgaria, regardless of the Prince's subsequent approval of his son Boris' adoption of the East Orthodox faith. Looking into the future, Karavelov saw Bulgaria in the camp of Ferdinand's natural allies – Austria-Hungary and Germany. In the event of a world military conflict, this would put the country in hostilities with Great Britain, France and Russia. That is why Karavelov remained an implacable enemy of Ferdinand's stay in the country.

After Alexander III's death on 1 November 1894, the contacts between the Bulgarian and Russian diplomacy intensified. The rapprochement process was accelerated and went through several stages in the 1894-1896 period of normalisation.

K. Stoilov focused his efforts on the international recognition of Ferdinand. This went through improving the relations with Russia, with the latter being interested in the process as well. Firstly, Russia was trying to stop the menacingly rising influences of the Catholic West on the Balkan peninsula. Secondly, Russia needed a *status quo* on the Balkans, given its commitments in other parts of the world: e.g. in the Far East, or over the Eastern question freshly exacerbated by the Armenian genocide and the events on the island of Crete. Through its press correspondents and other representatives, the political circles in Russia were keeping an eye on Bulgarian public opinion. They had a keen interest towards the views of the bourgeois opposition over domestic issues, the European political situation and the Russian-Bulgarian rapprochement. The prime minister, K. Stoilov, was aware of that; he was trying to be versatile and flexible in gaining the

support of the opposition over the most important steps undertaken by his government. After Alexander III's death, the efforts towards mending fences with Russia were also heightened, but still not decisive enough. In November 1894, Stoilov provisionally suspended his rapprochement effort: he was aware that the telegrams he received from the new Russian czar, Nikolai II, and foreign minister Girs in response to the Bulgarian government condolences were a matter of sheer politeness.

The opposition quoted the amnesty for emigrant officers as one of the key conditions for a Bulgarian-Russian rapprochement. On 19 November 1894, T. Kitanchev raised a motion in parliament or a blanket amnesty. It got the support of sixty MPs. But the government was willing to grant amnesty only contingent on a successful fence-mending with Russia. The emigrants' constant plotting to remove Ferdinand from the Bulgarian throne, which did not cease with the ousting of the Stambolov regime, were understandably a cause of concern for the monarch. If these officers returned to Bulgaria they might have successfully organised a coup d'état against him. Ferdinand's concerns were stoked by the Austrian and British diplomacy. The blanket amnesty motion was turned down by a majority of MPs.

By reshuffling his government in December 1894, Stoilov strengthened his hand in sustaining the course of rapprochement with Russia.

The late 1894 saw the completion of yet one more stage of the consistent but indecisive attempts to facilitate the process. The shortage of trust between the two sides still hampered its ultimate resolution.

Another step ahead was the visit to Saint Petersburg carried out by an official delegation led by the Metropolitan Kliment. The Russians gave the delegation some hints[33] about how the relationship could get warmer, but no formal negotiations were conducted. In the autumn of 1895, the Bulgarian government and the czarist diplomacy took some concrete steps towards an appeasement. Having agreed with Russia's key condition, his son Boris' baptism in the East Orthodox faith, Ferdinand assigned the old Russophile Nayden Gerov with a mission to Istanbul aimed at probing the

[33] On 30 August 1895 the Russian emperor sends a telegram to Nelidov, an ambassador in Tsarigrad. In this telegram without taking on any commitments whatsoever, he is instructed to advise the Bulgarian exarch that 'on his part he should insist that Ferdinand's son Boris accepts the orthodox religion, which is in the interest of the Bulgarians'. This is the most important condition that Russia poses to the Bulgarian government and Ferdinand in respect of the dynasty in Bulgaria (CSAOR, USSR, f. 568, op. 1. a. e. 100. Later on, in October 1895, the Russian diplomats officially sent their conditions for the reconciliation to T. Teodorov: the conversion of Boris and the reinstatement of article 38 of the Constitution (NLKM-BHA, f. 14, a. e. 4225, fol. 2; see also Damyanov 1974, 228).

Russian sentiment vis-a-vis this concession. For an additional boost to the rapprochement process, the Prince also sent to Istanbul Metropolitan Grigoriy Rusenski who met with ambassador Nelidov. The Metropolitan's mission was to finally clarify the two sides' positions before the rapprochement was finally sealed.

These moves were cautiously monitored by the Austrian diplomacy as well. The new Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Saint Petersburg, Count Alois von Aehrenthal, approved the Prince's decision and advised him to speed up the process in order to avoid irritating 'the spirits in the country'.[34] This provides grounds to believe that Ferdinand was acting under a plan endorsed by the Austro-Hungarian government. A compromise was finally reached as a result of the efforts made on both sides. Ferdinand conceded on christening his son in the East Orthodox faith as well as on greenlighting the government to address the issue of the émigré officers. On 2 February 1896, Russia recognised Ferdinand as the Bulgarian Prince. Several days later, the Sublime Porte did the same, as subsequently did all the great powers. Here is what Ferdinand's most prominent detractor, Petko Karavelov, said in the wake of this act: 'I don't know whether I am the insane one or the Russian Czar'.

Ferdinand's recognition as the legal Prince of Bulgaria put paid to the somewhat artificial 'Bulgarian question' in the international affairs of the late 19th century. The political ties between Bulgaria and Russia were restored. That went along with strengthening the positions of the Coburg dynasty in Bulgaria. The personal authority of the Prince was given a strong boost. The dynasty's heritage returned to the bosom of East Orthodoxy, but the Catholic Ferdinand who held the reins of power over the following decades stultified his son's belonging to it.

The consequences of Ferdinand's staying in power have proven tragic for the Bulgarian nation, and given a negative assessment of the Russian policy on the Balkans. Presiding over developments, which were crucial to Bulgarian fortune, Ferdinand invariably acted as beholden to

[34] NLKM-BHA, f. 14, a. e. 2703, fol. 218. The Austro-Hungarian government pursues a dual policy towards Bulgaria. On the one hand, it voices its disagreement with the king of the Bulgarian government over the issue of establishing normal and friendly relations between Russia and Bulgaria. When the talks between the two countries are drawing close to their end, some anxiety is felt among the Austrian political circles. It reaches such dimensions that Franz Joseph himself states the following: 'I will never let only Russia to make arrangements in Bulgaria' – see Peev 1942, 98. On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian government continues maintaining normal political relations with Sofia, showing its 'concern' over the recognition of Ferdinand – more details in Popov 1978, 106-150.

Viennese politics. For instance, in 1908, Bulgaria contravened the Berlin Treaty and announced its independence. The Bulgarian government was oblivious of Russia's warnings to wait until Austria-Hungary violated the treaty first by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, which – by the date of proclaiming the Bulgarian independence – only had two days until their term of staying within the Empire's borders expired. Under Vienna's pressure, Ferdinand forced the Bulgarian government into breaching the Berlin Treaty by claiming Bulgaria's independence. Thus, the country was dragged into a massive crisis and bought its way out of it by paying a large amount of money to Turkey.

But the damage Ferdinand inflicted on Bulgarian national interest for the benefit of the Central Powers was even greater during the wars between 1912 and 1918. Ferdinand's first major act of betrayal was committed just three weeks after the start of the Balkan War. On 28 October 1912, Turkey sent a telegram to Ferdinand pleading for the suspension of hostilities. But the Prince hid the telegram from Bulgaria's allies, the hostilities were sustained, and the first step made towards the undermining of the Balkan union, which was inconvenient for Vienna and Berlin in its current shape. Ferdinand committed an even greater crime against Bulgarian national interests on 16 June 1913. He incited the animosity between the former allies, which grew into the Second Balkan War. The Balkan union, the existence of which was favoured by the Triple Entente, was punched deadly, and Bulgaria was ruthlessly punished by the Bucharest (28 July 1913) and the Istanbul (16-29 September 1913) peace treaties.

Ferdinand spared no effort to push Bulgaria into the grip of the Central Powers. The striving of opposition parties and the diplomacy of the countries in the Triple Entente to change the country's course or to sustain the neutrality it kept in 1914 and the first half of 1915 was in vain. As the French journalist Marcel Dunant stated in his book, the 'Bulgarian summer' (L'ete bulgare) between July and October 1915 was squandered by Ferdinand. Bulgaria jumped into the fray on the side of the Central Powers and thus headed towards its doom and the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine.

As a conclusion, it can comfortably be argued that the decisive role for the Bulgarian defeat was played by the Catholic Ferdinand. His career in Bulgarian politics started at a time when the alliances leading towards the Great War were taking shape, and his crowning aimed to push the country into a union with its former ruler, the Ottoman Empire, and against its liberator, Russia, and the Western democracies, France, Great Britain, Italy and the US.

With hindsight, we also need to emphasise the myopia of Alexander III and his diplomacy, which proved unable to resist the shenanigans of the

pro-Austrian missionary Ferdinand. The Bulgarian factor, personified by the prime minister Stambolov, was neglected. The Russian diplomacy also failed to give credit to the most prominent opposition leader, Petko Karavelov, who happened to be the most prescient national politician and statesman of his time – and a staunch opponent of Ferdinand.

As far as Ferdinand's concession to allow his son Boris be christened in the East Orthodox church is concerned, this proved a mere ruse designed to gain Russia's recognition. When Boris III inherited the crown, his faith proved inconsequent in terms of his political orientation. On the eve of World War II, unlike the East Orthodox Yugoslavia and Greece, the young Coburg remained faithful to his father's predilections and allied with Germany and Austria, which was already integrated within the Reich. The East Orthodox faith Boris had acceded proved a low threshold in defining Bulgaria's political destiny. During World War II, Bulgaria was once again in the camp fighting against the Slavic nations, East Orthodoxy and its liberator Russia, which after 1922 called itself the Soviet Union.

CSA - Central State Archive (Sofia).

CSAOR, USSR – Central State Archive of October Revolution (Moscow).

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The religious factor in the Austrian-Hungarian policy towards Bulgaria throughout the wars of 1912-1918

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Abstract: This article regards the role of the religious factor in the Austrian – Hungarian policy towards the Bulgarians and Bulgaria during the wars of 1912-1918. In the beginning, the author analyses the Austrian and Austrian-Hungarian confessional interests on the Balkans and afterwards studies the nature of the problem. The author believes that in most cases, the Bulgarians are trying to exploit the confessional interests of Vienna and the Catholic Church aiming towards better living conditions for the Bulgarians who are under foreign domination after the defeat during the Second Balkan War. However, Austria – Hungary respects the traditional differentiation of the tasks for supremacy over the Bulgarians with catholic faith along with France. The author thinks that such efforts made by the concerned Bulgarians do not reach the wanted effect, they meet the expected resistance from the Holy Synod and do not receive support from most of the Bulgarians.

Key words: Austria-Hungary, Uniat, Uniat Church, count L. Berhtold

Резюме: Статията разглежда ролята на религиозния фактор в австро-унгарската политика към българите и България през войните 1912 – 1918 г. В началото авторът проследява австрийските и австро-унгарски конфесионални интереси на Балканите, след което изследва същността на темата. Според автора в повечето случаи българите се опитват да експлоатират конфесионалните интереси на Виена и Католическата църксва с цел да постигнат по-добри условия за българите под чуждо владичество след пораженията през Втората балканска война. Австро-Унгария обаче зачита традиционното диференциране на задачите за покровителство на българите с католическо вероизповедание заедно с Франция. Според автора тези усилия на заинтересованите българи не дават очаквания ефект, срещат обяснимата съпротива на Светия синод и не получават подкрепа от мнозинството българи.

This problem has two aspects. The first one shows the role of the confessional relations in the whole Austrian-Hungarian Balkan policy, especially towards the Bulgarians during the period 1912-1918. The second

aspect concerns the attitude and the reaction of the Bulgarian society and government against the actions and propaganda of the Roman Catholic and Uniat Churches among the Bulgarians in Macedonia, Eastern Thrace in the region of Edirne and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. In the community political and confessional history of the Bulgarian society in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century it was popular to search for collaboration and help from other churches, different from the traditional east Orthodox church, aiming towards the solution of important issues regarding the church and politics. This way, along with the natural personal and group religious preferences, the Bulgarians are involved in exploiting the existing back then religious propaganda. As a rule, such procedures are noticed when the religious, political, diplomatic and even military means are used up. They are apparent early in the Renaissance, but continue to grow stronger and are activated as a means for shading the consequences from the military and political defeats in Bulgaria. Therefore in the current research, we are trying to give additional information, comments and conclusions on not well-known facts about the role of the religious factor in the Austrian-Hungarian policy towards Bulgaria and the Bulgarians during the wars of 1912-1918.

* * *

For decades the Austrian empire along with France gained the reputation of a patron for some parts of the Balkan population with Catholic faith in North Albania, Macedonia, Thrace, the Nikopol eparchy in North Bulgaria, etc. Along with the commercial and political considerations, an important matter for the establishment of new Austrian diplomatic agencies on the Balkans was the need for patronage on the catholic faith. In October 1855 the Austrian Council of Ministers considered the offer by the Minister of internal affairs – count Buol-Schauenstein made on 2nd of October the same year, for founding an honorable vice-consulate in Plovdiv. At first, the idea was launched in the Ministry by religious and diplomatic representatives and the minister was very impressed by the fact that in Plovdiv and its surroundings there were 4000 Catholics that until then had no defense and representation. On the 23th of October1855 Kaiser Franz Joseph gave a permission to transfer the vice consulate from Sofia to Plovdiv and the official from the council in Smyrna – Joseph Berti was hired as a temporal vice council.[1] In other cases the Austrian vice councils in Macedonia defended the Christians, supervised and maintained the population with Catholic faith and the Uniat

[1] Agstner 2004, 35-36.

movement.[2] In the process of the confessional relations, it happened so that France had a priority as a mentor for the Bulgarian Catholics in Plovdiv (plus the surroundings) and Macedonia and Austria (Austria-Hungary) in Northern Bulgaria. Apart from that the Roman Catholic Church applied the scheme of approval for parts of the Orthodox population under its supreme jurisdiction in the form of Uniat churches, preserving the Orthodox religious rules and customs. The movement for a Uniat church in 1860 was an example of this.

According to some reports, in the middle of the 70s in the 19th century the Uniat movement in Macedonia included between 80 and 100 Bulgarian Catholics. Later, in the 1890s the Uniat movement diminished and in the beginning of the 20th century the Bulgarian Catholic church from eastern rite in Macedonia contained around 10 000 uniats, 45 priests, 16 churches and 22 schools. From Uniat centers in Macedonia and Thrace came such IROME (Internal revolutionary organization of Macedonia and Edirne) and SOM (Supreme committee of Macedonia) activists like Gotse Delchev, Argiv Manasiev, Petar Dyrvingiv, Dimitar Kushevaliev and Stoicho Garufalov.[3] In the beginning of the 20th century the disappointment of some main activists of the Bulgarian national liberty movement in Macedonia and Eastern Thrace in the region of Edirne from Russia's negative regard to their problems, urged them to seek the cooperation of other vires. An eloquent example for this tendency were the negotiations of Boris Sarafov with the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy in 1901 in Wien and his offer for the dualistic monarchy to propose a candidate for a prince for the eventually autonomous Macedonia.[4]

In the Eve of the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie revolt on the 5th of July 1903, in the Orient Express between the train stations Sofia and Vakarel a meeting was held between the Austrian-Hungarian military attaché baron Vl. Geezol and Toma Karajovov. According to Karajovov, the main aim of the revolutionary organization was an overall revolution in European Turkey but until now there was no success, as there was no support from the outside. In this regard, the Bulgarians were disappointed from Russia's policy and Bulgaria's present behavior. Therefore, in 1901 T. Karajovov and B. Sarafov offered to the Austrian-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph to accept the Bulgarians under his protection. This proposal was admitted during a conference in 1902 and the main merit was Gotse Delchev's. In return of the Austrian-Hungarian support, Karajovov promised that the

[2] Paskaleva 1994, № 138, 343-344.
[3] Eldarov 1994, 11-15.
[4] Mishev 1991, 49-54; 2004, 68-72.

Macedonian Bulgarians will surmount to the Catholic Church or under the superior leadership of the Karlovatsian patriarch. In this case, T. Karajovov did not speak on behalf of all leaders and probably exaggerated how many Bulgarians from Macedonia were ready for such an important step.[5] On the 15th of July 1903 the Austrian-Hungarian diplomatic representative in Sofia, J. Forgah, reported to his minister of foreign relations count Agenor Goluhovski about 2 flows in the national liberty movement in Macedonia. The first one involved educated people and it was for joining Bulgaria through autonomous Macedonia. The second one included a wide variety of people from the population and it was hoping for an Austrian-Hungarian support and it often pointed out the good managing of Bosna and Herzegovina. Forgah, however, explained that the second flow also accepted the 'teasing' with Austria-Hungary as a temporally tactic, he also added that whenever possible they would cooperate with Bulgaria. He advised Vienna not to fool itself with their promises.[6]

In 1911-1912 Sofia received information that the Austrian-Hungarian missioners and catholic priests were trying to contact the Bulgarian activists in Macedonia and there had already been meetings with them. There were no actual results, but they were constantly looking for establishing relations with the leaders and activists of the movement. Among the Bulgarian nationals in Macedonia, there was already an opinion that if the maximum program – the affiliation with Bulgaria could not be achieved, it would be better if Macedonia went under Austrian-Hungarian influence and the purpose would be to save the Bulgarian nationality for better times. Due to this reason, the Bulgarian general consul in Solun – Atanas Shopov researched the ploys of the general editor of the 'Law' newspaper - N. Naumov. He, however, received contradicting information.[7] The information found showed that the attempt for Uniat in 1913 was not sporadic.

The despair after the results from the Balkan wars and the anti-Bulgarian policy from the Greek and Serbian occupiers in Macedonia provoked a sudden revival of the Uniat idea. Different circles in Bulgaria and politic parties offered the proposition about a church Uniat with the Catholic Church as a weapon for saving the Bulgarians in Macedonia from the anti-national activities of the Serbian and Greek administration. On these lines, in 1913 a National Union was formed which unfolded an intensive propaganda in favor of the idea for a Uniat – often discussed in the media back then. The most enthusiastic followers of this offer were

[5] Mishev 2004, 92-93.
[6] Zografski 1995, № 1, 40-41; Kosev *et al*. 1978, 463, № 83.
[7] ABAS, f. 41k, Atanas Shopov, op. 1, a.e. 91, fol. 1, 40-52; a.e. 134, op. 1, fol. 1.

Ivan Snegarov and Dimitar Marinov.[8] The defeat in the Second Balkan war shook the hopes of the Bulgarians in Macedonia for upcoming freedom, therefore a new trend started to prevail that freedom could only happen with the support of foreign factors.[9] On the 21st of July 1913 IROME sent a memorandum to the participants in the peace negotiations in Bucharest. In it, on behalf of the Macedonian Bulgarians, it was emphatically insisted that Macedonia should at least be given autonomous governance under the guarantee of the European great powers. After the decisions in Bucharest, on the 11th of August a new memorandum was sent to the great powers with a protest against the Bucharest contract and with a demand for autonomy under the European control.[10] During the Second Balkan war the Bulgarian ministry of foreign relations was trying to exploit the anti – Russian frame of mind in Austria-Hungary and they published in Vienna newspapers the letter from the Holy Synod against the Slavophils in Russia who closed their eyes upon the confirmed facts about Bulgarian repression in the Greek and Serbian parts in Macedonia. In August 1913, associate professor Alexander Tsankov and professor N. Milev visited Austria-Hungary to inform the public about the real situation on the Balkans and to somewhat prepare the ground for the reorientation of Bulgaria to the Austrian-Hungarian direction.[11]

On the 7th of August 1913 the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador in Sofia – count Adam Tarnovski informed the minister of the foreign relations – count Leopold Berhtold about excitement among the supporters of the Uniat and that there were actual offers made to Austria-Hungary. A few representatives of the Macedonian-Bulgarian intellectuals, one of them was T. Pavlov, a former deputy in Skopje in the Ottoman parliament and a former member of the council of the exarch, asked him for a way to convert to Catholicism. It was about the Bulgarian nationality, which was under Greek and Serbian power, to be saved by accepting Catholicism. The Bulgarian delegacy claimed that about 500 000 Macedonian-Bulgarian uniats could pass under this protectorate.[12] In the very difficult situation on the Balkans in the end of the Second Balkan war and after it, on the 11th of August count Berhtold sent clear and explicit instructions to Tarnovski in Sofia. According to them, the opportunity to create a Uniat between the Catholic church and the Macedonian Bulgarians is formally and materially

[8] Eldarov 1994, 15-16.
[9] Shopov 1998, 26.
[10] Gotsev 1991, c. 133-134.
[11] Ilchev 1996, c. 258 – 259.
[12] HHSt. A, Karton 75, Weisungen 1913, Graf Tarnovski from Sofiya do Viena, 7th August 1913.

entirely religious work. In this sense, the last one could be activated only through direct negotiations between the two religious factors. At this stage, an eventual interference of the Habsburg country would be impossible, therefore the reaction from Vienna was supposed to be limited to the hint that at that moment there were probably obstacles for such a movement in Macedonia. According to count L. Berhtold, this initiative of the Macedonian Bulgarians could come true only by sending a delegacy to the Macedonian clergy in Rome. Austria-Hungary could interfere only in a situation that would appear after the Uniat was accomplished. In this sense, the Austrian-Hungarian commitments were reduced to complying with the principle of the auspices of the cults during the Turkish domination. Regarding this, it had to be seen what could be achieved about the new Christian neighbors of the monarchy. The conceivable influence had a territorial aspect, as the Austrian/Austrian-Hungarian protectorate was limited in the borders of the vilayet Kosovo, while in the vilayets Monastir (Bitolya) and Thessaloniki such influence was accomplished by France. Therefore in case of an Uniat, Austria-Hungary could have preferences for safety for the mass of Macedonian Bulgarian uniats who lived in the vilayet Kosovo, as for the others – France had to take care of them. Actually, this had already happened with the Bulgarian uniats in the diocese in Thessaloniki.[13]

A convincing proof for the situation in Macedonia after the end of the Second Balkan war was the letter of Joakim N. Mustakov to the Bulgarian metropolitan in Ohrid – Boris about the destiny of the Bulgarians in Ohrid after his expulsion by the Serbian authorities on the 16th of September 1913. 'As the Bulgarian nation sees the ugly danger from repression by the Serbian chauvinistic regime, it seeks salvation for its nationality. They see the Uniat as a medium for this, even though they are faithful to their great grandfather's Orthodox faith. In this current moment, the ground for a Uniat is very favourable in Macedonia'.[14] Obviously, those events highly concern the mentor of the eastreligious nations-Russia. On the 26th of March, 1913 the Russian diplomacy representative in Sofia-A. Nekliudov sends a letter to his foreign minister-S. D. Sazonov in which he shares his concern from the actual opportunity that the Uniat exploits the new situation on the Balkans and some other factors connected with it are actually a serious threat for the Russian interests: '...the handover of the towns Bitolja, Ohrid, Prilep to Serbian

[13] HHSt. A, Karton 75, Wiesungen 1913, Script telegram to Count A. Tarnovski in Sofia, Vienna, 11th August 1913.
[14] Ionov 1998, 397, № 229.

ownership – explains Nekliudov – would have the following consequences: first, the transfer of Bulgarian municipalities not only in those places, but in Skopje as well, in Debur-in the Uniat; second, the intensification of the Austrian intrigues in Bulgaria and third, it would lead to permanent dissent of the orthodox slavdom on the Balkans. Those threats are even more dangerous as in those days, they damage our influence on Belgrad purely externally'. [15]As it can be seen, the Russian diplomat writes about such a reaction among the Bulgarian nation even before the outburst of the Second Balkan War.

Such information and thoughts, Nekliudov shares as well in his report to the Russian foreign minister S.D. Sazanov on the 17th of August 1913. Regarding him, '...the Uniat actually could be in favor of the wide religious-administrative and school education of the Macedonian Bulgarians and from this point of view would most definitely act on the same side as the Bulgarian policy...'. Nekliudov believes that negotiations are being led for the approval of the of the Uniat. Regarding Nekliudov, in the regions, given to Serbia, the Uniat movement would not be such a great threat, as the serbiasation would happen without much disturbing, 'however, the Macedonian Bulgarians would find themselves in a completely different situation under the Greek influence, where because of the existing extremely difficult conditions, the nation would be forced to seek some foreign influence in order to keep their own national awareness. Here, the Uniat preaches from Rome could, unfortunately, lead to serious consequences as well because Kukush has already been for long the center of the catholic propaganda'.[16] The author of the article Rostislav Terzioski, as a conclusion accepts the opinion of the past Russian diplomacy that the propaganda and accepting of the Uniat in Macedonia is mostly formal, due to practical reasons and without actual success.

The interlacing of religious, diplomatic, cultural and other interests in Macedonia worried the Russian diplomacy which at this moment tolerated the Serbian aspirations. The Russian consul in Bitolya informed his foreign ministry throughout the ambassador in Belgrade about the difficulties that the Serbian administration faced with the exchange of the Bulgarian language with Serbian in Macedonia. In this period Bitolya region was a very tender spot where 3 levels of contradiction whirl – the local Bulgarian, Albanian, Greek and Serbian disputes, the interests of the great powers and the different religious propaganda. According to the Russian diplomat 'The protection from Austria does not promise a peaceful

[15] Terzioski 2003, 239.
[16] Terzioski 2003, 239-240.

resolving of the problem about the exchanging of the Bulgarian language in the program with Serbian, moreover, the Bulgarian sympathies for the local American missionaries are too old and deep...'. The Russian consul did not have any doubts about recommending to the Serbian country 'nice and solid schools' in order to change the minds of the local population.[17] It is obvious that everything, which due to religious, cultural or any other reason respected the mother tongue of the Bulgarian population, was against the Belgrade assimilation efforts.

Of course, the idea for a Uniat met the energetic resistance of the Bulgarian Orthodox church in general. On the 15th of December 1913, the Holly Sinod of BPC sent a county breve to the priests and believers in Bulgaria, with which he stigmatized the Uniat. Afterwards, the question regarding the Uniat, temporally faded away under the influence of new events, such as the First World war. Bulgaria's defeat in the world's conflict and the following troubles for the Bulgarians in Macedonia provoked a limited revival of the idea of a Uniat.[18] The wars from 1912-1913 play a great role for the development of the uniat movement in the Ottoman Empire. On the 13th of June, 1913, the head of the uniat church the archbishop Michail Mirov presents to exarch Joseph the question for church unity with Rome, which of course was not approved. On this meeting, one of Mirov's arguments was the necessity in the taken regions of Bulgaria to preserve the Bulgarian nation form denationalization throughout the Uniat movement. As a result from wars, more than 10 000 uniats are being deported from the Ottomat empire, the catholic education was destroyed and it is now clar that Bulgaria is the only place where you can exist. Because of the wars from 1912-1913 seminaries, the Bulgarian catholic high school in Edirne, the charity places were all destroyed, what's more the nuns-Eucharist were deported. Archbishop Mirov remains in Tsarigrad for awhile, hoping to lead the uniat movements in 4 countries. Till 1916 Epifanii Shanov resided in Solun, but was deprted in the end of the war. Archbishop Mirov remains head of the Bulgarian uniat church, but begins the inevitable administrative reconstruction. In 1912, representative centres are being closed down in Tsarigrad, Edirne and Solun, later a new eparchy with Sofia as a centre was formed.

In fact, in 1913 the Austrian-Hungarian diplomacy's attitude towards the attempt of some Macedonian Bulgarians to use the Uniat in order to save their national identity, happened to be part of the whole stand of Vienna towards the difficult situation on the Balkans. The Habsburg

[17] Kosev & Hristov 1969, 393, № 289.
[18] Eldarov 1994, 15-16.

country had historical experience with contacts with and influence on the catholic believers and many Uniat churches, for instance, the Catholics in Northern Albania, the Bulgarian Catholics in Northern Bulgaria, the Uniat church in West Ukraine, etc. Having in mind the experience, Austria-Hungary seemed to act too insecurely and cautiously in such an important moment. Despite the presence of precursory activity and good conditions, it commented on the question as 'purely religious'. Did this behavior add to the insecurity of the Habsburg country to force its interests on the Balkans with the help of Bulgaria during the Second Balkan war? Some authors in the Austrian historiography blame the government in Vienna that it missed the best moment and it made a late decision in the bad conditions in 1914.

It has to be admitted that in the summer of 1913, the situation on the Balkans was very complicated. Vienna's desire to help Sofia interfered with the unconditional refusal of the great German ally. The Second Reich supported Romania and Greece and neglected the strategic position of Bulgaria. To the German negativism we should also add the doubts of Italy, adding its 'eternal' compensational pretensions and also other inevitable difficulties. An unclear promise can be recognized in Berthold's statement that the dualistic monarchy can only be interested in the situation after a plausible realization of the Uniat with Rome, but it has no unambiguous concessions about the desired from the Macedonian Bulgarians support. Therefore, Austria-Hungary preferred to follow the routine of its traditional Balkan confessional politics. Vienna is made to respect the traditional distribution of religious influence and patronage, which is perfectly proven in the instructions of count L. Berthold to the ambassador in Sofia.

HHST. A - Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Wien. Haus – Hof und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv XV/ Bulgarien

ABAS – Archive of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences

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Attempt to create a Christian Democratic Party in Bulgaria at the end of World War I

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Abstract: This article has tracked an attempt to study the creation of a Bulgarian political party with Christian views. It failed because of the conditions in the country at the end of World War which were very inappropriate.

Key words: First World War, Bulgarian Christian Democratic Union, Christian Democracy

Резюме: В настоящата статия е проследен един опит за създаване на българска политическа партия с християндемократически възгледи. Той е неуспешен, защото условията в страната в края на Първата световна война са неподходящи.

Christian Democracy became a political ideology in the late nineteenth century[1] aiming to combine Christian values with modern social life. Despite its broad presence in the social sphere and the fact that it protected many civil liberties, this movement is generally considered to be a successor or even a wing of conservatism. The main reason is that it struggles with the pragmatism of the bourgeois time defending traditional Christian morals and values. In the 1890s it is popular in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands, but in the early twentieth century it

[1] The term 'démocratie chrétienne' ('Christian democracy') appears at the end of the eighteenth century and is connected with the administration of the Catholic Church. The first political organizations of Christian type arise in France and the UK in the 30 GE and 40 years of the nineteenth century, but have little political influence. Approximately from that time is the term 'Christian socialism'. See the problem in Fogarty 1957; Hürten 1964; Moody 1953.

declined to be revived again after the end of World War II.[2]

In Bulgaria Christian Democracy is an unknown phenomenon to the First World War. There are several reasons. First, as an economically underdeveloped nation during the period the Bulgarians traditionally have a positive attitude towards Christianity and the clergy. By the end of World War I atheism is an exception in Bulgarian society. Respect for priests is predetermined by their considerable involvement in the struggles for national liberation. Moreover, in their social status Bulgarian clergy stands very close to ordinary people and this further strengthens their relationship.[3] To this we should add that the Bulgarian conservatism has no broad social support,[4] which further reduces the possibility of occurrence and development of Christian Democracy.

The beginning of the First World War gave the Bulgarian people new hopes for solving national problems. Some political forces have expressed their ideas of revenge in relation to Belgrade, seeing the invasion of Austrian troops in Serbia as an opportunity for the establishment of the Bulgarian authorities in Vardar Macedonia.[5] The risks of immediate involvement of the country in the war, however, are great. The government in Sofia rightly fears to take the plunge because of the extremely negative attitude of Athens and Bucharest to Bulgarian foreign policy.[6] At that time, Bulgaria has already experienced its first national disaster marked in the Bucharest (28 July 1913) and Constantinople (16 Sept. 1913) peace treaties. They take huge territories inhabited by Bulgarians (Southern Dobrudzha,

[2] Some authors tend to attribute 'Catholic parties' in some countries in Europe to Christian course – see Becker & Morsey 1988). Such is e.g. 'the Catholic People's Party' in Hungary which lasted from 1895 until the end of the First World War (for political life in Austria-Hungary – see Mishev 2005, 27), but the two phenomena are not identical.

[3] About the role of the Bulgarian church in public life during the period - see Vatashki 2005, 11; *Ganev et al.* 2006; *Georgiev et al.* 2013, 67 ff. and loc. ref.

[4] About the development of conservative ideas in Bulgaria – see Gesheva 2013.

[5] CSA f. 176, inv. 3, a. u. 10, fol. 148-151. 328-329, 397. Immediately after the declaration of war the old Bulgarian chieftains form bands, and have the borders, but the Prime Minister does not allow them to pass – see CSA f. 142. See the mood in the country in *Pryaporets*, No 162/18 July, No 163/19 July 1914; *Balgariya*, No 252/2 Aug. 1914; *Narodni prava*, No 143/26 June and etc.; Diplomaticheski 1920, 114.

[6] Both sides concentrate troops along the Bulgarian border before the start of hostilities - see *Nardoni prava*, No 140/22 June 1914. See also Markov 1995, 19. Not only neighbors exhibit aggression against the Bulgarians but also the periodicals in some European capitals – see Ilchev 1990, 21, 34. Petersburg also stands on the pro-Serbian position, which is extremely painfully perceived by pro-Russian minded circles in Sofia – see for this Shishmanov 1913, 3; Kostov 1914, 5 ff., and others.

Vardar and the Aegean part of Macedonia, parts of Adrianople, etc.) and diminish considerably the Bulgarians' benefits of the London Peace Treaty (17 May 1913). In Sofia a coalition governs consisting of three liberal parties - Liberal, Popular Liberal Party and Young Liberal Party, popular with the names of their leaders as Radoslavist, Stambolovist and Tonchevist. It remained in power throughout the war. The Prime Minister of the country is Dr V. Radoslavov. At that time he is already over 60 years old but has great power in his hands, being (respectively a head and Chargé) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (17 Dec. 1913 - 21 June 1918) and the Ministry of Interior Affairs (23 dec. 1913 - 21 Sept. 1915 and 17 Sept. 1916 - 21 June 1918).[7] Fearing another rout, the foreign policy chief announced 'strict neutrality' almost immediately after the announcement of the First World War.[8] It is necessary for the country to overcome the greatest casualties and material damages of the two previous (First and Second Balkan) wars.[9]

The neutral position of Bulgaria remains little more than a year. The expansion of military activities and the pressure of the Great Powers of the two fighting blocks gradually force Balkan countries to abandon their neutrality. The Ottoman Empire is the first to go to war supporting Berlin and Vienna.[10] In October 1915 the government in Sofia, lured by the opportunity to achieve national reunification,[11] follows it. Bulgarian troops invade Serbia in the direction of Nis and Macedonia in direction of Skopje and Ohrid. The initial military actions are very successful. They force the Serbian government to capitulate, but a large part of the Serbian army manages to withdraw in Albania. Entente forces transfer a lot of troops in Greece and after several months of fighting the front stabilizes. The war acquires a positional character without recent prospects of ending.

In 1916 the Romanian government makes a move. Berlin and Vienna expect that Bucharest will follow the example of Sofia, but not only it did not happen, but the country declares war on the Triple Alliance. This forces the Bulgarian Army to fight on another front, mobilizing more than

[7] For the members of the government and its changes see Metodiev & Stoyanov 1987, 318-319.

[8] SCA, f. 176, inv. 3, a. u. 10, fol. 223, 436-437. In this period the monarch and the parliamentary opposition share the same position – see DV, No. 233/ 15 Oct. 1914; Ilichev 1993, 82.

[9] Over 50,000 killed and external debt which exceeds one billion levs. The direct costs of two wars exceed 450 million – see Radoslavov 1993, 60-61; *Pryaporets*, No 54/19 Noem. 1913. See also Markov 1995, 23 and op. ref.

[10] Kalchev 2011, 11 ff.

[11] Peshev 1993, 437 ff., 631 ff.; Radoslavov 1993, 91; Grancharov 1985, 173; Danev 1992, 272 ff. and others.

700,000 people. Despite major successes (the Bulgarian troops defeated the Romanians and invaded Bucharest),[12] Bulgaria is devastated economically. Germans and allies do not fulfill a considerable part of their commitments. This creates major military and political tensions.[13] The introduced rationing system increases discontent among the soldiers inside the country. Government efforts prove insufficient to provide the most basic needs of society. The Directorate for economic and social justice created in 1916 (SGOP) introduces rationing and forced commandeering of food from rural producers. However, the authorities fail to feed the army properly and to provide livelihood for the civilians. The Law on hygiene and safety published in July 1917 only guaranteed the working hours (reduces them to the 11 hours for adults, 10 hours for women and adolescents between 16 and 18 years and 8 hours for youngsters under 16) and some social benefits (control of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour on hygiene and other conditions of work in industrial enterprises, providing eight-week paid leave for pregnant women, reduced working hours for mothers of babies, mandatory presence of a doctor in enterprises with more than 1000 workers, etc.) but it does not solve the problem of feeding, because wages remain unchanged.[14] Inflation takes hitherto unseen rates.[15] Labor shortages and threshing machines leads to losses in the collection of grain in the summer of 1917, which soon leads to famine. In February 1918 bread rations of Sofia's residents are reduced to less than 300 grams per day, in May they fall to 200 g. In the countryside the situation is even worse, mountainous areas suffered mostly by the food shortages.[16] Speculation expands to unprecedented levels. The price per kilogram of flour on the black market reaches the huge sum of 15 levs.[17] The names of the biggest traders on the black market are openly associated with senior officials and even ministers.

The ensuing crisis leads to centrifugal processes in the ruling coalition. Yet, in 1916 some of the MPs in the seventeenth National

[12] Markov 2006, 129; Mal'kov 2002, 188; Minkov 2013, 103; Boichev 2010, 22 ff.; Toshev 2007, 11 and many others.
[13] Minkov 2013, 176-286.
[14] *Pryaporets*, No 158/17 July 1917. Due to shortage of funds some restrictions have been made in the pension fund about the retirement of civil servants – *Pryaporets*, No 159/18 July 1917.
[15] *Pryaporets*, No 165/25 July 1917.
[16] For instance, citizens of the town of Peshtera receive monthly only 4 kg. maize meal per person, which is less than 135 grams per day – see SCA f. 3, inv. 1 a. u. 20, fol. 21. For the general situation in the country see *Pryaporets*, No 168/29 July 1917.
[17] Hristov 1999, 304-305. See also Tsanev 1961, 14 ff.

Assembly express doubts in the line of politics followed by V. Radoslavov and his close supporters.[18] With the cost of many efforts the government headed by the Prime Minister, manages to overcome the crisis,[19] but the mood remains negative.

In the spring of 1917 the political situation outside belligerent Europe is gradually changing. Initiated by the Triple Alliance peace talks have been rejected by the Entente. After several attempts of breaking the Thessaloniki front in the winter of 1916 the war acquires positional character with no prospect of ending in the near future. At the same time the loan taken from the banking syndicate Disconto-Gesellschaft at the beginning of the war has not been fully completed.[20] The ill supply with food, ammunition and necessities strongly discourages part of the Bulgarian soldiers. This is also influenced by the news for the outbreak of the February Revolution in Russia.[21]

In mid-1917 the discontent in the front and back areas of the army becomes clear. Now it causes protests already found among the members of the Liberal Party. One of them is that of the MP Dr. Ivan Dimitrov. On 12 July 1917 he distributed among the prominent representatives of Radoslavov organizations a 'Confidential message to our political friends – the liberals'. At first it praises the efforts of the ordinary Bulgarian soldier to win the war and achieve national unity. Immediately after that there is a sharp criticism to the corruption in the back areas of the army. The author of 'The Message' criticizes sharply the leadership of the Liberal Party, describing it as a 'kinship mafia'. He openly announces that the leader of Liberals Dr. V. Radoslavov 'is no longer the same selfless' politician, and under the influence of his close relatives encourages black market, buying property in Berlin and other similar activities that enrich a small group of his strong supporters,[22] but it is not in the interests of the country.

[18] Diplomaticheski 1921, 677. See also Zhekov 1928, 8 ff. There are also reports of a coup and committed attacks - see Iotsov 1944, 56; Markov 1989, 124 ff.
[19] SD, 17 ONS, 655. See also Omarchevski 1921, 33.
[20] About the full terms of the contracts and their implementation - see Parvanova 1999, 23-45 and references cited.
[21] Marinova 2007, 63-93; Kolev 1986, 299 ff.; Petrova 1957, 96 ff.; Nikov & Dilovska 1976, 275 ff.
[22] The following names are mentioned; Dr. Hristo Georgiev - MP and son-in-law of V. Radoslavov, longtime activists of the Liberal Party Dr Kiryak Provadaliev, Tasho Uzunov, Nikola Altimirski, Nikola h. Kalchov and R. V. Radev, and with them - the new 'supporters' Hr. Gendovich Sotirov 'meal-man' Georgiev 'robber', 'dentist' Tomkov, etc. The latter are described as 'Great marauders of Greater Bulgaria' – see NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 42-43.

Dimitrov warns his political allies that this could lead to a new national catastrophe. He called for greater vigilance and justice for speculators, mentioning among other things that one of them - R. Radev - the Mayor of Sofia, has already received an indictment brought by Sofia Military Field Court. The measure, which according to Dimitrov should be applied, is 'party and public legal proceedings for the speculators'. He sharply criticized the indiscriminate change of government officials, stressing that corruption among officials would lead to 'another (internal) disaster'. The 'message' does not spare the foreign policy, whose main initiator, in the words of the author is the prime minister himself.[23]

The plundering of the country by people 'outside the Liberal Party' is a terrible scourge that must be stopped. Dr. Iv. Dimitrov persuades the political party members not to allow the party 'die with Radoslavov and his dirty dealers' company' but to express their protest. As an experienced politician, he understands that at this moment the power of Radoslavov is protected by the martial law and censorship,[24] but he advises them to try to act with the help of the National Assembly. The author himself promises at a suitable occasion in the near future to gather and present evidence of corruption from the minutes of the Council of Ministers and other documents. He expresses the opinion that even in the office there will be ministers who have the courage to resist V. Radoslavov. His main hope, however, is that the Army General Staff will oppose the government. To maintain public order and avoid public order disruptions similar to those in Russia, Dimitrov proposes the establishment of a new political party that is to take over the liberal heritage but without Radoslavov.[25]

In the second half of 1917 Bulgarian crisis deepens. The situation at the military front and back areas deteriorates. The Bolsheviks coming to power in Russia and Lenin's decrees on peace and land increase social tensions. There is a threat of revolution that will undermine the foundations of the old social order. Narrow Socialists in Bulgaria intensify their propaganda within and outside the National Assembly demanding the abolition of censorship, the increase of social benefits and getting the country out of the war. Some of their requests are supported by farmers and broad socialists, which creates a serious block against the government.[26] The bourgeois press is united against the socialist

[23] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 44-45.
[24] DV, No 172/1 Aug. 1914.
[25] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 46-49.
[26] *Rabotnicheski vestnik*, No 264/5 Apr. 1918; *Narod*, No 89/19 Apr. 1918; *Zemedelsko zname*, No 48/9 March 1918 and others. See also Kosev 1960, 197; Hristov 1957, 109; Pinkas 1981, 252.

propaganda, but its forces are insufficient to extinguish the ever-growing public discontent.[27] Strict order and patriotism retain soldiers in the trenches but patriotism cannot suppress everyday problems. There are frequent escapes from the front, disobediences and riots.[28] After the speech of the US President W. Wilson in front of the US Congress on January 8, 1918 and his notorious 14 points which offer just peace and the retention of the national boundaries[29] the covenant propaganda covers Bulgarian trenches with leaflets which persuade soldiers to stop fighting.[30] The situation in the country is also very intense. In early January 1918 the budget has to be voted. Some of the representatives of the opposition parties are prepared to criticize it but they are not given the floor, although they are in the list of the Assembly chair. This leads to a scandal and protests inside the Assembly and outside.[31] Without denying the need for the national reunion some political forces distance themselves from the ruling coalition. In the early spring of 1918 the Democratic, People's, Progressive-liberal, Radical, Social Democratic (broad Socialists) Parties and the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union begin talks to form a broad opposition bloc.[32]

In the current extremely difficult situation in the country, Dr. Iv. Dimitrov decided that the time has come for a general change in the domestic political situation and in January 1918 he goes out openly with 'Manifesto of the Union for independence and internal renewal' of Bulgaria.[33] He hopes his new organization will grow rapidly, spontaneously taking the lead of public discontent.

The 'Manifesto' begins with the statement that the global war changes fundamentally the social life and moral stands of society. In this regard, the old political forces are inadequate to meet the needs of the society which requires the formation of new political organizations. They,

[27] About the propaganda of the bourgeois Bulgarian politicians against Soviet Russia - see Marinova 2007, 94.
[28] Petrova 1957, 99.
[29] Bulgarian press pays serious attention to it - see *Pryaporets*, No 7/11 Jan. 1918. About the overall relationship between the US and Bulgaria in the period - see Pantev & Petkov 1983.
[30] Nikov & Dilovska 1999, 288.
[31] *Pryaporets*, No 4/5 Jan. 1918.
[32] CSA, f. 176, inv. 3, a. u. 3149, fol. 7-8, 9-10 and others. About their latest work see Kishkilova 1993, 36-59.
[33] That organization was created in between July and December, 1917. It was registered officially in court in January 1918 – see NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 52.

according to Dimitrov, should offer other than the current domestic and foreign policy perspectives. In contrast to the leftist politicians, the author of the 'Manifesto' believes 'hunger' is a 'bad advisor of the nations' and the revolutions resulting from the plight of ordinary people will not bring anything good to the nation. Using examples from the Russian revolution, he is right that the cause of social turmoil is not 'random', but a result of the approaching 'universal catastrophe' because of the devastating war.[34]

Immediately after the general characteristics Iv. Dimitrov briefly describes the basic principles of the new organization. According to the text it is a 'federal' party with 'Christian-orthodox socialist ... external and internal socio-educational policy'. He suggests that the reason for its formation is the 'complete failure of all political groups in Bulgaria'.[35] The National Assembly is seen as similar to the 'Polish nobility' that reigns in the spirit of 'greatest hostility' and only the coordination of personal and cliquish political interests temporarily supports parity. The internal party structure and activity of the existing political forces are not spared either. Based on recent examples the situation of an ordinary party functionary is described. He, as the manifesto shows, may be a reputable and popular politician among the masses, but if 'the head of the party is not fond of him' he has no chances for a successful career. Dimitrov stresses that this does not happen only in Bulgaria but also in other Balkan and European countries. On this basis, it was concluded that such politicians are the initiators of the ensuing 'world carnage' and there is no chance to achieve lasting and just peace.[36] Immediately after that a way out is proposed - Europe should be reformed on the basis of the principle of 'modern Neochristianity'. The principles of the latter are explained in more detail in the next few pages and there is an attempt to adapt them specifically to the Bulgarian reality. Firstly, it is strongly emphasized that individual nations are valued worldwide not for their conquests, but with their achievements in the field of culture. In this respect the Manifesto condemns the policy of the Bulgarian liberals for continuous accession of new territories without the previous being reclaimed. According to the future Christian democrats, such an approach continuously exhausts national forces and does not allow economic and cultural prosperity. On the other hand, following such politics, Bulgaria is perceived by other countries and advanced European

[34] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 51.
[35] The 'Manifesto' specifically refers not only to the ruling coalition parties, but to the opposition as well, including BAPU – see NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 53-55.
[36] In the text it is marked with italics that 'they and peace are mutually exclusive' - NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 57. See also fol. 56.

nations as an aggressor and is surrounded by enemies. In the spirit of Christian values Christian Democrats declare that they are against the use of force in international relations. The only exception is if the homeland is attacked and should be protected from external threats. They deny revolutions due to the same reason – bloodshed. They advocate overtly that Christian Democracy will follow the evolutionary path of development with a focus on economic and cultural development of the nation in times of peace and friendly relations with its neighbors.[37] Immediately a question arises here whether the foregoing is propaganda in connection with the upcoming elections,[38] whether it is due to external factors or the authors of the text seriously intend to follow those principles. The fact is that in 1917 and 1918 American Protestant missionaries intensify their activities in Bulgaria and have a definite impact on some circles.[39] At the same time at the beginning of 1918 victims and war troubles create mass antiwar sentiments that would attract voters in the next election. Ordinary people grumble louder than ever against corruption and the pursuit of power in the name of personal interests. Part of the lowlands are pauperized and shift decisively to left politics. This is supported by the Russian example, having in mind the traditional Russophile orientation of a large part of the Bulgarian nation. The alternative revolution, however, strongly startles the conservative circles in the society. Being aware that they cannot bring back the pre-war situation, they are fighting for the preservation of bourgeois democracy with new means. On the one hand, they oppose the restriction of civil rights and freedoms introduced by martial law, and on the other, they try to limit revolutionary actions to the maximum. The mechanism by which they plan to achieve it is the same - fighting against violence. The governing people willing to continue the war to a victorious end are personified as arsonists in the global fire and the followers of the Russian revolution - as rebels destroying public order and morality.[40] However, there are some inconsistencies and mixing of different elements in the ideology. The main objective of the authors of the manifesto is the complete preservation of bourgeois democracy. The Christian pattern of behavior associated with the opposition to violence (but in a peaceful way) is associated with many social demands. They are called 'socialist' probably to make difference with the new model of the narrow socialists who widely

[37] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 58-60.
[38] In the spring of 1918 the four-year mandate of the Seventeenth National Assembly expires and there should be new elections - see *Pryaporets*, No 20/29 Jan. 1918.
[39] About their overall activity - see Petkov 1981, 75-87.
[40] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 51, 57 and others.

advocate establishing a republic via revolution.[41] Iv. Dimitrov and his supporters are definitely against this idea. In this case they are in a delicate situation because Ferdinand is one of the main initiators for the participation of Bulgaria in World War I on the side of Germany.[42] For this reason, the 'Manifesto' does not mention anything about the Coburg dynasty, but it also does not attack it. The court protection is indirect. It consists of appeals for the preservation of public order and attacks on republican ideas. The future Christian Democrats imagine the development of the Bulgarian nation in a relatively limited area,[43] with good relations with its neighbors, while respecting the rights of minorities and progressing forward, but only evolutionally without revolutions and social upheavals, with emphasis on the development of culture and economy. These ideas are attractive to the tormented war compatriots, but some of them are definitely not realistic. The idea of peace and good neighborhood in the context of the still raging war at the Thessaloniki Front is definitely unrealizable at that moment. The situation is identical with the collection of 'healthy forces' of people in one organization. The latter is definitely a propaganda element used often by other parties in other conditions.[44]

The principles of organization of the newly established union are an important issue that will be shortly discussed below. From the document presented it is not entirely clear what will be the future structure of the 'Union'. It appears on behalf of the 'central council' and it is mentioned in the context that it will be built on a 'federal' principle[45]. Perhaps its creators hope to attract members of other parties as well. Familiar with the practice in Bulgaria, they probably assume that at least at the beginning their new fans will not break up completely with their old parties. In this case the Federal principle would be very useful for the purposes of attracting whole groups from other organizations. It should be recognized as a felicitous choice, but we must point out that even this practice does not give satisfactory results.

The activity of the newly established (in January 1918) 'Union for the independence and internal renewal of Bulgaria' does not begin so well as

[41] Hristov 1957, 130; Birman 1957, 54; Ivanov 1961, 227; Velikata 1957, 7.
[42] Papanchev 1946, 132-180. See also Markov 1979, 5-13.
[43] At the beginning of 1918 the overall faith in the successful outcome of the war gradually began to decline.
[44] See for example Bobchev 1894, 40; KLB 2, 304; 4, 180; Hadzhiev 1899, 84; 1906, 44; Sazdov 1987, 37; 2012, 23 ff., 33, 41, 51 ff., 111 ff.; Nikolova 2004, 165 ff.; Georgiev 2001, 76 ff.; 2007, 314 ff.; 2010, 56 ff.; 2014, 398, 405; Stefanov 1984, 32 ff.; Zhivkov 2014, 61 ff. and many other.
[45] NLKM – BHA, f. 263, inv. 1, a. u. 16, fol. 52, 61.

its creators expect and wish. The Liberal coalition, despite the negative prognoses of Dr. Ivan Dimitrov, survive and retain power in the next five months. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia (March 3, 1918) and the Bucharest treaty with Romania (7 May 1918)[46] give some hopes for a successful end of the war. Battles on the fronts start again. Bourgeois opposition criticizes mainly the economic and domestic policy of the Liberals and their compliance to the Allies, but supports the course of foreign politics of firm alliance with the Central Powers. This becomes quite apparent when Radoslavov's coalition is no longer in power. The change of Dr. V. Radoslavov's government with that of Al. Malinov's on 21 June 1918 does not change in general the Bulgarian foreign politics.[47]

Dimitrov's numerous group has no real political influence in the country, therefore big bourgeois newspapers ignore their statements. Despite their right orientation, they are an uncertain ally in the parliament because they have requirements to the membership of right-wing forces and thereby compromises their integrity. So, caught up in political isolation the small Christian Democratic group gradually stops working and falls apart without leaving traces in history. However, its emergence on the political scene in a difficult time for Bulgaria deserves some attention.

For various reasons Christian Democratic ideas do not find fertile ground for development in Bulgaria. The lack of hereditary aristocracy greatly reduces its potential supporters. Achieved with great efforts the national liberation and partial unity of the Bulgarians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century rise a spirit of negation to the traditional 'values' and the evolutionary path of development. The young and viable Bulgarian nation hurries to catch up with other Balkan countries and advanced European nations by all means. At times its behavior even seems ruthless, there are political assassinations, severance of diplomatic relations with the liberator Russia, non-compliance with international treaties and so on. In this situation, Christian values seem to remain in the background to give way to the young bourgeois chasing success by all means. It is not by accident that up to the wars in Bulgaria there is no hint

[46] About signing the agreements and their conditions – see Aleksandrov 2009; 2008; Penchikov 1991; Vladeva 1996; Vinogradov 1968.

[47] Dr. V. Radoslavov resigned on 18 June 1918. The discussions about the new Council of Ministers are short because most parliamentary parties do not want to take part in the government in such difficult times. In practice the government Malinov-Kosturkov has no parliamentary majority. It has as its primary goal to improve the economic situation of the country and to press the allies to make greater concessions to Bulgaria after the victory – see Girginov 1937, 35. In fact nothing of the expected happens – see Vlahov 1957, 268-278; Anchev 2000.

of the creation of a political organization on a Christian basis. Moreover, unlike other European countries, Bulgarian legislation partly restricts the political rights of the clergy, which is seen as a normal phenomenon among the public and does not reduce the respect to their merits.

The fact that the idea to build a Christian Democratic organization arose on the eve of the second national catastrophe is not accidental. At the beginning of 1918, facing a new rout the brightest minds of the nation began searching frantically for new ways of survival and prosperity. Some public figures naturally turn to morality, which is represented by Christianity. After the strong demoralization as a result of the famine and war, the return to moral values is a natural process. The dream of a better and fairer world unites a small group of public figures in their efforts to create a political party of a 'new' character. I put the word 'new' in quotes because some of the supporters of Dimitrov are just in a hurry to leave the sinking ship of the ruling liberal coalition. What unites them to some extent is the fear that the approaching defeat will destroy completely the traditional bourgeois order in the society. And the methods they use are not original. Another issue is that the surrounding environment is not suitable for defending such ideas. It is not by chance that the group of Dr. Ivan Dimitrov fails to achieve success and quickly descends from the political scene, to give way to more radical ideas. This once again shows that by the end of the First World War in Bulgaria there are no objective conditions for the existence of Christian Democracy.

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The Bulgarian Ortkodox Exarchate and Abolitionism

Valery Kolev

Abstract: The study contradicts the dominant thesis that within the Ottoman Empire there were no distinct circles and institutions opposing chattel slavery. Based upon archival documents and memoires from the second half of the 19th century, it reveals the leading position of the Bulgarian national church, the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate based in Constantinople as the central factor of Bulgarian abolitionism. The Exarchate plays the main role in the abolitionist legislature, both in the constitutional ban upon slavery in the Bulgarian principality and the anti-slavery bills and policies of the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia. At the same time the church authorities continue their traditional activities in ransoming Bulgarians sold as slaves in the remote regions of the empire in Asia and Africa.

Key words: Ключови думи: slavery, Ottoman Empire, Bulgarian Exarchate, abolitionism, Bulgarian principality, Eastern Rumelia

Резюме: Изследването оборва доминиращата научна теза, че в Османската империя не съществуват обособени обществени кръгове и институции, които се противопоставят на робовладението. Проучването е изградено върху архивни материали и спомени от втората половина на XIX век и разкрива водещата роля на националната православна църква, Българската екзархия със седалище в Цариград като централен фактор в българския аболюционизъм. Екзархията играе водеща роля в законодателната забрана на робовладението както в Българското княжество чрез специализирания текст в Търновската конституция, така и чрез частните законодателни инициативи и провеждането на ограничителна политика в автономната област Източна Румелия. Едновременно с това църковните власти продължават традиционата си дейност по откриване и откупуване на българите, продадени като роби в отдалечените райони на империята в Азия и Африка.

The problem of slavery in the late Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1878) is a subject of comparatively recent interest in historical research. Still the several monographs of outstanding European, Turkish and Near Eastern historians have already created a complex and in

depth reconstruction that outlines the general stream of events and analyses the characteristics of the slavery phenomenon usually in comparison with the slavery in the Arab world and in the Americas. As the research heavily depends on the lack of primary sources, the picture is somehow distorted with an emphasis on the Arabian provinces of the empire of the Sultan in Asia and Africa, while the situation in the capital Constantinople and especially in the European provinces is far vaguer.

Up to several years ago Bulgarian historians made no exception to that rule. The researches in the late 1950s were marked with the task of presenting scarce information, focusing on the classical period of the empire and imposing the Marxist approach and methodology. However, in the recent years a couple of new publications appeared that set the research on a new ground, trying to overcome the decades of silence. That renewed interest is in the context of the public discussion about the character of the Ottoman rule in Bulgarian lands, the situation of the Christian population and the legitimacy of the traditional and popular generalization term 'Turkish yoke'.[1] What the experts in the field of Ottoman slavery agree on is that the modernizing attempts to abolish the slave trade and slavery as an institution met little or no enthusiasm inside Ottoman society and were usually made under foreign and mainly under British pressure. It is constantly being repeated that Ottoman society knew no abolitionist pressure groups, organisations and initiatives unlike West European and North American societies. The purpose of this article is to oppose exactly this predominant concept and to reveal the role of the biggest and most important Bulgarian public institution, i.e. the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate or the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, that preserved its leading role after the establishment of the Bulgarian nation state not only on its territory, but also in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

In the second half of the 19th century chattel slavery was a well-established and stable social phenomenon within the empire of the Sultan, that no person or institution opposed or even questioned. Its existence was deeply rooted in a century-long tradition and both *sharia* sacred law of Islam and state legislation of the *canuns* were based on it. The predominant view of the *ulema* class of religious scholars and of their leader the *sheikh-ul-Islam* was that it is equally wrong to permit what Allah has abolished and to abolish what Allah has permitted, thus justifying slavery on the grounds of Islamic religion. At the same time the British

[1] Tsvetkova 1954, 82-100; Mitev 1955, 234-311; Mutafchieva 1960; Todorova 2002, 230-268; 2008/2009, 98; Kolev 2007, 105-110; 2008a, 43-53; 2008b, 88-102; Nedelchev 2012, 54-71.

diplomats in Constantinople reported the clear picture of Ottoman refusal to engage with abolition of slavery: 'I have mentioned the subject and I have been heard with extreme astonishment, accompanied with a smile at the proposition for destroying an institution closely interwoven with the frame of society in this country, and intimately connected with the law and with the habits and even the religion of all classes, from the Sultan himself, down to the lowest peasant… I think that all attempts to effect your Lordship`s purpose will fail, and I fear they might give offence if urged forward with importunity. The Turks may believe us to be their superiors in Science, in Arts and in Arms, but they are far from thinking our wisdom or our morality greater than their own.'[2]

In this context *sharia* law continued to be the basis of Ottoman slavery and it described the military clash between Islam and the other religious or pagan communities as the main source of acquiring slaves. On the one hand, this could be a formal war between the empire and some of its non-Muslim neighbours and, on the other hand, an internal unrest during which the non-Moslem population opposed the rule of the sultan with arms. Thus, at least in theory, the non-Muslims broke the *dhimmi* pact with the Muslim authorities over them and became formal enemies of the state and of Islam. The usual practice, denoting this situation, was through issuing a *fetw*a by the *sheikh-ul-Islam* but under concrete circumstances this judgement could be officially transferred or usurped by the local religious or administrative authorities. Thus every interior disturbance became a possibility for recruiting slaves from within the borders of the empire as every war became a source of captives that were sent to the slave markets. This major source was complemented by the slave trade, which brought an annual influx of about 15 000 slaves from Asia, Africa and the European dominions of the empire.[3]

The rise of Balkan nationalism and the activation of Balkan insurgencies in the 19th century created sufficient opportunities for the rise of the slave trade as well. Thus during the first Serbian revolution and after capturing Belgrade, more than 1800 Serbian captives were publicly sold into slavery at the improvised slave market at Kalemegdan in a sole day on October 5th, 1813.[4] Serbian slaves, both male and female, were exchanged as presents side by side with cattle among Ottoman nobility in the Serbian lands. During the uprising of Hadji Prodan in 1815 Prince Milosh Obrenovic ransomed more than 100 Serbian slaves from the Ottoman governor of

[2] PRO – FO 195/108. Ponsonby to Palmerston, 27.12.1840.
[3] Toledano 1982, 7-90.
[4] Merry 2005, 122; Popov no date, 212.

Belgrade Suleiman pasha Skopljak. According to Serbian historians, Serbian slaves could be found in Egypt, Asia Minor, Damascus, Smirna, Constantinople and even in the autonomous Christian Principality of Wallachia. Up to the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878 Christian slaves could have been easily obtained on the clandestine slave markets of Bosnia.[5]

The same picture of a thrilling slave trade is depicted by the travellers and the European press during the Greek national revolution. The mass massacres of innocent Greeks in Constantinople and in Asia Minor in April-July 1821 only under the suspicion of sympathizing with the insurgents, were combined with their abduction and selling into slavery.[6] After the famous massacre on the island of Chios in April 1822 the official permission tickets issued by the authorities for the trade in Greek captives abducted on the island, were more than 47 000 and turned out to be insufficient to the exceeding number of slaves. The massacre at Missolongi in mainland Greece in April 1826 brought another 4000 Greeks to the slave markets of the empire.[7]

Slavery and the restoration of the abducted Christian insurgents to their homelands constituted a major part in the negotiations about the evacuation of the Egyptian armies from Greece between the British admiral and the Egyptian viceroy in 1828. During them the ruler accepted the existence of the problem and promised to release all Greek slaves owned by the state from the Egyptian galleys and the arsenal in Alexandria. At the same time he insisted that the numbers in the European press were exaggerated and many of the slaves originated from Candia in Crete, where slavery was legal as in all lands of the Ottoman Empire. Still he promised to release as many Greek slaves as possible on the condition that it should be done in the form of exchange of war prisoners, which was an established practice under *sharia* law. This settlement was formalized in the Convention of August 6th, 1828.[8] It is often emphasized that some of the male children sold into slavery in these years rose to prominent positions in the central Ottoman administration or in the courts of the Maghreb autonomies.

The problem of slavery was reflected in the first Serbian constitution of February 14th, 1835. Its article 118 declared that every slave becomes immediately free after stepping on Serbian soil, being brought on it or fleeing. The Serbians could buy but could not sell slaves.[9] Similar

[5] Teinovich 2006, 11.
[6] Rodogn 1997, 67.
[7] Walsh 1836, 1ff; Bazili 1835, 48-85; Lavisen & Rambo 1938, 178, 192.
[8] BFSP 1832, 11-84-1186; FO 1835, 459-465.
[9] Ustav 1835.

articles existed in the constitutions and Organic statutes of Greece, Wallachia, Moldova and later of the unified Romanian principality.

The defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the exodus of the Circassians from the Caucasus gave a new impetus to the flourishing slave trade. The domination of the allied British and French navies in the Black sea created favourable opportunities for increased activities of the Ottoman slavers who managed to engage a considerable amount of the European steamers in the business. This trend became widely popular due to the parliamentary interventions of several members of the House of Commons and of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, who pressed the government to react.[10] According to the traveller Emile de Girardin, at the beginning of the Crimean War only in Constantinople the number of the slaves was about 52 000, of whom the women were 47 000 and the servile population was more than 12% of the inhabitants of the capital.[11] Those conservative numbers were discussed in the House of Commons as well, based on the diplomatic reports.[12]

The rising negative European attitude to the Ottoman slaving practices led to a temporary prohibition of the slave trade in white Caucasian slaves in October 1854 by the Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire, but immediately after the war the trade was resumed.[13] The efficiency of the ban was discussed by the British officers and diplomats both on the frontline and in Constantinople. What was not doubted, was the increase of slavery in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire after the war, mainly because of the massive emigration of the Circassians from their native lands, occupied by the Russians into the Ottoman Empire. According to the Ottoman high authorities more than 1 million Circassians emigrated between 1857-1867 and about 150 000 of them were slaves. Almost half of them were transported to European Turkey. This dramatic increase was not only noticed by the European consuls in the area, but was also led to the increase in the numbers of the abductions both of the local Ottoman subjects and of the clandestine trans-border activities. Thus in 1859 the second wife of the famous African explorer Sir Samuel Baker, Florence Maria Szasz from Hungary was sold at the age of 14 on the slave market of Vidin.[14]

As almost all of the Ottoman white slaves were Christians, the different Christian churches within the empire were active in opposing the

[10] Cobden 1854-1859, 36-37; Temperley 1972, 233.
[11] Girardin 1853, 25, note 2.
[12] HCD 1856, 1013.
[13] Aristarchi 1874, 37-38.
[14] Kolev 2008b, 92-93; Yakimov 2006, 71-78; *The Telegraph*, 29.03.2004; *The Express*, 09.09.2011.

tradition of abducting and enslaving of their kin. Although this practice is not well documented, it was routine and the climax during severe social crises within the empire can easily be traced. The codices of the different Christian artisan organisations from the 19-th century contain texts about collecting of money for charity among Christian slaves or for their liberation. During the Greek revolution the Orthodox church in Plovdiv organised numerable mass actions for collecting money for buying Greek slaves in the city and liberating them.[15] Thus the Christian denominations and the biggest of them, the Orthodox church, were the only societies within the Ottoman empire that opposed slavery on a practical base.

The foundation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate with an imperial firman at the end of February 1870 marked the official recognition of the Bulgarian nation by the Ottoman authorities within the traditional millet system. Despite the complicated formal relations between the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate, they usually acted together defending the Orthodox cannons and general humanitarian principles. One of them was their negative attitude towards the enslavement of Christians.

The beginning of the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878 saw a lot of opportunities for those common actions, especially between the followers of the two churches who were not on the top of the clergy. The well documented atrocities during the crushing down of the big Bulgarian April Uprising of 1876, were among those opportunities. Thus the Dutch honorary Consul in Varna, who was himself a Greek from the Aegean islands and was well acquainted with the slavery practices of the Ottomans used all his authority among the local authorities and his superiors in Constantinople to stop a cargo of 825 abducted Bulgarians ready to be transported to the slave markets of the capital. That humanitarian intervention was awarded by the Russian Empire and by Bulgarian state with the high state decorations. The case was made popular by the European liberal press and that pressure made the Ottoman authorities more careful and the slaving actions more clandestine.

Still a rich Greek banker was able to buy 4 Bulgarian youngsters to save them. The case of a Bulgarian father who found out his son on the open slave market in Adrianople but was not allowed to claim him, because he was a Christian, demonstrates the policies of the local authorities in the province quite near to the capital. After the end of the uprising it was the Bulgarian Exarchate that took the leading role in the campaign for returning the enslaved Bulgarians in exchange of financial compensation to their new

[15] Todorova 2008/2009, 98.

owners. As the accumulated actives were not enough, the Exarch Antim I addressed the issue to the attention of the Russian Orthodox Church, trying to receive financial and diplomatic support for the campaign.[16]

The repulsive enslavement of formally Ottoman subjects was strongly condemned in the European press and in the House of Commons. This condemnation was considered by the Russian Chancellor Count Gorchakov and his Ambassador in Constantinople Count Nikolay Ignatiev as one of the main issues on the agenda of the international conference that was summoned in December 1876. It was not brought forward only because it could have led to disagreement between the Great Powers and the Porte and having in mind how slavery was deeply embedded in the everyday life of the Ottoman society, in the Sultan`s court and in the retinues of the high officials. There the conflict between the British representatives, supporting the Sublime Porte and their Russian counterparts resulted in a remarkable incident. Some of the Russian aides and the American journalist Januarius Macgahan bought a little Bulgarian girl on one of the numerous clandestine slave markets of the city and brought her in front of the diplomats.[17] That demonstration played a crucial role for the consolidation of the European diplomats who tried to impose a peaceful solution of the crisis on the Ottoman Empire.

During the subsequent Russia-Ottoman War the abductions of civil population and slave trade received a new impetus. Besides the thousands of individual cases, there was at least one large scale abduction of Bulgarian population in the middle of July 1877 in Eski Zaara (today Stara Zagora). After the city was reconquered by the regular army of Suleiman pasha, it was set on fire and the entire male population of about 14 000 was massacred. Most of the women and children (about 10 000) were driven in a camp out of the burning town and after a march of several hundred kilometres reached Adrianople. There they were led under an arch of bare swords and rifles, an act demonstrating that they were war captives and could be legally sold as slaves.[18]

The new outburst of abductions and slave trading led to the collaboration of the Bulgarian Exarchate not only with the co-religious brethren from the Greek Patriarchate, but also with the representatives of the American Bible society in Constantinople. The Exarchate had to act very carefully and under cover because of the constant suspicions on behalf

[16] CSA, f. 176k, op. 1, a. e. 360, f. 1-2; Kolev 2008b, 94; New York Times, 17.07.1876. Slavery in Turkey.
[17] Ignatiev 1986, 188-189.
[18] Dimitrov 1895, 101-16; Chesson 1877, 11-15; 1879.

of the authorities of being a Russian agent. That suspicions led to the dismissal of the first Bulgarian Exarch Antim I and his replacement with the new Exarch Josef I. Being young and open minded, he established connections with a Greek merchant someone Stamatio Spanudis, a zelous abolitionist and acted through him. The Exarch managed to console the traditionally hostile Russian and British Embassies. Having the support of the British Aborigenes Protection Society St. Spanudis managed to establish close ties with George Washburn, the Head of the famous Robert College and managed to receive his financial and influential support.[19]

After the Russia-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 the situation with the enslaved Bulgarians rapidly deteriorated. The Preliminary treaty of San Stefano from February 19th, 1878 postulated the returning of all war prisoners and the abolitionists tried to encompass in their number the enslaved civilians. The temporary Russian civilian administration made the first steps for the returning of the enslaved Bulgarians due to the initiative of the Stara Zagora Municipality. They engaged several persons to track the fates of the Bulgarians abducted from the region and sold as slaves. With the support of the district governor Nestor Markov, emissaries were sent in Adrianople and Constantinople and their vicinities to track the fate of the enslaved Bulgarians, but the action remained without success due to the boycott of the Ottoman administration. Despite of that, sufficient and concrete information was gathered about no less than 2200 Bulgarians who were sold in different regions of the Empire. About 700 were abducted in the Gallipoli peninsula, 200 in the region of Chanakkale, 300 in Nicomedia, 100 near the island of Samos. About 450 of them had been sold in Beirut, another 100 in Hartut in Mesopotamia, and 150 in Egypt. They originated mainly from the regions of Stara Zagora and Plovdiv, but a sufficient number were also from Turnovo. Most of the enslaved were women and children but young men at the age of 20-21 were not an exception as well. They were openly sold at the improvised slave market at Atmeidan in front of St. Sofia in Istanbul and in Adrianople.[20]

A peculiar case occurred with the slaves, sold in Egypt. Besides the ones that accidentally reached the Egyptian coast at Alexandria, some of them were purchased in Constantinople under the explicit order of the court of the viceroy Ismail. The notorious slave trader Al Zubair Rahma Mansur, who had occupied the position of governor of the Bahr al Gazal province in Egypt and despite of his conflict with the newly appointed governor of Sudan the British General Charles Gordon, was sent to exile in Constantinople and

[19] Washburn 1909, 154-155.
[20] Kolev 2008b, 94-95.

there he organised the white slave traffic to Egypt. A special ship was sent by the court in Cairo and 30 Bulgarian slaves were purchased and transported to the Egyptian capital. No one of them returned back.[21]

After the war the efforts of the Bulgarian society were concentrated around the constitutional arrangements of the Bulgarian principality and of the autonomous province of Eastern Rumelia. The Constituent Assembly of the Principality in Tirnovo was aware of the formal possibility of reintroduction of the Ottoman slavery practices and acted accordingly. On March 24th 1879, the deputies discussed and voted the two paragraphs of article 61 of the Tirnovo Constitution: 'Nobody in the Bulgarian Principality is allowed to purchase or sell human beings. Every slave gets his freedom, stepping on Bulgarian soil.' The text of the article is an original creation of the Bulgarian 'founding fathers'. It did not existed in the 2 preliminary version of the initial Lukianov project of the constitution or in the amendments made in St, Petersburg during the 'Special Consultation' in November 1878. It was based upon the ideas of the Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the Basic Principles of the Constitution, which brought forward the principle of freedom as its constituent characteristics.

The metropolitan bishops of the Bulgarian Exarchate were among the most active members of that Commission and of concrete proposal. The person, who moved forward and defended that proposal was Marko Balabanov, a leading factor in the creation of the Exarchate and Secretary of its first Constitutive congress in 1871. The text followed the standard two stages in European abolitionism as they emerge in the domain of British public opinion: banning of the slave trade (Abolition of the Slave Trade act of March 25th 1807) followed by a general abolition of slavery (Slavery Abolition act of August 23rd 1833).

The proposal led to an intense debate, during which the clash between the Conservative and the Liberal fractions was renovated. The leader of the extreme Liberals Petko Karavelov acknowledges the first paragraph about banning slavery as a principle and rejects the abolition of the slave trade, trying to degrade it to a simple judicial procedure and compared it to the system of life long obligations such as the British systems of apprenticeship and indentured servitude, which were terminated in the British Empire in 1838. Similar was the attitude of Jacob Gerov from Varna, who declared that the introduction of that text in the constitution would be an 'ugly thing', and unsuccessfully tried to support his position with the constitutional texts of the neighbouring countries. In opposition to them, other prominent extreme Liberals like Petko Slaveikov

[21] Dimitrov 1899, 146, 189.

and Andrei Stoianov seconded the formal proposal with new argumentation. Slaveikov emphasized upon the current situation in the empire of the sultans, where chattel slavery still existed on a large scale and was thriving during the crisis. He stated that the problem was a pressing one and that certain influential circles in the Ottoman Empire were strongly interested in the restitution of chattel slavery in the country. Andrei Stoianov brought forward not only the activisation of the slave trade during the crisis but also the system of hereditary slavery.[22]

The Conservative fraction firmly supported the proposal and Marko Balabanov insisted that 'It should be engraved with unalterable letters in the Constitution'. In his opposition to the Liberal criticism, he brought forward the example of the four Greek constitutions and the leader of the extreme Conservatives added the international ban upon the slave trade. They considered the constitutional texts as an active practical legislation that would transform the problem from judicial into administrative and with the law enforcement: 'the police will be obliged to immediately liberate without bringing the matter to the court of these creatures, wherever they are to be found'. Finally the Constituent assembly backed Marko Balabanov and voted the proposal with the argument that 'it would be a matter of honour to implement this prohibition in our constitution'.[23]

The Bulgarian Exarchate played a leading role in dealing with slavery and the slave trade in the autonomous province of eastern Rumelia as well. The metropolitan bishop of the capital city Plovdiv, Panaret was a driving force in the Special Parliamentary Commission of the Provincial assembly. On October 24th 1880 that Commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Georgi Yankulov discussed a draft of a Bill for the abolition of slavery. It was proposed by a group of 13 distinguished deputies, bishop Panaret among them. The Commission unanimously supported the draft and declared it to be 'a grave stain upon the freedom loving principles on which our present government is based' trying to distance that government as much as possible and even to oppose it to the system of administration and to the social realities of the Ottoman Empire that preserved and supported chattel slavery. The trade in human beings was declared to be 'the meanest and most disgusting trade'

The motives to the draft cut a clear picture of the current situation in the province and in the empire: 'As it is well known that some of the Moslem refugees on their return into the province had brought slaves and as it is almost sure that there are slaves in many of the Moslem houses and to avoid the reestablishment of the hideous trade in human beings in the

[22] DUS 2004, 228-229.
[23] Kolev 2007, 106-107.

province'. Formally the draft was based upon articles 30 and 100 of the Organic statute of the province that proclaimed the personal freedom of the population and banned every limitation of this fundamental principle except for the cases and procedures, established in the laws.

The draft itself had an elementary structure of 3 separate articles. It started with the general abolition of slavery on the entire territory of the autonomous province. It implied the possession, selling, purchase and transportation of slaves of both genders. The violators of that prohibition were to be fined with 1000 to 1000 *groshes* (10-100 TL) in the benefit of the slave, who should be liberated on the spot or sentenced to 1-6 months imprisonment. In the case of a second violation, the perpetrator should be punished by the same fine, combined with 6-24 months of imprisonment and disfranchising for 5 years. In the case of a third violation, besides the same fine, the punishment should be permanent extradition and in every single case, the slave should be immediately liberated.[24]

Due to tactical reasons, to the obvious need of maintaining good relations with the empire and the fact that every provincial bill should be approved by the sultan, the draft was never submitted to parliamentary debates. Thus the administrative and police practices were to amend the lapsus in the legislation. It was considered that the texts of the Organic statute gave enough guarantees against the reinstitution of slavery especially in combination with the integral anti-slavery politics of the provincial executive.[25]

The abolitionist mood in Eastern Rumelia could easily be followed again at the end of 1883, when the Czech barrister Count Rudolph Turn-Taxis drafted a number of new bills, aiming to definitely separate the provincial judicial system from that of the Ottoman Empire. Central role in this construction was determined for a new Criminal Code. The constant threat about the reinstitution of the Ottoman chattel slavery can easily be traced in several of its articles. Article 189 of the draft emphasised upon the slave trade in the spirit of the Ottoman criminal code and amended and enlarged its stipulations, thus reaching the essence of the phenomenon: 'Whoever gives a person as a slave to another one or uses himself as a slave and whoever is engaged into slave trading by any means, or takes part in their bringing (to the province) or their holding, is entitled to heavy imprisonment of 3-12 years'. This respectable abolitionist manifestation is included into the second chapter of the draft entitled 'Crimes and Violations against Individual Freedom'. The upper limit of the punishment is quite near to the maximum possible imprisonment of 15 years in the

[24] CSA, f. 20k. op. 1, a.e. 49, fol. 9-10.
[25] Kolev 2008a, 50-52.

Code. Closely related are the following articles, which dealt with different variants of abduction.[26] To the end of the existence of the province, the biggest and most complete provincial draft did not managed to go through all the stages of the complicated process of legislature and to come into force, thus giving full guarantees against the restoration of the slave practices in this privileged Ottoman villayet.

Besides actively participating in the legislature of the Bulgarian principality and of the autonomous province, the Bulgarian Exarchate was engaged in its traditional activities of ransoming the abducted Bulgarians sold as slaves in the vast Ottoman Empire. In the year after the war, the Exarchate was operating the dangerous activity through its agent Stamatio Spanudis and his established network of informers. The formal ground was the stipulation of the preliminary San Stefano about returning the war prisoners as the Ottoman legislation made no difference between active participation in the belligerent armies and civil population abducted during the time of war. The case in Stara Zagora that we already discussed, is a clear illustration of this tradition. The network of Spanidis operated mainly in Constantinople and the coasts of the Marmara sea, but gathered information from a far wider region. The archive of the Bulgarian Ministry of Finance keeps three official letters issued by the Bulgarian Exarchate to Spanudis, which are evidence of his efforts and of the close relations between him and the Bulgarian ecclesiastical authorities in the ransoming and subsequent transportation of the Bulgarian slaves.[27]

At the end of August 1879, the Minister of Finance Grigor Nachovich addressing an official report to Prince Alexander I summarised the achievements of Stamatio Spanudis and his anonymous brother. Underlying the strong religious Christian motives in his abolitionist actions, the Minister revealed that because of them and the constant threat for their lives they had to abandon the Ottoman capital and to emigrate to the Principlaity. Their efforts resulted in ransoming and liberating of more than 200 Bulgarians and collecting information about more than 1000 other individual cases. The Bulgarian government reimbursed their financial losses. In February 1883 the Third Ordinary National Assembly reimbursed them with another 10 000 levs for the ransoming of a total of 558 Bulgarian slaves.[28]

After the Bulgarian Exarchate moved back its seat from Plovdiv to Constantinople in January 1880, it restarted its ransom policy. At first the

[26] SB 1889, № 3, 138f.
[27] CSA, f. 159k, op. 1 , a. e. 311, fol. 234-235.
[28] DV, № 6/ 08.09.1879; DTONS, 1 reg. session, 37th meeting from February 9th, 1883, 754.

main target were Bulgarian children from Stara Zagora, that were sold in the region of Balikesir in Anatolia. In the next year with the support of the Exarchate, the agents of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry were successful in ransoming Bulgarians from the region of Gyumyurdzhina.

The archive of the State Council from 1881-83 reveals part of this activity and the common ransoming activities of St. Spanudis and a certain Vasil Doichov from Chirpan. They have left their flourishing commercial businesses to explore Asia Minor and especially the islands of Cyprus, Rhodes, Samos and their respectable vicinities collecting information about Bulgarian slaves. Most of them were later clandestinely ransomed by the agents of the Bulgarian Principality. The two zealous abolitionists were provided with letters of recommendation from the Russian Consulate in Constantinople and the Bulgarian Exarchate. A replica of such a letter reveals that that activity was organised through the traditional Orthodox channels. In May 1881 the Orthodox Parish of Chirpan issued a letter to the Orthodox Parish of Diarbakir in Eastern Asia Minor and explicitly underlined the purpose: 'to investigate and ransom the enslaved persons during the last Russia-Turkish War, girls, boys and children, a job for which he was sponsored by the government'. The letter was signed by the chief parish priest and the subsequent money were taken from the special fund of the 'Poborniks', the active participants in the Bulgarian liberation movement and in the War of liberation. The supporting documents reveal that several other letters of recommendation were confiscated by the Ottoman authorities in the same year in their attempt to stop the action and especially to prevent it from being documented and publicised in European and North American press.[29] Those efforts continued well up to the end of the 19th century with less and less results as most of the Bulgarian slaves were gradually amalgamated into the local societies, following the general trend in the empire.

The Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate played a leading role in the emergence and development of abolitionist ideas and activities in Bulgarian society in the last years of Ottoman rule and during the restoration of the free Bulgarian state. This position was based both upon the Christian principles of brotherly love and compassion and the general liberal lay ideas of the time and in cooperation with the other Christian churches in the Ottoman Empire and with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the European Christian states. They were not centred on challenging the legality of the institution or of the slave trade. That was impossible in a Moslem state, where slavery was considered a sacred

[29] CSA, f. 708k, op. 1, a. e. 364, fol. 2-8.

institution created by Allah and confirmed in the lay state law. The activities were more of a practical character and were mainly related to ransoming of the enslaved Bulgarians during the troubled times after the Crimean War. Having in mind those circumstances, we can truly say that opposition to slavery in the Ottoman Empire existed in the face not only of the Exarchate, but also in all of the Christian churches.

After the War of Liberation, the metropolitan bishops of the Exarchate assumed a new role in the abolition legislation of the two Bulgarian states and continued its traditional ransom activities. They were far more fruitful due to the administrative, diplomatic and financial support on the side of the governments of the Bulgarian Principality and of the autonomous Province of Eastern Rumelia. Thus the Bulgarian Orthodox Exarchate played a pivotal role in dealing with one of the main issues of European civilisation in the 19th century, the abolition of slavery and of the slave trade.

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Birth of parliamentary democracy (1871 church and laity council)

Hristo Temelsky

Abstract: In the present paper the importance of the first Church and Laity Council (1871) which was held in an extremely difficult environment in the capital of the Ottoman Empire and under the nose of the Constantinople Patriarchate is studied. It was in that time when not only a statute for the management of the Bulgarian Exarchate was established with relatively progressive and democratic principles, but the Council itself also was in the bottom for activating the public opinion and for clarifying the political thinking on essential issues about national institutions and methods of management. The acquired experience in a broad and narrow sense proved extremely useful in the work of the Turnovo Constituent Assembly in 1879, which discussed and approved the first Bulgarian Constitution.

After the liberation and the establishment of the Third Bulgarian State entirely new conditions were created for the development of the Church. Therefore, another statute was written in which by partial amendments the progressive democratic acquisitions of the prototype of 1871 were abandoned. As consequence, the Bulgarian ecclesiastical government gradually became heavily dependent on the state-political power which let the Bulgarian Exarchate to a situation similar to that of the Orthodox churches in Russia, Greece, Romania and Serbia.

Key words: Laity Council, Bulgarian Exarchate, Third Bulgarian State, first Bulgarian Constitution

Резюме: В настоящата статия се разглежда значението на Първия църковно-народен събор от 1871 г., който се провел в изключително трудна обстановка в столицата на Османската империя и под носа на Цариградската патриаршия. По това време, не само се изработил устав за управлението на Българската екзархия, който се отличавал със своите сравнително напредничави и демократични принципи, но самият събор бил също така и в основата за активизиране на общественото мнение и за избистряне на политическото мислене по съществени въпроси на националните институции и методи на управление. Натрупаният опит в общ и в по-тесен смисъл се оказал изключително полезен при работата на Търновското учредително събрание през 1879 г., което обсъдило и приело Първата българска конституция.

Hristo Temelsky

След Освобождението и създаването на Третата българска държава били създадени съвършено нови условия за развитието на Църквата. Ето защо бил изработен друг 'Екзархийски устав', в който чрез редица изменения били унищожени демократичните и прогресивните идеи в неговия първообраз от 1871 г. Като следствие, българското църковно самоуправление постепенно попаднало под силната зависимост на държавно-политическата власт и довело Българската екзархия до положение, сходно с това на поместните православни църкви в Русия, Гърция, Румъния и Сърбия.

The first Church and Laity Council was carried out in Constantinople in 1871. It was a memorable event in the social and political life of Renaissance Bulgaria. It had two main objectives: the development and approval of the Statute for the management of Bulgarian Exarchate and the Exarch's elections. The first one in particular is extremely valuable for the new Bulgarian history. It is for the first time in five centuries of existence deprived of any rights that the Sublime Porte officially recognized a Bulgarian national institution – the Bulgarian Exarchate. The Bulgarians were allowed to develop by themselves the structure and management of their ecclesiastical office, which they obtained after decades of hard fights.[1]

1. Sultan's decree for the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The beginning of the church-and-laity fight, which was in its essence a social and political movement for recognition of the Bulgarian nation, was marked by a number of local conflicts between the population and the respective patriarchal bishop in the 1820s and 1830s. Especially acute were the conflicts in Vratsa and Skopie. In the late 1830s the church problem turned into a national issue and different social classes of the Bulgarian Renaissance society took part in its settlement.[2]

The fight of church and laity similarly to the movement for modern culture and education was legal, officially established by the reform decrees issued by the Turkish government - Hattisheriff (1839) and Hattihumayun (1856). The forms and methods of this fight were legal, therefore it was reasonably called a 'peaceful' stage of the Bulgarian national revolution. It is a well-known fact that the ideologists of the revolutionary movement considered the fight for church and political independence as the two sides of the national liberating process. 'The Bulgarian church problem is neither hierarchical, nor economical but political because its settlement will recognize the existence of the Bulgarian nation which had not been recognized even by the government until recently', said Lyuben Karavelov, the organizer and ideologist of the Bulgarian national revolution.[3]

[1] See on this Markova 1989, 19 ff.
[2] Temelski 2006, 247.
[3] Karavelov 1967, 276.

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Up to 1870 the church-and-laity fight went through two significant stages: the first one was the movement to replace the Greek language in the church services with Bulgarian and the second, which was more difficult and continuous, was the expulsion of the Greek patriarchate bishops from the Bulgarian eparchies. Until the Crimean war (1853-1856) the fight for an independent Bulgarian church took in all the main towns and the regions around them in central and north-west Bulgaria and north Thrace. The brightest representatives of the Bulgarian emigration in Romania, Russia, Serbia, etc. were involved in this national movement as well.[4]

The Bulgarians in the Turkish capital also took part in it. As it is well known in the middle of 15th century (1453) Constantinople was conquered by the Asian invaders and it became an administrative center of the huge Ottoman Empire. Bulgarians had been living in this 'royal' city since ancient times but during the Renaissance their number increased extremely quickly and reached 50 thousand till the middle of 19th century. Most Bulgarians were bachelors engaged mainly in crafts and trade and gradually they formed the circle of culture people. In the first half of 19 century the main centers of the Bulgarians in the Turkish capital were large inns as Balkapan, Kurshum-khan, Zyumbyul-khan, etc. At that time the idea to build a Bulgarian church originated and it belonged primarily to Archimandrite Neofit Hilendarsky Bozvely. He said: 'The center and the church should be built here, the activists should be here in front of king's eyes and the Greek assimilation clergy should be struck here in the very nest of the Patriarchy'.[5] Therefore, Archimandrite Neofit Bozvely was the insightful tribune, uncompromising and resolute leader, a wise politician. He and his followers managed to inflame the public energy and combative feeling and to aim them at real targets, to build the organization and to motivate the program and the tactics of people's struggle.

The sultan's reform decree issued during the Crimean war, called Hattihumayun, gave the Bulgarians the basis for legal activities that stimulated the church-and-laity fight. For 14 years the Bulgarians in Constantinople were in the center of a number of events which slowly but surely paved the way to win church independence. A turning point was the Easter event on 3 April 1860 when in the historical wooden church 'St. Stefan' Bishop Hilarion Macariopolsky, under the influence of the young Bulgarians in Constantinople symbolically rejected the dependency from the Constantinople Greek Patriarchy and declared an independent Bulgarian church organization. The population of hundreds municipalities

[4] Temelski 2001, 117.

[5] Arnaudov 1971, 125.

supported the Easter event of the Constantinople Bulgarians and also rejected the power of the Patriarchy.[6]

In Constantinople a Joint National Council of bishops and diocesan representatives from a number of Bulgarian towns was formed and it supported the clause for an independent church. The different 'party' groups also increased their activities. The strongest and most influential was the 'party' of national actions with two big leaders - Bishop Hilarion Macariopolsky and Dr. Stoyan Chomakov. It was supported by the whole nation, all municipalities, by the radically oriented Bulgarian intelligentsia and revolutionary democracy. The other three groups: the one of moderate activities (headed by the pro-Russian activists Nayden Gerov, Todor Burmov, etc.); the one of Turcophiles (Gavrail Krastevich, Tapchileshtovi brothers, Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich, etc.) and the one with west-European orientation (Dragan Tsankov, Dr. George Mirkovic, Todor Ikonomov, etc.) had a common characteristic – they were united by Bulgarian patriotism and their wish to solve the church problem to the advantage of the Bulgarian nation.[7]

Almost four decades after the first disturbances in Vratsa and Skopie, and later on in Veliko Turnovo, in 1870 the Bulgarian church and laity movement reached its happy ending. On February 27, Friday, 1870 the sultan Abdul Azis signed a firman for the establishment of an independent Bulgarian church hierarchy in the form of an Exarchy, almost independent of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. On the next day - 28 February, Saturday, the day of St. Theodore, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha called the Sublime Porte members of the bilateral Bulgarian-Greek committee and handed them a copy of the sultan's firman, asking them to convey it to their spiritual Archpastors. The Bulgarian representatives Gavrail Krastevich and Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich directly headed for the Constantinople suburb Ortaköy, which housed the Temporary Bulgarian St. Synod. On their way Krastevich dropped by only for seconds in *Macedonia* newspaper publishing house of the big Renaissance activist Petko Slaveykov to tell him the good news. Climbing the steps to the office of the chief editor he shouted: 'Slaveykov, Slaveykov! Here is the firman!' When Petko Slaveykov came out of the room and saw the document they had expected for so long in Krastevich's hands, the latter turned back in the middle of the staircase and went on to the house of bishops. The firman was diligently translated there and 'everyone was happy with its contents'.[8]

[6] Temelski 2001, 118.
[7] Temelski 2001, 118.
[8] Burmov 1902, 408.

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Coincidentally the awaited firman appeared on the eve of the 1000 anniversary of the founding of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (4 March 870). A little known fact is that the credit for this is due to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople Count Ignatiev. The latter made many efforts 'to reconcile the Bulgarians with the Great Church and lead if not to a fundamental solution to the quarrel, at least to a settlement acceptable to both sides…' To hasten the issuance of the Ottoman firman by the cumbersome administration, in a meeting with the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha, he used a diplomatic trick. 'I spoke precisely about the millennium of the Bulgarian national church, which would be celebrated on 4 March in memory of the era when King Boris, sending his delegates to the Synod of Constantinople, broke the ties that connected him with the Roman throne. This holiday, reminding the Bulgarians of the times of glory and independence, would give, of course, a reason for demonstrations, which is in the interest of the Turkish government to counteract… Ali Pasha fully accepted the appropriateness of my advice. He promised to present the firman immediately for the Sultan's approval and to try hard to get it back on time to be able to announce it before the Bulgarian holiday in question'. It is interesting that the Renaissance Bulgarians had prepared neither celebrations for the 1,000 anniversary, nor any related protest marches. Just the coincidence of this anniversary gave a chance to the Russian diplomat to use it as a trump card in front of the Grand Vizier in order the eagerly awaited firman to be issued immediately. And as it is known this clever move of Count Ignatiev's was successful.[9]

The rumours about the firman shortly went around the Bulgarian population in Constantinople. In *Macedonia* newspaper publishing house a lot of people came to ascertain the truth of the rumours. After he dictated to the typesetters the notice about the firman, Slaveykov went with friends to the inn 'to have fun and enjoy the great success of the Bulgarian nation'. He came home late at night and went to bed. However, an hour later he woke up, got up in his bed and wrote the poem 'Chestit den',[10] dedicated to the issue of the firman. Then he went to the publishing house in the middle of the night and with the help of another typesetter, who spent the night in the publishing house, he published the poem as a supplement to *Macedonia* newspaper.

'Ден тържествен! Празник всенароден!
Тържествувай български народ!

[9] Kiril 1958, 299.
[10] 'Happy day'

Ти черковно вече си свободен,
Свободен си, на царский живот"[11]

On the next day, 1 March 1870, Sunday of Orthodoxy, the Bulgarian wooden church and courtyard at the Golden Horn were full of joyful and excited worshipers. After the divine Liturgy and thanksgiving Bishop Hilarion delivered inspired speech and in the end said: '... The third of April (1860 – Bulgarian Easter) was a glorious and distinguished day in which the question about people's desire for hierarchy was pronounced. Today, 1st March 1870 is still more glorious and distinguished because the national desire was fulfilled. The question was asked years ago, today the problem is solved. It was a simple desire then, today the question is answered in a royal law. These were only hopes then, and today the hopes are fulfilled. Harvesting, children, is more pleasant to the sower than sowing because whoever sows hope, they sow to harvest. The reapers collect fruit. Thus, we sowed on April 3, 1860 and now we reap the fruit on 1st March 1870. Here it is, children, the firman given yesterday to the Bulgarian people by the government'. In this solemn moment the chairman of the Bulgarian Council of bishops Bishop Hilarion Lovchanski took the firman out of a leather case and opened it for all to see. The joy of Constantinople Bulgarians was indescribable. The cries: 'Long live the sultan! Long live his ministers! Long live Hilarion Makariopolsky!' and continuous applauses could be heard for a long time far from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.[12]

Immediately enthusiastic telegrams flew to all major Bulgarian municipalities: 'Congratulations for the Bulgarian national hierarchy! The church problem was resolved and it was resolved to our benefit!' There was joy and excitement everywhere. Spontaneous celebrations were organized, the Bulgarians rejoiced, feasted and wrote thank you letters to the sultan and the Sublime Porte.[13]

Thanks to the sultan's firman of February 27, 1870 it was possible to recover the lost at the beginning of the fifteenth century Bulgarian church independence. It is incorrect that some researchers point out that the Bulgarians acquired by the firman a church 'independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople'. Others still believe that essentially the firman was 'self-government' and that the Porte tried to solve a religious-

[11] 'Happy day! Nationwide celebration !
Celebrate Bulgarian people!
Your church is already free,
you are free for the life of a king'
[12] Burmov 1902, 420.
[13] Temelski 2001, 120.

theological problem and thus the Bulgarians broke away from Orthodoxy and did not recognize the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. These accusations, however, prove completely groundless if we consider the events preceding it in the Turkish capital (namely the period 1856 to 1870) and if the firman is analyzed in detail as a legal document. Especially after Hattihumayun (1856) there were numerous negotiations between Bulgarians and Greeks, dozens of proposals for mutual settlement of the ecclesiastical status of the disadvantaged Bulgarians were submitted. And because the church dispute between the two neighboring Orthodox nations was interrelated with national political aspirations, the Turkish government felt committed 'to the case as a constitutional legislator, executor of the statutes of natural law, mandatary of the international collectivity...' In simpler words, as in the past a sultan's act legalized the withdrawal of our Church autonomy, now (1870) in a similar way the rights of the Bulgarians and their Church were restored.[14]

In addition there was no anti-canonical Turkish intervention in the firman. As it is known, it is based on the draft by the Constantinople Patriarch Gregory VI of 1867, as well as on the revised by him draft of the Joint Bulgarian - Greek Pax Commission of 1869. Essentially, nothing in the firman disturbed the historic rights of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, nor the holy canons adopted by ecumenical and local councils. Five articles (3, 4, 6, 7 and 9) out of 11 of the firman confirm the placement of Bulgarian Exarchate in direct connection with the Mother-Church of Constantinople and even in some dependence on it. The other articles of the firman were composed also in the spirit of church canons and in harmony with the practice of other churches.[15]

Only Art. 10 of the firman caused some 'difficulties' for acceptance by the Constantinople Patriarchate. This is actually the article which defined the diocese of the new Exarchate. But while in the first drafts this diocese was accurately defined, in the official document the Porte put such a text so that it could be a constant source of discord between Bulgarians and Greeks. It is about the fact that the firman listed only 15 parishes by name and for the rest where mixed population lived it foresaw a referendum and if two thirds of the Orthodox wished they could switch to the Exarchate. This was what annoyed Patriarchate mostly because that way the Exarchate diocese remained permanently open and might be increased continuously.[16]

[14] Burmov 1902, 425 ff.
[15] Sabev 1973, 61.
[16] Temelski 2001, 121.

This was the most important reason the Patriarchate to refuse initially the formal receipt of the firman, then its recognition and hence its application. Although the Russian embassy in Constantinople was very active and more specifically Count Ignatiev made attempts to reconcile the conflicts and improve the relationship between both parties (Bulgarians and Greeks), the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople manifested firm rigor and refused to recognize the validity of Sultan's decree. For two and a half years (and 17 days) continued the harsh and unprincipled cat-and-mouse game until it came to the fatal September 16, 1872, when the Patriarchate using its position of strength resorted to the shameful and disgraceful act of declaring schism.[17]

2. Provisional Joint Council of the Exarchate. Despite the difficulties caused by the Patriarchate, the Bulgarian leaders in Constantinople proceeded to build the Exarchal Office. First of all, it was necessary to elect a provisional governing body officially recognized by the Sublime Porte (unlike the existing Temporary Saint Synod and Interim Joint Council) to draw up the draft for the ecclesiastic governance of the Exarchate; to organize and convene the council for the adoption of the Statute; to solve daily issues and communicate with the Turkish authorities.

On March 13, 1870 in the Exarchate home (a rented Jewish house) in Ortaköy 39 prominent Constantinople Bulgarians gathered to elect the members of the Interim Joint Council. 30 persons were in the list and the election was conducted by secret voting with (black and white) beans. Ten laymen were selected (Gabriel Krastevich, Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich, Georgaki Chalooglu, Hadji Nikoli Minchoglu, Dr. Chimayo, Dr. Hristo Stambolski, Hristo Tupchileshtov, Dimitar Geshov, Stefan Kamburov and Velyo Miloshev) and together with the five bishops (Hilarion Lovchanski, Panaret of Plovdiv, Paisii of Plovdiv, Antim of Vidin and Hilarion Makariopolsky), who constituted the Temporary St. Synod, took the leadership of the Bulgarian Exarchate and started writing the draft of the Statute.[18]

The elected Interim Joint Council was approved with a sultan's decree on March 30, 1870 and its chairman became the chairman of the Temporary St. Synod – Bishop Hilarion Lovchanski. Archimandrite Meletios (later Metropolitan of Sofia) took the clerk job, additionally, from mid-July the same year another clerk was employed – the young ambitious lawyer Marko D. Balabanov.[19]

[17] Stambolski 1927, 233.
[18] Nikov 1971, 314.
[19] Temelski 2001, 123.

Birth of parliamentary democracy (1871 church and laity council)

The Interim Joint Council began its work on March 15, 1870, meetings were held once a week on Friday. For seven months they had an intensive debate over G. Krastevich's project proposal for an Exarchal Statute. The fact that the discussions went on behind closed doors caused murmur in some Democratic circles and mistrust towards the work of the Board members (called commissioners). Furthermore, there were attacks to these commissioners that in fact they were not real MPs because they were elected only by a very narrow circle of Constantinople Bulgarians. Indeed, these criticisms were reasonable, but they would be justified only in a normal atmosphere; in this particular case all the choices and actions were the only reasonable and proper ones.[20] In the discussions on the draft for the governing of the Bulgarian Exarchate some important and relevant issues remained unanswered – primarily those about the perpetuity or periodic elections of an Exarch and the amount of revenue of the bishops. At this point in the Interim Joint Council (and out among the activists of the Bulgarian national revolution) the interests of the representatives of the two currents clashed – the conservative (i.e. 'the old') and the democratic-liberal ('the young'). The conservative activists strictly adhered to the provisions in the firman, as some of them were ready to sacrifice the national interests for their personal. The principles of the dispute had not been observed and it began to show personal ambitions and lower partisan passions. This was especially characteristic of the so called 'Party of Turnovo' or the group around Bishop Hilarion Makariopolski. This famous fighter for church independence only for a few months in 1870 succeeded to compromise significantly his enormous contribution to the Church and people, and with his 'stubbornness of a wealthy man' fooled the members of the Council and interfered with their normal activities. His followers led by the thirst for personal profits and excessive ambition, not only supported him, but pushed him into hasty and risky actions.[21]

Some conservative leaders as G. Krastevich, Dr. Hr. Stambolski, Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich, Metropolitan Antim of Vidin, etc., were willing to accept the modern principle of catholicity of the Church, however, they thought the perpetuity of the Exarch and the complicated and multi-electoral system guaranteed the stability of the ecclesiastical institution.

The representatives of the democratic-liberal movement (the circle around Dr. Stefan Chomakov) lightly ignored the canonical side of the issue, guided solely by public and national interests. Their aim was the establishment of a more liberal church that in the conditions of slavery and

[20] Temelski 2001, 123.
[21] Temelski 2001a, 13-14.

the explicit and enhanced aspirations of the neighboring Balkan countries to the Bulgarian lands to stabilize the national unity and allow for some internal autonomy and strengthening of the educational and cultural affairs.[22]

At the same time the problems of the future church government increasingly interested the Bulgarian Renaissance people who shared their views in the press. For instance, P. R. Slaveykov in a historical overview of Western and Eastern churches defended the synodical principle and the principle of catholicity to individual command. He came to extremes by demanding for regular replacement of synodal members, for exchangeability of the members of the Pax Board, which should have had real and active participation in the Exarchal governance and not be a silent adjunct to the St. Synod as it had been in the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. He justified the need for wider participation of the laity in the choice of the governing church authorities, both at exarchal and eparchial level, so that the Church can belong to the people according to 'the spirit of the times'.[23]

Another person who took part in the heated discussion was Todor Ikonomov - one of the brightest and most extreme supporters of the democratic and progressive Church organization. In this case, the objections of Ikonomov were against the division of power between the St. Synod and the Pax Board because there was no barrier between spiritual and worldly affairs. 'The church are not only the clergymen, the church are all the believers, all the people'. In a series of articles and documents he further developed and enriched his idea. In his opinion, the Bulgarian Exarchate could be useful to the society only if it facilitated its progress, its spiritual enlightenment and socio-political development, its national unification. That would have been possible only in a democratically structured ecclesiastical institution and adequate participation of the laity in its management. His radical appeals for a return to the principles of early Christianity, against the accumulated through the centuries dogma and complex ecclesiastical hierarchy and for a democratic system in the spirit of the nineteenth century, etc. were later summarized in 'Edna stapka napred'.[24] There he revealed his reformist and enlightened attitude towards the Church, for which he was rightly called 'the revolutionary among the clergymen'.[25]

The interesting thing here is that T. Ikonomov was also the instigator of practical actions to engage wide public circles in defense of his

[22] Temelski 2001a, 14.
[23] Nikov 1971, 316.
[24] 'One step forward'
[25] Markova 1981, 10.

radical principles. His idea was the initiative to establish in Tulcha parish a unity of church communities in the inner part of the country in order to impose democratic with the nationwide interests to form a basis in the construction of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Nearly a month after the issue of the firman the church community in Tulcha sent a letter to several communities in the Danube Vilayet inviting them to designate representatives to work in mutual agreement guided by the following principles: appropriate management, mixed councils with a majority of laymen, periodic exchangeability of all governing bodies, public control over church revenues, majority of votes in resolving all matters and issues, selecting bishops from the dioceses themselves, etc. This document was written by Ikonomov and published in *Macedonia* newspaper. It became a program of 'the young' and received the name 'Tulcha municipality project'. The project in question played a big role in mobilizing the public and helped the laity from several Bulgarian towns to clarify and define their positions.[26]

Thus, for a few months dozens of parishes in the Danube Vilayet looked into 'Tulcha project' and made abridgements or additions. Svishtov citizens gave a specific proposal for gathering a meeting in Ruse of the representatives from the major settlements, on which to clarify the positions that they were going to defend later in the Turkish capital. A part of the church communities were entirely solidary with the people from Tulcha and Svishtov, others expressed some doubts. Vidin citizens' objection was that the draft should have been written by Constantinople Bulgarians and to be sent to church communities for discussion. Ruse citizens shared the same opinion and tactfully rejected the idea of organizing a meeting in their town fearing trouble from the Ottoman rulers. Only Turnovo parish expressed overt disagreement with the Tulcha letter. According to them Bulgarian clergy should possess strong power and should not be dependent on the laity.

So the idea of collecting the MPs in Ruse failed, as well as writing a draft statute behind the Commissioners' backs. This reached the editors of *Turkey* newspaper which spoke quite strongly against Todor Ikonomov, the initiator of the Tulcha affair, calling him 'Russian hanger-on and Russian stooge'.[27]

At the same time *Macedonia* newspaper continued to appeal for an exchangeable Exarch, so that he could not gain excessive power – a condition for despotism, unsuitable for the Renaissance spirit. Harsh criticism was directed to the double electoral system that was described in the draft and in the 'Reason for the election of representatives', written for the Church and Laity Council. With it the laity were actually excluded from participation.

[26] Markova 1981, 11.
[27] Burmov 1902, 424.

There was a special emphasis on the responsibility of the MPs, who should not be guided by personal or local interests but by the interests of the nation. Their main duty was to contribute to achieving national unity by joining the dioceses defined as 'controversial' in the meaning of Art. 10 of the firman to the Bulgarian Exarchate. In this regard they advocated the idea that the seat of the Exarchate should definitely be in Constantinople. There were hints on the pages of the newspaper about the need for higher theological school in the Turkish capital, financed by all dioceses. All in all, Slaveylov's newspaper became a bright platform for a broad discussion of the draft and printed dozens of articles about the democratization of the Bulgarian Exarchate – a direction that the representatives were going to follow during the meetings of the council. The emigrant press took the same position although in general the problems of the Exarchal management concerned it only partly.[28]

In the beginning of October, 1870, the draft was finalized and given to P. R. Slaveykov 'to print it in *Macedonia*' but he had to print it for free on a brochure and he would be paid only for the paper. There is no information why but Slaveykov did not print the draft, it happened in the printing house of the Armenian A. Minassian, who had a Bulgarian department and a few Bulgarians worked there as typesetters.[29]

Immediately after the draft was finished, the Interim Joint Council after a preliminary agreement with the Sublime Porte, wrote and sent rules for the election of the representatives to the First Church and Laity Council to the dioceses. Those rules, called 'Reason' ('Povod'), consisted of 12 articles and pointed out in detail the way for the election of MPs. Their number was proportionate to the size of the diocese, only Turnovo was entitled to 4 people; Dorostol, Vidin, Nish, Sofia, Kyustendil, Plovdiv and Samokov to two and all the rest – one. The elected representatives were invited to come to Constantinople between 1 and 15 January 1871 at the latest, they had to wear regularly certified and duly stamped letters of constituency. Furthermore, they were asked to provide detailed statistical information about the number of weddings, churches, monasteries, schools, priests, monks and teachers in their diocese.[30]

At some places the elections were quite spontaneous, unorganized and at other places they were too formal. All the requirements of the 'Reason' were not complied with, both because of their complexity and because of some objective difficulties as in the Macedonian dioceses (Pelagonia, Strumitsa, Voden, Skopje, etc.).

[28] Markova 1981, 11.
[29] Temelski 1996, 87-89.
[30] Temelski 1996, 89.

Birth of parliamentary democracy (1871 church and laity council)

While the elections were held the Interim Joint Council managed the current affairs of the Exarchate. In its turn the Constantinople Patriarchate asked persistently for the consent of the Sublime Porte to convene the Ecumenical Council which was to condemn the firman as anti-canonical. The 'commissioners' refuted the arguments of the Patriarchate on the need for convening such a gathering in a statement to the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. They argued that there was no violation of the dogmas that the document contained primarily matters of administrative nature. Furthermore, the Council made some attempts of reconciliation with the Patriarchate, but the results were negative.[31]

The representatives of the dioceses who began to arrive in January 1871 were allowed to attend the 41st session of the Interim Joint Council. On February 5 the same year the next 42nd session of the Council was conducted. The participants decided that it should be transformed into preparatory First meeting of the Church and Laity Council.

Five preparatory meetings were conducted which discussed a number of procedural matters and adopted the rules of procedure of the Council. There were quite lively disputes whether the 'commissioners' had the right to participate in the meetings of the council, because they were not especially selected for this purpose. In the end the participants reached the opinion that as the 'commissioners' worked out the draft, they should participate with full rights for its final drafting and adoption.[32]

There were heated debates about the legality and appropriateness of participation of the representatives of the so called controversial dioceses, which were not mentioned by name in the sultan's firman. Initially these dioceses were not invited to participate, which confused their population. On January 1, 1871, under the influence of pro-democracy activists in Constantinople, the Temporary St. Synod appealed to the Bulgarian municipalities in these controversial dioceses to send their elected representatives to the council as well.

On the third preparatory meeting (12 February 1871) the question was raised about their participation in the meetings, because some members had already arrived and waited at the door. Some of the representatives, mainly those from the Turnovo-Ruse group continued to persist against their participation in order not to irritate the government. But after hearing the moving speeches of Todor Kusev (later a monk and senior clerk by the name of Methodius) in Pelagonian diocese and G. Krastevich about the unity of the entire Bulgarian people, the majority

[31] Temelkski 2001a, 15.
[32] Temelkski 2001a, 15.

voted to participate all together with equal rights in solving Exarchal cases.[33]

3. The First Church and Laity Council. The inauguration of the First Church and Laity Council took place on February 23, 1871 in the Exarchate home in Ortakoy. There was a ceremony with holy water in which five Bulgarian bishops took part, two priests and a deacon. After a decorous prayer to God, the chairman of the council, Bishop Hilarion Lovchanski delivered a congratulatory speech to all participants. After that Dr. Stefan Chomakov explained in details the history of the Bulgarian church problem in the last decade. The historical survey of G. Krastevich was also emotional. Bishop Hilarion Makariopolsky talked on some specific moments of his personal involvement in the church issue. So, the first regular meeting of the Church and Laity Council passed in emotional speeches and memories.[34]

The regular working meetings of the council were held twice a week - on Tuesdays and Fridays and they lasted 5-6 hours. The record was written by the clerk of the Interim Joint Council M. D. Balabanov, who was a representative of the Plovdiv diocese.

In the First Church and Laity Council, which lasted five months (until July 24, 1871), involved a total of 50 people - 15 members of the Interim Joint Council (5 bishops and 10 'Commissioners') and 35 representatives of the dioceses. Some of the latter, however, did not participate in all meetings, but for various reasons (personal, family, business, etc.) came and left the Council at different times. Most of them were replaced by regularly elected local deputies and others by Bulgarians living in Constantinople, but some of the latter were not accepted by the Council.

Representatives of the dioceses in the Council were: Mr. Hadzhiivanov from Varna diocese; Kostadin P. Shulev (replaced in July 1871 by Lazarus Iovchev, but the latter was not accepted) from Veles diocese; Nikola Parvanov from Vidin diocese; Georgi Gogov from Voden diocese; Nicola Zankin (replaced on 23 April 1871 by Archimandrite Dionysios) from Vratsa Eparchy; Dimitraki Teodorov and Sava Hadjiiliev Dobroplodni from Dorostol (Silistra) diocese; Dimitar Angelov and butler priest Apostle Polikarev from Kyustendil diocese; Michail (Miryu) Pavlov from Lovech diocese; Kostadin (Costa) Sarafov from Nevrokop; Petar Dimitrov and Kosta Petrov Daskalov from Nishava (Pirot) diocese; Archimandrite Victor from Nish diocese; Jacob Gerov from Edirne diocese; Michail Manchev

[33] Temelski 1996, 90.
[34] Temelkski 2001a, 16.

from Ohrid diocese; Todor Iovchev Kusev from Pelagonia Bitolya diocese; Georgi Gruev and Marko D. Balabanov from Plovdiv diocese; Hadji Georgi Buchkov replaced on April 9, 1871 by Kostadin pop Gutov from Polena Doyran diocese; Velichko Hristov from Preslav diocese; Zahari Hadjigyurov and Hristo Dimitrov Todorov from Samokov diocese; Simeon G. Gruev (on March 12, 1871 replaced by Stoyan Kostov) from Skopje diocese; Dobri Chintulov and Stephen P. Stefanov from Sliven eparchy; Hadji Mano Todorov and Hristo Todorov Stoyanov from Sofia eparchy; priest Todor Iliev Tilkov from Strumitsa diocese; Kancho Kesarov (replaced in May 1871 by Kiril Popov, but the latter was not accepted because he was elected only by Turnovo municipality), Petar Angelov (replaced in the summer of 1871 by Dimitar Pavlov Grozdanov, but because he was elected only by Turnovo municipality, he was not accepted), Hadji Gospodin Slavov and Yordan D. Nikolov (on April 27, 1871 replaced by Nicola St. Mihajlovski) from Turnovo diocese and butler Peter K. Arnaoudov from Cherven (Ruse) diocese.[35]

An interesting case was the representative of Berkovo district Archimandrite Dionysios Pomakov (later Metropolitan of Lovech), who was not accepted by the Council because the Diocese of Sofia (to which Berkovo district belonged) had already two regularly elected representatives. However, he remained in Constantinople and participated informally in a number of meetings.

As it is seen the people who participated in the first Church and Laity Council were all honoured figures in the Bulgarian ecclesiastical problem of national and local scale, influential leaders from Constantinople and diocesan centers, teachers, priests and members of the local government. It is noteworthy that about a fifth of the participants in the Council were university graduates (three of them lawyers) and almost as many had theological education.

In almost all meetings we are respected by the professional competence of G. Krastevich, M. D. Balabanov, Dr. Stefan Chomakov, Hr. T. Stoyanov and others (apart from the five bishops), who actively participated in the discussions and carried out all the business activities of the Council. Some representatives were only figureheads and hardly spoke, and when they did it was to say that they agree with the views of some of the experts. Undoubtedly the most active was G. Krastevich who as the author of the draft very often took the floor to clarify or further defend one or another statement. Not accidentally the Vidin representative N. Parvanov said he behaved like a dictator and did not respected sufficiently the opinion of the other members. The meetings did not always pass in a

[35] Temelkski 2001a, 16-17.

businesslike and collegial manner, but sometimes chatter and bickering dominated, accompanied with insults. All this when viewed from the perspective of the developed parliamentarianism, looked immature and at times even naive. But it was quite normal and understandable in this first forum of the enslaved Bulgarians.[36]

To some extent the businesslike progress of the meetings of the Council was ensured by the joint Bulgarian-Greek committee whose purpose was to balance the communication between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate. In complete privacy on Bulgarian side G. Krastevich and Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich participated in the committee. However, the participants in the Church and Laity Council learned about this committee and asked the two Bulgarian representatives for detailed explanations. Naturally they received inconclusive answers and this led to a number of disturbances and unrest, the work on the draft was delayed.[37]

When discussing the latter the adopted principle was of consistent and detailed, article-by-article examination and in case of problems workgroups or dedicated committees were activated. Disagreements were inexhaustible and they started with the discussion of the first articles. The five bishops supported by G. Krastevich were for the 'spiritual origin' of the Church, while the liberal-democratic movement insisted on the unity of the secular, 'material' and spiritual. This principle was generally characterized by the Plovdiv Metropolitan Paisij as 'protestant' and 'schismatic'. That was why the liberals were forced to retreat and Art. 3 remained unchanged: 'In accordance with this statute, the whole Exarchate is managed by the St. Synod and each diocese by a Metropolitan'. However, they imposed their opinion on the question about the diocesan councils (Art. 12). The draft insisted on two separate councils - spiritual and secular. But this was rejected and they voted for one - mixed diocesan council, in which the laity dominated. Also the number of secular people in the Exarchate Joint Council was increased - from 4 to 6 (Art. 8).[38]

There were heated debates on the two-stage electoral system in the draft. Liberals insisted one way or another on a direct vote of the people in the elections of secular members in the mixed diocesan councils, the Exarch and the bishops. Bishops supported by G. Krastevich exhibited extreme stubbornness and threatened that if it was accepted, the Exarchate could become schismatic. Several times the meetings were interrupted because of the uproar. The bishops exhibited exceptional perseverance -

[36] Temelski 1996, 91.
[37] Temelkski 2001a, 18.
[38] Temelkski 2001a, 18.

the election of bishops under the influence of the laity was not canonical, according to them. Ultimately, this two-stage electoral system was preserved but the participation of the laity was strengthened in the election of diocesan bishops.[39]

Debates were conducted on the proposal for a more limited annual income of bishops, metropolitans and the Exarch. In the end both sides were willing to compromise, as the dioceses were divided into three types and the remuneration of their bishops was set at 72, 54 and 45 thousand pennies.

The question about the perpetuity or periodic exchangeability of the Exarch was examined during the 23rd meeting (14 May 1871) of the Council. There was a fierce debate as the opinion of the liberals for a fixed term was stubbornly defended by the representative of the Sofia diocese Hr. Stoyanov. The interesting thing here was that the views of the bishops on this issue were not unanimous and Ilarion Lovchanski, Panaret and Paisij Plovdiv agreed that the periodic exchangeability of the Exarch was "an innovation in the governance of the church," but that it was not anti-canonical. Verbal dispute was resolved by a secret ballot - 43 people were present, 28 of them voted for periodicity in the Exarch's elections.

So on May 14, 1871 the 'Statute for the management of the Bulgarian Exarchate' was finalized and submitted to the participants in the Council for signature. While signing G. Krastevich added: 'I accept all the contents of the Statute without the periodicity of the Exarch'. The other conservatives: Hadji Nikoli Minchoglu, Dimitraki Teodorov and Nikola Mihajlovski (Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich was absent from the meeting) signed with a similar remark. This behavior of the four conservative activists was contrary to the accepted principle of the majority vote 'and caused extremely large and fairly outrage' among the other representatives.[40]

4. Statute for the structure and management of Bulgarian Exarchate. The adopted and signed Statute contained 134 articles, divided into three parts. The first part examined in detail the election of the Exarch, the members of the St. Synod, the members of the Exarchate mixed council, of the diocesan bishops, of the members of diocesan mixed councils, of the members of the joint councils of large or small districts; the choice of diocesan secular and religious voters and the election of parish priests.

The second part extensively referred to the rights and obligations of the central and local exarchal authorities. The St. Synod and the respective clergymen had competences for religious and dogmatic issues and for

[39] Temelkski 2001a, 18-19.
[40] See Protokoli 1871, 134-140.

violations and justice in these areas (Art. 93, 94 and 100). Reasonably the secular members were given the freedom for national activities – looking after schools for the improvement of the Bulgarian language and literature; taking care by 'all means and useful measures for the development of the education in Bulgarian dioceses and the mental and moral progress of Bulgaria'; founding socially useful institutions, preserving the state of the Exarchate property; controlling the income and expenses; solving material divorce disputes, engagements, validation of wills, donations, etc. (Art. 98).

The last part, the third, was dedicated to the revenue and expenditure of the church. What impresses is the strict control over them and the allocation of a significant portion of the revenue for the maintenance of schools and other public facilities.

According to the last article 134 the supreme legislative body of the Bulgarian Exarchate was the Church and Laity Council (which consisted of clergy and laymen), convened every four years. All exarchal accounts were reported there; if necessary, amendments and annexes to the Exarchate Statute were submitted there and it elected the new Exarch.

Compared to the draft, the statute was characterized by a number of advantages. It contained more clarity, logic, consistency and most of all – it was dominated by liberal-democratic spirit. Naturally, this was a result of people's will, persistently and diligently maintained and carried through by diocesan representatives.[41]

To assess more fully and more accurately the Bulgarian ecclesiastical Statute, it must undoubtedly be compared with the basic laws of the neighboring Orthodox churches at that time. The published reports of the council showed clearly that they were taken into account. It is well known that the synodal form of government was not the discovery of the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was also common for Hellas (Greece), Romanian, Serbian and Russian Orthodox churches, but with the significant difference that they were strongly dependent on the state. In fact, the state was the one which made the rules for the management of the church. Basically, the St. Synod appeared as the supreme ecclesiastical authority, but in fact it belonged to the head of state (the tsar or king) and the government. Thus, the Church had actually been converted into an ordinary public institution. The Bishop had rights only in the dogmatic and liturgical sphere and the participation of regular clergy and laity in the Church's governance was quite limited.

The situation of the Bulgarian Exarchate at this point was quite different because it was forced to operate under the power of different religious beliefs. On the other hand, the Exarchate had considerable

[41] Temelski 2001a, 20.

autonomy in arranging their internal affairs - in the spiritual, educational and cultural activities. Thus, it had the opportunity to establish itself and to become nation-uniting institution that epitomized and conducted a partial civil autonomy of the Bulgarian people.[42]

The authors of the Exarchate statute had the opportunity to draw from the experience of the 'general laws' for the management of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, accepted by the Church and Laity Patriarchal Council, convened in 1858-1860. But along with a number of similarities, there were some significant differences.

Undoubtedly, the democratic state of the Bulgarian church Statute was the electoral principle, according to which everyone in the Church 'from the first to the last' was not appointed, but elected, including the Exarchal officials. A clearly revolutionary novelty for the Orthodox Church was the periodic (every 4 years) exchangeability of the Exarch, which was a purely republican principle. This periodic exchangeability abolished the possibility of establishing a strong autocracy in the Church and guaranteed the collective principle in management. Furthermore, each bishop already had the right to run for the Exarch's position. The principle of catholicity was held more consistently than in the statutes of all the above-mentioned Orthodox churches. A characteristic feature was the periodic convening of the Church and Laity Council in every four years to perform higher legislative and control functions. The role of the laity in the Church was extended not only through their place in the central government (as in Constantinople Patriarchate), but also through the creation of joint diocesan councils and joint councils of large and small districts.[43]

The signed Exarchal Statute was given immediately for translation into Turkish, in order to be presented to the Sublime Porte for approval. The meetings of the Church and Laity Council continued discussing other pressing issues - territorial reorganization of certain dioceses (partially allowed because of some conflicts); compilation and adoption of a catalog of candidates for bishop departments; current financial support of the Exarchate, etc. The participants in the council expected in vain the government to give permission for the election of an Exarch. The number of representatives gradually diminished - several months of meetings violated the family, business and financial lives of many of them. Consequently, on July 24, 1871 last 37th meeting was held which decided on the adjourning of the council. 'This last session of the Council was held in an open space in the garden of the Exarchate home' and they made some

[42] Temelski 2001a, 21.
[43] Temelski 2001a, 21.

corrections in the almost translated into Turkish Statute. At the end of the meeting an invited photographer arrived (possibly Pascal Sebah) and all the people present were photographed, thus committing to history this glorious Bulgarian forum.[44]

After the closing of the Council the meetings of the Interim Joint Council continued. Those diocesan representatives who stayed in Constantinople were allowed to participate there. The Exarchal Statute translated into Turkish was finally handed to the Porte on July 29, 1871 by a delegation of four members, namely G. Krastevich, Hadji Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich, Dr. Stefan Chomakov and Georgaki Chaloglu. The government did not rush with the approval of the statute and thus slowed down the election of the Exarch. Finally on February 11, 1872 a permission for the election was given, although the Exarchate Statute had not been approved yet. On February 12, 1871 the Interim Joint Council conducted the election and selected Bishop Hilarion Lovchanski as the first Bulgarian Exarch. However, influenced by outside forces, he gave his resignation and on 16 February a new election was conducted. This time the Metropolitan of Vidin – Antim was unanimously elected as Exarch. This way the Interim Joint Council finished the work of the First Church and Laity Council. Here we should clarify that the Exarchate Statute was never approved by the Sublime Porte, but regardless of that the seat of the Bulgarian Exarchate remained in Constantinople until November 27, 1913, when Exarch Joseph I moved it to Sofia.[45]

The first Church and Laity Council (1871) in an extremely difficult environment – in the capital of the Ottoman Empire and under the nose of the Constantinople Patriarchate – managed to write a statute for the management of the Bulgarian Exarchate. This statute was with relatively progressive and democratic principles and brought honor to its authors and the Bulgarian public. The Council was the reason for activating the public opinion and for clarifying the political thinking on essential issues about national institutions and methods of management. The acquired experience in a broad and narrow sense proved extremely useful in the work of the Turnovo Constituent Assembly in 1879, which discussed and approved the first Bulgarian Constitution.[46]

After the liberation and the establishment of the Third Bulgarian State entirely new conditions were created for the development of the Church. Therefore, after many problems another statute was written – 'an

[44] Temelski 2001, 134 –148.
[45] Temelski 2015, 107.
[46] Temelski 2001a, 22.

Exarchal Statute adapted in the Principality, approved by the Holy Synod, adopted by the State Council and the National Assembly and confirmed by a decree of His Highness the Prince on February 4, 1883, № 82'. This statute underwent partial amendments in 1890 and 1891, in 1895 a new statute was adopted, which in its turn was supplemented in 1897 and 1900. The prototype of the Exarchate statute remained only a distant memory - and its progressive democratic acquisitions were gradually destroyed: the periodic exchangeability of the Exarch was replaced by perpetuity; the Exarchal mixed council was removed; the diocesan councils of mixed type gradually became only ecclesiastical; the Church and Laity Council was not convened for half a century, i.e. till 1922, when a new Exarchal Statute was made. The Bulgarian ecclesiastical government gradually became heavily dependent on the state-political power. So, the inexorable course of events inevitably led the Bulgarian Exarchate to a situation similar to that of the Orthodox churches in Russia, Greece, Romania and Serbia.[47]

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Church and care for orphan children on Ukrainian territories in the 19th – the beginning of 20th centuries

Olena Kravchenko

Abstract: The article analyses charity of the Russian Orthodox Church in organization and taking care of orphan children in the Ukrainian provinces. There has been shown the role of eparchial patronage in caring for the poor clergy, Orthodox monasteries and clergy in providing welfare assistance for orphans from clergy and laity, in creating orphanages, educational and disciplinary institutions. The forms and lines of church care in the war years at the beginning of the 20th century have been studied.

Key words: The Orthodox Church, children, care, orphanage, monasteries, eparchial patronages

Анотация: В тази статия е анализирана благотворителната дейност на Руската православна църква за организирането и осъществяването на приюти за деца сираци в украинските губернии. Показана е ролята на епархиалното попечителство, братствата, православните манастири и духовенството в оказването на материална помощ за сираците, създаването на приюти и учебно-възпитателни учреждения. Проучени са и формите на църковното попечителство във военните години в началото на XX век.

Adoption of Christianity in the Kyivska Rus promoted for wide spreading of charity and mercy traditions. Churches and monasteries on Ukrainian lands remained for a long time (up to the 18th century) almost the only high powered centers of charity. As a result of deconsecrating of church and monastery possessions, submitted by the Orthodox Church to the government, the financial ability of the clergy to make charity had been sufficiently limited. However those were the church officers who became examples of merciful treatment for the poor, the abandoned and orphans. As far back as 1706 year Novgorod in the Khamovo-Uspensky monastery metropolitan Iov founded an orphanage for illegitimate children, which

was the first in Russia. For the orphanage maintenance Peter the First designated benefits from several monasteries' ancestral lands.[1]

At the end of the 18th century the system of governmental care for the poor and orphans started its formation with creation of special institutions by Catherine the Second. They were Prikazes of general care (year 1775), however the presence of the society class division promoted for introduction of noble and then merchant care. Under the supervision of the Orthodox administration and military clergy there were public clergy institutions, such as patronages for poor clergy, eparchial patronage and other church charitable institutions.

Social charity of the Orthodox Church reflected in historiography at the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries in the works of laity authors (E. Maksymov,[2] V. Padutchev[3]) as well as clergy authors (A. Kudryavtsev,[4] A. Vertelovsky,[5] V. Benzyn,[6] D. Popov,[7] N. Voznesenskiy,[8] Afanasiy[9]). These publications paid great attention to personal and public charity; they also analyzed the humanitarian and charitable activity of the Orthodox monasteries. These studies also characterized adjuvant work of church and district patronages for the poor and the Church social ministration during the World War I.

The contemporary research of church care history for children are of regional character, such as publications by E. Khmelkova,[10] E. Karavayeva,[11] M. Ehyzaryantz.[12] In the articles by S. Fedorenko[13] and T. Yantchenko[14] there has been analyzed charity of the Orthodox in the area of public education. The history of church care for underage orphans on Ukrainian territories remains almost unstudied; therefore the aim of this article is analysis of the Russian Orthodox Church activity in taking care of orphan children in Ukrainian counties.

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[1] Maksimov 1907, 14.
[2] Maksimov 1899, 11–21.
[3] Paduchev 1915, 135–144.
[4] Kudryavtsev 1883.
[5] Vertelovskii 1884a, 676–699; 1884b, 754–775.
[6] Benzin 1907a, 161–184; 1907b, 289–306.
[7] Popov 1907a, 253–260; 1907b, 395–402.
[8] Voznesenskii 1909, 161–215.
[9] Afanasii 1913a, 551–557; 1913b, 688–693; 1913c, 815 – 824; 1913d, 125–129.
[10] Khmel'kova 2009, 243–247.
[11] Karavaeva 2010, 95–100
[12] Egizar'yants 2010, 36–41.
[13] Fedorenko 2006, 62-67.
[14] Yanchenko 2009, 179–184.

In the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century nine Ukrainian counties were parts of the Russian Empire and their perimeters of the agglomeration were congruent with those of Orthodox archdioceses: the one in Volyn', in Ekaterynoslav, in Kyiv, in Podol, in Poltava, in Tavriya, in Kharkov, in Kherson and in Chernigov. Since year 1823 in the Russian Empire the authorities of class care were created – they were eparchial patronages for the poor clergy who helped widows and orphans of the clergy. In Ukraine most of the patronages were founded exactly in year 1823: in Volyn', in Ekaterinoslav, in Podol and in Kharkov. The patronage in Chernigov was founded in 1824, in Poltava - in 1827, in Kherson in 1837, in Tavriya – in 1860. In the year of 1898 302 orphan children received welfare assistance from eparchial patronages in Kherson archdiocese, 238 – in Kharkov archdiocese, 140 – in that of Chernigov, 84 – in that of Podol, 16 – in that of Tavriya.[15] Data for other archdioceses are missing.

The Church care for children reflected in organization of upbringing, education, financial aid. The clergy private initiative also played great part. In the beginning of 1860s in Kherson archdiocese at the expense of Kherson archpriest of The Assumption Cathedral Maksym Perepelytsyn an orphan institution for homeless clergy girls was built. The construction of the orphanage building lasted from the 22nd of April 1862 to the 21st of September 1864. In the name of the founder who died before the institution was opened, the orphanage inherited the name of Perepelytsyn.[16] In exceptional cases the orphanage accepted orphan clergy boys under the age of eight as well. Under the statute the number of educates should have been 40. The orphanage was maintained at the expense of the Kherson eparchial patronage for the poor clergy, offertory from the Bizukovsky monastery and eparchial clergy.[17]

In 1898 in the Belikov hamlet of Kharkov archdiocese near Dergatchy station an orphanage for widows and orphans of clergy for 80 persons was opened at the expense of eparchial patronage.[18] According to the approved rules, Kharkov eparchial orphanage accepted 1) widows of clergies with underage children who have no means of subsistence or who have sons on service or relatives who don't receive official pension; 2) full orphans under age of seven of both genders who have no means of subsistence and relatives.[19] Children were brought up in the orphanage till the age of 10, and then boys were sent for education to religious, technical or industrial

[15] BURI 1900, 98, 167, 216, 539, 553, 798, 916, 941, 955.
[16] Mukhin 1875, 193.
[17] Ustav 1875, 111 – 112.
[18] Anonym 1898, 90
[19] Pravila 1898, 1 – 2.

schools. Girls were sent to eparchial women school.[20] There was such an orphanage school for clergy orphans in Kyiv archdiocese (year 1897).[21]

At Orthodox monasteries there were created charitable institutions for orphan children aiming to caring and providing with elementary education. They were maintained at the expense of funds from eparchial patronages for the poor clergy and donations from clergy and monasteries. Upon a personal petition by Kyiv metropolitan Filaret in 1839 Kyiv-Sophia a religious school was opened. There were supported up to 40 educates at the expense of metropolitan's charitable donations.[22] Since 1844 in Odessa city of Kherson archdiocese at the women monastery of Archangel-Mykhailovsk an orphanage school for girls was functioning; it was under the authority of the school council.[23] At the orphanage enrollment the advantage was given to clergy orphans, however there also were children of laity. After finishing a study course which lasted for 6–8 years (that means it lasted till educates reached the age of 16–20), the graduates obtained severance pay from percents of school funds; this severance pay sum varied from 50 to 150 rubles.[24] In 1878 the orphanage was reorganized in eparchial school.[25]

In Kyiv archdiocese children orphanages and schools for children orphans were at the following women cells: Kyiv-Florov woman cell, Lebedinsky woman cell, Rzhyshevsk woman cell, Chygyryn woman cell and also at Kyiv-Vydubetsk[26] and Svyato-Troitsk fratries.[27]

In Kharkov archdiocese at Khoroshevsky Assumption women monastery Mother Superior Izmaragda founded women school for orphans and children of poor parents that was called 'Ecclesiastical Orphanage' in September 1871.[28]

As a result of church reorganization in 1864, the parochial patronages and orthodox brotherhoods started appearing in the Russian Empire. Their creation was dictated to the need of parochial life revival, activation of charity work that was aimed at the clergy of a parish, congregate and the church. Additionally, the arrangement of educational charitable institutions for children – schools and orphanages was the responsibility of patronages and brotherhoods.[29]

[20]Pravila 1898, 3 – 4.
[21] BURI 1900, 221.
[22] Svyatnenko 2008, 90.
[23] SAOR, f. 274, op. 2, a. e. 2, f. 13.
[24] SAOR, f. 2, op. 11, a. e. 57-58, f. 38.
[25] SAOR, f. 274, op. 1, a. e. 107, f. 26.
[26] Anonym 1892, 429–430.
[27] BURI 1900, 220.
[28] Anonym 1871, 5 – 7.
[29] Svod 1892, 565.

The foundation of parochial patronages and orthodox brotherhoods on Ukrainian territories took place in 1860–1870s. It is worth noting that the scope of charity works in the parishes remained inconspicuous, especially the countryside. The reason for this is that country dwellers were poor, so the parish financing was insufficient as well. By the year of 1901 the number of patronages in the Russian Empire reached 19 108. Among Ukrainian counties the biggest number of patronages was in Chernigovsky county – 915 and in Podolsky county – 1264.[30] Children institutions at parishes and brotherhoods were working in a few Ukrainian archdioceses.

In 1866 in Kerch-Yenikal city of Tavriya archdioceses the Holy Trinity orthodox brotherhood with the church in the name of intercession of the Holy Virgin was opened.[31] In 1868 at the brotherhood an orphanage with five seats for the poorest boys and a school were opened.[32] Urban land of 550 square Russian fathoms was allocated for the children orphanage.[33]

Children orphanage per 40 persons with industrial school was situated at the Orthodox Holy John the Forerunner brotherhood in Kamenetz-Podolsky city.[34] For assistance to bringing up the children at the brotherhood a Women committee was created. There were 10 permanent scholarships – 5 of them were at the brotherhood's expense and the other 5 were at the expense of the Women committee.[35]

Children orphanages, nurseries, refuges for orphans functioned in Kharkov city at Voznesensky[36] and Blagoveshchensky parochial patronages,[37] and at Rozhdestvo-Bogorodichnaya church in Nikolayev city of Kherson archdiocese.[38] It is worth noting that in Kharkov city parish charity work was more widespread in comparison with other cities. Since 1896 divisional patronages for the poor functioned here. They were arranged by territorial division at orthodox churches. In May 1902 the nursery founded in 1889 by Mariya Nykolayevna Fesenko, the wife of Kharkov city mayor I. O. Fesenko was passed under the control of the patronage for the poor of Spaso-Preobrazhensky parish of Kharkov city.[39] Since 1898 Odessa parish patronage at the Church of the Exaltation of the

[30] Anderson 1908, 472.
[31] Anonym 1914, XVI.
[32] BURI 1900, 808–809.
[33] Otchet 1888, 356.
[34] Gul'dman 1889, 269.
[35] Obzor (no date), 180.
[36] BURI 1900, 916, 919.
[37] Anonym 1907.
[38] BURI 1900, 940.
[39] Othcet 1908, 74.

Holy Cross maintained children daily orphanage per 50 persons. For a year it was visited by 1546 boys and 1769 girls.[40]

An important role in the organization of care for orphan children was played by the orthodox establishment in the war period. In the beginning of the 20th century orphanages for children of soldiers who died during the Russo-Japanese war and World War I were opening. In the resolution of the 1st of September 1904 about care for children of soldiers who died of injuries and illnesses, the Holiest Synodus encouraged charitable and educational organizations, brotherhoods, parochial patronages and monasteries for taking part in orphans' destiny and providing them with refuge.[41] 'Church should take care of fostering and educating orphan children'.[42]

In Kharkov archdiocese the cells took active part in caring for orphans aged under 18 of officers and enlisted men of the Russo-Japanese war. At complete maintenance children boys were taken to the following monasteries: monastery of Ryazan' – 20, Vysochynsky Kazansky monastery – 8, Akhtyrsky monastery of the Holy Trinity – 15, Svyatogorsky Dormition monastery – 20, Kuryazhsky Preobrazhensky – 10. Girls orphans found refuge in women cells: in Upper-Kharkov monastery – 10 persons, in Starobelsky monastery – 5 persons, in Khoroshevsky – 50 persons.[43] Since 1910 at Kytayevsky ashram of the Kiev-Pecherskaya Lavra in Kyiv archdiocese an orphanage for the orphans of killed soldiers has been functioning.[44] It was one of the biggest in Ukraine monastery institutions – in 1917 there dwelled 49 boys and 27 girls.[45] An orphan institution for boys was also opened at Chernigovsky cathedral. Among 25 orphans there were 19 children of soldiers who were killed at war.[46]

In the years of World War I a sequence of orders were issued, they were about the creation of new church organizations aiming at assistance for war-affected civilians including orphan children. According to the resolution of the 20th of July 1914 the special 'Patronage councils of aid for war victims' were opened in parishes. The councils' duties lied in making detailed lists of soldiers' families, determining their property condition, providing financial aid to orphans, widows, encouraging congregation for helping soldiers' families in agricultural work, organization of free education for orphan

[40] BURI 1900, 949.
[41] Opredelenie 1904, 862.
[42] RSHA, f. 796, op. 185, a. e. 620, fol. 423.
[43] Anonym 1905, 1826.
[44] Kusok 2000, 94.
[45] Stepanenko 2002, 150.
[46] Akt 1913, 587.

children.[47] By regulation of 19th of December 1914th the Holiest Synod encouraged the orthodox monasteries, especially women monasteries for creating orphanages for soldiers' orphans, where they could get elementary education.[48] Two of such orphanages for soldiers' orphan girls and half-orphan boys were opened at the beginning of the war in Mezhygorsky Transfiguration of the Saviour monastery of Kyiv archdiocese.[49]

On the 17th of July the Holiest Synod decreed to promote for representatives of the clergy in assistance with orphanages organization; it happened after the government ordered to create agricultural orphanages for children of damaged and killed soldiers throughout the whole Empire.[50] This way, in Bohodukhovsky county of Kharkov archdiocese two orphanages were founded – an industrial orphanage for 45 children of killed soldiers, where the orphans studied joinery, shoemaking, sewing; and an orphanage for 30 orphan girls where they studied handiwork; both of them were founded at the expense of local clergy by archpriest A. Stanyslavsky.[51]

During World War I in Moscow, Petrograd, Kyiv, Zhitomir and Kharkov the special 'Ciscarpathian committees' were organized. They provided welfare assistance and moral support to Russian refugees of Galytchyna. Kharkov Ciscarpathian committee that was created at the initiative of archpriest Antoniy, in fact was functioning since December 1914, and its official opening happened on the 12th of July 1915. This committee activity was directed mostly at helping orphan children of Galytchyna, who arrived to Kharkov from Lvov in December 1914, 77 persons in number aged from 2 till 18; they were accommodated in the building of Kharkov eparchial women school.[52]

The clergy of Ukrainian archdioceses actively collaborated with laic institutions which cared for orphan children by organization of fundraising in favor of local departments of the Society for commonplace aid for soldiers injured at war and their families; Romanovsky committee which cared for orphans of rural population; Society of caring for children of people who were killed on duty; Society 'House of fraternal troop' caring for orphans and begging children.[53]

[47] Anonym 1915, 408.
[48] Stepanenko 2004, 61.
[49] Lobanova 2004, 184.
[50] Opredelenie 1915, 382.
[51] SAKHR, f. 40, op. 101, a. e. 349, fol. 23.
[52] Otchet 1916, 2–3.
[53] SAKHR, f. 40, op. 101. – a. e. 980, 1; op. 100, a. e. 1203, 53, 63; a. e. 2067, fol. 1; a. e. 2090, 1, 7.

Thereby the Orthodox Church care for children resulted in providing aid to orphans of clergy from the funds of eparchial patronages for the poor clergy, arranging the underaged to study at eparchial schools, opening educational refuges for orphans of laity origin at monasteries. Orphan institutions were under the authority and control of Ecclesiastical consistories. Nurseries, refuges, orphanages were organized by parochial patronages and orthodox brotherhoods. Not only had the clergy taken great part in their activity, but also the laity. So these organizations were treated not just like exclusively ecclesiastical, but also like institutional bodies of public charity at churches.

Church and monastery care obtained its extra activity during the Russo-Japanese war and World War I. The orphans of officers and enlisted men, children refugees found care from the people of the clergy who were an example of humane treatment of children and encouraged the laity for it.

BURI (1900) – Blagotvoritel'nye uchrezhdeniya Rossiiskoi imperii. Sostavleno po Vysochaishemy poveleniyu Sobstvennoyu Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantselyarieyi po uchrezhdeniyam imperatritsy Marii, tom 2 (Saint Petersburg).

RSHA - Russian State Historical Archive

SAKHR – State Archive of Kharkhiv Region

SAOR – State Archive of Odessa Region

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'I gave my vision for their country! ...' Blinded Soldiers of the First World War in Austria (1914)

Stefan Karner

Abstract: In World War I hundreds of thousands of citizens of Austria-Hungary are wounded and crippled. 300 of them are soldiers of Austrian and German origin blinded in the fights. Most of them are young people up to 25 years old. The state of Austria makes everything possible to provide a normal life for them: not only to give them a pension but to find an appropriate job for them. Thanks to the efforts their socialization becomes possible.

Key words: World War I, Austria-Hungary, blinded, socialization

Резюме: През Първата световна война стотици хиляди граждани от Австро-Унгарската империя са ранени и осакатени. Сред тях има около 300 ослепени в боевете войници от австро-немски произход. Повечето са млади хора до 25 години. Затова Австрийската държава прави всичко възможно да им обезпечи нормален живот: не само да им даде пенсия, но и да им осигури подходяща работа. Благодарение на положените усилия социализирането им става възможна.

The First World War claimed the lives of about 1.5 million citizens of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Surviving the war invalids and brought her home were forgotten. This is especially true of soldiers lost their sight. The new Republic of Austria had about 300 blinded soldiers. They were mostly young people - blind soldiers on all fronts on average are under 25 years of age.

Many lost their sight in the fight for their country since the war began, that is in 1914. This heightens the sense of pity for him. Therefore, everything possible was done as early as possible to ensure their life. Were collected millions in donations. It was quickly decided and implemented not just provide them with a pension, as well as give them the opportunity to receive professional training. Austrian law provided for war invalids faster than in other member countries of the war, financial compensation. In this case, the priority of the Government of

Austria was precisely the creation of conditions for social and professional reintegration of blinded soldiers.

By the beginning of World War I in Austria (i.e. in the Austrian part of the monarchy) had three great military aid organizations: the Red Cross, the Office of military assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Office of the military security of the Ministry of Military Affairs, which collects donations for the soldiers, veterans for the families of the victims and to humanitarian organizations - in the first place, it is for the bodies of social Security Disability war.

It is through the so-called Funds persons with disabilities in the administration of military support is provided by the work of most organizations in support of the war blinded soldiers.

In general, a distinction between 'practical (or 'scientific') and 'social' blindness. In the scientific sense of the blind is the one who at one meter could not count fingers. If a person was not blind in both eyes, and had some residual vision, he attributed the 'social blindness'. There is no information about the fate of those who are at war since 1914, and although blind, but was not recognized as a 'blind soldier'.

In World War I the number of eye injuries was 6 per cent of all injuries. In previous wars, it was only 2 percent. The reason for that was in charge of the war trenches, feeding the fire in the supine position with his head, hand grenades and mines have led to an increase in the number of head injuries.

Most of the eye injuries in World War I was the result of shooting injuries and explosions, but also led to blindness and apply gas. The first cases of the use of chlorine gas in Austria were already recorded in 1912 and 1913.

At the same time the number of blinded soldiers during the First World War would be many times more if it ranked as those who did not survive.

There were also deadly poisonous 'unstable' fighting substances - chlorine, phosgene and chloropicrin.

All irritants defended gas masks. If they did not exist or did not wear, chemical weapons agents or its collapse could damage the eyes.

Typical of the First World War, as well as for other wars, was that in the early battles of the number of victims exceeded the average level. During the first 24 months of hostilities blind approximately 280 'German-Austrian', and in the next 27 months – 'only' 98 people.

If we talk about the nationality of blinded soldiers, then, according to the Fund blinded soldiers, most of them came from Bohemia and Galicia. Such a large number of immigrants from Galicia due to the fact that there is a lot of fights going on especially (Carpathian operation).

The question that was raised in 1914, was as follows - the best way to take care of soldiers blinded in the sense of preserving their independence? The answer was short and clear - through education!

By decree of the Kaiser from 29 August 1915 war invalids went to work after undergoing appropriate treatment and training. The duration of additional education was not to exceed 1 year. This led to serious problems in the training of soldiers blinded so typical for the blind or professions as schetochnik korzinochnik. One year - too short a time for teaching blind soldier!

To ensure the life of all damage your eyes on the war on Austria-Hungary after the passage of the treatment was opened Institute of education of the blind in Vienna, later called Center blinded soldiers. After hospitals and hospitals for them it was the first place, 'specialized for people with disabilities'.

Already in August 1914, the Institute of Education Blind Red Cross provided 60 beds for convalescent soldiers and patients with damage to eyes. Later he became a reception center for all blinded soldiers. Wounded soldiers were to remain there until the healing of wounds and to get rid of emotional trauma. They were educated to live independently later. Health care and employment were free. The costs of caring for them paid the Ministry of Military Affairs.

As the wounded came from all parts of the monarchy, they tried to distribute at the place of origin. Taken not only of the Austro-Hungarian blinded soldiers, but also of allied countries. All between 1941 and 1918 at the Vienna Institute for the Blind Education visited 475 soldiers lost their sight. Among them, 129 people were from Galicia, 62 from Bohemia, 43 of Lower Austria, 41 from Moravia, 33 from Vienna, 29 from Hungary, 22 from Silesia, 15 of Upper Austria and 14 from Bukovina. German spoke of them only 197 people, Polish 83, 62 in Ukrainian, Czech 58, Slovene 22 and one-legged.

In addition to the Vienna Institute were other orphanages and educational centers for soldiers blinded in Vienna, Graz and Lviv.

We can not say that the blinded soldiers soon again used for military purposes - such as 'knitting for the front', since the fall of 1914 to work in agriculture or in factories. At the same time in the production of blind workers must be protected from spinning and moving parts of machines. Relatively easy to blinded soldiers considered work at the telephone exchange.

As a result, it soon became clear that the best and safest option welfare blinded soldiers - determination to work in tobacco shops.

This measure of social security in Europe was 'Austrian feature', but since 1911 has become a practice in relation to disabled veterans. From 1914 blinded soldiers used herein priority.

In general, the social policy of Austria was largely effective in pursuit of its objectives to ensure the reintegration of soldiers blinded in the war in the workplace.

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Serbian Orthodox Church cooperation and frictions with Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Bulgarian Exarchate during interwar period

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Abstract: During the period between the two world wars, Serbian Orthodox Church had continuingly had a supportive role for the Yugoslav Foreign Policy and diplomatic actions, as it had done until 1918, helping the international activities of the Kingdom of Serbia. Mutual state and church actions toward the Ecumenical Patriarchy aimed toward reorganisation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the new kingdom's boundaries and protection of Patriarchy's position in Turkish republic, during 1918-1923. Frictions were emerging, while the new Serbian Patriarchy was backing Yugoslav interests in allied Czechoslovakia and against Italian penetration into the Balkans, as well as in competition for greater prestige among other orthodox churches in 1922-1933. The relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and Bulgarian Exarchate were determined by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian state relations, mainly in connection to the Macedonian question. During the period 1918-1932 they were more hostile, and since 1932 the two churches had been acting as a vanguard for rapprochement among the two nations and kingdoms.

Key words: church relations, diplomatic actions, Yugoslavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia

Резюме: В периода между двете световни войни, Сръбската православна църква непрекъснато поддържа югославската външна политика и дипломатически действия, за да помогне на международната дейност на Кралство Сърбия. Съвместните държавни и църковни дейности са носочени главно по отношение на Вселенската патриаршия. Те са предназначени за реорганизация на Сръбската православна църква в границите на новото кралство и защита на позициите на Патриаршията в Турската република през 1918 – 1923 г.Търкания възникваха когато новата сръбска патриаршия отстъпваше югославските интереси спрямо съюзницата си Чехословакия и срещу италианското проникване на Балканите, както и в конкурентната надпревара за по-голям престиж сред другите православни църкви

през 1922 – 1933 г. Отношенията между Сръбската православна църква и Българската екзархия се определят чрез югославско-българските държавни отношения, главно във връзка с македонския въпрос. През периода 1918 -1932 г. те са враждебни, но от 1932 г. двете църкви действат като авангард за сближаване между двете нации и царства.

During the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, in XIX century, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) had associated fight for freedom and struggle for faith. This relation between nation and religion was characteristic for Serbian orthodoxy even after the liberation wars had ended in 1918. After the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SCS) was formed, one of the first tasks for SOC was to unite organisations which had coexisted in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, Archbishopric of Karlovac-Belgrade and Patriarchy of Pec. Prince regent Alexander signed an Order in June 1920, and Serbian Patriarchy was proclaimed on 12th of September 1920. The relations between church and state were defined by Serbian Orthodox Church Law from 8th November 1929 and the Constitution of Serbian Orthodox Church from 16th November 1931. Election law of Serbian Patriarch, from 6th April 1930, secured state influence for the head of the Church during era of King Alexander I Karadjordjević's regime and the policy of Integral Yugoslavism which aimed at overcoming tribal, religious and regional differences.[1]

The creation of Kingdom of SCS sought not only new SOC's organisation, but also the expansion of its prestige. The SOC entered a competition with the Church of England and other Orthodox Churches for assumption of former influences of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Constantinople Patriarchy, which were lost by the political development in Russia and Turkey, during 1917-1923. Immediately after the First World War, the SOC was working on obtaining approval from the Ecumenical Patriarchy for unification of the Archbishopric of Karlovac-Belgrade and the Patriarchy in Pec with jurisdiction over all orthodox eparchies within Yugoslav borders. Benediction of the patriarch in Istanbul was necessary because he had religious authority over some of those eparchies. The two churches negotiated from the end of 1919 till mid-1920, and one of the most representative members of the SOC delegation was Bishop Nikolay Velimirović.[2] Although Ecumenical Holly Synod had decided to allow jurisdiction's transfer to the SOC, in March 1920, it was necessary to obtain patriarch's Tomos of Autocephaly. Since the throne of the ecumenical patriarch was vacant, Serbian patriarchy had to wait for new elections which were held on 8th December (25th November) 1921 in a very awkward

[1] Pržić 1933; Radić 1994, 349-351; 2002, 19-22.
[2] AY, 370-8-36, 446-450, 462-467; Slijepčević 1966, 556-560.

situation and there were many doubts about the regularity of the election and personality of the new Patriarch Meletios IV (Meletios Metaxakis) who was a relative and a political associate to Eleftherios Venizelos. The Greek government and the Metropolitan of Athens Theocletos I (Theocletos Monopoulos) were tending to obtain repudiation of the election throughout Orthodox world.[3]

The Kingdom of and the SOC recognised the election of a new patriarch, sending their diplomatic and religious representatives to attend his enthronement.[4] The Minister of Foreign Affairs Momchilo Ninchic informed the Yugoslav diplomatic representatives they were pleased with Meletios IV and instructed them to regard that information as strictly confidential.[5] Negotiations on Tomos of Autocephaly lasted from 13th to 20th March 1922, and the two sides reached an agreement to send one delegation of Ecumenical Patriarchy to Belgrade with Tomos. The delegates travelled with Yugoslav passports through Romanian territory in order to avoid all inconveniencies with the authorities in Thrace, since the Greek government intended to postpone their trip until the establishment of normal relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchy and the Metropolitan of Athens.[6] After the negotiations were completed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested the representative in Istanbul Radomir Shaponic to take a reserved attitude toward Meletios IV on 20th and 24th March 1922.[7] The Kingdom of SCS and the SOC did not want to give the false impression they were involved in any way in his election as they observed that Meletios IV used his good relations with the SOC trying to obtain recognition of other Orthodox patriarchs.[8] The Yugoslav government paid the second half of SOC's debt to Ecumenical Patriarchate, which amounted 500 000 French francs, in the beginning of April 1922.[9] The relations between the SOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchy had other political aspects. On a Peace Conference in Lausanne, Turks demanded dislocation of the Patriarchy of Constantinople from their territory. Patriarch Meletios IV personally asked King Alexander I and the

[3] AY, 370-20-61, 46-49; Nanakis 2008, 361, 363, 367.
[4] AY, 370-20-61, 41.
[5] AY, 341-6-12 telegraph reports of Plenipotentiary Minister in London Mihailo Gavrilovic to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conf.No.5 from 10th January and Conf.No.13 from 16th January 1922; telegraph instruction of Minister of Foreign Affairs Momchilo Ninchic to the Legation in London, Conf.No.388 from 13th January and Conf.No.626 from 21st January 1922; AY, 370-20-61, 36, 38.
[6] AY, 370-20-62, 469-474.
[7] AY, 370-20-61, 46-49.
[8] AY, 370-20-61, 51.
[9] AY, 370-20-61, 50.

Serbian patriarch Dimitriy for their support. The Yugoslav government requested from Great Britain, France and Italy to change their perspectives on the question and initialised joint actions with the Greek and Romanian governments, regardless to their attitudes toward Meletios IV in December 1922 - June 1923, which were crucial for the favourable solution.[10] The Serbian and Romanian Patriarchy, Athens and Cyprian Archbishopric also gave their support to Ecumenical Patriarchy, accepting an invitation to take part in a Conference for the unification of Church calendars. Moscow Patriarchy sent only observers and Patriarchies in Alexandria, Jerusalem and Antioch excused themselves with the political situation in their countries.[11] The Kingdom of SCS withdrew from open contacts with Meletios IV and his successors, after obtaining Tomos and after the successful defence of the Ecumenical Patriarchy at the Peace Conference.[12] However, Yugoslavia remained a political protector of the Ecumenical Patriarchy.[13]

Frictions between the two Patriarchies started emerging in their relations to other Orthodox Churches. The Serbian Orthodox Church continued following the state foreign policy in relation to new states/churches according to political alliances and hostilities. Also, Serbian Patriarchy was trying to extend its influence abroad. The most characteristic cases were those of Czechoslovakian Orthodox Church and Albanian Orthodox Church.

During Habsburgs rule in Czechs and Moravian lands, the Russian Orthodox Church had overwhelming influence. After the First World War and the foundation of Czechoslovak republic, in the ranks of catholic priests developed the following idea 'Away from Rome!' ('*Pryč od Rimu!*'), and one group was interested in approaching to the SOC and the Anglican Church. Czechoslovakian delegation visited Sremski Karlovci, 1921, and the Serbian Patriarch Dimitriy agreed upon consecration for three bishops. In the spring of 1923, the SOC ordained Bishop Gorazd (former catholic priest Matěj Pavlík).[14] Ecumenical Patriarchy ordained Savatiy (secular name: Antonín Vrabec) in June 1922, and gave Tomos for Autonomy of Archbishopric of Prague and whole Czechoslovakia in March 1923. Bishop Nikolay Velimirovic visited Bishop Savatiy in mid-1923 in order to explain to him that the SOC did not have any political intensions with appointing

[10] AY, 370-20-61, 53-55, 57, 98, 103-110; AY, 395-9-95, 48, 50.
[11] AY, 370-20-61, 59-97, 99-102, 148-156, 184, 185; AY, 334-Personnel - Section 334-105-381, 91-93; Radić 2011, 213-237.
[12] AY, 370-61-22, 193, 194, 199-214.
[13] AY, 388-12-32, 818.
[14] Pilipović 2010, 38-59; Radić 1997, 93-121.

Gorazd.[15] Yugoslav Foreign Service was unable to intervene with the enthronisation of Savatiy due to delayed instructions. The diplomatic mission in Istanbul and diplomacy could only help with retaining Ruthenians under the jurisdiction of the SOC. A problem emerged from the attitudes of President Tomas Masaryk and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Benes who did not accept the idea that the Czechoslovak minorities could be subordinated to foreign religious hierarchy, even Serbian Patriarchy.[16] In the conflict between Gorazd and Savatiy, the former chose open confrontation with the Ecumenical Patriarchy relying on the support of the SOC.[17] The Yugoslav-Czechoslovakian alliance imposed the involvement of diplomatic service in the religious question of Ruthenia. The result was the mission of Bachka's Bishop Iriney (secular name: Jovan Chirić) in Ruthenia in 1926.[18] In response the Ecumenical patriarchy sent the Exarch for Central Europe Bishop of Amasea German. In the end, Bishop Gorazd managed to win the elections for a Bishop of Prague and the Statute of Czechoslovakian Orthodox Church was enacted in 1929.[19]

More important frictions emerged between the SOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchy relating to the Albanian Orthodox Church (AOC). Albania was a theater of struggle between Yugoslav and Italian foreign policies throughout interwar period. Yugoslav Foreign Service decided to extend its basis for operational work in Albania after the Orthodox Archbishop Fan Stilian Noli came to power in 1924. Besides supporting the prominent Muslim Albanians Ahmet bey Zog and Ceno bey Kryeziu, and Catholic tribes in north Albania, the Kingdom of SCS wanted to cooperate with the Orthodox Albanians who were under the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church.[20] A plan for obtaining autocephaly for the AOC was discussed in Belgrade during the emigration of Ahmet bey Zog, Ceno bey Kryeziu and Bishop Vissarion (Vissarion Xhuvani) in the second half of 1924. Bishop Vissarion had been in Yugoslav service since the end of the First World War.[21] The question of autocephaly was raised in a

[15] Pilipović 2010, 63-65.
[16] AY, 370-20-61, 711-719, 721-731; Pilipović 2010, 76.
[17] Pilipović 2010, 66-69, 76.
[18] AY, 334 – Political - 334-7-25, 627, 628.
[19] Pilipovich 2010, 63, 70, 71, 76-79.
[20] More on Yugoslav-Albanian relations and historiography on this topic- see Mishić 2009, 13-71.
[21] AS, SIA, List III, Document No.114, Elaborate *'Albania in interwar period (written by memoirs, according to Confidential Archive and personal experience in Albania and Albanian, i.e. Balkan Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)*' written in Belgrade 11th May 1952, pp. 101, 10211th May 1952, 101, 102.

conversation of the new Albanian Prime Minister Ahmet bey Zog and the Yugoslav Plenipotentiary Minister in Tirana Bogoljub Jevtic in January 1925. The Supreme Council of the Albanian Orthodox Church appointed Bishop Vissarion for a provisional governor of the Metropolitan in Durrës, Tirana and Elbasan in April 1925. He was ordained in Herzeg Novi, in the Kingdom of SCS, by bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) Mihailo and Germogen (secular name: Grigorii Maksimov Ivanovich) in May 1925.[22] The enthronement of Vissarion was delayed by the Italian diplomatic activities in Albania, a reaction of the Ecumenical Patriarchy and a quarrel among Yugoslav Plenipotentiary Minister Branko Lazarevic and Yugoslav Military Attaché Lt. Col. Tanasije Dinic in 1925–1926.[23]

The Ecumenical Patriarchy started its counteraction directly by the AOC and through Orthodox Albanians in Romania during the autumn of 1925. The Albanian clergy rejected the invitation for negotiating the independence without autocephaly.[24] Further weakening of Yugoslav-Albanian relations and strengthening of Italian influence implicated an agreement between the Albanian and Greek government upon mutual cooperation between the AOC and the Greek Orthodox Church.[25] The Metropolitan of Trebizond Chrysanthus (secular name: Charilaos Filippidis) led a new delegation of the Ecumenical Patriarchy for negotiations with the AOC in Korçë in May 1926. The Yugoslav Foreign Service concluded that he was working for the interests of the Greek government and the Ecumenical Patriarchy and that autocephaly would be given only when they secure that all members of Holy Synod were Helenophiles.[26] Due to the political persecution, Bishop Vissarion fled once again to the Kingdom of SCS under the guise of medical treatment, and stayed in Sremski Karlovci as a guest of Serbian Patriarchy. He warned the Yugoslav Foreign Service and Serbian Orthodox Church that the Ecumenical Patriarchy withdrew only due to the fear of Yugoslav-Albanian military conflict in 1926, and would continue its efforts after the threat disappeared. Also, Bishop Vissarion asked for a raise of the monthly allowance which amounted to 2 000 French Francs during the conversations with the Chief of Albanian Section of Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Milan Stevanovic in August-September 1927.[27]

[22] Mishić 2009, 95, 96.
[23] Mishić 2009, 101, 120, 121.
[24] Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV initialised unsuccessful negotiations for independence of the AOC in 1923. AY, 74-3-10, 349-354; AY, 334-Political-4-18, 379, 318, 382; AY, 370-20-62 528-570.
[25] AY, 334-Political-4-18, 626-634.
[26] AY, 370-22-70, 307, 317-319.
[27] AY, 334-Political-4-18, 741, 748-751.

During 1928, the Serbian Patriarchy pressured the Yugoslav government to take immediate action upon the information that Italy was planning to found Uniate Church (Eastern Catholic Church) in Albania with the support of Vatican. The SOC made a plan with Bishop Vissarion and vicar bishop of the SOC for Shkodër Victor, to create a counterbalance in the Albanian Holy Synod toward Bishop of Berat Kristifor (secular name: Kristifor Kisi) and Bishop of Korçë Hierotheos, both Helenophiles. It was planned that the two bishops of the ROCA to ordain two Albanian bishops in Tirana. Also, the SOC and bishops Vissarion and Victor agreed upon appointing Serbian clergy in parish of Shkodër and that the bishop of Shkodër should be a member of the Albanian Holy Synod. The plan was only partially realised. Two Russian bishops illegally crossed the border on their way from Podgorica to Shkodër, and during the night ordained the two new Albanian bishops in Tirana. Although uninformed about these plans, the high clergy of the AOC and Ahmed bey Zog accepted that consecration because they were afraid of the Italian plans for a Uniate Church. But Victor was not elected in the Holy Synod of the AOC and he became vicar bishop of Vissarion, and soon after that he left Albania. Due to his unfulfilled promises, Plenipotentiary Minister in Tirana Stanoye Mihailović was recalled.[28] After his proclamation for the King of Albanians, Ahmet Zog initialised new negotiations with the Ecumenical Patriarchy in September 1928. Unwilling to escalate frictions with the SOC, the Patriarchy of Constantinople sent the Metropolitan of Trebizond Chrysanthus to Belgrade to make agreement with the Serbian Patriarchy on their standings toward the AOC. The Serbian Holy Assembly of Bishops resolved on 2nd November 1929 that they still recognised Victor as an administrator of Shkodër's eparchy, and do not recognise the autocephaly of AOC nor the new Orthodox bishops in Albania.[29] The Plenipotentiary Minister in Tirana Djordje Nastasijević blackmailed bishop Vissarion throughout 1929 that the continuous financial support depended on the number of Serbian priests appointed in the eparchy of Shkodër. The special envoy of King Alexander I and Minister of Foreign Affairs Voyislav Marinković, major Milosav Jelić[30] was trying to persuade Bishop Vissarion in 1929-1930 that he should take a more moderate attitude toward the SOC if he wanted to regain its support.[31] The Yugoslav diplomatic personnel in

[28] AS, SIA, III, 114, 102-105; AY, 74-3-10, 349-354; Pearson 2004, 306, 307.
[29] AY, 74-3-10, 349-354 Albanian Autocephaly Church. Summary review.
[30] On missions and role of Milosav Jelic in Albania, during 1919-1927, see Mishić 2009, 228-239.
[31] ASACA 14.439/397 and 14.439/399 major Milosav Jelic's reports on his missions in Albania, 12th November – 4th December 1929, 6th – 14th June 1930.

Tirana were not allowed to attend liturgies in Tirana. During the intensive work for Balkan Entente, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogoljub Jevtić sent two letters to the Serbian Patriarch Varnava (secular name: Petar Rosić) in December 1932 and January 1933 asking for his attitude toward the AOC. Patriarch Varnava replied on 2nd February 1933 that the Holy Synod still did not recognise ordains of Bishop Vissarion, but they are ready to acknowledge Autocephaly in cooperation with other Orthodox churches.[32]

The relations among Serbian Patriarchy and Bulgarian Exarchate were far more complicated due to various factors. Both churches had heavy inheritance of previous conflicts that arose in the context of national struggles for freedom and territorial aspirations, which were primarily diverted in Macedonia, especially during 1913-1918. Their relations during interwar period were further hampered by mutual mistrust and often hostile policies implemented by the Kingdom of SCS/Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Third Bulgarian Empire. The main problem in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations was the Macedonian question. Until the Balkan wars Serbian and Bulgarian propaganda were trying to prove that in this region of the Ottoman Empire existed only Serbian or Bulgarian majority, respectively, while almost completely wiping out the existence of other ethnic elements.[33] After the First World War the social elites in Sofia continued to propagate the standpoint that the Bulgarians were majority in Southern Serbia, while the Yugoslav state annulled recognition of Bulgarian population on Yugoslav land. Thus, Bulgaria wanted to raise the issue of national minorities, which the Kingdom of SCS persistently avoided. The national minority issue entailed a number of other problems, among them school and church autonomy.[34]

Ecumenical patriarch's anathema cast upon Bulgarian Exarchate, in 1872, was not officially recognised by the SOC, but had an impact on the favourable decision of the Ecumenical Holy Synod and Patriarch Meletios IV to award all eparchies which were in the boundaries of SCS the Kingdom of SCS to the SOC's jurisdiction. During 1921, only four of seven bishops in South Serbia were enthroned and eparchies were officially included in the scope of the SOS in April 1922.[35] Throughout the interwar

[32] ASACA 14.439/398 major Milosav Jelic's report on his mission in Albania, 27th April – 9th May 1931; AY, 74-3-10, 349-354.

[33] On Serbian propaganda and comparative analyse of Serbian and Bulgarian propaganda statistics, see: Vojvodić 2002, 22-25.

[34] Sherrill 1921, 211, 212, 227, 231; Stojanov 1980, 38-51; Avramovski 1980, 61-66, 71-79, 85-97; 1980a, 149, 151-153; 1986, 7-10; Türkeş 1993, 125.

[35] Jovanović 2002, 362; Radić 1995 18, 19; Troitski 1933, 74-75; Yanić 1936, 610; Gligorijević 2002, 135, 136.

period, the SOC and state authorities paid attention to the work of the former Exarchate priest who admitted jurisdiction of the Serbian Patriarchate and pleaded for loyalty to Yugoslav kingdom.[36] On the other hand, Bulgarian Exarchate adopted the Law of Amendments and Supplements to the Law of the Bulgarian Exarchate in October 1920, allowing participation in the Church Council for dignitaries from the 'enslaved' territories. To the great astonishment of Bulgarian officials and Yugoslav Plenipotentiary Minister in Sofia Milan Rakić there was no reaction of Serbian Patriarchate.[37]

After the First World War, the SOC showed no interest in direct contacts with Bulgarian Exarchate, reducing them to meetings in international conferences. First contacts which had a significant impact on the relations between the Serbian Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate were within The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches. In that, as well as in other international church organisations initiated by protestant churches, the bishop of Ohrid Nikolay Velimirovic and the Metropolitan of Sofia Stefan (secular name: Stoyan Popgeorgiev Shokov) had important roles. Yugoslav National Assembly for The World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches had officially performed as a private organisation independent from the SOC. Some of its members were: bishop of Batchka Irinej Ciric, bishop of Dalmatia Irinej Djordjević (secular name: Milan Djordjević), bishop of Nish and later Metropolitan of Zagreb Dositey (secular name: Dragutin Vasić), but also politically active persons such as priest Valerian Pribicević (secular name: Vasilie Pribichević) and Dr. Vojislav Janjić. The importance of the World Alliance work was not only due to their annual conferences, but also to promoting regional conferences with participation of representatives of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Greek and Hungarian church. The First Regional Conference was held in Novi Sad in 1923; however the Bulgarian delegation had not taken part justifying its absence with the unsettled political situation in the country. From the Second Regional Conference held in Sinai in 1924 Serbian and Bulgarian delegations were regular participants. At the beginning there were no concrete results, while the Bulgarian delegations raised the issue of the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece.[38]

[36] AY, 334-Political-8-28, 148-151; AY, 63-5-64, 29 and 63-5-204, 29 reports of Minister of Army and Marine General Stevan S. Hadzic to Minister of Justice Dr Milan Srshkic, 1st July and 30th November 1929; Jovanović 2002, 197; 2011, 309.
[37] ASASA, 14.331-15 (1) Diary of Milan Rakic, entrance for 9th February 1921.
[38] AY, 334-Personnel-108-410, 131-138; Eldarov 2010, 174-177.

Yugoslav authorities have paid attention on activities of the Bulgarian Exarch Church (BEC) after the Metropolitan of Sofia Stefan held memorials for the assassinators of general Mihailo Kovacević and for the murdered father and brother of Ivan Mihailov Gavrilov in 1927.[39] Despite the worsening of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations, first act of friendship provided by the Serbian Orthodox Church was after the devastating earthquake that hit Bulgaria in 1928. The SOC has sent financial and material assistance over the bishop of Nish Dositey.[40]

The reopening of the conflict between the two churches was initiated by the Bulgarian Exarchate. Namely, Bulgarian church launched a broad campaign for the rights of the Bulgarian minority, initiated actions for removal of the Ecumenical patriarch's schism through the Romanian Orthodox Church and for recognition of the autocephalous the Albanian Orthodox Church. The information collected by the Yugoslav services resulted in the preparation of counteraction of the government in collaboration with the SOC. Some Yugoslav authorities emphasised that the propaganda of the Bulgarian Exarch Church was more dangerous than the Bulgarian propaganda, because it was shrouded under the cloak of Slav and Christian brotherhood and love.[41] The main discussion was prepared for the Conference of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through Churches in Avignon, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stipulated an action over Legation in London by the General Secretary Sir Willoughby Dickinson.[42] Following the presentation of the Bulgarian memorandum at

[39] AY, 334-Political-8-28, 356, 360; AY, 341-23-53 telegraphic reports of minister Vojislav Marinkovic to the Legation in London, Conf.No.12056 from 8th December and Conf.No.12504 from 18th December 1927.

[40] Avramovski 1986, 504.

[41] AY, 38 -26-70 reports of Press Attaché in Sofia Branislav Denic to the Director of the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers Milan Marjanovic, Conf.P.B.No.382 from 6th July, Conf.P.B.No.427 from 16th July, Conf.P.B.No.477 form 22nd July, Conf.P.B.No.471 from 26th July, Conf.P.B.No.506 and Conf.P.B.No.507 from 6th August, Conf.P.B.No.525 from 14th August, Conf.P.B.No.534 from 19th August, Conf.P.B.No.537 from 22nd August, Conf.P.B.No.596 from 5th September, Conf.P.B.No.610 and Conf.P.B.No.612 from 11th September, Conf.P.B.No.618 from 14th September 1929.

[42] AY, 341-23-54 telegraph instructions Kosta Kumanudi to the Legation in London, Conf.No.10242 from 9th September 1929, Chargé d'Affaires Pavle Karovic to the Rt. Hon. Sir Willoughby Dickinson, K.B.E., 10th September 1929; Pavle Karovic's note on telephone conversation with H. Charles, secretary of Sir Willoughby Dickinson, conducted on 11th September 1929 at 2 PM, Chargé d'Affaires Pavle Karovic to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11th September 1929, H. Charles, secretary of Sir Willughby Diskinson, to P. Karovitch, 12th September 1929.

the Conference, it was agreed that Serbian and Bulgarian delegations should hold a separate meeting to discuss the presented issues. One of the direct results of this meeting was an agreement to hold a Bulgarian-Serbian Conference in Sofia. However, upon conclusion of the Conference in Avignon, a public debate began over the press in Sofia and Belgrade about the essence of the talks in Avignon. Metropolitan Stefan claimed that the Serbian delegation acknowledged the existence of the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslav territory, and that it was begging the Bulgarian delegation to withdraw the memorandum from the agenda.[43] According to Bishop Irinej Djordjevic the Serbian delegation presented to the Bulgarian delegates two options. Either they would discuss issues mentioned in the memorandum at the Conference in Avignon which would open discussion on all the other problems that prevented better Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations or the Bulgarian delegation would withdraw memorandum and they would open direct talks that were aimed at soothing the atmosphere. Metropolitan Stefan understood all repercussions of public debate and chose the second option.[44] Metropolitan Stefan tried to respond through the Plenipotentiary Minister in Sofia Ljubomir Neshić who advised him to avoid discussions with the Serbian delegates through the press and directed him to straight communication with the SOC.[45]

The Bulgarian-Serbian Conference in Sofia was not held in 1929,[46] and the Yugoslav intelligence service continued to monitor the propaganda work of Metropolitan Stefan against the Kingdom of SCS.[47] According to the report which Bishop Irinej Ciric had submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in November 1931, the Conference was delayed for confusions that occurred in the ranks of the Serbian and Bulgarian delegations due to various political factors.[48] Also, the death of Patriarch

[43] AY, 38-26-70 reports of Press Attaché in Sofia Branislav Denic to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.658 from 30th September, Conf.P.B.No.663 from 2nd October, Conf.P.B.No.675 from 8th October 1929.
[44] *Vreme* and *Politika* from 6th October 1929.
[45] AY, 334-Political-8-28, 555.
[46] AY, 38-26-70 report of Press Attaché in Sofia Branislav Denic to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.789 from 11th November 1929.
[47] AY, 38-26-70 reports of press attaché in Sofia Branislav Denic to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.761 from 1st November, Conf.P.B.No.801 from 15th November, Conf.P.B.No.802 from 16th November and Conf.P.B.No.813 from 22nd November 1929.
[48] AY, 395-23-240, 577-583; AY, 370-20-61, 426-433.

Dimitriy and the election of Varnava sparked a considerable discussion and vigorous response in the Bulgarian publics. Accusing the former Metropolitan of Skopje that he was elected by Court and the so-called 'White Hand' and that he was responsible for many murders committed in South Serbia, Bulgarian press did not spare the personality of the new Serbian Patriarch, writing about him: 'He is a Stalin dressed in a black cassock', 'Varnava is unrestrained Serbian chauvinist and furious Bulgarophobe' and that the former Bishop of Skopje Firmilian (secular name: Dimitrije Drazhic) was a bandit of a kind and his successor Varnava 'was even more unholy and more ruthless'. The main propaganda aim of those articles was primarily directed against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but it could not leave a favorable impression on the SOC.[49] The propaganda against the Serbian Patriarch Varnava was extended against the work of the two churches for the rapprochement between the nations and against the Bulgarian delegation which attended the funeral of Patriarch Dimitriy and the enthronement of Patriarch Varnava.[50]

After the death of the Metropolitan of Vratza Neofit (secular name: Grigorii Ivanov Shivachev), a new opportunity aroused for direct contact between the dignitaries of the two churches. The representative of SOC at the funeral was Bishop of Nish Dositej. Returning to Nish, he submitted an oral report to the Deputy Head of Moravian County about his talks with tsar Boris III and the Bulgarian dignitaries. His main focus was on the conversation with Metropolitan Stefan, considering him as the most influential amongst the Bulgarian clergy, a true Bulgarian, a very ambitious man close to the Bulgarian monarch, but Bishop Dositey thought he was not a suitable person to conduct the rapprochement policy as he was unwilling to endure personal sacrifices. Nevertheless, the main part of the report was dedicated to the declarations of Metropolitan Stefan on obstacles which the Bulgarian Exarchate had in conducting the rapprochement policy: 1) Pros were the change of attitude of the

[49] AY, 38-26-70 reports of Deputy Press Attaché in Sofia Boshko Tokin to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.160 from 17th April, Conf.P.B.No.172 from 26th April, Conf.P.B.No.173 from 30th April, Conf.P.B.No.190 from 10th May 1930; report of Press Attaché Velimir Krisovic to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.190 from 10th May 1930; AY, 341-7-14 Counsellor of the Legation in London to the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conf.No.816 from 11th October 1930.

[50] AY, 38-27-71 report of Deputy Press Attaché Boshko Tokin to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.P.B.No.183 from 9th May 1930.

Metropolitan of Stara Zagora Pavle (secular name: Petar Popkonstantinov) after his one-week stay in Belgrade, the older clergy educated in Russia carrying the ideas of Slav cooperation and the dissatisfaction of the Bulgarian public provoked by the terror of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) against Bulgarian citizens; 2) Cons were the younger clergy educated in West Europe with no interest in Slav cooperation, distrust toward the Serbian idea of Integral Yugoslavia, Italian financial support for IMRO's activities against Bulgarian-Yugoslav rapprochement and the Macedonian emigrants in Sofia. Bishop Dostije suggested to the Yugoslav authorities: 1) careful and patient work toward rapprochement with Bulgaria, leaving initiative to the Bulgarians in order to avoid impression of any kind of pressure; 2) if they were not to be in a haste, they should not stall either, which could be dangerous for the Italian counteractions; 3) even if the rapprochement is impossible it could diminishe the influences of Italy and the IMRO.[51]

Due to its postponement, the Bulgarian-Serbian Conference became a pretext for a Regional Conference scheduled in October 1929 in Belgrade. The Management Board of the World Alliance sent its delegation to persuade two churches and ministries of foreign affairs to settle the matters. Due to the new frictions, the issue was finally disclosed before the meeting of the Management board of the World Alliance held in Cambridge in 1931. The expected quarrel among Bishop Irinej and Metropolitan Stefan was avoided by their reasonable approach, which had created an opportunity for continuation of negotiations.[52] Beside the postponements of the conferences, there was another reason for dissatisfaction of the SOC and Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The

[51] AY, 38-27-71 Deputy Head of Moravian county Mil. K. Jovanovic to the Department for State Protection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Central Press Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Conf.II.No.1783 from 20th May 1930.

[52] AY, 395-23-240, 577-583; AY, 395-36-306, 30, 31; AY, 370-20-61, 426-433; AY, 341-23-54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in London, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Patriarchy of the SOC, Conf.No.15069 Bu.-42 from 27th July 1931; Charge d'Affaires in London to the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Conf.No.419 from 11th August 1931; AY, 38-28-72 Press Attaché in Sofia Velimir Krisovic to the Central Press Bureau, Conf.P.B.No.239 from 20th August 1931; Archive of Yugoslavia, Reports and papers of the Permanent Delegation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to the League of Nations in Genève 159-9-2 reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations, Conf.No.9425.-Min. from 15th May and Conf.No.10192 Min.-5 from 26th May 1931.

Bulgarian Exarch Church took its part in broad diplomatic-religious propaganda for minority rights in 1931. The failure of this action had an implication on strengthening of the wing in the ranks of the BEC willing to collaborate with the SOC.[53] Nevertheless, that change was not immediately noticed by the Serbian National Assembly for the World Alliance. They were still focused on activities by Professor Stefan Tsankov whom they considered as an irreconcilable opponent to the rapprochement policy.[54] His speech at the Conference of the World Alliance in Genève, 1932, aroused a new debate among the Serbian and Bulgarian delegation, who organised several meetings and concluded that mutual issues should be discussed at bilateral conferences and not in front of the whole international community.[55] Thus, the Serbian delegation led by Bishop Nikolay Velimirovic was guest of Bulgarian National Assembly from 28th April to 3rd May 1933. The program of their visit and manners of mutual work aimed to help building trust and confidence among two nations and kingdoms. A signed Protocol stipulated further exchange of visits between clergy and professors and students of theological faculties. Also, they agreed upon a return visit of Bulgarian delegation and joint liturgy in Ohrid, scheduled for 1934.[56]

At the request of the Serbian Patriarchate, the Foreign Minister Bogoljub Jevtić asked in June 1933 whether the Romanian Patriarch Miron would support an action at the Ecumenical Patriarchate to withdraw the Anathema from 1872.[57] Although the Romanian Orthodox Church accepted the offer, the Romanian government proposed that ministers Bogoljub Jevtić and Nicolae Titulescu should consider first all political aspects of the Church issues in September 1933.[58] The outcry of the Balkan committee in London about founding of good relations between the SOC and the BEC, in September 1933, was countered by the government of Kimon Georgiev by Metropolitan Stefan in London in August 1934.[59] A return visit of the

[53] Eldarov 2010, 178-180.
[54] AY, 395-23-240, 577-583; AY, 370-30-61, 426-433.
[55] AJ, 395-27-260, 46; Anonym 1933, 46-47; Petrović 1933, 157-159; Yanić 1936, 610.
[56] AY, 74-50-68, 103-105; CSA,f. 460к, Bulgarian legation in Prague, op.2, a.e.55, 86, 87, 247, 248; Avramovski 1986a, 150, 155, 156; Petrović 1934; 1933, 331, 332; Stefan 1940, 3-5; Pashev 1940, 6-7.
[57] AY, 395-29-276, 75.
[58] AY, 395-29-276, 76.
[59] AY, 341-13-30 Acting Chief of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vladislav Martinac to the Royal Legation in London, Conf.No.21565 Bu.-39 from 8th November 1933; AY, 341-24-55 coded letter from Bogoljub Jevtic to the Royal Legation in London, Conf.No.17525 from 3rd August 1934.

Bulgarian delegation was not organised during 1934 and 1935[60] and Metropolitan Stefan was exposed to critics in the Bulgarian public and was pronounced a partner in the republican's conspiracy to overthrow tsar Boris III and Sachsen-Coburg und Gotha Dynasty.[61] During the negotiations and preparations for signing the Pact of Eternal and Inviolable Friendship between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Bishop Irinej Ciric and Dr. Vojislav Janjić made an agreement with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Milan Stoyadinović upon a return visit of the Bulgarian delegation,[62] which was organised in September 1936.[63] The relations between the two churches continued to evolve in the direction of cooperation and rapprochement until 1941.[64] The change of the BEC posture was manifested when the AOC asked for their support for the Memorandum of Bishop Vissarion on the minority issues prepared for the Conference of the World Alliance for International Friendship by the Churches in Lavrik, in September-October 1938. The Bulgarians refused to give their support, and the Prime Minister Georgi K'oseivanov ordered the plenipotentiary ministers in London, Rome and Paris to avoid conversations on minorities.[65]

AS, SIA - Archive of Serbia, Collections of the Security Information Agency.

ASACA, 14.439 - Archive of Serbian Academy of Science and Art, Personal collection of Vojislav Marinkovic.

ASASA-Personal collection - Archive of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts, Personal collection of Milan Rakic

AY, 334-Personnel - Archive of Yugoslavia, Reports and papers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Personnel Section;

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[60] AY, 38-31-76 Conf.P.B.No.2442 from 11th April 1936, annual report of Press Attaché in Sofia Dr Pavle Jevtic for the year 1935, report of Press Attaché Dr Pavle Jevtic to the Central Press Bureau, Conf.Np.204 from 18th June 1935; AY, 38-55-128 report without date on the Turkish press; AY, 74-50-68, 142-147, 165, 169, 187; Avramovski 1986a 238, 316; Pashev 1934, 118-120; Yanić 1936, 611; B. 1934, 136-139; 1934a, 144; 1934b, 52-56; Anonym 1934, 147, 148; Brakocvević 1934, 28-31; Eldarov 2010, 182.

[61] AY, 38-27-72 correspondence between Acting Chief of the Department for Foreign Press of the Central Press Bureau and Press Attaché in Sofia Dr Pavle Jevtic, Conf.No.640 from 29th January, Conf.No.49 from 7th February, Conf.No.54 from 14th February 1935.

[62] AY, 37 – Personnel - 37-23-182, 338, 445.

[63] Anonym 1936, 551; 1936a, 552-558; Yanich 1936, 609-611.

[64] Eldarov 2010, 182, 183.

[65] AY, 334-Political-4-18, 961-963; AY, 341-13-30 telegram from Stoyadinovic to the Legation in London, Conf.No.2301 from 3rd November 1938.

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AY, 38 - Archive of Yugoslavia, Reports and papers of the Central Press Bureau of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

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AY, 395 - Archive of Yugoslavia, Reports and papers of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Romania – Bucharest;

AY, 63 - Archive of Yugoslavia, Records and Papers of the Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Confidential Archive

AY, 74 - Archive of Yugoslavia, Records and papers of the Court of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 74-3-10, 349-354 Albanian Autocephaly Church. Summary review.

CSA - Central State Archive (Sofia).

AY, 370 - Archive of Yugoslavia, Records and papers of the Legation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in Turkey – Constantinople, Ankara.

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Anonym (1934) 'Nasha poseta i boravak u Bugarskoi', *Svetoslavl'e* 2, 28-31.

Anonym (1936) 'Bugarski velokodostoinitsi u Jugoslavii', *Glasnik* No.24-25 from 13th September 1936, 551.

Anonym (1936a) 'Manifestatsiya ljubavi i bratske snage izmezhdu Bugar, a i nasheg naroda. Spasonosan rad na delu mira', *Glasnik* No.24-25 from 13th September 1936, 552-558.

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(1934a) 'Yugoslovensko-bugarski pregled, Sofia, 1934', *Svetoslavl'e 2,* 144.

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Political Morality and the Recall of Members of Parliament in the Bulgarian Parliamentary Tradition

Todor Galunov

Abstract: Over the period of Bulgarian Socialism (1944 – 1989) the recall of elected parliamentarians was one of the instruments used by the totalitarian regime. The idea that those people's representatives who had betrayed people's trust had to leave the Parliament was part of the mechanism within the Bulgarian Communist Party for punishing the activists who had lost their position among the ruling elite. Recall procedures were typical of a closed society, which was far from the principles of democracy and political morality. Recalls were performed for propaganda reasons aiming to demonstrate the 'iron' unity of the communist elite and the lack of a political alternative.

Key words: parliamentarians, instruments, totalitarian, party, democracy, constitution, political, imperative, mandate, propagated

Резюме: В периода на българския социализъм (1944-1989) отзоваването на депутати е един от пропагандните инструменти на тоталитарния режим. Идеята, че народните представители изгубили доверието на народа трябва да излязат от състава на парламента е част от вътрешнопартийните механизми на Българската комунистическа партия за разправа с дейците загубили позициите си в управляващата върхушка. Процедурите по отзоваване са типични за едно затворено общество, стоящо далеч от принципите на демокрацията и политическия морал. Отзоваването се прави и с пропагандна цел, целяща да покаже 'желязното' единство на комунистическия елит и липсата на политическа алтернатива.

The Turnovo Constitution, adopted on 16 April 1979, introduced, under certain provisions, the free parliamentary mandate. Parliamentarians represented their electorate as well as the nation as a whole. A recall was not an option. Until the 'historic' changes after 9 September 1944 there was not a parliamentary recall procedure. However, the establishment of the new regime led to a 'revolutionary' action regarding parliamentarians' status. On 8 June 1945 the regents Venelin Ganev, Tsviatko Boboshevski

and Todor Pavlov endorsed the adopted by Kimon Georgiev's cabinet Members of Parliament Electoral Act – Ordinance, which regulated the elections for the 26th Ordinary National Assembly. Shortly after that it went through a number of amendments, which showed that the text was not legally precise.

A key point in the election or rather the post-election process was that for the first time in Bulgarian political practice such a restrictive pattern of behaviour of the would-be elected parliamentarians was introduced, namely the imperative mandate. It was explicitly stated that the National Assembly would be allowed to revoke parliamentarians' mandate – even when lawfully elected – if they betrayed brutally the ideas and programme of their office. The proposal was made solely by the governing body of the political party and only then the National Assembly recalled the mandate. Such a recall procedure led to parliamentarians' instability. They had to follow strictly the party's programme even if it did not meet people's real needs. On the other hand, that prevented the substitution of the vote by the parliamentarians in the National Assembly who would dare to leave the parliamentary group or betray the ideas they had been supposed to defend as representatives of the constituency. The recall of the mandate raised the problem of electing a new member of parliament. Generally, the vacancy was taken by the next on the list. If the list was exhausted, though, a by-election in the same constituency was held. The text is imprecise. General elections were held by proportional representation, whereas by-elections, as stipulated, were for one mandate and proportion could not be applied. Therefore, the election should have been determined by the majority, which is not clarified in the law.

On 4 December 1947 Bulgaria adopted the Second Constitution in its history, also known as the Dimitrov's Constitution. It stipulated the imperative mandate. Parliamentarians were accountable to their electorate. They could be revoked before the end of their mandate. The recall procedure was regulated by law. Such a measure was a diversion from the principles of the free mandate, which even though imprecisely formulated, existed until 1945 in Bulgaria. It provided parliamentarians with the opportunity to work calmly in the parliament without worrying about premature termination of their mandate. A regime of insecurity of the people's representation was established, which was in harmony with the gradual imposing of the totalitarian regime and aimed to depersonalize the Parliament. The fact that parliamentarians were elected with secret vote was not taken into consideration and they could be recalled with open vote. The secret vote is one of the most important achievements of

democracy, but at the historical period observed here the traditional understanding of democracy had already been left behind.

The first parliamentary recall procedures started in accordance with the Constitution and the Election Act. On 2 March 1948 the National Assembly discussed a letter by the National Committee of the Otechestven Front (OF) claiming the recall of the following members of the National Assembly: Lyuben Gumnerov, Spas Nikolov and Mladen Bidzhov, who 'betrayed the Front's ideas'. The grounds were found in their action leading to personal benefits. A special commission was set up to investigate the case. It worked extremely quickly, which raised doubts about the precision of its work. On 4 March the report was ready. Gumnerov – Bulgarian Communist Party (communists) - was accused of illegal wine sale, which he had profited from without paying excise tax to the state. Mladen Bidzhov – Bulgarian Agrarian National Union - was charged with wasteful expenditure and embezzlement of considerable funds. Nikolov's actions - Bulgarian Agrarian National Union – were similar: personal benefits, assigning posts to relatives, cheap goods distribution.[1] The three of then were revoked from the Grand National Assembly and their seats were taken by the next on the electoral lists.

On 18 December 1949 the Parliamentary Elections under the new law were held. The new National Assembly was named the First National Assembly. The old 'bourgeoisie' way of numbering had been left behind. In 1951 the First Ordinary National Assembly used its authority to recall parliamentarians under the provisions of Art. 73 of the Election Act several times. On 31 August a proposal was filed at the Bureau of the National Assembly by the National Committee of the Otechestven Front for the recall of the following parliamentarians of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union: Petar Kamenov and Nikola Pavlov (both of them from Vratsa's Constituency) and Stefan Svetozarov (Vidin's Constituency). The three of them had been charged with 'performing brutal fractional and hostile actions', which had been the reasons for their expulsion from the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union.

The next one was the former member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and former Minister of Agriculture Titko Chernokolev (Kolarovgrad's Constituency). The accusations were that he had been carrying out 'a hostile action against the Party's policy, the Government and the cooperative movement in the country leading to disorganization of the Labour Cooperative Agricultural Farms (TKZS)'. He had already been expelled from the Bulgarian

[1] SD, 6 VNS I, 139-148.

Communist Party for those reasons, which made it possible for him to be dismissed from the National Assembly. The Letter of the National Committee of the Otechestven Front was from the 1 November and the retribution was immediate. The very same day the proposal for the recall of the four members of the National Assembly was discussed at a plenary session. A five-member commission was established and headed by Dr. Ivan Pashov to conduct an inquiry on the available evidence and to propose a decision. The commission reported on the following day. It confirmed the accusations and declared that the four parliamentarians had broken the 'basic rules and discipline of their parties'. The arguments were 'smashing' and proved that there was not any chance of expressing political interests outside the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Agricultural National Union. The National Assembly voted unanimously for the recall of the parliamentarians. Their seats were immediately taken by the next on the lists: Yordan Parvanov and Vesko Filipov (Vratsa's Constituency), Velko Tsvetkov (Vidin's Constituency) and Osman Ismailov Ebazarov (Kolarovgrad's Constituency). It is worth mentioning that they had been waiting in the building of the Parliament and took vows immediately.[2] This fact shows that everything had been decided beforehand and the decision of the National Assembly was a mere formality. Thus, the provisions of the Election Act for the recall of parliamentarians were used as an instrument for political, and possibly personal, retribution inside the party.

On 21 December 1951 the National Assembly carried out another recall of one of its members. The procedure started with the request of the National Council of Otechestven Front submitted to the Presidium of the National assembly on 19 December. The person under attack was Encho Baychev – elected by Turnovo Constituency as a representative of Otechestven Front – who 'publicly declared his disapproval of the Party's and Government's decisions and betrayed working people's trust'. A five-member commission was elected and assigned to investigate the case during the same session. Within hours the investigation was done! It is obvious that a detailed inquiry did not take place, but that did not hinder the reporting member of the commission – Dr. Ivan Pashov – from announcing the four offences of the MP at the plenary session:

1. Declared his disapproval of the policy of Otechestven Front and the Government and broke all connections with the electorate;
2. Declared himself against the loan for the development of the national economy and savings;

[2] SD, 1 ONS IV, 17-19.

3. His behaviour discredited him morally in front of the working people;

4. Betrayed the principles, programme and statutes of Otechestven Front, which he had been elected to follow.

Based on the above stated, Encho Baychev's recall as an MP and his replacement by the next on the list – Petar Atanaschev - were put to the vote.[3] The Assembly voted obligingly in favour of the termination of the MP's mandate without requiring further inquiry. It was obvious that the highest legislative body had become docile and did not have the courage to want justice even for the members elected through the adopted by the new political elite pseudo- democratic electoral system.

The evolution of the electoral system between 1947 and 1952 moved towards diminishing the existing opportunities for political choice and abolishing the remains of political pluralism. Proportional representation was merely formal and practically impossible because it was a single-party regime dominated totally by the Bulgarian Communist Party. The other party – the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union - was purely ornamental, it was there to show to the outside world a more democratic tint of the regime, but it did not take part in the poll outside BCP's scheme.

The elections in 1953 saw the transition from the proportional representation to the majority electoral system. Single-member constituencies were introduced. The practice of having one candidate for one seat was established. The main argument for such a system was justified by the necessity for the citizens to 'get to know' their representatives better and to turn to them if 'in need'. Further 'strengthening' of the connection between representatives and electorate was also provided by law banning one candidate from running in two different districts. Candidates were not supposed to 'expand' their election campaign. There was a big fuss over representatives' assignments. They were assigned by citizens and were instigated by the 'creative' initiative of the people. Examples can be taken from the practice of the People's Councils elections, when citizens 'competed' to give assignments to their representatives. Breaking 'assignment' records became popular.

The propagated close connection between 'voters' and 'representatives' was also expressed in the possible recall of people's representatives elected by the majority. A recall procedure could be started on request of the organization which had nominated the representative if it proved the representative's betrayal of the principles and programme he or

[3] SD, 1 ONS IV, 108; 119-120.

she had been elected to defend. The decision was taken by the National Assembly by half plus one majority vote. By-elections were held to fill up the vacancy. Such a regulation is glaringly anti-democratic. It is not reasonable for a parliamentarian to be elected with the vote of 20,000 voters and to lose their mandate with the vote of 200 members of Parliament. It is obvious that the stipulated norm provided an opportunity for in-party political repression against representatives who had lost their positions within the ruling elite. The recall followed Valko Chervenkov's instructions for 'permanent people's control' over representatives' work.

Unlike the previous Parliament, now the Second National Assembly did not use its authority to do any parliamentarians' recall procedures. Changes in the composition of the National Assembly were, however, made after vacant seats had become available due to the death or the transfer to different jobs of some of the representatives.

On 22 December 1957 elections for the Third National Assembly were held. It was necessary to open seats for the 'worthy' party veterans and the greedy for power new party functionaries. Seats for the old party 'soldiers' were not planned, though.

1961 was characterized with some in-party 'cleansing'. The most notable one was done at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian National Party, held on 28 – 29 November 1961, when the First Secretary of BCP – Todor Zhivkov – managed to pass the decision to remove the ex-PM and ex-Secretary General - Valko Chervenkov – from the post of vice-chair of the Council of Ministers. The National Assembly was 'advised' to carry out the decision.[4]

On 9 December 1961 the party's decision was made effective as a public act. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers – A. Yugov – presented a motion and the Presidium of the National Assembly, headed by Dimitar Ganev, issued a decree to remove from office the Prime Minister Valko Chervenkov. The campaign for the removal of the former party leader had been well planned and balanced. Elections for the Fourth National Assembly were on the way and the ruling elite were preparing a new re-arrangement of the political strata. At the same time, it was another example of breaking with the Stalinist past – past partially associated in Bulgaria with Valko Chervenkov. Thus, another stage of the power struggle among the powerful within BCP ended.

On 25 February 1962 the parliamentary elections for the Fourth National Assembly were held in the 321 majority constituencies in Bulgaria. The constituencies had to elect one representative each. Within its

[4] Gruev 2009, 144.

mandate the Parliament carried out a number of significant recall procedures of people's representatives. They are indicative of how in the conditions of a totalitarian political model the loss of in-party positions is equivalent to political death of former leaders. On 4 November 1962 at a plenum of the Central Committee of BCP the party leader Todor Zhivkov made a crushing blow to his opponents. The former Prime Minister and leader of the party Chervenkov, the Prime Minister Anton Yugov and his deputy and former Minister of Interior Georgi Tsankov, another former Minister of Interior Rusi Hristozov, and other party activists were accused of the repressions and atrocities during the Cult of Personality period. Valko Chervenkov was expelled from the Bulgarian Communist Party and the plenum took the decision to remove from office the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.[5] On 19 November 1962 the docile National Assembly made the decision effective. However, Todor Zhivkov's opponents remained part of the composition of the NA. It was rightfully estimated that due to the decline of the institution they would not be able to play an important role as an in-party opposition. That situation lasted for about a year and a half. On 27 May 1964 the National Council of Otechestven Front, headed by Encho Staykov, adjudged that A. Yugov, G. Tsankov, R. Hristozov, the former Minster of Interior Georgi Krumbiliev, the former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party Ivan Raykov, the former Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Interior Apostol Kolchev had committed grave offences and seriously harmed BCP and the state. It was proved that after they had been removed from the central party bodies, they did not appear in front of their electorate and lost its trust. Therefore, they had practically stopped performing their duties as people's representatives. Such offences required the execution of Art. 10 of the Election Act of People's Republic of Bulgaria, which stipulated recall of the parliamentarians who had lost people's trust. The move was supported by motivated accounts of the regional committees of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sliven, Silistra, Targoviste, Blagoevgrad and Pleven, whose constituencies had elected the above-mentioned people's representatives. The retribution was quick. The Commission of Enquiry into the elections of 10 June 1964 was activated. Its speaker – Dafina Velikova – presented a motion to the National Assembly to decide to recall the six parliamentarians. Out of the present 256 people's representatives no one dared to defend the former leaders, who had been vigorously applauded as ministers and functionaries by the very same Parliament just two years earlier. The decision was taken unanimously and

[5] Gruev 2009, 145.

with no debates. That group recall of six renowned functionaries of the Bulgarian Communist Party had probably been the most massive parliamentarian cleansing, done according to all formal procedures, in the years of socialism. The seats of the former MPs were taken after a by-election carried out in August and the new MPs were: Georgi Petrov, Apostol Pashev, Boris Stoev, Ivan Popov, Mariy Ivanov and Kostadin Gyaurov, who were meant to 'reinforce' the National Assembly and to follow the 'April direction' of the new well-established leader – Todor Zhivkov.

Altogether, within the four-year mandate of the 4th National Assembly, 16 by-elections were held – 10 because of parliamentarians' death and 6 because of recall. This renewal did not influence in any way the Parliament's work. In general, the by-election idea in a pluralistic society is to reflect the electorate's current attitudes and thus to reflect more precisely the real influence of the different political parties and social groups. During the 1960s such an idea could not be implemented. Society was deeply stuck into the 'big standstill' and the electoral system served the purposes of the regime and was used as an extra instrument for in-party squabbles, punishment and praise. The system envisaged involvement in the campaign with various assignments and commitments. However, the introduced imperative mandate was increasingly used to 'control' the elected MPs and they were asked to do personal favors for people of their constituencies. The MPs chosen by the majority entered the National Assembly not as individuals but as part of the party mechanism and became elements of the totalitarian system, which used the National Assembly as a cover for people's sovereignty. All the decisions that the Parliament formally passed had been doomed to be taken and voted unanimously. There was not a single case registered in which even one chosen by the 'majority' MP voted 'against' or abstained. All the elections – general or partial – were characterized with nearly 100% activity of the voters and were won by votes close to 100%. The number of the parliamentarians increased in parallel with the diminishing function of the Parliament. It is indicative that at the end of its mandate the Fourth National Assembly made amendments in the Constitution once again raising the number of people's representatives. On 8 December 1965 it was voted that one Member of Parliament would be elected by 20,000 and not 25,000 citizens.[6] Thus yet another increase of the convenient parliamentary seats was set to satisfy the 'ever growing' needs of the ruling elite. The majority system was meant to guarantee a smooth implementation of the new initiative and truly free and pluralistic elections were absolutely out of

[6] Metodiev & Stoyanov 1990, 40.

the question. The propaganda scheme for MP recall worked actively again after the Fifth National Assembly had adopted the *Zhivkov's* Constitution in 1971. The imperative mandate remained, which allowed premature recall of MPs. Another campaign for establishing and expanding 'socialist democracy' was under way. As a result, on 17 April 1972 the National Assembly voted the first in Bulgarian political history Act on the Terms and Conditions for Recall of People's Representatives and Councilors. Formally, the imperative mandate was strengthened even further. The grounds for recall were:

1. Betrayal of the ideas and programme the MP was chosen to protect
2. Regular neglect of the duties
3. Improper behaviour incompatible with the 'high' rank of the MP or councilor.

A recall motion could be put forward by: one third of the electorate from the relevant constituency and organizations and associations entitled to appoint candidates for members of parliament and councilors. The recall proposal was sent to the National Council of the Otechestven Front if it concerned a member of parliament and to the District Committee of the Otechestven Front if it concerned a councilor. The officials subjected to be recalled were informed in a letter within one week after the notice had been received. They were given the opportunity to reply and protest within seven days. When the objection was rated as ungrounded, the files of the people's representatives were sent to the State Council or, respectively, to the District People's Council of the councilors. The mentioned institutions considered the file within two weeks and set down a voting date, which had to be announced at least one month earlier. Voting was direct with two ballots of different colour and text: 'for the recall' and 'against the recall'. The recall was effective if more than half of the voters had voted and more that half of them expressed their will for the person who had lost people's trust to leave the National Assembly. The decision on the recall of the parliamentarian was announced in the official gazette, and the recall of the councilor in the relevant executive committee was reported to the District People's Council. The above said shows that formally the recall was direct and mirrored the election procedure of the parliamentarian.

On 27 June 1973 the National Assembly launched the debate on a new election bill. The bill was personally submitted by the Chairman of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Chairman of the State Council - Todor Zhivkov. The purpose was clearly to show the importance of yet another noisy 'reform'.

The first main emphasis of the planned reform was laid on codifying the legal matter regarding the election of people's councils, the National Assembly and the recall of parliamentarians. The arguments behind the proposed bill were that systematized norms would facilitate the implementation of the election norms by the official bodies responsible for the elections.

The fifth emphasis of the reform envisaged the parliamentarians' recall procedure. A recall proposal was to be made by one fifth of the voters and not one third. Thus, seemingly, there was to be a broader opportunity for a stricter people's control over guilty politicians, but bearing in mind the nature of the political system, the amendment was of purely formal value. A recall could also be proposed by the central governing bodies of parties and public organizations. A recall of councilors could be proposed by the district governing bodies of the above mentioned organizations. Parliamentarians and councilors had the right to object. If objections were not accepted, the documentation was forwarded to the State Council. The State Council set for – against voting procedure for the recall, which was carried out in the relevant constituency, similar to the election procedure. An opportunity for campaigning for or against the recall was provided. The new thing was that the decision on starting the recall procedure was seized from the Otechestven Front and taken over by the State Council. The idea was to set unified criteria, but in fact, that ensured further centralization and, in particular, centralized rule of the Chairman of the State Council – Todor Zhivkov. The amendment was dictated by the fact that Otechestven Front had lost long time ago its positions as an organization and did not have any importance compared with the state bodies and the power of the party.

The recall idea was adopted in the new Election Act, which was enforced on 29 June 1973. The Act was, in its essence, an election code. All recall options, though, remained purely on legal and theoretical level until the collapse of socialism. The Bulgarian Parliament was so dysfunctional that parliamentarians' positions were not seen as powerful positions but rather as a further bonus to the position within the party or other 'merits'. We can also raise the question of what the political morality was in the recall procedure. Did the citizens who had voted a 100% to elect the parliamentarians have, actually, the right to recall them? How come they voted unanimously and then uncomplainingly, as the 'socialist tradition' required, demanded a recall? These questions were not answered until the collapse of the socialist system in 1989. The issue of political morality was clearly left behind in the context of the totalitarian regime.

SD – Stenografski dnevnitsi (Shorthand Transcripts).

SD, 6 VNS – Stenografski dnevnitsi na 6 VNS (Shorthand Transcripts of the 6th Grand National Assembly).

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Attempts of the Holy See to invite local Eastern Orthodox Churches to participate in the work of the Second Vatican Council

Rumen Vatashki

Abstract: The Second Vatican Council (The 21st Ecumenical Council for Roman Catholic Church) is one of the most important events for the Christian Church. The broad circle of questions discussed there outlines to the biggest degree the development of the theological idea during the second half of the 20th century. Discussed topics find reactions in whole Christian world because Roman Catholic Church has a serious intellectual and theological potential to be the leader.

The Second Vatican Council is a deed of Pope John XXIII (Archbishop Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli), apostolic visitor and delegate in Bulgaria from 1925 to 1934. He is the inspirer and organizer of that Council that leaves permanent marks in the life of the Roman Catholic Church in 20th century.

In June 1961 for three years time in the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate Constantinople reside two official delegates of Pope John XXIII – Archbishop Yakov Testa, rector of the Pope Academy in Rome, and the adorable Alfons Ras, the rector of Pope Institute for oriental researches in Rome. The purpose of their visit is to introduce the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the preparation for the Second Vatican Council.

Johannes Willebrands, Secretary of Secretariat for Christian Unity, arrives by plane on 14th February 1962 in Constantinople.

No doubt the first contact between supreme clergymen allows Eastern and Western Churches go one to another from the position of Christian Love in the name of common Church Unity, which is hardly feasible, because there are obstacles mostly of political reasons besides the religions ones, of course.

Nevertheless dialogue continues also during the sessions of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and this gives the chance the confidence between the churches to be strengthened.

I am fully convinced that if Eastern and Western Churches want to go to the true rapprochement together, they must take back their trust to each other in the spirit of Christian Love, to rebuke the proselytism in all of its shapes and unions to be rejected.

Key words: The Second Vatican Council, Holy See, Roman Catholic Church, Pope Institute for oriental researches

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Резюме: Вторият ватикански събор (XXI вселенски събор за Римокатолическата църква) е едно от важните събития в историята на християнската църква. Широкият кръг от въпроси, които се разглеждат, очертава до голяма степен развитието на богословската мисъл през втората половина на XX век. Обсъжданите теми намират отзвук в целия християнски свят, защото Римокатолическата църква има сериозен интелектуален и богословски потенциал, за да бъде водеща.

Вторият ватикански събор е дело на папа Йоан XXIII (архиепископ Анджело Ронкали), апостолически посетител и делегат в България от 1925 до 1934 г. Той е вдъхновителят и организаторът на този събор, който оставя трайни следи в живота на Римокатолическата църква през XX век.

През юни 1961 г. в продължение на три дни в седалището на Вселенската патриаршия Цариград пребивават двама официални пратеници на папа Йоан XXIII – архиепископ Иаков Теста, ректор на Папска академия в Рим, и благоговейният Алфонс Рас, ректор на Папския институт за ориенталски изследвания в Рим. Целта на посещението им е да запознаят Вселенската патриаршия с подготовката на Втори ватикански събор.

На 14 февруари 1962 г. в Цариград пристига със самолет Йоан Вилебрандс, секретар на Секретарията за единството на християните.

Без съмнение този първи контакти между висши клирици позволява на Източната и Западната църква да вървят една към друга от позицията на християнската любов в името на общото църковно единство, което е трудно осъществимо, тъй като на пътя му стоят най-вече причини от политически характер, освен религиозни, разбира се. Независимо от това диалога продължава и по време на заседанията на Втория ватикански събор (1962-1965) и това дава възможност да се засили доверието между църквите.

Мое дълбоко убеждение е, че за да могат да вървят заедно към истинско сближаване, Източната и Западната църква трябва да възстановят доверието си една към друга в духа на християнската любов, да осъдят прозелитизма във всичките му форми, а униите да бъдат отречени.

The Second Vatican Council (The 21st Ecumenical Council for the Roman Catholic Church) is one of the most important events for the Christian Church. The broad circle of questions discussed there outlines to a considerable degree the development of the theological idea during the second half of the 20th century. The discussed topics find reactions in the whole Christian world because the Roman Catholic Church has a serious intellectual and theological potential to be a leader.

As for the church itself, circumstances are favourable. Its internal life is relatively calm and the external threat – communism – does not succeed to influence it a lot. The general athmosphere when the Council is held is too different from the one of the last Council held in 1870. Not only Christians but also the other believers and atheists want to know the opinion of the Roman Catholic Church on the most important issues, namely the religious freedom, relations between the Church and the state, the role of laity etc. The decisions of the Second Vatican Council must show wheather the Roman Catholic Church is ready to transform and to

help the unity with the other Christian Churches.[1] Although we may not like to, here we find a 'Bulgarian trace', which is related to our church history. The Second Vatican Council is a deed of Pope John XXIII (Archbishop Angelo Roncalli), an apostolic visitor and delegate in Bulgaria from 1925 to 1934. He is the inspirer and the organizer of that Council which leaves permanent traces in the life of the Roman Catholic Church in the 20th century.

Communist countries allow Roman Catholic bishops from those countries to go to Rome. In such atmosphere negotiations begin between the Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church for sending observers. At the beginning there is an impression that the Church of Ellada and the other ancient patriarchates are not prone to send observers but during the work of the Council some of the local Orthodox Churches sent observers though.[2]

A couple of the Orthodox Churches as the Greek Church for example try to show an external lack of interest meanwhile they follow the events closely and lead an intensive dialogue with the other sister churches on topics concerning the decisions of the Council.

In June 1961 two official delagates of Pope John XXIII visit for three days Constantinople – the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate – Archbishop Yakov Testa, rector of the Pope Academy in Rome, and the adorable Alfons Ras, the rector of Pope Institute for oriential researches in Rome.[3] The purpose of their visit is to introduce the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the preparation for the Second Vatican Council.

The visit confirms the desire of Eastern and Western Churches for cooperation and helps creating a suitable atmosphere for communication between the two churches thus it triggers the beginning of further development as the Vatican internuncio in Turkey admits with confidence immediately after leaving the Pope Delegation.[4]

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[1] The Second Vatican Council. World review, October 1962. It concerns a magazine in English for church and international topics. A translation exists from English into Bulgarian - see CPRO, f. 549, inv. 3, f. u. 90; fol 103-104.

[2] In connection with the opening of the Second Vatican Council Athenian Professor V. Ioannidis publishes two articles in the newspaper Kathimerini on 11th and 12th October 1962 - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2507, fol.30-32.

[3] Ecumenical Patriarch wanted the the Bulgarian Patriarch to be informed very well for the established contact and the conversations held, he encloses a note to the main secretary of the Holy Synod in Constantinople. A letter from July 1961 of Patriarch Athenagoras, addressed to Patriarch Cyril - CPRO, f. 549, inv. 3, f. u. 90, fol. 171.

[4] N O T E from 18th August 1961 - CPRO, f. 549, inv. 3, f. u. 90, fol. 172-173.

On 14th February 1962 in Constantinople arrives Johannes Willebrands, the secretary of the Secretariat for Christian unity under the leadership of Cardinal Augustin Bea.

On 16th February the Commission of Christian issues at the Ecumenical Patriarchate consisting of the Metropolitan of Sardia Maxim, the rector of Theological School of Halki, the secular Metropolitan Chrysostomos, Archimandrite Simeon, the main secretary of the Holy Synod, and Patriarchal Deacon Evangelos, the secretary of the Commission, carries out a meeting with Willebrands.

The visit of Willebrands in Constantinople is semi-formal as its purpose is to pay their respects to His Holiness Ecumenical Patriarchate Athenagoras, to get a notion about his collaborators with the view of realization of the idea for rapprochement of Chrisitans and to introduce to them the preparation of the different commissions in connection with the forthcoming Second Vatican Council, which is scheduled for October 1962.[5]

No doubt that the first contact between the supreme clergymen allows Eastern and Western Churches to approach one another from the position of Christian Love in the name of the common Church Unity, which is hard to achieve mostly because of reasons of political character besides the religions ones, of course.

Regardless of that the dialogue continues during the sessions of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and allows the confidence between the churches to strengthen.

During the First Session Council Fathers learn that Pope John XXIII is seriously ill. That news brings confusion amongst the delagates and observers of the Council. Soviet party and state leader Nikita Khrushchev is one of the first politicians in the world who values the new line in the Vatican in defence of the peace, mutual understanding and friendship between the nations. A sign of sympathy is his telegram where he writes down the following: 'With deep regret we learnt about your ill health. This deeply disturbed us. With all my heart I wish you quick recovering to continue successfully your beneficial work to improve peace and collaboration between the nations'. His Holiness Patriarch Alexy of Moscow and All Russia also shows his brotherly sympathy: 'With grief we learnt about the disease of Your Holiness, we beg almighty God to give you health for many years to serve the Church of Christ and to continue your work proclaiming and affirming lasting peace in the world'. A

[5] Transcript of the report from 24th February 1962 of the Synodical Commission on All Christians questions to the Ecumenical Patriarchate - CPRO, f. 549, inv. 3, f. u.90, fol. 51-58.

number of high-standing statesmen from different coutries express their respect to Pope John XXIII. On 7th March 1963 His Holiness Pope meets the special messanger of the prime minister of the USSR Alexei Adjubey and his wife.

Roncalli's last encyclical 'Pacem in terris' ('Peace on earth') dates from 11th April 1963. John XXIII considers in it the current theological and sociological problems such as the dignity of man, violated in the face of many underprivileged, abandoned, sick and poor people. 'World peace a welfare which concers all people alike. That is why we open our hearts for all those who wish to live in peace and in humane conditions'.[6]

The news for the death of Pope John XXIII comes on 3rd June 1963. Under his leadership the Roman Catholic Church begins policy for rapprochement between churches and it is recognized in the church and social circles. Bulgarian Church reacts adequately to the sad event. On behalf of the Holy Synod and on his behalf Patriarch Cyril sends a telegram of condolence to the Vatican with the following text: 'Please accept my sincere sorrow and that of the Holy Synod of Bulgarian Orthodox Church for the blessed decease of His Holiness Pope John XXIII, zealous in the godpleasing deeds for all Christian Unity, for world peace and goodwill between people'. On 11th June the same year a telegram is sent from the Vatican to thank Patriarch Cyril signed by Cardinal Aloisi Masella.[7]

Cardinal Augustin Bea duly informs the Holy Synod of Bulgarian Orthodox Church for the election of Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, the archbishop of Milan, for Pope under the name of Paul VI.[8] On the occasion of electing His Holiness Pope Paul VI, the First Hierarch of Bulgarian Orthodox Church sends greetings, given by Bishop Parthenius with a letter written on 13th June 1963, the greetings are brought to the knowledge of the Pope. Paul VI delivers his thankfulness and his feelings of spiritual love and deep respect to the Old Cyril through Cardinal Bea.[9]

In his first speech in public on 22nd June 1963 the newly elected Pope expresses his intention to continue with all powers the great deed

[6] The deed of Pope John XXIII. Letter of Archimandrite Methodius from 2nd September 1963, addressed to Patriarch Cyril - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 917, fol. 9.
[7] Sessions of the Holy Synod from June 1963 - CPRO, f. 549, inv. 3, f. u. 9, fol. 101.
[8] The letter of Cardinal Augustin Bea is from 25th July 1963, addressed to the Holy Synod of Bulgarian Orthodox Church - CPRO, f. 1318, inv. 1, f. u. 2929, fol. 1-2.
[9] Letter of Cardinal August Bea from 8th August 1963 (prot. No A 800/63), addressed to Patriarch Cyril, Metropolitan of Sofia amd Patriarch of All Bulgaria - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2486, fol. 27.

began with so many hopes and with the lucky protection of Pope John XXIII, i.e. realization of the words of Christ: 'all to be one: as You, Father, are in me and I am in You, thus they to be in Us one…' (John. 17.21). Paul VI declares that the Second Session of the Second Vatican Council will be opened on 29th September 1963.

The First Session of the Council shows that the position of the observing delegates is different from that one of the ordinary audience. Attending all common gatherings of the Council, they have the chance to express their point of views over the discussed topics at the meetings organized each week with the members of the Secretariat. They have the required freedom to meet the Council Fathers individually and in groups.[10]

After the end of the First Session of the Second Vatican Council Krum Hristov, Bulgarian minister plenipotentiary in Rome, makes a similar report, where he exposes his impressions from the Council.

He thinks that the Council is slow, marked with a lot of disputes during the discussion of the plans. His observations are that in the Roman Catholic Church exists deep disagreement concerning the preparation, the organization, the internal order of the Council, the relations between Roman Curia and bishops, main issues from theological and doctrine character. The international environment of that time also influences the work of the Council. Its main purpose is that Roman Catholic Church should ove with the times, consider the new realityand open for the new problems.

The opposing groups of the Council are conservative and progressive but some specialists define them as 'canonics'– Council Fathers, who keep strictly to canons and traditions of Roman Church, and the group of 'pastors' – members of the Council who comply with the mood and needs of their congregation.

Cardinal Ottaviani is presented as 'one of the most reactionary and narrow-minded catholic dignitaries' with influence on the circles of Roman Catholic Church and on Italian politics and Cardinal Amleto Chikoniani, a state secretary in the Vatican is presented as 'a closely connected with the USA'.[11]

The speaches of the Pope during the opening of the Council and before the representatives of diplomatic missions in Rome make a big impression. In them John XXIII determines preservation of peace and

[10] Letter (No A 642/63) from 9th July 1963, signed by Cardinal Angelo Bea and Willebrands, addressed to Patriarch Cyril - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2486, fol. 10.

[11] Report from 2nd January 1963 of Krum Hristov, minister plenipotentiary in Rome, regarding the First Session of the Second Vatican Council, directed to Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs - CPRO, f. 165, inv.10, f. u. 755a, fol. 1-4.

prevention of war as the most important tasks in front of the people and governments. He decisively declares against colonialism. All of that influences the work of the Council, too.

Interesting is the attitude of the Council Fathers to socialist coutries and the behaviour of the delegations from those countries. Organizers of the Council take the initiative not to make attacks against the socialist regime, as well as ideological attacks against materialism. Nevertheless an attempt is made for discussing the issue for the position of the Church in the socialist countries, but it is diverted by the retort of a Czechoslovac bishop who declares that 'the best which the Council could do in that case is not to raise that quesion'. The line recommended by the Pope is adopted i.e. rejection of Pope Pius XII's policy, tolerance, search of contacts and dialogue with the communist countries. Pope John XXIII gives a personal example in that relation with his meeting with the members of the delegation from socialist countries and talking with them.

According to Krum Hristov, the diplomats from Eastern Europe who communicate continuously with the Council Fathers from their countries express satisfaction from the attitude of the Pope and the behavior of the members of their delegations and that gives positive results as a whole. Bishops from Hungary hold successful business meetings with the Pope and the other Vatican dignitaries and introduce them to the 'true status' of Roman Catholic Church in Hungary.

Czechoslovac diplomats share that the Pope does not support the exclusion from the church, imposed by Pope Pius XII on the Czechoslovac catholics and John XXIII does not approve of the act of the former Primate Cardinal Beran, who refused to be sworn in according to the new constitution of the country and for that reason he was removed from the position of a Primate of the Roman Catholic Church in Czechosklovakia.

In front of the Polish deligates Pope Roncalli expresses his opinion in favour of recognizing the western borders of Poland and accepts the member of the state council in Poland Y. Zavievski. The Pope is interested in the situation in Poland and in other socialist countries, amongst which is Bulgaria – specifically about the status of the catholic temple in Varna. He shows his satisfaction when he finds out that the temple is well preserved.

Polish Cardinal Vishinski expresses mistrust to the new power in Poland and shows a critical attitude to it. He has relations with the conservative circles in Vatican and is very surprised from the spirit of the Council.

The Second Vatican Council finds the biggest response in Italy. Suggestions arise that it will influence the political life in the country by stabilizing the left centre.

The clear positions of the Pope on a number of international problems and to the socialist countries provoke irritations in the circles of the Italian right-wing group. In most of them Italian bishops have more conservative positions. During the First Session of the Council the Pope is supported by the Archbishop of Milan, Cardinal Montini, the Patriarch of Venice Urbani, Cardianal Bea, and Bishop Johannes Willebrands etc. As a chairman of the Commitee for Christian Unity, Cardinal Bea takes the most work of organizing the Council. The Bulgarian diplomat is informed by doctors that the Pope has cancer and has not more than ten months to live.

The conclusion of Krum Hristov for the Fisrt Session of the Council is that in the Roman Catholic Church there is a process of reevaluation of the essential issues of church-disciplinary and dogmatic character, of questions with public and social character, concerning the believers and atheists, as well as the place of the church in the contemporary world. Main initiator for that new attitude of the Church to the world problems is Pope Roncalli. He is the motor of the church renewal, but everybody is aware that his main purpose is to strengthen the Church positions in the society and the world. New means and ways are looked for so that the Roman Church could be closer to people's problems. According to Bulgarian diplomats the process of renewal in Roman Catholic Church is irreversible and the work of the Second Vatican Council will have a positive role not only in Church life but also in the development of international relations.[12]

Bulgarian Orthodox Church is invited to take part in the Second Session of the Council. Cardinal Augistin Bea invites on behalf of Pope Paul VI the Bulgarian Church to send observers to the Council. In that connection at the beginning of September 1963 in Sofia Catholic Prelate Father Willebrands is expected, who is a member of the Secritariat for Christian Unity at the Second Vatican Council.[13]

Initially, synodal bishops decided to send as an observer at the Council His High Reverence Archimandrite Reader Dr. Seraphim, a lecturer at Theological Academy, in condition that he is the only observer and will not deliver speeches on his behalf or on behalf of the Holy Synod.

[12] Report from 2nd January 1963 of Krum Hristov, minister plenipotentiary in Rome, regarding the First Session of the Second Vatican Council, addressed to Ivan Bashev, Minister of Foreign Affairs - CPRO, f. 165, inv.10, f. u. 755a, fol. 9-16.

[13] Session of the Holy Synod not in full strength from 3rd September 1963, protocol No 33 - CPRO, f. 549, inv.3, f. u. 10, fol. 521-522.

It is suggested that steps should be taken for issuing a passport and a visa for Archimandrite Seraphim.[14]

By his invitation the Pope expresses his hope that the presence of observers will contribute to strengthening the understanding and respect between those who are given a name by Christ and are spiritually united in the Eucharist.

Due to a new decision of the Holy Synod, Bulgarian Orthodox Church does not send Archimandrite Seraphim to the Second Session of the Council. Probably it is estimated that he is not suitable to represent our church as he is thought to be conservative and not diplomatic for such a mission in Rome. Though the members of the Synod are very contented from the report of the observer delegates of the Russian Orthodox Church, who attended the Fisrt Session. The content is reported following the order of His Holiness Patriarch Alexy of Moscow and All Russia.[15]

During the sessions of the Second Vatican Council the common character of Christian Church is cleary underlined. 'Church has no borders, racial or cultural differences between people and continents because their deeds must aim at unity with Christ. The differences in the historical development are no hinder for the Unity of the Church on the contrary they enrich it with their diverse contribution'.

At the invitation of Pope John XXIII 47 representatives from other Christian churches and religious communities attend the First Session. From the local orthodox churches only the Russian Church sends its observers.

For the Second Session of the Council the newly elected Pope Paul VI declares: 'We decided to invite again observers of the separated from Apostle Metropolis Christians and even to increase their numbers'.

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[14] Session of the Holy Synod in full strength from 4th July 1963, protocol No 9 - CPRO, f. 549, inv.3, f. u. 9, fol. 271-272. Archimandrate Seraphim (Stoyan Dimitrov Alexiev) was born on 25th February 1912 in the village of Gorno Brodi, Sersko, Macedonia. In 1932 he graduates Sofia Theological Seminary and in 1937 Old-Catholic Theological Faculty in Bern, Switzerland where he receives a doctoral degree. For the period 15th September 1939 – 31st December 1940 he is a teacher of Plovdiv Theological Seminary. The next year he is appointed a protosingel at Sliven bishop's residence. On 1st January 1945 until the end of December 1960 he is a head of the Education Department of the Holy Synod. In 1961 he is appointed a senior lecturer at the Department of dogmatic and moral theology at Theological Academy. On 6th November 1962 he is appointed a reader in ordinary. He reads lectures on dogmatic theology and history and analysis of heterodox religions and the sects in Bulgaria. Retired on 26th March 1969 - see on him Nikolai 1978, 174-175.

[15] The letter has no signature but it is most likely that it belongs to the Bishop of Levkia Parthenius - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2486, fol. 21.

Indeed, 61 observers from 20 different Christian churches and religious communities attend the opening of the Second Session. Besides the Russian Orthodox Church which sends two observers (Archpriests Vitaliy Borovey and Yakov Ilich), observers from the Patriarchate of Alexandria participate there, also observers from other orthodox churches are expected because at the meeting of the local orthodox churches on the island Rhodes (24-28 September 1963) it was settled that the separate Orthodox Autocephalous Churches were to take a decision alone for sending observers to the Vatican Council.

On 17th October 1963 Pope Paul VI receives an audience of 66 observers attending the Council from the other Christian religions (Orthodox, Protestants and Aglicans) in his private library in Vatican and in front of them he delivers a speech.

The Pope is accompanied by the chairman of the Secratariat on the unity of Christians – Cardianal Augustin Bea. While talking about the Unity of the Church, the Pope says: 'As you Dear Sirs, brothers in Christ, we do not expect unusual or immediate results. The fruits, we hope for, must ripe for a long time with the help of science and prayer. Uncertain or improvised rapprochement would slow down our approach to unification.'

The Pope addresses those words to the observers after the introduction of Cardinal Bea and Professor K.E. Skidsguard from the University of Copenhagen, a representative of the world Lutheran society.

'We – the Pope declares – are like a guardian, whom Isai referred to. We try to see in the dark night the forerunners of the shining daybreak i.e. the sign of the true progress in the dialogue, the step forward to raproachement between those who feed on the same Gospel and can hear in the depth of their souls the same epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians. 'God is one, and the faith is one, and baptism is one, and one God and Father of all, who is above all'. (Eph. 4.5-6).

The Pope expresses his gratitude to the observers that they accepted the invitation of the Roman Catholic Church to attend the Council. He says that he wanted to accept them in his library where he does private audiences and to speak with them 'directly and friendly'. 'Be sure in our respect, in our recognition, in our desire to communicate with You in the name of our God with the best attitudes. Our opinion does not hide in itself any ambush, it does not hide the difficulties to the full agreement, it does not fear of the delicacy of the discussion, nor of the patience following the expectation. The good of faith and love are the merits which we give to your presence here'.[16]

[16] Document is entitiled 'For the observers of the Second Vatican Council' - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2510, fol. 11-12.

During the work of the Second Session of the Council the conversations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate continue. On 11th October 1963 the delegate of Ecumenical Patriarch George Hollenbach and his wife arrive by a plane from Belgrade to Sofia. The representatives of the Bulgarian Church are not informed beforehand and for that reason the Hollenbachs stay in hotel Balkan at first.

The Holy Synod appoints Archimandrite Gorazd to accompany them everywhere during their stay in our country. He accommodates them in hotel Bulgaria where the rooms are occupied, because at the same time there is a congress of historians, but for them an exception is made and they are given a decent room, which saves the Holy Synod a lot of money because the price of the apartment in hotel Balkan is 15 leva a night.

Before his arrival in Sofia, Hollenbach stays for 15 days in Rome as a delegate of the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras where he meets representatives of the Roman Catholic Church. Because Pope Paul VI is busy he appoints him an audience at the end of October, but the programme of Hollenbach does not allow him to stay to the end of the month because he has to visit Athens, Alexandria, Damascus and Jerusalem.

His Holiness the Pope authorizes the Cardinal of Vienna, Koning to negotiate with Hollenbach. They both meet a couple of times in Rome and the conversations are led according to the requirements of the Ecumenical Patriarch. It is discussed what the protocol foresees in case of a visit of His Holiness Patriarch Athenagoras in the Vatican. It is cleared out that the issue concerns the 'Protocol' service at the Holy Synod and a standpoint is taken there. The matter about the privilages in the Eastern Church is discussed in case it sends 'delegates-observers' to the Second Vatican Council. It is decided that the Ecumenical Patriarchate cannot be given a special priority because the places in Basilica cannot be reorganized, the Russian Church cannot be offended either as it is the first Church to send observers to the Council. They also discuss the sending of permanent representatives of the Vatican to the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Rome. The standpoint of some circles in the Vatican is that the representatives should be accredited to the Secretariat of the Holy See and respectively to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. That is reported to Patriarch Athegonaras but he prefers the representatives to be accredited to the first hierarchs of both Christian Churches.

The forthcoming visit of Cardinal Koning and Rudolf Graber in Regensburg is announced as well as the visit of the representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other heads of local orthodox churches. Also information is shared about a movement for independence which appeared in the Catholic Church of Germany, Holland, Belgium and Austia. The tendency

is to the leadership of the Pope to be recognised but to decrease the influence of the Roman Curia on the national churches because they are getting under Italian influence. Archbishop Gorazd has similar details for other important persons and expressed thoughts which he had no chance to systematize.[17]

Hollenbach holds a meeting with Rudolf Graber, the bishop of Regensburg. German Catholic bishops express discontent from priest Willebrands and suggest that Bishop Graber should become an expert and adviser on eastern issues. During his conversation with him Hollenbach finds out his deep understanding of the contemporary problems of the church and his good will to the Eastern Church. Besides Graber is an author of a scientific study on Patriarch Photios. The conclusion is that Cardinal Koning and Bishop Graber have one purpose and synergies. The same line of understanding is supported by Pierre Laurentius Klein, Dr. Johanes M. Hyok, abbot of Sheyirn, Bavaria, Benedictine, adviser of Graber, Dr Auegar Albrecht, Benedictine, permanent representative of the organization Una Sancta in Rome. He makes easier contacts with the members of the Vatican Council and the Secretariat; Priest Willebrands, secretary of Secretariat for helping Christian Unity, Priest Pierre Dupre, assistant of Willebrands, 'with better positions toward Eastern church from Willebrands himself'.

Learning that Hollenbach is in Rome, Maxim IV, the Uniat Patriarch of Antioch based in Damascus, wanted to meet him, but Hollenbach refuses. Then the 86-year-old patriarch writes to him the following memorable words: 'You do not respect me as a patriarch of Unia but please visit me as an old man'.

Hollenbach meets him, combining his visit to Cardinal Koning with that of respect to the Uniat Patriarch of Antioch. On the order of Patriarch Maxim IV Hollenbach is met by Archimandrite Oreste Kerame, Referendar at the Patriarch and a head of the Unia sector in Cairo.

Hollenbach accuses the Uniats of big fanatism. Patriarch Maxim thinks that regarding the Protestants Apostole Paul's words must be applied: 'Omnia Omnibus'. The question about the order of the church heads in case of future union is also raised. According to Hollenbach the first of honour has to take the Roman throne the next the one in Constantinople.[18]

Looked at from a clear ecumenical aspect and from the point of view of the unity of the Church the most important act of the Second

[17] Report note from 18th October 1963, signed by Gorazd and addressed to His Holiness Patriarch Cyril - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2514, fol. 2.

[18] To the report for Georgie Hollenbach from 18th October 1963, addressed to Patriarch Cyril. The report is signed by Archimandrite Gorazd and has the date of 10th October 1963 - CPRO, f. 1318k, inv. 1, f. u. 2514, fol. 1.

Vatican Council is the anathema cancellation between the Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Roman Catholic Church, which proves the favourable atmosphere of the Second Vatican Council, which turns to be a corrective for the whole Church of Christ. The most important result is that the act allows conditions for a dialogue between the two churches. Actually this is a new beginning which is a precondition for bigger trust in the name of the love in Christ.

The cancellaton of the anathema on the side of Church of Contantinople is its inner decision and right, because it concerns only it and in no way concerns the other Orthodox Autocephalous Churches.

The mistrust accumulated during the centuries between the two churches is significant and the policy of proselytism, carried out by the Roman Catholic Church, is a serious hindrance to a normal dialogue with it. Thus the unions are a serious reason for the mistrust and hostility by the Orthodox Church. I am deeply convinced that in order to go together to the true rapproachement, the Eastern and Western Churches must restore their trust to each other in the spirit of Christian Love, to condemn the proselytism in all of its forms and the unions to be abolished. It would be good if union churches are initially put under double jurisdiction i.e. under the control of Mother Church– Orthodox and Roman Catholic. Thus the trust between the two churches would improve in order to be realized a century-old Christian striving expressed in a categorical manner in the highpriest prayer of Jesus Chist, where he prays '...they all may be one; as thou, Father, are in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us' (John. 17:21).

In an article for a French Catholic theological magazine, published in Paris, Patriarch Cyril admits that the Second Vatican Council and its decisions correspond to the spirit of the time and the Church has no right not to consider the realities and to be outside the time. The bold decisions which Council Fathers take are an example for all churches.[19]

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[19] Cyril 1965, 1-2.

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